Duvall v. Mobley ( 1999 )


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  •            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    RICHARD DUVALL                )                    FILED
    )
    Plaintiff/Appellant,     )       Appeal No.   June 29, 1999
    )       01A01-9810-CV-00530
    v.                            )                   Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    )       Davidson County Circuit
    ARTIE MOBLEY                  )       No. 98C-1241
    )
    Defendant/Appellee.      )
    )
    COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
    FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY
    AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
    THE HONORABLE THOMAS W. BROTHERS PRESIDING
    JAMES BRYAN LEWIS
    BARRETT, JOHNSTON & PARSLEY
    217 SECOND AVENUE NORTH
    NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37201
    ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
    SCOTT A. RHODES
    ADAIR, SCHUERMAN & WHITE
    BRENTWOOD COMMONS 1, SUITE 160
    750 OLD HICKORY BOULEVARD
    BRENTWOOD, TENNESSEE 37027
    ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
    AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    KOCH, J.
    CAIN, J.
    OPINION
    Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s Order granting summary judgment to
    Defendant on the ground that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res
    judicata. We affirm the order of the trial court.
    This case involves a car accident which occurred between the parties on
    August 9, 1997, in Nashville, Davidson County. Richard Duvall (hereinafter
    Plaintiff) filed a Civil Warrant in General Sessions Court against Artie Mobley
    (hereinafter Defendant), seeking damages for injury to personal property
    resulting from the accident. The case was set on March 31, 1998, at which time
    the parties reached an agreement on the issue of damages to Plaintiff’s vehicle
    in the amount of $8,500. A hearing on the merits was held on Plaintiff’s
    remaining claim for damages done to other personal property. Plaintiff received
    a judgment for an additional $500.
    On May 5, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for
    Davidson County against the same defendant. In this complaint, Plaintiff sought
    an award for personal injury damages allegedly sustained during the same
    accident which was the subject of the parties’ earlier law suit.1 On June 9, 1998,
    Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment raising the doctrine of res
    judicata. On September 30, 1998, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion on
    the ground that Plaintiff’s claim based on personal injury was barred by the
    doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff now appeals.
    Res judicata is a claim preclusion doctrine that promotes finality in
    litigation. Moulton v. Ford Motor Company, 
    533 S.W.2d 295
    , 296 (Tenn. 1976).
    A final judgment in General Sessions Court bars a subsequent suit in another
    1
    Although Plaintiff submits that he did not know the full extent of his
    injuries at the time of the accident, it is undisputed that he was aware that he had
    been injured immediately after the accident.
    2
    court on the same subject. Staggs v. Vaughn, 
    205 Tenn. 9
    , 
    325 S.W.2d 277
    (1959).
    Res judicata bars a second suit between the same parties and their privies
    on the same cause of action as to all issues which were or could have been
    litigated in the former suit. Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistry, 
    913 S.W.2d 446
    , 449 (Tenn. 1995).
    Under Tennessee law:
    A single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for damages.
    ***All damages which can by any possibility result from a single
    tort form an indivisible cause of action. Every cause of action in
    tort consists of two parts, to wit, the unlawful act, and all damages
    that can arise from it. For damages alone no action can be
    permitted. Hence, if a recovery has once been had for the unlawful
    act, no subsequent suit can be maintained.
    *****
    [I]f the plaintiff, suing for damages for injuries resulting from a single tort, does
    not include in his suit all the injuries sustained, a subsequent suit for those
    omitted will be barred upon a plea of res adjudicata aptly pleaded. This follows
    naturally from the conclusion that the recovery is for the tort, and not for the
    injuries. If 'a single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for damages,' it
    [in]evitably follows that there can be but one suit to recover for injuries resulting
    from that tort.
    Potts v. Celotex, 
    796 S.W.2d 678
    , 682 (Tenn. 1990) (internal citations
    omitted in the original) (quoting National Cordova Corporation v. City of
    Memphis, 
    214 Tenn. 371
    , 380-381, 
    380 S.W.2d 793
    , 797 (1964), quoting
    Johnston v. Southern Ry. Co., 
    155 Tenn. 639
    , 643, 
    299 S.W. 785
    , 786 (1927)).
    The judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit is affirmed.
    This case is remanded to the trial court for any further proceedings which may
    be necessary. Costs are taxed to Appellant, Mr. Richard Duvall, for which
    execution, if necessary, may issue.
    3
    _____________________________
    PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________________
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JUDGE
    ___________________________________
    WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
    4