84 Lumber Company v. R. Bryan Smith - Concurring ( 2010 )


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  •                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    September 1, 2010 Session
    84 LUMBER COMPANY v. BRYAN SMITH, ET AL.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County
    No. 27548      Jean A. Stanley, Judge
    No. E2010-00292-COA-R3-CV - FILED OCTOBER 28, 2010
    CHARLES D. SUSANO , JR., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    I agree with so much of the majority opinion as affirms the trial court’s judgment against
    Allstate Building System, LLC. I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s decision (1) to reverse
    the judgment in favor of 84 Lumber Company against R. Bryan Smith and (2) to grant summary
    judgment to Mr. Smith.
    While the majority cites relevant authority for its holding that Mr. Smith is not liable on the
    commercial credit application (“the application”) at issue in this case, I cannot get beyond the all-
    capitals language in the application as quoted in the majority opinion. That language, in pertinent
    part, provides as follows:
    I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT . . . I DO UNCONDITIONALLY AND
    IRREVOCABLY PERSONALLY GUARANTEE THIS CREDIT
    ACCOUNT AND PAYMENT OF ANY AND ALL AMOUNTS
    DUE BY THE ABOVE BUSINESS. . . .
    (Capitalization in original.) The majority acknowledges that the “ABOVE BUSINESS” is the
    customer of 84 Lumber, i.e., Allstate. Actually, the language “ABOVE BUSINESS” appears twice
    in the all-capitals language, only a part of which is quoted in this separate opinion. Query, if the
    “ABOVE BUSINESS” is Allstate, who, pray tell, is the “I” who is doing the guaranteeing? Can it
    be anyone other than the person who signed his name under this language?
    Mr. Smith took pen in hand and signed his name below the subject language. It is true that
    he wrote out the word “President” after his signature, but this was obviously done to show his agency
    relationship with the customer – the “ABOVE BUSINESS” – to whom credit was going to be
    granted.
    I do not understand why Mr. Smith’s signature is not effective both to bind the “ABOVE
    BUSINESS” and to bind him – the “I” – “PERSONALLY” on the account. He is assumed by law
    to have read that to which he has signed his name. See Giles v. Allstate Insurance Company, 871
    S.W.2 154, 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). In my judgment, when he signed the application, he had to
    have known that the “I” doing the personal guaranteeing was him.
    I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.
    _______________________________
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2010-00292-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.

Filed Date: 10/28/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014