Grimes v. Grimes ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FILED
May 13, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
FRED GRIMES and ) Appellate Court Clerk
JEANETTE GRIMES WOODW ARD, )
)
Plaintiffs/Appellees, )
) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9809-CH-00483
VS. )
) Maury Chancery
) No. 96-539
DONNIE GRIMES, )
)
Defendant/Appellant. )
APPEALED FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF MAURY COUNTY
AT COLUMBIA, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SENIOR JUDGE
TOM W. MOORE, JR.
MOORE & PEDEN
29 Public Square
P. O. Box 981
Columbia, Tennessee 38402-0981
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees
JERRY C. COLLEY
COLLEY & COLLEY
P. O. Box 1476
Columbia, Tennessee 38402-1476
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
KOCH, J.
COTTRELL, J.
OPINION
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the parties’ agreement to divide
their mother’s estate was supported by consideration. The Chancery Court of Maury
County held that the agreement was enforceable. We affirm.
I.
Wilma Brannon Grimes, a resident of Maury County had three children.
Ms. Grimes owned a farm where she lived in what the parties referred to as the “brick
house.” Her son Donnie also lived on the farm in the “old home place” and raised
cattle and hay in a partnership with his mother.
Ms. Grimes was in her eighties. On May 19, 1992 the three children met
and executed a handwritten agreement on how their mother’s property would be sold
to raise money for her anticipated medical expenses and how the estate would be
divided after her death. Three days later, Ms. Grimes executed her Last Will and
Testament, in which she left $5,000 to her son Fred, $5,000 plus some miscellaneous
personal property to her daughter Jeanette Grimes Woodward, and the balance of her
estate to Donnie.
In 1994 the parties decided to execute a more formal agreement. Fred
Grimes and Jeanette Grimes Woodward had a lawyer prepare the following writing:
AGREEMENT
We the undersigned, being all the children and the
only heirs-at-law of Wilma Brannon Grimes, hereby agree
as follows:
1. Without regard to any will left by our mother,
Wilma Brannon Grimes, we will divide the estate of our
mother according to this agreement.
2. Donnie Grimes shall receive the old home
place, the garden and barn joining it consisting of about
-2-
three (3) acres and the water rights to the spring that now
supplies water to the old home place.
3. Donnie Grimes shall also receive all the
cattle, farm machinery and automobiles owned by our
mother at the time of her death.
4. All the rest of our mother’s estate, whether
real property, personal property or money, shall be
divided equally between us, namely: Fred Grimes,
Jeanette Woodward and Donnie Grimes.
On September 18, 1994 the three children signed the agreement.
Ms. Grimes died in the spring of 1996. Shortly thereafter Donnie Grimes
repudiated the agreement. The other two children sued for a declaratory judgment
and the chancellor upheld the agreement.
II.
Donnie Grimes disputes the validity of the agreement because of a lack
of consideration. It is his contention that he received nothing for this promise to divide
the estate with his brother and sister. We disagree. He received their promise to give
him the old home place along with the water rights and then to divide the estate
equally -- even if their mother changed her will. There is a slight dispute in the record
about what the parties knew when they signed the first agreement in 1991, but it is
clear that they knew in 1994 that Ms. Grimes had a will leaving nearly everything to
Donnie. They also knew that she could change the will or that her needs might
consume most of her estate before her death. In either case, Donnie would get a
substantial benefit from the agreement.
Consideration exists when the promisee does something that he is
under no obligation to do or refrains from doing something which he has a legal right
to do. Brown Oil Co. v. Johnson, 689 S.W.2d 149 (Tenn. 1985). The consideration
does not have to be adequate; it need only be valuable. Townsend v. Neuhardt, 139
Tenn. 695 (1918). A valuable consideration passes when a party makes a promise
-3-
to secure himself against a contingency that may never happen. In Richardson v.
Snipes, 330 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. App. 1959), the court quoted the following from
Williston on Contracts § 112:
“A conditional promise may be sufficient consideration,
and ‘when a man acts in consideration of a conditional
promise, if he gets the promise he gets all that he is
entitled to by his act, and if, as events turn out, the
condition is not satisfied, and the promise calls for no
performance, there is no failure of consideration.’”
330 S.W.2d at 385.
We are satisfied that the contract was supported by valuable
consideration.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause to the
Chancery Court of Maury County. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant.
_________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
_____________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
_____________________________
PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE
-4-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FRED GRIMES and )
JEANETTE GRIMES WOODW ARD, )
)
Plaintiffs/Appellees, ) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9809-CH-00483
)
VS. ) Maury Chancery
) No. 96-539
)
DONNIE GRIMES, ) Affirmed and
) Remanded
Defendant/Appellant. )
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the
Chancery Court of Maury County, briefs and argument of counsel; upon consideration
whereof, this Court is of the opinion that in the decree of the Chancellor there is no
reversible error.
In accordance with the opinion of the Court filed herein, it is, therefore,
ordered and decreed by this Court that the decree is affirmed. The cause is
remanded to the Chancery Court of Maury County for the enforcement of the decree
and for the collection of the costs accrued below.
Costs of this appeal are taxed against Donnie Grimes, Principal, and
Colley and Colley, Surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
______________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
______________________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
______________________________________
PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE