State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Brian Howard ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    AT KNOXVILLE
    FILED
    January 31, 2000
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    E1999-02558-COA-R3-CV
    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE        )    BLOUNT COUNTY
    INSURANCE COMPANY                   )    03A01-9905-CV-00179
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee             )
    )
    )
    v.                                  )    HON. W. DALE YOUNG,
    )    JUDGE
    )
    BRIAN HOWARD, BARBARA CRESSE,       )
    AND CHARLES TOLFA, PERSONAL         )
    REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF     )
    SHEILA K. TOLFA, THE ESTATE OF      )
    BRIDGETT WINGO, AND TERRY MORTON    )
    )
    Defendants-Appellants          )    VACATED AND REMANDED
    LOUIS A. MCELROY, II AND TOBY R. CARPENTER OF KNOXVILLE FOR
    APPELLANT BARBARA CRESSE
    CHARLES DUNGAN OF MARYVILLE FOR APPELLANT TERRY MORTON
    PAUL E. DUNN AND STEVE ERDELY, IV OF KNOXVILLE FOR APPELLEE
    O P I N I O N
    Goddard, P.J.
    This is an appeal from the Circuit Court’s grant of
    summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile
    Insurance Company (hereinafter “State Farm”).    Barbara Cresse,
    Defendant-Appellant, raises the following issue, which we
    restate:
    Whether the trial court erred by granting summary
    judgment on the grounds that Brian Howard was a
    resident of Sheila Tolfa’s household at the time of the
    automobile accident?
    On June 18, 1994, Brian Howard was driving Sheila
    Tolfa’s 1993 Chevrolet Camaro when an accident occurred.      Sheila
    Tolfa and her daughter, Bridgett Wingo, died from their injuries
    sustained in the accident.    At the time of the accident, Brian
    Howard had an insurance policy in effect with State Farm.
    A statement by Brian Howard was taken on November 3,
    1994.   Mr. Howard stated that he stayed at Mrs. Tolfa’s apartment
    five or six nights a week immediately prior to the accident.       Mr.
    Howard stated that he spent the majority of his spare time at
    Mrs. Tolfa’s apartment for three and a half months prior to the
    accident.    He did not pay any rent, but the telephone bill was in
    his name and he paid the bill.    Mr. Howard stated that Mrs. Tolfa
    usually paid the utility bill, but he had given Mrs. Tolfa money
    for the two months prior to the accident for the utility bill.
    He paid for groceries occasionally and for gas and oil changes
    for Mrs. Tolfa’s car.    Mr. Howard possessed a key to Mrs. Tolfa’s
    apartment and a key to her automobile.    Some of Mr. Howard’s
    clothes and personal care items were kept at Mrs. Tolfa’s
    apartment.    The remainder of his possessions were kept at his
    mother’s house.
    On August 13, 1997, Mr. Howard testified at his
    deposition.    He affirmed his prior recorded statement.   Mr.
    Howard testified that his bedroom furniture, weapons, dog and
    snake remained at his mother’s house.    He did not pay rent or any
    other expenses at his mother’s house.    He received most of his
    mail at his mother’s house, except for Mrs. Tolfa’s telephone
    bill.   The telephone bill, which was registered in Mr. Howard’s
    name, was sent to Mrs. Tolfa’s apartment.    Mr. Howard testified
    that he and Mrs. Tolfa both drove Mrs. Tolfa’s automobile.       He
    occasionally drove her car alone for oil changes and other
    errands.    Mr. Howard testified that he would ask for Mrs. Tolfa’s
    permission to drive her car.
    Barbara Cresse, Mrs. Tolfa’s mother, testified at her
    deposition regarding the living arrangements of Mr. Howard and
    Mrs. Tolfa.    Mrs. Cresse testified that Mrs. Tolfa lived in a
    two-bedroom apartment with her daughter, Bridgett Wingo.      The
    apartment was leased in Mrs. Tolfa’s name for a year.
    Approximately one month prior to the accident, Mrs. Tolfa made
    statements which led Mrs. Cresse to believe that Mr. Howard was
    spending the weekends at Mrs. Tolfa’s apartment.    Mrs. Cresse
    testified that she did not think Mr. Howard spent any week nights
    at Mrs. Tolfa’s apartment.    After the accident, Mrs. Cresse
    removed all items from Mrs. Tolfa’s apartment.    Mrs. Cresse found
    some of Mr. Howard’s clothes in Mrs. Tolfa’s apartment.
    Lucy Bowser, Mr. Howard’s mother, testified by
    deposition that Mr. Howard had a bedroom and a storage room at
    her home.    According to Mrs. Bowser, Mr. Howard performed
    property maintenance and lawn care for her instead of paying
    rent.
    On February 8, 1995, State Farm filed a complaint for
    declaratory relief asserting that Brian Howard was precluded from
    coverage for the accident.    Pursuant to the insurance contract,
    Brian Howard’s coverage extended to “non-owned” cars.    The
    pertinent definition of a non-owned car is “a car not owned,
    registered or leased by . . . any other person residing in the
    same household as you.”    State Farm contended that Brian Howard
    and Sheila Tolfa resided in the same household at the time of the
    accident.    On December 3, 1998, State Farm filed a motion for
    3
    summary judgment.    The Circuit Court found that Mr. Howard was a
    resident of Mrs. Tolfa’s household and granted State Farm’s
    motion for summary judgment.    Mrs. Cresse and Terry Morton
    pursued this appeal.
    Our standard of review for a trial court’s action on a
    summary judgment motion is de novo without a presumption of
    correctness because our inquiry is purely a question of law.
    Carvell v. Bottoms, 
    900 S.W.2d 23
    , 26 (Tenn. 1995).      An
    evaluation of a summary judgment motion must address these
    questions: “(1) whether a factual dispute exists; (2) whether the
    disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3)
    whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial."
    Byrd v. Hall, 
    847 S.W.2d 208
    , 214 (Tenn. 1993).      The Tennessee
    Supreme Court stated that the “test for a ‘genuine issue’ is
    whether a reasonable jury could legitimately resolve the fact in
    favor of one side or the other.”       
    Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215
    .   In a
    motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in a
    light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable
    inferences must be made in the nonmoving party’s favor.       
    Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210
    .    Summary judgment is appropriate if both the
    facts and conclusions to be drawn from the facts permit a
    reasonable person to reach only one conclusion.       See Guiliano v.
    Cleo, Inc., 
    995 S.W.2d 88
    , 94 (Tenn. 1999).
    The Appellants claim the Circuit Court erred in
    granting summary judgment because there are material facts in
    dispute.   The material facts disputed by the Appellants are the
    frequency with which Brian Howard stayed at Sheila Tolfa’s
    apartment and whether the relationship was “headed toward
    marriage.”    Both of these facts are important elements in
    determining whether Mr. Howard was a resident of the same
    4
    household as Sheila Tolfa.   Additionally, the Appellants dispute
    the conclusion that Mr. Howard was a resident of Sheila Tolfa’s
    household.   Reviewing the evidence in the record, we find the
    record does not establish that only one conclusion can be drawn
    from the facts adduced.   Because there are material disputed
    facts which create a genuine issue for trial, the trial court
    inappropriately granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm.
    For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Circuit
    Court is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.   Costs of appeal are adjudged
    against State Farm.
    Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
    CONCUR:
    Herschel P. Franks, J.
    D. Michael Swiney, J.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E1999-02558-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Houston M. Goddard

Filed Date: 1/31/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014