Turnbull Preservation Group, L.L.C. v. Dickson County, Tennessee ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                                         05/27/2022
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    March 2, 2022 Session
    TURNBULL PRESERVATION GROUP, L.L.C. ET AL. V. DICKSON
    COUNTY, TENNESSEE ET AL.
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Dickson County
    No. 2020-CV-202      Laurence M. McMillan, Jr., Chancellor
    No. M2021-00542-COA-R3-CV
    This is an Open Meetings Act case regarding the Dickson County Planning Commission’s
    approval and subsequent denial of a site plan for the construction and operation of a fuel
    terminal. A non-profit and two Dickson County residents filed a petition for writ of
    certiorari, arguing that the Planning Commission acted in violation of the Open Meetings
    Act when it held an unpublicized meeting and initially approved the site plan. The trial
    court found the case was moot because the Dickson County Planning Commission
    overturned its approval of the site plan at a subsequent meeting. We agree and affirm the
    trial court’s dismissal of the case as moot.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
    ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,
    JR., P.J., M.S., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.
    Rodger Dale Waynick, Jr., Dickson, Tennessee, for the appellants, Turnbull Preservation
    Group, L.L.C., Charles W. Spann, and Margaret Sullivan.
    Timothy Valton Potter and Andrew Eldridge Mills, Dickson, Tennessee, for the
    appellees, Dickson County, Tennessee, Dickson County Planning and Zoning Office, and
    Dickson County, Tennessee Regional Planning Commission.
    Thomas V. White and George Arthur Dean, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Titan
    Partners, L.L.C.
    OPINION
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The Dickson County Planning Commission (“the Planning Commission”) held
    regular meetings on the second Thursday of every month at 7:00 p.m. In April 2020, the
    regularly scheduled Planning Commission meeting was set for April 9; however, on April
    9, David Darnell, the Dickson County Planning & Zoning Director, sent a memorandum
    to the members of the Planning Commission notifying them that the April Planning
    Commission meeting was being rescheduled to April 23. The memorandum stated, in
    relevant part:
    RE: April Meeting
    The Dickson County Planning Commission will meet in session on
    Thursday, April 23, 2020. . . .
    If social distancing rules are still in effect, we will meet outside under the
    open air big top tent. Please dress accordingly and bring your loud speaking
    voices.
    Enclosed is the agenda and the information on the items that will be before
    you for your consideration. It is important for all members to attend. The
    site plan enclosed is a very large project, that has been in the works for a long
    time. If you should have any questions or comments, please feel free to call
    the office at the number listed above.
    The “site plan” referenced in Mr. Darnell’s memorandum was submitted by Titan Partners,
    L.L.C. (“Titan Partners”) and was referred to as “Project DV.” Project DV was for the
    “construction of a +/-34 Acre Petroleum Products / Bulk Fuel Storage and Distribution
    Terminal on a +/- 146 Acre parcel of land in southeast Dickson County, near access to
    Interstates I-40 and I-840.” The public was not notified of the change in the Planning
    Commission’s meeting date.
    On April 23, 2020, the Planning Commission held its rescheduled meeting on three
    substantive agenda items, including Project DV. Fifteen people attended the Planning
    Commission meeting, including Margaret “Missy” Sullivan. According to the April 23
    Planning Commission meeting minutes, the Planning Commission heard a lengthy
    discussion about Project DV as well as discussion regarding two other substantive items
    on the agenda. The Planning Commission approved the proposed site plan for Project DV
    by a margin of 7 to 3.
    -2-
    On June 19, 2020, Turnbull Preservation Group, L.L.C., a non-profit neighborhood
    association promoting environmental responsibility, Ms. Sullivan and a fellow Dickson
    County resident, Charles W. Spann (collectively “Petitioners”), filed a Petition for Writ of
    Certiorari in the Dickson County Chancery Court requesting the court to “declare Dickson
    County, Tennessee Regional Planning Commission’s actions on April 23, 2020 to be void
    and of no effect” because the Planning Commission violated the Open Meetings Act.1
    After the petition was filed, Project DV was placed back on the Planning Commission’s
    agenda for the July 23 meeting. At the July 23 meeting, the Planning Commission
    overturned its prior approval of the plan.2
    Chancellor Laurence McMillian, sitting by interchange3 in the Dickson County
    Chancery Court, held a hearing on the petition for writ of certiorari on March 9, 2021. On
    April 21, 2021, he ruled:
    This Court finds the Planning Commission failed to provide any public notice
    for the April 23, 2020 meeting, and therefore all action taken in that meeting
    was void.
    In its July 23, 2020 meeting, the Dickson County Planning Commission
    overturned its April 23, 2020 approval of the site plan at issue in this case.
    See Titan Partners, LLC v. Dickson County, Dickson County Chancery No.
    2020-CV-312. This case is therefore moot. See Lynch Family Purpose LLC
    v. Putnam County, 
    301 S.W.3d 196
    , 204 (Tenn. 2009) (“A case will be
    considered moot if it no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of
    judicial review to the prevailing party.”)
    Petitioners appeal from this holding and articulate the following issue on appeal: “Did the
    trial court abuse its discretion in ruling the Commission’s violation of the Open Meetings
    Act was moot, notwithstanding the Commission’s ratifying act failed to meet the
    requirements of the Cure Doctrine?”
    1
    Tennessee’s Open Meetings Act requires that meetings be open to the public and that “adequate public
    notice” be given of the regular and special meetings of government bodies, among other things. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-44-102
    ; 8-44-103. Actions taken in violation of the Open Meetings Act are void: “Any
    action taken at a meeting in violation of this part shall be void and of no effect; provided that this
    nullification of actions taken at such meetings shall not apply to any commitment, otherwise legal, affecting
    the public debt of the entity concerned.” 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-105
    .
    2
    We note that the meeting minutes from the July 23, 2020 Planning Commission do not appear in the
    record. This oversight is not fatal to the appeal, however, because the parties agree that the Project DV site
    plan was placed on the Planning Commission’s July 23 agenda and was voted down at that same Planning
    Commission Meeting.
    3
    Three Dickson County judges recused themselves from hearing the case.
    -3-
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Judicial review of an action by an administrative body, such as the Dickson County
    Planning Commission, is accomplished through the common law writ of certiorari. See
    Roten v. City of Spring Hill, No. M2008-02087-COA-R3-CV, 
    2009 WL 2632778
    , at *1
    (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2009); B & B Enters. of Wilson Cty., LLC v. City of Lebanon, No.
    M2003-00267-COA-R3-CV, 
    2004 WL 2916141
    , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2004).
    When reviewing a certiorari proceeding, appellate courts apply a very limited standard of
    review. State ex rel. Moore & Assocs., Inc. v. West, 
    246 S.W.3d 569
    , 574 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    2005). Specifically, judicial review of a common-law writ of certiorari consists of
    determining whether “the decision maker exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful
    procedure, acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence
    to support its decision.” 
    Id.
     (citing Petition of Gant, 
    937 S.W.2d 842
    , 844-45 (Tenn.
    1996)); see also 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101
    . “At the risk of oversimplification, one may
    say that it is not the correctness of the decision that is subject to judicial review, but the
    manner in which the decision is reached.” Powell v. Parole Eligibility Rev. Bd., 
    879 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
    A trial court must make written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support
    of its decision to either grant or deny the relief requested in the writ of certiorari. B & B
    Enters. of Wilson Cty., 
    2004 WL 2916141
    , at *2 (citing 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-111
    (c)).
    The trial court’s findings of fact must be based on the preponderance of the evidence;
    therefore, on appeal, we review the trial court’s findings under the Tenn. R. App. 13(d)
    standard of review which “requires us to defer to the trial court’s factual findings as long
    as the evidence does not preponderate against them.” 
    Id.
     As to issues of law, like a
    determination of whether a case is moot, we review the trial court’s holding de novo, with
    no presumption of correctness. Alliance for Native Am. Indian Rights in Tenn., Inc. v.
    Nicely, 
    182 S.W.3d 333
    , 338-39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
    ANALYSIS
    As a threshold matter, we must determine whether this case has been rendered moot.
    City of Memphis v. Hargett, 
    414 S.W.3d 88
    , 96 (Tenn. 2013) (“This Court must first
    consider questions pertaining to justiciability before proceeding to the merits of any
    remaining claims.”). Our Supreme Court has held that, “[t]he role of our courts is limited
    to deciding issues that qualify as justiciable, meaning issues that place some real interest
    in dispute.” 
    Id.
     (citing Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 
    263 S.W.3d 827
    , 838 (Tenn.
    2008)). “A case is not justiciable if it does not involve a genuine continuing controversy
    requiring the adjudication of presently existing rights.” All. for Native Am. Indian Rights
    in Tenn., 
    182 S.W.3d at 338
    . The concept of mootness means that the case has “lost its
    justiciability either by court decision, acts of the parties, or some other reason occurring
    after commencement of the case.” Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v.
    Putnam Cty., 
    301 S.W.3d 196
    , 204 (Tenn. 2009). “Where a matter has been resolved, that
    -4-
    claim must be dismissed as moot.” Person v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Shelby Cty., No. W2007-
    01346-COA-R3-CV, 
    2009 WL 30746116
    , at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2009) (citing
    Cty. of Shelby v. McWherter, 
    936 S.W.2d 923
    , 931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)).
    The Planning Commission voted to approve the site plan for Project DV at an
    unpublicized meeting held on April 23, 2020. On June 19, 2020, Petitioners filed their writ
    of certiorari arguing that the Planning Commission violated the Open Meetings Act during
    their April 23 meeting and requested the court to declare the Planning Commission’s
    “actions on April 23, 2020 to be void and of no effect.” On July 23, 2020, the Planning
    Commission took a second vote on Project DV and voted against the project. Because the
    Planning Commission nullified its April 23 decision by overturning its prior approval of
    the project on July 23, Petitioners received the relief they were requesting. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-105
     (requiring actions taken in violation of the Open Meetings Act to be “void
    and of no effect.”).
    We find the scenario presented here to be analogous to the case of Cathey v. City of
    Dickson, No. M2001-02425-COA-R3-CV, 
    2002 WL 970429
     (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10,
    2002). In Cathey, the plaintiff opposed an annexation ordinance that the City of Dickson
    passed; she claimed, among other things, that the City of Dickson discussed the ordinance
    in private meetings in violation of the Open Meetings Act. 
    Id. at *1
    . After the plaintiff
    filed suit, the City of Dickson repealed the annexation ordinance. 
    Id.
     On appeal, this Court
    cited 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-105
     and held that “repeal of the annexation ordinance would
    have been the statutory remedy had the Open Meetings Act been violated.” 
    Id. at *5
    . We
    further held that the City of Dickson’s repeal of the annexation ordinance rendered the
    plaintiff’s Open Meetings Act claims moot. 
    Id.
     Similarly, in Person v. Board of
    Commissioners of Shelby County, No. W2007-01346-COA-R3-CV, 
    2009 WL 3074616
    , at
    *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2009) a juvenile court judge filed suit alleging the Shelby
    County Board of Commissioners passed a resolution in violation of the Open Meetings
    Act. After the suit was filed, the Shelby County Board of Commissioners unanimously
    rescinded the resolution at issue. 
    Id. at *2
    . The trial court found that rescission of the
    resolution rendered the Open Meeting Act claims moot. 
    Id. at *13
    . This Court agreed that
    the Open Meetings Act claims were moot, noting that, “where, as here, the governmental
    body acts quickly and decisively to correct any mistake in its procedure, the primary goal
    of the Open Meetings Act has been accomplished.” 
    Id. at *14
    .
    Petitioners point out that litigation between Titan Partners and Dickson County
    ensued following the July 23 meeting, and that as a result of that separate litigation, there
    were settlement negotiations between Titan Partners and Dickson County which ultimately
    led to an extensive settlement agreement that included an approval of Project DV, among
    other things. We explore the Planning Commission’s adoption of the settlement agreement
    in detail in a companion case, Gray v. Dickson County, Tennessee, No. M2021-00545-
    COA-R3-CV (released simultaneously with this opinion). Petitioners argue that the
    settlement of Titan Partners’ litigation was an attempt to “cure” the April 23 violation of
    -5-
    the Open Meetings Act that did not comport with the Cure Doctrine discussed in
    Neese v. Paris Special Sch. Dist., 
    813 S.W.2d 432
    , 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). However,
    the Planning Commission’s vote denying Project DV at the July 23 meeting effectively
    cured the prior violation and resolved the claim. See Person, 
    2009 WL 30746116
    , at *11
    (“Where a matter has been resolved, that claim must be dismissed as moot.”). Regardless
    of Titan Partners’ litigation and resultant settlement negotiations, Petitioners’ Open
    Meetings Act claim, relating to the lack of public notice for the April 23, 2020 meeting,
    became moot on July 23, 2020 when the Planning Commission voted against the Project
    DV site plan. Therefore, in accordance with our holdings in Cathey and Person, we find
    that the Planning Commission’s actions on July 23 rendered Petitioner’s Open Meetings
    Act claim related to the April 23 Planning Commission meeting moot, and we affirm the
    trial court’s dismissal of the case.
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against
    the appellants, Turnbull Preservation Group, L.L.C., Charles W. Spann, and Margaret
    Sullivan, for which execution may issue if necessary.
    _/s/ Andy D. Bennett_______________
    ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE
    -6-