Helm v. Hayes ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
May 19, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
JAMES A. HELM and JUDY NELSON, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9710-PB-00497 Clerk
Appellate C ourt
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) CUMBERLAND PROBATE AND
) FAMILY COURT
v. )
) HON. JAMES A. BEAN,
HELEN A. HAYES and HARRY ) JUDGE
SABINE, )
) AFFIRMED AND
Defendants-Appellees. ) REMANDED
DUDLE Y W. TAY LOR, THE TAYLO R LAW FIRM, Knoxville, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
JOE M. LO ONEY, LO ONEY & LOONE Y, Crossville, for Defendants-Appellees.
O P I N IO N
Franks, J.
After the w ill of the testatrix M ildred L. Fin k had bee n admitted to
probate, plaintiffs, children of deceased, filed this action contesting the validity of the
will, alleging th at “she lack ed testame ntary capacity” to m ake a will.
The testatrix, at the time she executed her will, advised her attorney that
she had no child ren and a statem ent to tha t effec t was in corpor ated into her wil l.
Plaintiffs assert that this establishes that the testatrix was suffering from an insane
delusion, and the W ill should be declared void. A fter an evidentiary hearing before
the Judge without a jury, the Trial Judge ruled that the Will was valid, by concluding
the testatrix had the requisite tes tamentary cap acity to make a Will.
The order of the Probate Court admitting the will to probate, was prima
facie evidence of the valid ity of the will, 1 and the burden shifted to opponents of the
will to p rove th at the T estatrix w as of u nsoun d mind . See Matlock v. Simpson, 902
S.W.2d 3 84; Harper v. Watkins, 670 S .W.2d 611, 62 8 (Ten n. App . 1983) .
The courts of this state have recognized that a person suffering from an
insane delu sion that ma terially influences the disposition s made in th eir wills wo uld
be a basis to void such wills. This Court has explained an insane delusion thus:
A person is possessed of a delusion - that is, an insane delusion - when
he conceives something extravagant or unreasonable to exist which has
no existence except in his own abnormal imagination, but having once
conceived the thing or conditioned to exist, it is impossible to reason
him out of it.
Melody v. Ham blin, et al., 21 Te nn. Ap p. 687, 7 01 (19 37). Accord: Gass’ Heirs v.
Gass’ Executors, 22 Tenn. 278 at 28 3-4 (1842).
Plaintiffs made out a prima fac ie case that the testatrix was suffering
from a delusion, that is, the statement to her attorney and in her will that she had no
children. The proponents of the will then offered evidence from the preparer of the
will, witness to the will, the testatrix’s treating physician and testatrix’s sisters that
convinced the Trial Judge that the testatrix was not suffering from a delusion at the
time she execu ted her w ill.
The issue thus becomes whether the evidence preponderates against the
finding s of the Trial Ju dge. T .R.A.P . Rule 1 3(d).
The evid ence estab lished that the testatrix aban doned h er two ch ildren in
the early 1950's when they were ages 5 and 6, and their abusive father took them and
placed them in a foster home. The testatrix had no further contact with these children
throughout the remainder of her life, except she was approached by the son in the
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The will was executed on March 17, 1994, and testatrix died on February 25, 1995.
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1980's when she told him she had no children. The attorney who prepared the
testatrix’s will testif ied that after h er death he learned tha t she did hav e children, an d it
was his opinion “that she deliberately chose not to tell me the truth” about having
children. The testatrix’s sister testified at length about having numerous conversations
with the testa trix about the se children o ver the years, an d that the testatrix would
enquire about them periodically. She testified as follows:
Q. Did you speak with her [testatrix] with some degree of frequency
right up until the time she died in February of 1995?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you continue to discuss family matters with her in many of
those conversations?
A. Yes.
Q. And by family matters, did that also include discussion of these
children?
A. Yes.
The testatrix’ personal p hysician, the on ly expert to testify, said th at to a reason able
degree of medical ce rtainty, he had no reason to b elieve that she “could no t direct a
will in a competent manner”. The Trial Judge found the sister, Mrs. Partin, credible,
and relied upon her testimony in finding that the testatrix was not suffering from an
insane delusion. He stated:
So, based on what Mrs. Partin testified to, obviously the testatrix knew
she had children, acknowledged she had children, but for some reason,
chose no t to make th em bene ficiaries in her will.
When we look to another item, we can all speculate that perhaps as a
result of her hospitalization with a nervous breakdown that this blocked
her knowledge of these children. However, I think that’s refuted by
Mrs . Partin’s testim ony.
Also, the Judge relied on the doctor’s testimony to buttress his finding.
We conclude the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial
Court’s finding that at the time of the execution of the Will the testatrix knew of the
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existence of her two children, and was therefore not suffering from an insane delusion
which wo uld void her Will. T.R.A .P. Rule 13(d).
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed and the cause remanded,
with the cost of the appeal assessed to appellants.
__________________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.
CONCUR:
___________________________
Don T. McM urray, J.
___________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
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