Miceli v. Thompson ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FILED
ELEANOR MICELI, )
) August 17, 1999
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Sumner Chancery No. 97C-229
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
v. ) Appellate Court Clerk
) Appeal No. 01A01-9807-CH-00400
DEBORAH KAY THOMPSON, )
CHARLES R BURNETT, and wife )
MEREDYTH G. BURNETT, )
)
Defendants/Appellees. )
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF SUMNER COUNTY
AT GALLATIN, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE TOM E. GRAY, CHANCELLOR
For the Plaintiff/Appellant: For the Defendants/Appellees:
Vance Cramb, Jr. William Timothy Hill
Nashville, Tennessee Nashville, Tennessee
AFFIRMED
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J.
CONCURS:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S.
ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.
OPINION
This case involves the enforcement of a judgment lien. The trial court held that the judgment
lien had expired because the judgment creditor failed to enforce the lien within the three year period
set out in Tennessee Code Annotated § 25-5-105. We affirm.
On March 4, 1994, Plaintiff/Appellant Eleanor Miceli (“Miceli”) obtained a judgment against
Defendant/Appellee Deborah Kay Thompson (“Thompson”) in the Chancery Court of Davidson
County, Tennessee, in the amount of $18,000.1 On March 23, 1995, an order was entered allowing
the judgment to be paid by installments. At the time of the judgment, Thompson and her husband
Thomas Thompson owned real property located at 1096 Jenkins Lane, Hendersonville, Tennessee,
(“the Property”) as tenants by the entirety. On March 8, 1996, Deborah Kay Thompson and Thomas
Thompson were divorced.
After the Thompsons were divorced, on March 27, 1996, Miceli recorded a judgment lien
against the Property. Deborah Kay Thompson and Thomas Thompson subsequently conveyed their
interest in the Property to Defendants/Appellees Charles and Meredyth Burnett (“the Burnetts”) by
warranty deed on May 9, 1996.
Approximately one year later, on May 7, 1997, Thompson filed another motion to pay the
judgment by installments. On May 8, 1997, the trial court stayed garnishment for sixty days from
the date of its order. On June 23, 1997, Miceli attempted to execute on Thompson’s personal
property in order to satisfy the judgment. The execution/levy was returned “Nulla Bona” on July
1, 1997. On July 31, 1997, Miceli filed a complaint to enforce the judgment lien. The Burnetts filed
an answer and a cross-claim against Deborah Kay Thompson and a third party complaint against
Thomas Thompson for breach of warranty in the conveyance of the Property. Miceli filed a motion
for default judgment against Deborah Kay Thompson; the motion was granted on March 18, 1998.
The Burnetts filed a motion for summary judgment. In the motion, the Burnetts argued that
the judgment lien had expired because Miceli failed to execute the lien within the three-year period
set out by Tennessee Code Annotated § 25-5-105. The Burnetts noted that the judgment was entered
on March 4, 1994, and the complaint seeking to enforce the judgment lien was filed on July 31,
1997, well beyond the statutory period. In response, Miceli argued that the statutory period should
be extended because the trial court granted several motions to stay execution on Thompson’s
1
Deborah Kay Thompson was formerly known as Deborah Kay Miceli.
personal property. Miceli noted that Tennessee Code Annotated § 26-3-101 requires that the
plaintiff first execute on goods and chattels of the defendant, and if the amount recovered is
insufficient to pay the debt, plaintiff may then execute on the defendant’s real property. Miceli
argued that the trial court stayed execution on personal property, which prevented Miceli from
executing on the real property. Miceli also noted that a judgment lien attaches to after-acquired
property of the debtor, and asserted that Thompson in effect acquired a “new” interest in the Property
when the divorce decree was entered on March 12, 1996.
The trial court granted the Burnetts’ motion for summary judgment:
[T]hat a judgment for which Eleanor Miceli seeks enforcement in this suit
was rendered on March 4, 1994. The abstract of judgment obtained by Miceli was
recorded on March 27, 1996 . . . . Thomas E. Thompson, et ux, Deborah Kay
Thompson executed and conveyed certain real property in Sumner County to Charles
R. Burnett et ux, Meredyth Burnett by Warranty Deed . . . on May 9, 1996. This
action to enforce the judgment lien as to real property was commenced on July 31,
1997.
T.C.A. 25-5-105 states that a lien given by that chapter will be lost, unless an
execution is taken out within three (3) years commencing with the date of entry of
the judgment. Levy on personal property was issued on June 23, 1997. Execution
was taken out more than three years after the rendition of the judgment. This action
was commenced after the time period as prescribed by T.C.A. 25-5-104 and T.C.A.
25-5-105 and the lien expired.
Plaintiff asserts that the injunctive powers granted pursuant to T.C.A. 26-2-
216 are equal in effect to an extension of time for execution for other adverse
proceedings provided in T.C.A. 25-5-106. The injunctive powers and extension of
time for execution for other adverse proceedings was a provision which was deleted
by the legislature in 1986. T.C.A. 25-5-106 provides that the time for sale in section
25-5-105 shall commence upon the final determination of such case if an appeal is
taken. T.C.A. 25-5-106 as amended in 1986 does not provide for extension of time
on injunctions or other adverse proceedings as previously enacted.
Plaintiff next submits that the judgment lien attached to after acquired interest
in land and continued for the period of three years from the time that title was
acquired by judgment debtor. While the Debtors divorce decree may have divided
[sic] certain actions to take place with respect to title, the deed as filed by the parties
and before this Court . . . does not reflect any conveyance to a judgment debtor, but
rather was executed by both Thomas E. Thompson and Deborah Kay Thompson to
present owners and defendants, Charles R. Burnett and wife, Meredyth G. Burnett.
The doctrine of after acquired property does not apply so as to defeat defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The plaintiff submitted several documents in asserting admissions and
waivers. These items are presented to the Court absent an affidavit and are not a part
of certified documents from the Court. The defendants make objection that these
items are not properly filed under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court does not consider these items, but nonetheless, these items are considered as
relevant nor material facts.
The Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this
cause, and Charles R. Burnett and wife, Meredyth G. Burnett are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
From this order, Miceli now appeals.
2
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. In this case, there are no disputed facts, only isses of law which arise
from the undisputed facts. Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of
correctness regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622.
Therefore, our review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before
this Court. Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).
Tennessee Code Annotated § 25-5-105 states that execution on a judgment lien must
commence within three years from the date the judgment was entered, or the lien will be lost. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 25-5-105 (Supp. 1998). Tennessee Code Annotated § 26-3-101 requires execution on
personal property before real property:
Executions shall be levied on the goods and chattels of the defendant, in the first
instance, if any there be; but if, to the best of the officer’s knowledge, there be no
such goods and chattels, or not sufficient to answer the plaintiff’s demands, the same
shall be executed upon the lands and tenements.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-3-101 (1980).
In this case, the underlying judgment was rendered on March 4, 1994. On July 31, 1997,
Miceli filed a complaint to enforce the judgment lien. Miceli argues that the three year period for
the enforcement of the judgment lien should be extended because the trial court stayed execution on
Thompson’s personal property, and precluding execution on the real property.
In Weaver v. Hamrick, 907 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1995), the Tennessee Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the three year period for the enforcement of a judgment lien in
Tennessee Code Annotated § 25-5-105 was tolled during an automatic stay in bankruptcy, which
precluded the enforcement of the lien. The Weaver Court noted that Tennessee Code Annotated §
25-5-106 tolls the statute only during the appeal of the underlying judgment. Weaver, 907 S.W.2d
at 390. The Court recognized that Section 25-5-106 once provided for the continuation of the lien
“[i]f . . . prevented by injunction, writ of error, or other adverse proceeding in court . . . .” Id. at 390
(citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-106 (1980)). However, the statute was amended to delete this
language. The Weaver Court noted “that the Tennessee legislature has narrowed the situations in
which the life of the lien may be extended.” Id. Thus, it held that the three year period was not
tolled by the automatic stay in bankruptcy. Id. at 390-91.
3
The reasoning in Weaver must control in this case. The statutory language which would
support Miceli’s argument was specifically deleted by amendment of the statute. We must conclude
that the three year period to enforce the judgment lien was not tolled by the trial court’s stays of
execution in this case. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-106 (Supp. 1998).
Miceli also contends on appeal that the three year period should commence on the date the
Thompsons’ divorce decree was entered. Miceli argues that the Property was “after-acquired”
property because it was “revested,” pursuant to the language of the divorce decree, as a tenancy in
common. The trial court rejected this argument:
While the Debtors divorce decree may have divided [sic] certain actions to take place
with respect to title, the deed . . . does not reflect any conveyance to a judgment
debtor, but rather was executed by both Thomas E. Thompson and Deborah Kay
Thompson to present owners and defendants, Charles R. Burnett and wife, Meredyth
G. Burnett. The doctrine of after acquired property does not apply . . . .
(emphasis added). We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. This issue is without merit.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the Appellant, for which
execution may issue, if necessary.
HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J.
CONCUR:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P. J., W.S.
ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.
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