Charles William Coulter and wife Donna Lee Coulter v. Richard Anthony Hendricks ( 1995 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
CHARLES WILLIAM COULTER and
wife DONNA LEE COULTER,
)
)
)
FILED
C/A NO. 03A01-9505-CH-00150
HAMILTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Plaintiffs-Appellants,)
) October 3, 1995
)
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
v. ) HONORABLE HOWELL N. PEOPLES, C ourt Clerk
Appellate
) CHANCELLOR
)
)
RICHARD ANTHONY HENDRICKS, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
CONCURRING OPINION
I concur wholeheartedly in the majority opinion. I
write separately to address the plaintiffs' contention that their
sister married Richard Anthony Hendricks "in jest." Even
assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the common law
requirement of mutual intent to be bound is still a requirement
for a valid marriage in Tennessee, an allegation that the parties
married in jest is conclusory in nature. Furthermore, it is not
supported in the complaint by factual allegations and hence not
conceded to be true by the defendant's motion to dismiss. Such a
pleading admits well-pled facts, not conclusions of the pleader.
See Swallows v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 543 S.W.2d 581, 583
(Tenn. 1976); Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tenn. App.
1992). Therefore, the conclusory allegation of a marriage in
jest does not render the trial court's action of dismissal
inappropriate. The well-pled facts, liberally construed in favor
of the plaintiffs, do not make out a cause of action.
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______________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
2