In Re: C.H. ( 2017 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    November 22, 2016 Session
    IN RE C.H.
    Interlocutory Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County
    No. 15-00926 Dennis (Will) Roach, II, Judge
    No. E2016-00702-COA-R9-PT-FILED-JANUARY 31, 2017
    _________________________________
    This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. Biological grandparents of a child at
    issue in a termination of parental rights action sought to intervene in the termination
    proceeding. The child had lived in the grandparents‟ home with them and the child‟s
    parents. The Department of Children‟s Services removed the child from that home and
    later sought to terminate the parental rights of the child‟s parents. The grandparents filed
    a motion to intervene. The trial court denied their motion, but granted their request for an
    interlocutory appeal. Thereafter, we also granted their request for interlocutory review.
    We affirm the decision of the trial court and now remand this case to the trial court for
    further proceedings.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal; Judgment of the Juvenile Court
    Affirmed; Case Remanded
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL
    SWINEY, C.J., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.
    John T. Sholly, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, J.H. and S.J.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter, Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor
    General, and Kathryn A. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for
    the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children‟s Services.
    Linda G. Larson, Dandridge, Tennessee, for the appellee, K.J.
    1
    OPINION
    I.
    J.H. (grandmother) and S.J. (grandfather) are the maternal grandparents of the
    child at issue, C.H. The child was born in May 2010 to K.J. (mother) and R.H. (father).
    Since 2010, the child had lived with his grandparents. The same house was also shared
    by the child‟s parents, aunt, and older cousin. DCS removed the child from the home in
    November 2014 due, in part, to the parents‟ drug use.
    DCS filed a dependency and neglect action against the child‟s parents in the trial
    court. The grandparents sought to intervene, but their application was denied. On
    October 16, 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child‟s
    parents. The grandparents again moved to intervene. Along with their motion, they
    attached three affidavits1 asserting that the grandparents, rather than the parents, looked
    after the child, providing him with food, shelter, clothing, and transportation, among
    other things. The trial court dismissed the motion to intervene, stating:
    this matter, including a hearing on the merits, has previously
    been heard on September 2, 2015, in the Dependence and
    Neglect case filed in this court on November 26, 2014, and
    nothing has changed regarding the [grandparents‟]
    circumstances since then.
    The grandparents then asked the trial court to permit them to pursue a Tenn. R. App. P. 9
    interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted their request. It listed the following reasons
    for its action:
    Having given consideration to the severity of potential injury
    to the [grandparents], the probability of its occurrence and the
    probability that review upon entry of final judgment will be
    ineffective, this Court believes this Order is appealable due to
    the need to prevent irreparable injury.
    1
    The grandparents‟ motion to intervene states that “five (5) notarized affidavits from friends,
    family, neighbors, and teachers” are attached to the document. Only three affidavits – from, respectively,
    the child‟s grandmother, the child‟s aunt, and family friend, Michelle Durand – are attached to the motion
    in the record.
    2
    The [grandparents] are seeking permission to Intervene in a
    Termination of Parental Rights action with a view to
    obtaining visitation with and/or custody of their grandson, the
    minor child in the case. If they are not allowed to intervene at
    this time, they will be unable to appeal the final judgment as
    they would not be parties to the case. If their daughter‟s
    rights are terminated, [the grandparents] will forever be
    deprived of a legal relationship with the child, which is an
    irreparable injury. Even if they do not prevail in their petition
    for custody, if [the grandparents] are allowed to intervene
    they would at least have the opportunity to seek visitation
    with their grandson during the pendency of this matter until
    he is adopted.
    For purposes of judicial efficiency and economy, and to
    prevent the need for additional filings by [the grandparents,]
    which might delay permanent placement of the child, which
    would not be in his best interest, this Court believes the
    appeal should be permitted.
    (Paragraph numbering in original omitted.)
    II.
    In the order granting this appeal, we certified the following question:
    Whether the Trial Court erred in denying the motion to
    intervene as parties filed by the applicant/grandparents in the
    termination of parental rights proceeding below.
    III.
    With respect to intervention as a matter of right, we review the trial court‟s
    decision de novo with no presumption of correctness. Gonzalez v. State Dept. of
    Children’s Servs., 
    136 S.W.3d 613
    , 616 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Brown &
    Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
    18 S.W.3d 186
    , 191 (Tenn. 2000)). “When there is no basis
    for intervention as of right, the decision to allow intervention is a matter within the
    discretion of the trial court. This decision should not be reversed by an appellate court
    absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Shelby Cty. Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Gilless,
    
    972 S.W.2d 683
    , 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.02; Ballard v.
    3
    Herzke, 
    924 S.W.2d 652
    , 658 (Tenn. 1996)). We review the trial court‟s factual findings,
    if any, de novo with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence preponderates
    against those findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).
    IV.
    A.
    The grandparents sought to intervene as a matter of right and, alternatively, via
    permission pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24. In Tennessee, chancery, circuit, and juvenile
    courts have concurrent jurisdiction to terminate parental rights. 
    Gonzalez, 136 S.W.3d at 617
    (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(a)). As a result,
    [b]ecause the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning
    intervention would apply in both chancery and circuit court
    proceedings to terminate parental rights, and because their
    application would not compromise the efficacy of juvenile
    proceedings, we find that standing to intervene in a
    termination proceeding in juvenile court should be analyzed
    under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tenn. R.
    Civ. P. 1 (2003). Accordingly, we expressly overrule any
    holding to the contrary.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    omitted).2 Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24 provides that the authority to
    intervene may be conferred expressly by statute. 
    Gilless, 972 S.W.2d at 685
    . Without
    such express authority, “determining whether a party is entitled to judicial relief „requires
    the court to decide whether the party has a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of
    the controversy to warrant the exercise of the court‟s power on its behalf.‟ ” 
    Id. (quoting Metro.
    Air Research Testing Auth. (MARTA) v. The Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 
    842 S.W.2d 611
    , 615 (Tenn. App. 1992)).
    B.
    Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01 provides when intervention by right is permitted:
    2
    DCS and the grandparents acknowledge on appeal that as of July 1, 2016, Tenn. R. Juv. P. 304
    provides for intervention by right or by permission in juvenile court. The parties agree, as does this
    Court, that the current action should proceed under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24 because this matter began prior to
    July 1, 2016.
    4
    Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
    intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an
    unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant
    claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
    is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that
    the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
    or impede the applicant‟s ability to protect that interest,
    unless the applicant‟s interest is adequately represented by
    existing parties; or (3) by stipulation of all the parties.
    The grandparents rely on subpart (2) of the above rule. They assert that “[t]heir
    interest in the future and well-being of their grandson is obvious[.]” DCS argues that
    interest is “too attenuated” to allow intervention by right. Under our case law, “the
    precise nature of the interest required to intervene as of right has eluded exact definition.”
    In re Brian M., No. E2014-00941-COA-R3-PT, 
    2015 WL 78179
    , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.,
    filed Jan. 6, 2015). Still, the required interest “does not include a mere contingent,
    remote, or conjectural possibility of being affected as a result of the suit, but must involve
    a direct claim on the subject matter of the suit such that the intervenor will either gain or
    lose by direct operation of the judgment.” 
    Id. (quoting State
    v. Brown & Williamson
    Tobacco Corp., 
    18 S.W.3d 186
    , 192 (Tenn. 2000)). For the reasons set forth below, we
    hold that the grandparents have not established an interest sufficient to permit
    intervention by right in this termination proceeding.
    A grandparent‟s biological relationship with a child, in and of itself, is not enough
    to establish a right to intervene in a termination case brought against a child‟s parents.
    
    Gonzalez, 136 S.W.3d at 620
    . In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court analyzed the “varying
    conclusions” reached by other state courts “regarding the right of grandparents to
    intervene in dependency and neglect and termination of parental rights proceedings.” 
    Id. at 618-20.
    The Court determined that “[a]lthough it is conceivable that a grandparent
    may adduce evidence sufficient to support intervention as of right in a parental
    termination hearing, we agree with the majority of jurisdictions which hold that the
    grandparental relationship does not alone support intervention.” 
    Id. at 620
    (emphasis
    added). In support, the Gonzalez court noted that grandparents are not included in the list
    of the parties who are mandatory participants in a termination proceeding under Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 36-1-117(a) (2014). Further, subsection (d) of the same statute provides
    “[o]ther biological or legal relatives of the child . . . are not necessary parties to the
    proceeding unless they are legal guardians as defined in § 36-1-102 or legal custodians of
    the person of the child . . . at the time the petition is filed.” 
    Id. Here, the
    grandparents
    were neither the guardian nor custodian of the child at the time the petition was filed.
    5
    The grandparents point out that, in contrast to the grandparents in Gonzalez, they
    have a relationship with the child beyond that of a biological one. 
    Gonzalez, 136 S.W.3d at 615
    , 620. The child, with his parents, had lived in the grandparents‟ home until his
    removal by DCS. Grandmother asserts by affidavit that she and grandfather had
    “assumed almost all parental responsibility for [the child],” while his parents “were not
    interested or capable of caring for their son.” The grandparents argue that their role in
    caring for the child establishes their right to intervene in the current suit. In support, they
    point out that this Court previously held that a legally-protected interest sufficient to
    allow intervention by a non-parent in a termination action may arise through “the actual
    exercise of significant parental duties, control, or responsibilities for the child‟s benefit.”
    Skerrett v. The Ass’n for Guidance, No. M2002-00218-COA-R3-JV, 
    2003 WL 21634412
    , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed July 11, 2003) overruled by 
    Gonzalez 136 S.W.3d at 617
    , n.8. However, the grandparents‟ reliance on Skerrett is misplaced. The Skerrett
    court, at the outset of its analysis, held that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24 is not applicable to
    juvenile court proceedings. 
    2003 WL 21634412
    , at *2. Our Supreme Court expressly
    overruled that holding, stating that “standing to intervene in a termination proceeding in
    juvenile court should be analyzed under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”
    
    Gonzalez 136 S.W.3d at 617
    , n.8. Instead of applying Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24, the Skerrett
    court “look[ed] elsewhere for the rules and principles that should be used to determine
    whether a party should be permitted to intervene in a proceeding to terminate parental
    rights.” 
    Id. As previously
    noted, pursuant to Gonzaelz, we must determine whether
    intervention is proper under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24. Because Skerrett did not proceed under
    Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24, we decline to follow it here.
    The grandparents rely upon language from the “visitation rights of grandparents”
    statutory scheme codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(b)(2) (2015),3 to establish that
    the bond they have with their grandchild is “significant.” If the grandparents cite this
    statute to establish an interest sufficient to allow intervention in this termination
    3
    This portion of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(b) provides:
    (2) For purposes of this section, a grandparent shall be deemed to have a
    significant existing relationship with a grandchild if:
    (A) The child resided with the grandparent for at least
    six (6) consecutive months;
    (B) The grandparent was a full-time caretaker of the
    child for a period of not less than six (6) consecutive
    months; or
    (C) The grandparent had frequent visitation with the
    child who is the subject of the suit for a period of not
    less than one (1) year.
    6
    proceeding as a matter of right, their reliance is misplaced. The plain language of Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 36-6-306(b)(2) indicates that the description only applies “[f]or purposes of
    this section[.]” (Emphasis added.) Simply stated, the statute has absolutely nothing to do
    with a grandparent‟s attempt to intervene in a termination case. This is shown by the
    express language of the statute.
    Notably, despite having lived with the child, the grandparents lacked standing to
    file a termination petition under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(b)(1) (2015). Under that
    statute, “prospective adoptive . . . parents, including extended family members caring for
    a related child . . . shall have standing to file” a termination petition against the child‟s
    parents. “[P]rospective adoptive parents” are defined as
    non-agency . . . persons who are seeking to adopt a child and
    who have made application with a licensed child-placing
    agency or licensed clinical social worker or the department
    for approval, or who have been previously approved, to
    receive a child for adoption, or who have received or who
    expect to receive a surrender of a child, or who have filed a
    petition for termination or for adoption[.]
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(41) (2015). The grandparents have not established that they
    “have made application with” a licensed child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social
    worker, or DCS for approval to adopt the child, nor that they have previously received
    such approval. Significantly, a “prospective adoptive parent” is one who has “the legal
    capacity and ability” to file a petition for adoption. In re Sonya M., No. M2015-00064-
    COA-R3-PT, 
    2015 WL 4381567
    , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed July 16, 2015) (quoting In
    re Shelby L.B., No. M2010-00879-COA-R9-PT, 
    2011 WL 1225567
    , at *10 (Tenn. Ct.
    App., filed March 31, 2011)). “[P]ersons filing for adoption must have physical custody
    of the child or the right to receive physical custody pursuant to a valid surrender.” In re
    Sonya M., 
    2015 WL 4381567
    , at *3 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-111(d)(6); see In re
    Adoption of M.J.S., 
    44 S.W.3d 41
    , 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
    115(b) (2014) reserves an exception to the physical custody requirement at the time of
    filing if a party is “filing an intervening petition seeking to adopt the child.” The child
    before us has been in DCS custody since November 2014. The grandparents have not
    filed a petition for termination or for adoption, nor have they filed a petition to intervene
    in an adoption proceeding. Without meeting the definition of “prospective adoptive
    parents,” they would not have standing to file for termination.
    The grandparents assert that their “interest” will disappear “if the current action
    ends with the rights of the parents being terminated and the child being adopted[.]”
    7
    (Emphasis added.) However, “[t]he sole purpose of the termination proceeding under
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 is to sever irrevocably the legal relationship between
    biological parents and their children.” In re M.J.B., 
    140 S.W.3d 643
    , 651 (Tenn. Ct.
    App. 2004). Should the court terminate a parent‟s rights to the care and custody of a
    child,
    the court may award guardianship or partial guardianship of
    the child to a licensed child-placing agency or the department.
    Such guardianship shall include the right to place the child for
    adoption and the right to consent to the child‟s adoption.
    Upon termination of parental or guardian rights, the court
    may award guardianship or partial guardianship to any
    prospective adoptive parent or parents with the right to adopt
    the child, or to any permanent guardian who has been
    appointed pursuant to title 37, chapter 1, part 8.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(m). “[W]hen partial guardianship has been granted to DCS
    or any party, the guardianship carries certain rights that must be dealt with before another
    party can adopt the child.” In re Don Juan J.H., No. E2010-01799-COA-R3-JV, 
    2011 WL 8201843
    , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Sept. 7, 2011). If DCS is awarded
    guardianship at the conclusion of a termination action, “Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 and
    113 grant DCS the right to place the child for adoption, and to consent to the adoption.”
    
    Id. at *3
    (citing In re E.M., II, No. W2006-00663-COA-R3-CV, 
    2006 WL 3007511
    (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Oct. 24, 2006)). The child in this case will not be adopted as of the
    conclusion of the current termination action.
    Considering other jurisdictions, the Gonzalez court found “[i]n the majority of
    cases . . . grandparents are not allowed to intervene in termination cases either because
    their interests are adequately represented by the parent‟s attorney or guardian ad litem, or
    because they are deemed to have no interest in the outcome of the proceedings.”
    
    Gonzalez, 136 S.W.3d at 619
    . In In re Brian M., this Court considered grandparents‟
    request to intervene in a termination of parental rights case brought by DCS against the
    child‟s parents. 
    2015 WL 78179
    , at *1. There, the father was a convicted felon, serving
    a long prison sentence. 
    Id. The children‟s
    paternal grandparents filed a motion to
    intervene, but were denied. 
    Id. at *1-2.
    On appeal, we affirmed, finding, in part,
    [t]he pending custody petition . . . did not warrant
    intervention when Father was capable of adequately
    representing their interest in the termination proceeding. The
    parties and the court were apprised of the situation regarding
    8
    Grandparents‟ desire to adopt the Children. Indeed, Father
    testified to that fact during the proceeding.
    
    Id. at *4.
    Here, DCS argues that if the grandparents established an interest in the current
    action, that interest would be “adequately represented” by the parents. Under Tenn. R.
    Civ. P. 24.01(2) intervention is inappropriate where “the applicant‟s interest is adequately
    represented by existing parties.” The grandparents maintain that if they are “allowed to
    intervene, their testimony will be against the interests of the parents[.]” However, mother
    expressed support for the grandparents‟ position in a brief she filed in the current appeal.
    She stated that she “does not refute that [the grandparents] and [the child] were extremely
    bonded” and expressed her desire for the child to be returned to their home. We find that
    mother would adequately represent any interest the grandparents have in the termination
    action. As a result, intervention as a matter of right is not appropriate under Tenn. R.
    Civ. P. 24.01.
    C.
    We also must consider the grandparents‟ request for permissive intervention:
    Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
    intervene in an action: . . . (2) when an applicant‟s claim or
    defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
    common. In exercising discretion the court shall consider
    whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
    the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
    Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.02(2). “Where . . . a common question of law or fact is established,
    the decision to allow intervention is a matter entrusted to the trial court‟s discretion, and
    the decision should not be reversed by an appellate court absent a showing of abuse of
    discretion.” 
    Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 658
    . “An abuse of discretion exists when the
    reviewing court is firmly convinced that the lower court has made a mistake in that it
    affirmatively appears that the lower court‟s decision has no basis in law or in fact and is
    therefore arbitrary, illogical, or unconscionable.” 
    Brown, 18 S.W.3d at 191
    (citing
    
    Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 661
    ). Here, the grandparents do not address how the trial court
    abused its discretion. Instead, they simply state that they raised a common question –
    “that of [C.H.]‟s future” and a desire to “vigorously pursue [the child]‟s best interest.” In
    In re Brian M., this Court affirmed a trial court‟s denial of a motion to intervene despite
    concluding that “[t]he proceedings admittedly had a question of law or fact in common,
    namely the best interest of the [c]hildren.” 
    2015 WL 78179
    , at *4. There, we affirmed
    9
    after finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion or act against logic in concluding
    intervention was not proper under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.02. 
    Id. We find
    that the gravamen of the grandparents‟ argument is in support of their
    position that they are entitled to visitation with or custody of the child. To this point, the
    trial court stated the grandparents seek permission to intervene “with a view to obtaining
    visitation with and/or custody of their grandson[.]” In the current appeal, the
    grandparents seek to intervene in a termination of parental rights proceeding, which has
    the “sole purpose” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 of “sever[ing] irrevocably the
    legal relationship between biological parents and their children.” In re 
    M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 651
    . “Permissive intervention is generally not proper when the intervenor
    seeks to raise new claims or issues against the existing parties.” 
    Brown, 18 S.W.3d at 191
    (citing Ariz. v. Calif., 
    460 U.S. 605
    , 614 (1983)). We find any efforts by the
    grandparents to obtain visitation through intervention in a termination proceeding are
    misplaced. For the reasons set forth above, we find no abuse of discretion in denying the
    grandparents‟ motion to intervene.
    “This ruling, made at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings, does not leave
    the [grandparents] without a remedy. They may participate in the termination
    proceedings as witnesses,” pursue adoption, or seek other appropriate options. 
    Gonzalez, 136 S.W.3d at 620
    .
    V.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed to the
    appellant grandparents, J.H. and S.J. This case is remanded to the trial court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    _______________________________
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
    10