150 4th Ave. N. Tenant, LLC D/B/A WeWork v. The Metropolitan Nashville Board of Zoning Appeals ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                           03/17/2020
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    December 4, 2019 Session
    150 4TH AVE N. TENANT, LLC DBA WEWORK v. THE METROPOLITAN
    NASHVILLE BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS ET AL.
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
    No. 17-1287-I     Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor
    ___________________________________
    No. M2019-00732-COA-R3-CV
    ___________________________________
    This dispute arose from the issuance of a skyline sign permit to a high-rise office-
    building tenant. The permit allowed the tenant to erect two 495-square-foot signs on the
    building’s northwest and southeast facades. Another tenant with skyline signs on the
    northeast and southwest facades appealed the issuance of the permit by filing an
    application with the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) for interpretation against the
    zoning administrator. The complaining tenant contended, inter alia, that its brand was
    harmed because the juxtaposition of the new and existing signs would blur the
    relationship between the two tenants and asserted that the new signs caused the building
    to exceed the maximum signage permitted under the zoning code. The BZA determined
    that the new signs violated the zoning code and revoked the permit. On a Petition for
    Writ of Certiorari, the Davidson County Chancery Court held that the BZA erred by
    relying on a zoning map rather than the code’s plain language and found the new signs
    complied with the code’s requirements. This appeal followed. We have determined the
    complaining tenant failed to establish standing because it failed to demonstrate that it was
    aggrieved by the issuance of the permit. There is no competent evidence to show that the
    signs’ juxtaposition would create public confusion about or signal a business relationship
    between the two tenants. Accordingly, the record fails to demonstrate that the
    complaining tenant’s alleged injury “falls within the zone of interests protected or
    regulated by the [law] in question.” See City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning
    Appeals, 
    149 S.W.3d 49
    , 55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Further, based on the facts of this
    case, the BZA lacked the ability to provide meaningful redress. For these and other
    reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, albeit on different grounds, and
    remand with instructions for the trial court to order the BZA to dismiss the complaining
    tenant’s application and to reinstate the new sign permit as issued in June of 2017. As for
    a separate issue that a neighboring homeowners’ association attempted to raise during the
    BZA hearing—whether the northwest sign exceeded brightness standards—that issue was
    not properly before the BZA or the trial court. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s decision
    to remand the brightness issue to the BZA.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
    Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded
    FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which RICHARD
    H. DINKINS, J., joined. W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., filed a separate opinion in which he
    concurs in part and dissents in part.
    Junaid Adetayo Odubeko and James L. Murphy, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
    appellant, Regions Bank Corp.
    Douglas Berry and Robert F. Parsley, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 150 4th Ave
    N Tenant, LLC, d/b/a WeWork.
    Lora Barkenbus Fox and Jonathan Barrett Cooper, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee,
    Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville & Davidson Co.
    OPINION
    A. Background
    One Nashville Place, a.k.a., the “R2-D2 Building,”1 enriched the Nashville skyline
    in 1985. The 25-story octagonal building sits in the heart of downtown Nashville on a lot
    that abuts Fourth Avenue North, Commerce Street, and the south end of Printers Alley.
    In 2010, the Metropolitan Planning Commission codified a set of development
    standards for several sub-districts in downtown Nashville, including the area where One
    Nashville Place is located. See Zoning Code for Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson
    County § 17.37 (“Downtown Code”). Section V of the Downtown Code includes two
    design standards related to the width and area of “skyline” signs. First, a skyline sign
    1
    When viewed from a distance, the architectural shape of the building resembles the iconic and
    loveable Droid named R2-D2, a character from “a galaxy far, far away” in the Star Wars franchise
    created by George Lucas. The creative design of R2-D2 was influenced by Akira Kurosawa’s 1958
    feature film The Hidden Fortress, particularly Tahei and Matashichi, the two comic relief characters that
    serve as sidekicks to General Makabe. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R2-D2. Legend has it that the
    name R2-D2 derives from when Lucas was making one of his earlier films, American Graffiti. 
    Id. Sound editor
    Walter Murch states that he is responsible for the utterance that sparked the name for the droid. 
    Id. Murch asked
    for Reel 2, Dialog Track 2, in the abbreviated form “R-2-D-2.” 
    Id. Lucas, who
    was in the
    room and had dozed off while working on the script for Star Wars, momentarily woke when he heard the
    request and, after asking for clarification, stated that it was a “great name” before going back to writing
    his script. 
    Id. (citations omitted).
    -2-
    cannot exceed 60% of the building width. 
    Id. § V,
    at 117. Second, the maximum area of
    all skyline signs on a building is determined by the number and type of abutting streets.
    
    Id. 109, 117.
    In 2013, Regions Bank Corp. (“Regions”) moved its headquarters to One
    Nashville Place. Shortly thereafter, Regions applied for and obtained a permit to install
    two 495-square-foot skyline signs, one on the northeast facade and one on the southwest
    facade. The Regions signs were installed, and they remain on the building to this day.
    In January 2017, 150 4th Ave N Tenant, LLC, a workspace provider doing
    business as WeWork (“WeWork”), became a tenant of One Nashville Place. On
    February 12, 2017, WeWork applied for a permit to install two 45-foot-long skyline
    signs, one on the northwest facade and one on the southeast facade.
    The Zoning Administrator for the Metropolitan Department of Codes initially
    denied the application based on a determination that the width of each sign exceeded 60%
    of the facade to which it was to be attached, and the sign needed the approval of the
    Downtown Code Design Review Committee (“the DRC”) because of the sub-district
    where the building was located.2 Thus, WeWork made the requisite application to the
    DRC. Following a review, the DRC construed the octagonal building as effectively
    having four longer facades rather than eight shorter ones and determined that the signs
    were within the 60% limit. Based upon the DRC’s determinations and approval, the
    Zoning Administrator approved WeWork’s application and issued the permit in June of
    2017. WeWork completed the installation of the signs in August of 2017.
    B. Board of Zoning Appeals
    Shortly after the WeWork signs were installed, Regions appealed the issuance of
    the permit by filing an application with the BZA for interpretation against the Zoning
    Administrator. Regions asserted that WeWork’s signs would damage Regions’ brand and,
    when combined with Regions’ signs, exceed the maximum area permitted by the
    Downtown Code:
    [T]he juxtaposition of the existing Regions Signage and the approved
    WeWork Signage on the Subject Property will create public confusion
    2
    In the event the approval of the signage design is required or a modification or variance from
    the applicable standards is needed, applicants must submit a request to the Planning Department and the
    Downtown Code DRC. See Downtown Code § I, at 14, and § V, at 104. When the subject property is
    within a “redevelopment district” designated by the Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency
    (“MDHA”)—as in this case—the MDHA’s Design Review Committee fulfills the role of the Downtown
    Code DRC. 
    Id. § I,
    at 14.
    -3-
    about the relationship between Regions and WeWork. To the public, the
    Co-branding of the Subject Property with skyline signs of the same size
    will signal a business relationship between Regions and WeWork that, at
    best, would be misleading and, at worst, would be damaging to Regions’
    brand. In the worst case scenario, Regions’ significant investment in its
    public brand would be diminished.
    .    .    .
    . . . . [T]he [Sign Standards] Map reveals that the portion of Printer’s Alley
    abutting the Subject Property is not considered qualifying street frontage
    for purposes of calculating maximum allowable skyline signage. . . . [T]he
    maximum allowable skyline signage on the Subject Property is 1,440
    square feet (720 square feet per Pedestrian Street multiplied by two
    qualifying Pedestrian Streets). . . .
    The Regions Signage currently utilizes 990 of the permitted square feet,
    which means that only 450 square feet of additional skyline signage is
    available for future use at the Subject Property. As shown in the Permit,
    each of the WeWork signs is 45' by 11', or 495 square feet. Therefore, the
    WeWork Signage, as approved, will exceed the maximum allowable
    skyline signage at the Subject Property pursuant to Section V of the
    [Downtown Code].
    At the BZA hearing on September 21, 2017, Regions clarified that its objection
    was “all about size,” and it would not oppose one “slightly smaller” sign instead of two
    equally sized signs. Regions acknowledged that the Downtown Code’s sign standards
    included a street type titled “Printers Alley” but relied on the Sign Standards Map, which
    identified only the portion of Printers Alley between Church Street and Commerce Street
    as the “Printers Alley” street type. The remainder of Printers Alley and every other alley
    in downtown was unlabeled.
    In addition, the homeowners’ association for the Viridian, a residential tower
    across the street from One Nashville Place, submitted a letter in support of Regions’
    appeal. Although the Viridian homeowners’ association did not file an appeal or
    application for interpretation against the Zoning Administrator, several Viridian residents
    attended the hearing. The president of the homeowners’ association advocated for the
    revocation of WeWork’s permit, asserting the northwest sign exceeded the Downtown
    Code’s brightness standards.
    In response to the foregoing arguments, Calvin Lee, corporate counsel for
    WeWork, argued that the DRC had already determined that the signs complied with the
    Downtown Code. Mr. Lee engaged in the following colloquy with Board Chairman
    David Ewing and Vice Chairman David Taylor:
    -4-
    Mr. Lee:          Well, [counsel for Regions] said that this is all about
    size and if that is the case then . . . this is not the venue
    or the forum to discuss that. The Design Review
    Committee was the authority that looked at that and—
    Chairman Ewing:   Let me stop you there because you went to law school,
    as I went to law school, and I said earlier it’s kind of
    Marbury versus Madison. It’s here, you’re here, and
    you shouldn’t assume that we don’t have jurisdiction.
    Mr. Lee:          We understand. And we stand by the MDHA Review
    Committee’s interpretation that this is a 4-sided
    building. I have their approval of our sign right here. It
    was conditioned that there are no other signs to be put
    up on that building. They’re only allowing four signs
    because they are finding it as a four-sided building.
    Mr. Taylor:       I guess that the opposition, I don’t think they’re
    contesting that at all. They said, in terms of the
    percentage of facade that can be covered, they’re
    saying that this is 60 percent. I mean they’re not
    contesting that is what he said. So, their only argument
    to us was that it exceeds the maximum allowed square
    footage of signage for that building, which I think
    deals with Printer’s Alley and whether that’s a street or
    not. . . .
    Mr. Lee:          I understand. And the Design Review Committee
    considered that fact also, and we made a presentation
    at that meeting. And they decided that they accepted
    our argument that there were three streets to calculate
    the amount of signage on that building.
    Mr. Taylor:       I’m sorry, so what are you basing the three streets on?
    What is your argument on it being three streets?
    Mr. Lee:          I don’t have that information in front of us. That was a
    presentation that our signage consultant and our
    designers sat with the Design Review Committee to
    work out. We know that we are new to your
    neighborhood and we don’t want to be intrusive. We,
    in early December, reached out to the different
    planning departments here. We were working with
    Mr. Herbert’s department very closely; they advised us
    -5-
    on the process; we went through the process in good
    faith. . . .
    Chairman Ewing:         Let’s talk about the brightness. How many foot candles
    is that sign?
    Mr. Lee:                That I’m not sure as well.
    .    .    .
    You know, and so it’s a little frustrating to not have an
    argument about the street, which is apparently what
    allows the building to have the amount of signage that
    it does. . . .
    After the public hearing was closed, Board Member David Harper moved for the
    BZA to find that the Zoning Administrator erred by issuing the permit based on the
    square footage calculation:
    Mr. Harper:             [T]here’s one specific piece in the Code that was in
    this presentation and it’s a calculation, how much
    signage is allowed on a building? I don’t care from
    where it’s calculated or how you calculate what a
    facade is, what is in a facade, there’s a total number
    and they’re over it. And when that number was
    surpassed, that’s when the error occurred. When that
    number added up to be more than the maximum
    number, an error occurred.
    .    .    .
    I will move that we find . . . that the Zoning
    Administrator did err in issuing the permit for the
    reasons I mentioned, the square footage calculations.3
    The Board voted unanimously to revoke WeWork’s sign permit.
    In October 2017, the Board entered a formal order, finding “that the Zoning
    Administrator erred in [the] application of law with this issuance of the subject permit.”
    3
    Chairman Ewing also stated in his motion: “And I would like to add that it is also an error of the
    Downtown Sign Code with the brightness as it reflects to a close-by residential building.”
    -6-
    C. Chancery Court Decision
    On December 1, 2017, WeWork timely filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the
    Davidson County Chancery Court, arguing that the BZA erred, inter alia, by exceeding
    its jurisdiction and basing its interpretation solely on the “illustrative maps” in the
    Downtown Code.
    After hearing argument from counsel for both WeWork and Regions, the trial
    court concluded that the Downtown Code unambiguously treated the entirety of Printers
    Alley as a street:
    The Court must find that the Board erred when it relied upon the color-
    coded map of the street types to determine the size of the skyline signs
    allowed on the property under the petitioner’s permit. The map is in
    conflict with the text in the Downtown Code. Specifically, the text in
    Chapter 17.37 Section V, Sign Standards, Allocation by Street Type,
    allocates 720 square feet for the Printer’s Alley type street. The text of the
    Downtown Code also states that Printer’s Alley will not be treated as an
    ordinary alley, but will be treated differently, that is unconventionally.
    Neither the parties nor the Court found text in the Downtown Code which
    would remove part of Printer’s Alley from serving as street frontage.
    Relying on unambiguous text in the Downtown Code at just this quoted
    section, Printer’s Alley is treated as any other street frontage and it is
    treated as a whole in its entirety and not in parts.
    The Zoning Ordinance in Title 17 has its own rule of construction, which
    states that text shall prevail over illustrations. Metro Government
    anticipated that its numerous illustrations could on occasion cause conflict
    between the text of the Downtown Code and the numerous illustrations.
    Such a rule of construction is completely consistent with the common law
    rules of statutory interpretation, which recognize and help resolve
    ambiguity in the text, that is, the language of the statute or ordinance. Such
    an ambiguity is not present here, because the text is clear. The problem is
    caused by the illustration. Consequently, the property is allocated 2,160
    square feet for skyline signage, because there’s no dispute at all that the
    other two frontages, that is, Commerce Street and Fourth Avenue North are
    pedestrian street frontages and they each also get, are assigned or allocated,
    720 square feet for the skyline signage.
    Although it ruled in favor of WeWork on the square footage issue, the trial court
    found it necessary to remand to the Board the issue regarding the brightness of the
    northwest sign because the Board did not articulate which standard it relied on in
    determining that WeWork’s northwest sign violated the brightness standards of the
    Downtown Code. This appeal followed.
    -7-
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Judicial review of a decision by a board of zoning appeals “is limited to
    determining whether the board exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure,
    acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence to support
    its decision.” Harding Acad. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 
    222 S.W.3d 359
    , 363 (Tenn. 2007). “In proceedings involving a common law writ of certiorari,
    illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent actions include: 1) the failure to follow the minimum
    standards of due process; 2) the misrepresentation or misapplication of legal standards; 3)
    basing a decision on ulterior motives; and 4) violating applicable constitutional
    standards.” 
    Id. Additionally, “[c]ourts
    must not ‘reweigh the evidence’ or ‘scrutinize the
    intrinsic correctness of the decision,’ but independently review the record to ‘determine
    whether it contains “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
    adequate to support a rational conclusion.”’” Venture Holdings, LLC v. Metro. Gov’t of
    Nashville & Davidson Cty., 
    585 S.W.3d 409
    , 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Gulley
    v. Robertson Cty. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, No. M2015-00734-COA-R3-CV,
    
    2016 WL 2898478
    , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2016)), appeal denied (Sept. 18,
    2019). “If ‘any possible reason’ exists justifying the action, it will be upheld.” McCallen
    v. City of Memphis, 
    786 S.W.2d 633
    , 641 (Tenn. 1990).
    Under a codified version of this standard, we have recognized a three-step
    analysis:
    The court must first determine whether the agency has identified the
    appropriate legal principles applicable to the case. Then, the court must
    examine the agency’s factual findings to determine whether they are
    supported by substantial and material evidence. Finally, the reviewing court
    must examine how the agency applied the law to the facts. This step is, of
    course, a highly judgmental process involving mixed questions of law and
    fact, and great deference must be accorded to the agency. At this stage, the
    court must determine whether a reasoning mind could reasonably have
    reached the conclusion reached by the agency, consistent with a proper
    application of the controlling legal principles.
    McEwen v. Tennessee Dep’t of Safety, 
    173 S.W.3d 815
    , 820 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)
    (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
    ANALYSIS
    The parties have raised several issues for our consideration, but we have
    determined the dispositive issue is whether Regions had standing to challenge the Zoning
    -8-
    Administrator’s issuance of the sign permit to WeWork. We have also determined that
    the illumination issue purportedly presented by the Viridian homeowners’ association
    was not properly before the BZA or the trial court.4
    I. STANDING
    Both parties addressed this issue in their briefs. WeWork raised the issue in its
    Appellee’s Brief, and Regions addressed the issue in its Reply Brief.5 WeWork’s
    position on this issue is stated as follows:
    The Court should reinstate WeWork’s permit for another reason. Regions
    lacks standing to assert its challenge. Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-206(b)
    provides that “[a]ppeals to the board of [zoning] appeals may be taken by
    any person aggrieved . . . by any grant or refusal of a building permit or
    other act or decision of the building commissioner of the municipality or
    other administrative official. . . .” “The sort of distinct and palpable injury
    that will create standing must be an injury to a recognized legal right or
    interest. In many cases, this right or interest may be created or defined by
    statute.” City of 
    Brentwood, 149 S.W.3d at 56
    . That is so here. Because
    Regions “is seeking to vindicate a statutory right of interest, the doctrine of
    standing requires [Regions] to demonstrate that its claim falls within the
    zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute in question.” Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 13-7-206(b).
    For its part, Regions contends that WeWork’s standing argument fails “because
    Tennessee law favors interpreting standing broadly in zoning cases, such as the instant
    matter.” Also relying on this court’s decision in City of 
    Brentwood, 149 S.W.3d at 57
    ,
    Regions notes that “the extension of authority to appeal and to seek judicial review to all
    persons who are ‘aggrieved’ reflects an intention to ease the strict application of the
    customary standing principles.”
    When a statute creates a cause of action and designates who may bring suit,
    standing is interwoven with subject matter jurisdiction and “becomes a jurisdictional
    4
    Our determination pretermits all other issues raised by the parties.
    5
    The Metropolitan Government filed a brief that states in its entirety: “The Metropolitan
    Government joins the Brief of Regions Bank, particularly the portion crediting the BZA’s treatment
    of Printer’s Alley (a distinctive and unique street downtown). On this basis, Metro submits that the
    BZA’s decision is supported by material evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and should be
    affirmed.” (Emphasis added). Thus, it did not address nor take a position concerning the issue of standing.
    -9-
    prerequisite.” In re Estate of Smallman, 
    398 S.W.3d 134
    , 149 (Tenn. 2013). “Subject
    matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s ‘lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy
    brought before it’ and is conferred on a court by statute or the constitution.” Griffin v.
    Campbell Clinic, P.A., 
    439 S.W.3d 899
    , 902 (Tenn. 2014). The issue of subject matter
    jurisdiction “is non-waivable and must be considered by an appellate court.” In re Estate
    of 
    Smallman, 398 S.W.3d at 148
    . “The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is so
    fundamental that it requires dismissal whenever it is raised and demonstrated.” First Am.
    Trust Co. v. Franklin-Murray Dev. Co., L.P., 
    59 S.W.3d 135
    , 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
    Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 13-7-206(b) and 27-8-101, respectively, empower
    “aggrieved” persons to challenge the acts of zoning officials. Significantly, each statute
    uses the same standard for standing. Section 13-7-206(b) authorizes appeals by persons
    “aggrieved” by an act of a zoning official:
    Appeals to the board of appeals may be taken by any person
    aggrieved . . . by any grant or refusal of a building permit or other act or
    decision of the building commissioner of the municipality or other
    administrative official based in whole or part upon this ordinance enacted
    under this part and part 3 of this chapter.
    (Emphasis added). Similarly, § 27-9-101 authorizes appeals by persons “aggrieved” by
    the final judgment of a board of zoning appeals:
    Anyone who may be aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any
    board or commission functioning under the laws of this state may have the
    order or judgment reviewed by the courts, where not otherwise specifically
    provided, in the manner provided by this chapter.
    (emphasis added); see Fallin v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 
    656 S.W.2d 338
    , 342 (Tenn.
    1983) (recognizing that a writ of certiorari under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 is “the
    proper remedy for one who seeks to overturn the determination of a Board of Zoning
    Appeals”).
    “For the purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101, to be ‘aggrieved,’ a party must
    be able to show a special interest in the agency’s final decision or that it is subject to a
    special injury not common to the public generally.” Wood v. Metro. Nashville &
    Davidson Cty. Gov’t, 
    196 S.W.3d 152
    , 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
    In its application to the BZA, Regions asserted that the size and location of
    WeWork’s signs would blur the relationship between Regions and WeWork and tarnish
    Regions’ brand:
    As an active, longtime partner in Nashville’s development, Regions is
    aggrieved by the approved issuance of the Permit authorizing the placement
    - 10 -
    of the WeWork Signage on the Subject Property. There is no relationship
    between Regions and WeWork besides being co-tenants at the Subject
    Property. However, the juxtaposition of the existing Regions Signage and
    the approved WeWork Signage on the Subject Property will create public
    confusion about the relationship between Regions and WeWork. To the
    public, the co-branding of the Subject Property with skyline signs of the
    same size will signal a business relationship between Regions and
    WeWork that, at best, would be misleading and, at worst, would be
    damaging to Regions’ brand. In the worst case scenario, Regions’
    significant investment in its public brand would be diminished.
    Regions maintains that it met the requirements of § 13-7-206(b) by alleging “injury to its
    brand resulting from the approval of the WeWork signs.”
    When interwoven with subject matter jurisdiction, standing is a constitutional
    issue. See City of Memphis v. Hargett, 
    414 S.W.3d 88
    , 98 n.8 (Tenn. 2013).
    Constitutional standing “is one of the ‘irreducible . . . minimum’ requirements that a
    party must meet in order to present a justiciable controversy.” 
    Id. at 98
    (quoting Lujan v.
    Defs. of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560 (1992)).
    Establishing constitutional standing requires a plaintiff to satisfy three elements:
    First, a party must show an injury that is “distinct and palpable”; injuries
    that are conjectural, hypothetical, or predicated upon an interest that a
    litigant shares in common with the general citizenry are insufficient in this
    regard. [Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Darnell, 
    195 S.W.3d 612
    , 620 (Tenn. 2006)]. Second, a party must demonstrate a causal
    connection between the alleged injury and the challenged conduct. 
    Id. (citing Mayhew
    v. Wilder, 
    46 S.W.3d 760
    , 767 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    2001)). . . . The third and final element is that the injury must be capable of
    being redressed by a favorable decision of the court. 
    Id. Id. The
    plaintiff must establish these elements “by the same degree of evidence at each
    stage of litigation as other matters on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Petty
    v. Daimler/Chrysler Corp., 
    91 S.W.3d 765
    , 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing 
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
    ). We have determined that Regions failed to satisfy its burden of proof on the
    first and third of these elements.
    We shall first address whether Regions has shown an injury that is “distinct and
    palpable” and not predicated upon an interest it shares in common with the general
    citizenry. Indeed, brand dilution and tarnishment are recognized as legal injuries. See
    15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c). However, Regions presented no competent evidence that the
    public was likely to infer a relationship between it and WeWork or that such an inference
    was likely to harm the reputation of Regions’ brand.
    - 11 -
    The presence of multiple brands on a single building is not unusual. See, e.g.,
    Downtown Code § V at 103 (requiring new developments submit a “common signage
    plan,” which “regulates signage for multiple businesses or tenants within one building or
    complex”). The mere fact that Regions now shares the skyline of One Nashville Place
    with WeWork is insufficient to infer a likelihood of injury. Moreover, their signage is not
    on the same facade of the building.
    As for the element of redress, the BZA’s ability to provide meaningful redress is
    significantly limited based on the facts of this case. For example, the BZA does not have
    the discretion to deny the permit if WeWork’s signage is within all permissible
    parameters of size and design under the Zoning Code. See Harding 
    Academy, 222 S.W.3d at 363
    . This is because the “denial of a zoning permit which meets all the
    requirements of the ordinance when there is no valid ground for denial is arbitrary and
    unreasonable.” 
    Id. (quoting Merritt
    v. Wilson County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 
    656 S.W.2d 846
    , 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). This limitation becomes even more relevant considering
    that Regions stated it would not be opposed to one “slightly smaller” WeWork sign,
    instead of two signs, on the skyline of the building. Under Regions’ interpretation of the
    Zoning Ordinance, WeWork would be entitled to at least 450 square feet of skyline
    signage—meaning WeWork could erect a skyline sign that is only 10% smaller than
    Regions’ signs. Thus, we find it implausible that one 450 square-foot sign would be any
    less suggestive of a business relationship, and there is no competent proof in the record to
    the contrary.
    Based on the foregoing, we find Regions lacked standing under Tenn. Code Ann.
    § 13-7-206(b) to challenge the Zoning Administrator’s issuance of the sign permit to
    WeWork. Accordingly, Regions’ appeal and application for interpretation against the
    Zoning Administrator to the BZA must be dismissed for lack of standing.
    II. THE BRIGHTNESS ISSUE
    As noted earlier, the Viridian homeowners’ association attended the hearing and
    requested the BZA to revoke WeWork’s permit based on allegations that the brightness
    of the northwest sign adversely affected the homeowners’ use of their residential
    property. For the reasons explained below, we have determined this issue was not
    properly before the BZA or the trial court.
    The BZA’s Rules of Procedure allow an appellant that files an appeal and
    application for interpretation against the Zoning Administrator’s ruling to present its case,
    which includes presenting testimony from “witnesses in support of the application.”
    R. 8(G). However, the appellant must have previously filed an appeal—that is, an
    application “on a form provided for that purpose by the Department of Codes
    Administration.” R. 3(A). The Viridian homeowners’ association did not file an appeal or
    application for interpretation against the Zoning Administrator regarding the brightness
    of WeWork’s sign or any issue regarding WeWork’s signs.
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    Moreover, Regions’ only comment on the brightness issue came after the president
    of the Veridian homeowners’ association addressed the BZA at the hearing. The relevant
    and very brief colloquy between Regions’ counsel and the BZA Chairman on the
    brightness issue reads:
    Mr. Murphy:          Obviously, we’re concerned about [brightness] as well,
    although it affects—my client is in the building so they
    don’t have the brightness problem that the Viridian
    folks do. The Viridian folks really have the brightness
    impact more so than my client.
    Chairman Ewing:      So, your client, the bank, yeah, that’s not as big a deal.
    Gotcha. But you still think that’s an issue?
    Mr. Murphy:          Obviously, it is, because it’s having an impact—it’s too much
    signage and, in addition to being too much, it’s also having an
    adverse impact on the surrounding neighborhood. So, I think
    those are both issues.
    Whether the northwest sign exceeded the brightness standards was not properly
    before the BZA. Therefore, the BZA erred in considering the issue and erred in basing its
    ruling, at least in part, on the brightness of the sign. Because the issue was not properly
    before the BZA, it was not properly before trial court. Therefore, we reverse the trial
    court’s decision to remand this issue back to the Board.
    III. THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
    In a separate opinion, our colleague concludes that Regions had standing to
    challenge the issuance of the sign permit to WeWork and would hold that the
    Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking the
    WeWork sign permit. While we respectfully disagree with our colleague’s determination
    that Regions had standing to challenge the permit issued to WeWork, we agree with his
    conclusion that
    the Downtown Code is clear and that the Printers’ Alley street type includes
    Printers’ Alley, even that portion abutting One Nashville Place. See 
    id. at 15.
    Although the “Map of Street Types for Signage Standards” could be
    seen as contradicting the text of the Downtown Code, the Zoning Code
    specifies that text controls over figures in the case “of any difference of
    meaning or implication.” Zoning Code, Chapter 17.04.050(L) (Mar. 2015).
    The portion of Printers’ Alley abutting One Nashville Place may not
    include businesses on the ground floor and upper floors, but the same is
    also true of other portions of Printers’ Alley highlighted in green on the
    “Map of Street Types for Signage Standards.” The character of that portion
    - 13 -
    of the alley does not justify ignoring the fact that it is named “Printers’
    Alley.”
    Thus, if Regions had standing, we would affirm the trial court’s determination that
    the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking
    the WeWork sign permit and remand with instructions to reverse the decision by the
    BZA.
    .
    IN CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part,6 reversed in part, and this
    matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court to order the BZA to dismiss
    Regions’ appeal of and application for interpretation against the Zoning Administrator’s
    issuance of the sign permit and reinstate the permit as issued to WeWork in June of 2017.
    Costs of appeal are assessed against Regions.
    ________________________________
    FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.
    6
    The Court of Appeals may affirm a judgment on different grounds than those relied on by the
    trial court when the trial court reached the correct result. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Smith, 
    720 S.W.2d 48
    , 50
    (Tenn. 1986); Arnold v. City of Chattanooga, 
    19 S.W.3d 779
    , 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Allen v. Nat’l
    Bank of Newport, 
    839 S.W.2d 763
    , 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Clark v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
    Davidson Cty., 
    827 S.W.2d 312
    , 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
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