Estate of Wolfe v. Matthews ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE March 24, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt
IN THE MATTER OF: ) C/A NO. Clerk
03A01-9808-PB-00249
THE ESTATE OF A.W. WOLFE, )
DECEASED. )
)
BRENDA MATTHEWS, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
) SEVIER COUNTY PROBATE COURT
v. )
)
)
)
)
RICHARD BRADLEY WOLFE, Executor, )
) HONORABLE CHARLES S. SEXTON,
Defendant-Appellee. ) JUDGE
For Appellant For Appellee
ROBERT L. OGLE, JR. R.B. HAILEY
Ogle & Wallace, P.C. Sevierville, Tennessee
Sevierville, Tennessee
O P I N IO N
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1
This lawsuit involves a claim filed by Brenda Matthews
(“Matthews”) against the Estate of A.W. Wolfe (“the Estate”).
Mr. Wolfe died testate on October 17, 1989. In her complaint,
Matthews seeks recovery for personal services rendered by her to
Mr. Wolfe. The probate court granted the Estate’s motion to
dismiss. Matthews appeals, raising the sole issue of whether the
probate court erred in dismissing her claim. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Matthews testified that she began providing services to
Mr. Wolfe around the time of his heart attack in March, 1977, and
that she continued to assist him until he died at the age of 75.
Matthews, who was approximately 42 years old at the time of Mr.
Wolfe’s death, had known Mr. Wolfe for most of her life.
According to Matthews, she went to his home every day to cook for
him, clean, help with work on his farm, and perform various other
duties to assist him. She also testified that she frequently
drove him to the store, as well as to various doctors and
hospitals in Sevierville and Nashville.
Matthews testified that she was a close friend of Mr.
Wolfe’s. She denied the existence of any romantic relationship.
Matthews alleged that she took care of Mr. Wolfe for
some twelve and a half years. She testified in her deposition
that Mr. Wolfe had promised to “take care of” her if she would
take care of him. Matthews had no written contract with Mr.
Wolfe, nor was she paid any wages by him; however, she did
2
acknowledge that Mr. Wolfe had bought rings for her and had
helped her pay for several Cadillacs over the years.
Shortly after Mr. Wolfe died in 1989, his will was
admitted to probate. The will, which had been executed on
October 8, 1977, makes no provision for Matthews; instead it
leaves to his wife1 “the amount to which she is entitled to
receive as my wife under the laws of the State of Tennessee,” and
places the rest of the estate in trust for the benefit of his
son, who is the executor of the Estate.
On or about January 12, 1990, Matthews filed a claim
against the estate and a complaint in the probate court, seeking
$42,700 as compensation for services rendered to Mr. Wolfe. In
response, the Estate filed an exception to her claim and an
answer to the complaint.
Following the filing of the Estate’s answer, little or
no action was taken in this case until August 18, 1992, at which
time Matthews’ deposition was taken by agreement of the parties.
Apparently, Matthews subsequently failed to furnish various late-
filed exhibits that had been requested during her deposition.
Other than correspondence relative to the production of these
exhibits, no additional action appears to have been taken in the
case for over four years from the date of Matthews’ deposition.
On October 18, 1996, the deposition of Mr. Wolfe’s wife, Helen B.
Wolfe (“Mrs. Wolfe”), was taken. In March, 1997, Mr. Wolfe’s
son, Richard Bradley Wolfe, submitted his affidavit, and on April
1
Mr. and Mrs. Wolfe had separated in early 1977, but were still married
at the time of Mr. Wolfe’s death.
3
29, 1997, the Estate filed a motion to dismiss Matthews’
complaint. In the motion, the Estate cites several bases for
dismissal, including laches, failure to prosecute, frivolous
claim, and accord and satisfaction. Significantly, it also
relies upon Estate of Nease v. Sane, C/A No. 03A01-9104-CH-00150,
1991 WL 220954 (Tenn.App., E.S., filed November 1, 1991,
McMurray, J.), a case involving similar facts in which this Court
found that the plaintiff’s proof was insufficient to establish
the requisite contract, express or implied, between the plaintiff
and the decedent. In support of its motion in the instant case,
the Estate attached as exhibits various documents, including the
will, Matthews’ deposition, Mrs. Wolfe’s deposition, and Richard
Bradley Wolfe’s affidavit. Matthews did not file any affidavits
or discovery material in response to the Estate’s motion.
Following a hearing, the probate court found “the
Motion to Dismiss by the Executor to be well taken relying on the
[case of] Estate of Nease v. Sane.” It therefore dismissed the
complaint, and Matthews appealed.
II. Standard of Review
In evaluating the Estate’s motion to dismiss, the trial
court considered, among other things, the deposition testimony of
Matthews and Mrs. Wolfe, as well as the affidavit of Richard
Bradley Wolfe. Rule 12.03, Tenn.R.Civ.P., provides that where
“on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
4
of as provided in Rule 56....” Such being the case here, we must
review the decision of the trial court under the standard of Rule
56, Tenn.R.Civ.P., which provides in pertinent part as follows:
...the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law....
Rule 56.04, Tenn.R.Civ.P.
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an
appellate court must decide anew if judgment in summary fashion
is appropriate. Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d
741, 744 (Tenn. 1991); Gonzalez v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d
42, 44-45 (Tenn.App. 1993). Since this determination involves a
question of law, there is no presumption of correctness as to the
trial court’s judgment. Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426
(Tenn. 1997); Hembree v. State, 925 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tenn. 1996).
In making our determination, we must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, and we must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Byrd v. Hall, 847
S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate
only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the
undisputed material facts entitle the moving party to a judgment
as a matter of law. Rule 56.04, Tenn.R.Civ.P.; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d
at 211.
5
III. Applicable Law
We have recently summarized the law applicable to cases
such as the one now before us:
In asserting a claim against an estate for
services rendered the decedent, the cause of
action necessarily is based upon either
contract or quasi contract. To bring a
contract into existence there must be an
offer and an acceptance of that offer. The
offer and acceptance may be expressed or
implied from the parties’ conduct.
Contracts implied in fact arise under
circumstances which, according to the
ordinary course of dealing and common
understanding of men, show a mutual intention
to contract. Such an agreement may result as
a legal inference from the facts and
circumstances of the case.
In order to make out an implied contract for
the rendition of services, facts and
circumstances must be shown which amount to a
request for services, which is the offer to
contract, and the performance of the
requested services, which is the acceptance
of the offer.
Cobble v. McCamey, 790 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tenn.App. 1989)
(citations omitted). Furthermore, we have stated that
[w]here one renders services to another in
the hope or expectation of a legacy, devise,
or other provision by will for his benefit,
without any contract, express or implied, but
relying solely upon the generosity of the
person for whom such services were rendered,
he cannot recover for such services because
of the failure of such person to make such
testamentary provision in his behalf.
Therefore, if the plaintiffs establish that
the decedent expressly or impliedly requested
the services, and if plaintiffs prove that
they rendered those services with the
expectation that they were to be paid in some
6
manner for those services, then a contract is
made out entitling the plaintiffs to recover
against the estate for the reasonable value
of those services. This contract must be
proven in the face of the “Dead Man’s”
statute (T.C.A. [§] 24-1-203) and the hearsay
rule.
Cobble, 790 S.W.2d at 282 (citations omitted; emphasis in
original); see also Cotton v. Roberts’ Estate, 337 S.W.2d 776,
779-80 (Tenn.App. 1960).
T.C.A. § 24-1-203, commonly referred to as the “Dead
Man’s Statute,” provides that
[i]n actions or proceedings by or against
executors, administrators, or guardians, in
which judgments may be rendered for or
against them, neither party shall be allowed
to testify against the other as to any
transaction with or statement by the
testator, intestate, or ward, unless called
to testify thereto by the opposite party....
Generally speaking, within the meaning of this statute, the
phrase “transaction with or statement by” the deceased has been
interpreted to “pertain to matters of personal communication
between the claimant and the deceased.” Watts v. Rayman, 462
S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tenn.App. 1970).
IV. Analysis
Cobble contemplates two distinct factual scenarios in
cases involving claims for personal services rendered to a
decedent during his or her lifetime: first, where the claimant
7
has performed the services pursuant to an express or implied
contract between the claimant and the decedent; and second, where
the claimant has performed the services without a contract but
with the mere hope or expectation of being rewarded in the
decedent’s will. See Cobble, 790 S.W.2d at 281-82. It is clear
that under the latter scenario, the claimant generally “cannot
recover for such services because of the failure of [the
decedent] to make such testamentary provision in his behalf.”
Id. at 282; see also Cotton, 337 S.W.2d at 780.
The probate court found that the facts of the instant
case bring it within the second category listed above. Implicit
in the court’s holding was a finding that, in accordance with
Estate of Nease, 1991 WL 220954, no contract had existed between
Matthews and Mr. Wolfe, and that Matthews had rendered the
services to Mr. Wolfe in the hope or expectation of being
rewarded in the latter’s will. The probate court thus determined
that Matthews was precluded from recovery.
The only sworn testimony in the record is found in
Matthews’ deposition, Mrs. Wolfe’s deposition, and Richard
Bradley Wolfe’s affidavit. As noted earlier, Matthews
acknowledges that she had no written contract with Mr. Wolfe.
The only specific evidence relevant to the existence of some
other type of contract is found in Matthews’ deposition. The
deposition, consisting of some 75 pages, contains much testimony
regarding statements allegedly made to Matthews by Mr. Wolfe;
none of these statements are more specific than her assertion
that “he told me he was going to take care of me.” This court
8
has previously stated that evidence of statements of this type is
“ambiguous, vague, and indefinite, and does not prove the
elements of a contract.” Cotton, 337 S.W.2d at 779. Thus, it is
by no means clear that the testimony offered by Matthews, even if
admissible, would constitute evidence of a contract. However,
even assuming, without deciding, that this testimony is
sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to whether a
contract existed, it nevertheless pertains to “transaction[s]
with or statement[s] by the testator,” i.e., Mr. Wolfe. T.C.A. §
24-1-203. As such, the testimony is inadmissible under the Dead
Man’s Statute, which, in the context of this case, prohibits
Matthews from testifying against the estate as to statements made
to her by Mr. Wolfe. Id.
The remaining, admissible portions of Matthews’
deposition do not make out a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether an express or implied contract existed. As explained in
Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993), the facts upon
which the nonmovant relies must be admissible at trial;
accordingly, we may only consider admissible evidence in
reviewing this grant of summary judgment. Thus, Matthews’
testimony reflects a rendering of services, and nothing more. By
the same token, the record contains no other testimony that would
establish an express or implied contract.
Having considered the record in this case, we find that
there is no admissible evidence of a contract, express or
implied, between Matthews and Mr. Wolfe. Rule 56.04,
Tenn.R.Civ.P. The material filed by the Estate reflects an
9
absence of a contract; the record as a whole does not contain any
admissible countervailing evidence. In the absence of any
evidence of a contract, Matthews’ claim rests solely on her hope
or expectation of being rewarded in Mr. Wolfe’s will; this being
the case, Mr. Wolfe’s failure to make testamentary provision on
her behalf does not entitle her to recover for the services
rendered to him. Cobble, 790 S.W.2d at 282; Cotton, 337 S.W.2d
at 780. Therefore, the Estate was and is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Rule 56.04, Tenn.R.Civ.P. Accordingly, we hold
that the probate court correctly dismissed Matthews’ claim.
V. Conclusion
The decision of the probate court dismissing the
appellant’s complaint is affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to
the appellant. This case is remanded to the probate court for
the collection of costs assessed there, pursuant to applicable
law.
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
________________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.
________________________
Don T. McMurray, J.
10