Estate of Key v. Hamilton Co. Nursing ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE March 24, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt
Clerk
IN THE MATTER OF: ) C/A NO. 03A01-9810-CH-00319
THE ESTATE OF CALLIE T. KEY, )
DECEASED. )
)
)
HOWARD WALDEN RODDY, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
)
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
) HAMILTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
v. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
HAMILTON COUNTY NURSING HOME, )
) HONORABLE HOWELL N. PEOPLES,
Defendant-Appellee. ) CHANCELLOR
For Appellant For Appellee
JOHN W. MCCLARTY ARTHUR C. GRISHAM, JR.
Chattanooga, Tennessee Grisham, Knight & Hooper
Chattanooga, Tennessee
O P I N IO N
REVERSED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1
This appeal requires us to decide whether a claim
against an estate was timely filed. Howard Walden Roddy
(“Roddy”), executor of the Estate of Callie T. Key (“the
Estate”), appeals from an order of the trial court allowing the
claim of Hamilton County Nursing Home (“the Nursing Home”). He
raises one issue that presents the following question for our
resolution: Is the Nursing Home’s claim time-barred under the
provisions of T.C.A. §§ 30-2-306 through 30-2-310 (Supp. 1998)?1
I. Facts
Mrs. Key died on November 29, 1996. Prior to her
death, she had lived for a number of years at a facility owned by
the Nursing Home. In fact, shortly before her death, she was
transported from that facility to the hospital on an emergency
basis.
Prior to qualifying as executor, Roddy went to the
nursing facility and asked for Mrs. Key’s final bill. He
testified that the staff “rudely” ignored him. In any event, he
left without securing a bill for services rendered to Mrs. Key.
1
Some of the relevant statutes, T.C.A. §§ 30-2-306 through 30-2-310,
have been amended on several recent occasions. In the instant case, the
provisions, as amended, are applicable, with one exception: because of
differences in the effective dates of the various amendments, the previous
six-month period for filing claims applies, rather than the recently-enacted
four-month provision. Compare T.C.A. § 30-2-306(c) (1984) with T.C.A. § 30-2-
306(c) (Supp. 1998). In all other respects, however, the code provisions, as
amended, are applicable. T.C.A. § 30-2-307 makes reference to “the period
prescribed in § 30-2-306(c);” therefore, for ease of reference, we will refer
to both T.C.A. §§ 30-2-306 and -307 as they are found in the supplement to the
bound code volume. We do so, however, with the understanding that the
applicable time frame is six months, as previously set forth at T.C.A. § 30-2-
306(c)(1984).
2
Roddy qualified to administer Mrs. Key’s estate on July
3, 1997, some seven months after her death. Notice of his
qualification, as required by T.C.A. § 30-2-306(a) (Supp. 1998),
was first published on July 11, 1997. Roddy concedes that he did
not “mail or deliver” a copy of the “published notice” to the
Nursing Home as contemplated by T.C.A. § 30-2-306(e) (Supp.
1998).2
On January 29, 1998, 13 months after Mrs. Key’s death,
an attorney acting on behalf of the Nursing Home called the
office of the probate court in Hamilton County and learned that
Roddy had qualified to administer Mrs. Key’s estate. This was
the Nursing Home’s first knowledge of Roddy’s qualification. On
February 5, 1998, the Nursing Home filed its claim against the
Estate.
Roddy contends that the Nursing Home’s claim is time-
barred because it was not filed within 12 months of Mrs. Key’s
death. The Nursing Home argues its claim was properly filed
pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 30-2-307(a)(1)(A).
2
T . C . A . § 3 0 - 2 - 3 0 6 ( e ) ( S u p p . 1 9 9 8 ) p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s :
I n a d d i t i o n , i t s h a l l b e t h e d u t y o f t h e p e r s o n a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o m a i l o r d e l i v e r b y o t h e r m e a n s a
c o p y o f t h e p u b l i s h e d o r p o s t e d n o t i c e a s d e s c r i b e d i n
s u b s e c t i o n (
c ) t o a l l c r e d i t o r s o f t h e d e c e d e n t o f
w h o m t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s a c t u a l k n o w l e d g e
o r w h o a r e r
e a s o n a b l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e b y t h e p e r s o n a l
r e p r e s e n t a t iv e , a t s u c h c r e d i t o r s ’ l a s t k n o w n
a d d r e s s e s . S u c h n o t i c e s h a l l n o t b e r e q u i r e d w h e r e a
c r e d i t o r h a s a l r e a d y f i l e d a c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e ,
h a s b e e n p a i d o r h a s i s s u e d a r e l e a s e o f a l l c l a i m s
a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e .
3
II. Standard of Review
This non-jury matter is before us for a de novo review
on the record of the proceedings below. Rule 13(d), T.R.A.P.
That record comes to us with a presumption of correctness -- a
presumption that we must honor unless the evidence preponderates
against the trial court’s factual findings. Id. The trial
court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with
no presumption of correctness. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp.,
919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996). Therefore, we will examine the
trial court’s interpretation of the applicable statutes with no
presumption as to the correctness of the trial court’s judgment.
Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998); Myint v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998); Tibbals
Flooring Co. v. Huddleston, 891 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tenn. 1994);
Comdata Network, Inc. v. State Dept. of Revenue, 852 S.W.2d 223,
224 (Tenn. 1993).
We must effectuate the intent of the legislature by
looking to the plain language of a statute. Browder, 975 S.W.2d
at 311; Tibbals Flooring Co., 891 S.W.2d at 198. This we must
do “without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage
beyond its intended scope.” Id. In addition, “we are to assume
that the legislature used each word in the statute purposely, and
that the use of these words conveys some intent and has a meaning
and purpose.” Browder, 975 S.W.2d at 311. If the language of a
legislative enactment is clear, unambiguous, and within the
“legislative competency,” we must “obey it.” Carson Creek
4
Resorts v. Dept. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). It is
not our prerogative to question the wisdom of a legislative
enactment.
III. Trial Court’s Judgment
The trial court held that the Nursing Home received
“actual notice” on January 29, 1998, when its representative
called the probate court and learned, for the first time, that
Mrs. Key’s estate was being administered.3 The trial court
concluded as follows:
Therefore, the [Nursing Home] had sixty days
from January 29, 1998, to file its claim
against the estate. The claim was filed
February 5, 1998, thereby complying with the
provisions of T.C.A. § 30-2-306.4
IV. Analysis
A.
Our initial task is to determine whether the filing of
the Nursing Home’s claim was timely under the provisions of
T.C.A. §§ 30-2-306 and -307 (Supp. 1998). Specifically, we must
3
The Estate contends that the Nursing Home knew of Mrs. Key’s death at
the time of her demise and that this knowledge is tantamount to “actual
notice” under T.C.A. § 30-2-307 (Supp. 1998). We disagree. Knowledge of a
person’s death, standing alone, does not constitute the concept of “actual
notice” under T.C.A. § 30-2-307 (Supp. 1998). See Estate of Jenkins v.
Guyton, 912 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tenn. 1995)(“...while the term ‘actual notice’ in
§ 30-2-307(a)(1) may be something other than an exact copy of the published
Notice to Creditors outlined in § 30-2-306(c), such notice must, at a minimum,
include information regarding the commencement of probate proceedings and the
time period within which claims must be filed with the probate
court.”)(emphasis in original). In the instant case, neither party makes an
issue as to whether the information received in the phone call to the probate
court on January 29, 1998, is sufficient to satisfy the definition of “actual
notice” in Estate of Jenkins.
4
The trial court apparently meant to refer to T.C.A. § 30-2-307.
5
decide, on the facts of this case, whether the relevant statutory
scheme countenances the filing of a claim some 14 months after
the decedent’s death and almost seven months after the first
publication of notice of the executor’s qualification.
The relevant chronology in this case is not disputed:
11/29/96 Date of Mrs. Key’s death
07/11/97 Date of first publication
of notice of
qualification of personal
representative of Mrs.
Key’s estate
09/30/97 60 days “before the date
which is twelve (12)
months from [Mrs. Key’s]
date of death” See
T.C.A. § 36-2-
307(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1998)
11/12/97 60 days “before the
expiration of [six months
from the date of first
publication of notice of
qualification of personal
representative of Mrs.
Key’s estate]” See T.C.A.
§ 36-2-307(a)(1)(A)
(Supp. 1998)
11/29/97 One-year anniversary of
Mrs. Key’s death
01/11/98 Six months from date of
first publication of
notice of qualification
of personal
representative of Mrs.
Key’s estate
01/29/98 Date on which the Nursing
Home’s attorney first
learned of the opening of
Mrs. Key’s estate in
probate court
02/05/98 Date on which the Nursing
home filed claim in
6
probate court against
estate
The trial court held that the Nursing Home’s claim was
timely filed. That holding was based upon the court’s
interpretation of T.C.A. § 30-2-307 (Supp. 1998), which provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
(a)(1) All claims against the estate arising
from a debt of the decedent shall be barred
unless filed within the period prescribed in
the notice published or posted in accordance
with § 30-2-306(c). However:
(A) If a creditor receives actual notice less
than sixty (60) days before the expiration of
the period prescribed in § 30-2-306(c) or
after the expiration of the period prescribed
in § 30-2-306(c) and more than sixty (60)
days before the date which is twelve (12)
months from the decedent’s date of death,
such creditor’s claim shall be barred unless
filed within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt of actual notice; or
(B) If a creditor receives actual notice less
than sixty (60) days before the date which is
twelve (12) months from the decedent’s date
of death or receives no notice, such
creditor’s claim shall be barred unless filed
within twelve (12) months from the decedent’s
date of death.
Our reading of the statute leads us to a conclusion different
from that of the trial court.
The introductory language of subsection (a)(1) of
T.C.A. § 30-2-307 (Supp. 1998) states the well-known general
rule: “[a]ll claims against [an] estate arising from a debt of
the decedent shall be barred unless filed within [six months from
the date of the first publication of notice of the personal
representative’s qualification].” As can be seen from the above
7
chronology, the claim in this case was filed beyond the relevant
six-month period; but this does not end our inquiry, because
subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) of T.C.A. § 30-2-307 (Supp.
1998) address other relevant time periods that impact the filing
of claims in probate proceedings. We must decide if the Nursing
Home’s claim was properly filed under one of these other time
periods.
Subsection (a)(1)(A) sets forth the rules applicable to
claims filed by creditors who are entitled to receive and do
receive the statutory “actual notice,” see T.C.A. § 30-2-307
(Supp. 1998), as that term was interpreted by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in the case of Estate of Jenkins v. Guyton, 912
S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tenn. 1995).
The first predicate for a different time period for
filing a claim is found in the following language of subsection
(a)(1)(A) of the statute:
If a creditor receives actual notice less
than sixty (60) days before the expiration of
[six months from the first notice of the
personal representative’s
qualification]...and more than sixty (60)
days before the date which is twelve (12)
months from the decedent’s date of death,
such creditor’s claim shall be barred unless
filed within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt of actual notice;
Since the Nursing Home received actual notice after, rather than
before, the expiration of six months from the first publication
of notice, it is clear that this provision is not applicable to
this case.
8
There is another exception in subsection (a)(1)(A):
If a creditor receives actual notice...after
the expiration of [six months from the first
notice of the personal representative’s
qualification] and more than sixty (60) days
before the date which is twelve (12) months
from the decedent’s date of death, such
creditor’s claim shall be barred unless filed
within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt of actual notice;
The trial court relied upon this provision as legal authority for
allowing the Nursing Home’s claim. If the Nursing Home’s claim
fits within this provision, it is clear that its claim was timely
filed. However, we find and hold that the trial court
misinterpreted the statutory language at issue and that the
subject claim does not fall within the subject language.
The trial court reached its conclusion based on a part
-- but, significantly, not all -- of the language under
discussion. The trial court concluded that the Nursing Home was
chargeable with “actual notice” as of January 29, 1998, the date
that the claimant’s attorney called the probate court and learned
of the probate of Mrs. Key’s estate. Since the claim was filed
within 60 days of the date of that telephone conversation, the
trial court reasoned that the claim was timely filed; but the
trial court, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the rest of the
pertinent language -- “more than sixty (60) days before the date
which is twelve (12) months from the decedent’s date of death.”
T.C.A. § 30-2-307(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1998). Since the provision of
the statute under discussion is stated in the conjunctive, it is
clear to us that the second exception only applies if the
9
relevant facts bring a claim within both parts of what is clearly
a two-part test. Because the creditor in this case did not
receive actual notice of the opening of Mrs. Key’s estate until
after 12 months from the date of Mrs. Key’s death, we conclude
that the pertinent language simply does not fit the facts of this
case. Hence, the claimant cannot rely upon it to sustain its
claim.
By the same token, it is clear that the claimant also
cannot rely upon subsection (a)(1)(B) of the statute to validate
its claim in this case. Again, this is because the facts of this
case do not fall within the language of that statutory provision.
T.C.A. § 30-2-307(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1998) contemplates a situation
in which a creditor receives actual notice less than 60 days
before the date which is 12 months from the decedent’s date of
death, or receives no notice at all. Here, the Nursing Home did
receive actual notice, but only after 12 months from the date of
Mrs. Key’s death; therefore, subsection (a)(1)(B) of the statute
is inapplicable to the instant case.
In summary, the Nursing Home cannot rely upon the
provisions of T.C.A. § 30-2-307 (Supp. 1998) to validate its
claim. This being the case, we must look to T.C.A. § 30-2-310
(Supp. 1998), which provides as follows:
All claims and demands not filed with the
probate court clerk, as required by the
provisions of §§ 30-2-306 -- 30-2-309, or, if
later, in which suit shall not have been
brought or revived before the end of twelve
(12) months from the date of death of the
decedent, shall be forever barred.
10
Because the Nursing Home’s claim was not filed in compliance with
any of the provisions of T.C.A. §§ 30-2-306 and -307 (Supp.
1998), and because the claim was not lodged with the probate
court before the end of the 12-month period specified in T.C.A. §
30-2-310 (Supp. 1998), it is barred.
Our holding is consistent with the observation of the
Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of Estate of Jenkins v.
Guyton, 912 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. 1995). In that case, the Supreme
Court held that there was an absolute bar to claims not filed
within one year of the date of the decedent’s death:
Tenn.Code Ann. § 30-2-307(a)(1)(B) provides
for an absolute one year limit on the filing
of claims against the estate, and this
limitations period applies whether the
creditor has received proper notice or no
notice at all.
Id. at 138 n.3. (Emphasis added).
B.
The Nursing Home would argue that our interpretation of
T.C.A. § 30-2-307 (Supp. 1998) runs afoul of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Tulsa Professional
Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 1340,
99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988). We disagree.
In Pope, a hospital failed to file its claim within the
time period specified in an Oklahoma probate statute. That
11
statute required claims to be filed within two months of the date
of first publication to creditors. The claimant there contended
that the statute did not provide proper notice to known creditors
and, as such, violated a claimant’s right to due process under
the authority of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950), and Mennonite Board
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 77 L. Ed. 2d
180 (1983). The Supreme Court agreed and held that “due process
is directly implicated and actual notice [to known or reasonably
ascertainable creditors] generally is required...[where a
statute] becomes operative only after probate proceedings have
been commenced in state court.” Pope, 485 U.S. at 487; 108 S.Ct.
at 1346.
Pope is of no help to the Nursing Home in the instant
case. This is because Pope focuses on a statute that became
“operative only after probate proceedings [had] been commenced in
state court.” Id., 485 U.S. at 487; 108 S. Ct. at 1346. Pope
holds that “in such circumstances, due process is directly
implicated and actual notice is generally required.” Id. The
Oklahoma statute at issue in Pope is quite similar to the one set
forth at T.C.A. §§ 30-2-307(a)(1) (Supp. 1998) in that the time
limitation in each of the statutes comes into play only after
probate proceedings have been commenced. However, in the instant
case, the real issue is whether the Nursing Home’s claim is
barred by a different statute of limitations -- the self-
executing one set forth in T.C.A. §§ 30-2-307(a)(1)(B) and 30-2-
310 (Supp. 1998). The holding in Pope clearly does not apply to
12
a self-executing statute of limitations such as the one found in
these code sections. This is clear from the following excerpt
from Pope:
The State’s interest in a self-executing
statute of limitations is in providing repose
for potential defendants and in avoiding
stale claims. The State has no role to play
beyond enactment of the limitations period.
While this enactment obviously is state
action, the State’s limited involvement in
the running of the time period generally
falls short of constituting the type of state
action required to implicate the protections
of the Due Process Clause.
Id. 485 U.S. at 486-87; 108 S. Ct. at 1345-46. The Nursing Home’s
claim is barred because it was not filed within 12 months of Mrs.
Key’s death. Since it is barred by Tennessee’s self-executing
statute of limitations of 12 months -- which does not implicate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment -- we are not
bound by the holding in Pope.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, we hold that the Nursing Home’s claim
against the Estate was not timely filed.5 Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on this appeal
are taxed to the appellee.
5
Our holding in this case does not address how, if at all, the self-
executing statute of limitations would apply in a situation where an estate
was first opened more than 12 months after a decedent’s death. Resolution of
this issue must await another day.
13
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
_______________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
_______________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.
14