Mace, Mario v. Express Services, Inc. , 2015 TN WC App. 47 ( 2015 )


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  •              TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
    WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
    Mario Mace                                  )   Docket No. 2015-06-0059
    )
    v.                                          )
    )   State File No. 88006-2014
    Express Services, Inc.                      )
    )
    )
    Appeal from the Court of Workers’           )
    Compensation Claims                         )
    Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge             )
    Affirmed and Remanded – Filed December 11, 2015
    In this second interlocutory appeal of this case, the employee contends that he is entitled
    to temporary partial disability benefits notwithstanding his termination for using profane
    language in the workplace. The employer deemed the employee’s actions to be
    insubordination and unprofessional conduct, which were prohibited by an employee
    handbook, and terminated his employment. The employee claimed that his misconduct
    was a pretext for terminating him for his work injury. The trial court determined that the
    employer provided appropriate light-duty work and that the termination was not
    pretextual. Accordingly, the trial court denied the employee’s request for temporary
    partial disability benefits. We affirm.
    Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which
    Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined.
    William B. Hicky, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellant, Mario Mace
    Gregory H. Fuller, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Express Services,
    Inc.
    1
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Mario Mace (“Employee”), a forty-five-year-old resident of Humphreys County,
    Tennessee, was employed by Express Services, Inc. (“Employer”), a temporary staffing
    agency. He was assigned to work at Tennessee Bun Company in its shipping and
    receiving department when, on November 4, 2014, a mishap with a dolly caused stacks of
    bread trays to fall on him, injuring his left shoulder.
    Employee’s authorized physician, Dr. Damon Petty, recommended surgery to
    repair a torn rotator cuff and a labral tear in Employee’s left shoulder. Employer declined
    to authorize the surgery, and Employee filed a petition seeking to compel Employer to
    provide medical treatment as recommended by Dr. Petty. Following an evidentiary
    hearing, the trial court agreed that the requested medical benefits were appropriate and
    entered an order on April 27, 2015, directing Employer to provide the treatment
    recommended by Dr. Petty. Employer appealed and, on June 19, 2015, we affirmed the
    trial court’s decision.
    Two months later, on August 18, 2015, Employee filed a second petition, this time
    claiming that Employer was improperly denying temporary disability benefits based on
    his March 17, 2015 termination after he “stormed out of Employer’s office” the previous
    day. Employee was terminated for using profane language as he walked through
    Employer’s lobby where co-workers and prospective employees were present and heard
    what he said.
    The events leading up to Employee’s termination are not seriously in dispute.
    Because Dr. Petty had assigned work restrictions prohibiting Employee from using his
    left arm at work, Employer elected to provide light-duty work for him in its office.1 The
    work involved clerical duties such as compiling packets of documents, paper clipping
    documents, and assembling employee handbooks. He was also asked to empty trash cans
    and clean the parking lot. Employer provided a tool for grabbing the trash and would
    assist in moving trash receptacles so that Employee would be able to perform this task
    using only his right arm.
    Employee testified that it was difficult to put on shirts with sleeves due to his
    shoulder injury, so he began wearing sleeveless shirts with a jacket over his shoulder. At
    one point, Employer’s owner saw Employee and inquired about his attire. After
    Employee explained why he was wearing a shirt with no sleeves, the owner agreed that
    Employee could continue to wear sleeveless shirts as long as he covered his arms while
    working in locations visible to the public. Pam Kuhns, Employer’s manager, testified
    1
    Employee was taken completely off work for a period of time after undergoing surgery on his shoulder
    in July 2015. Temporary total disability benefits were paid for that period, and those benefits are not in
    dispute.
    2
    that Employee was required to cover his arms because he had tattoos the owner
    considered unprofessional in the workplace.
    On March 16, 2015, Employee was asked to clean the parking lot and, because the
    day was warm, he removed his jacket. After completing his assigned task, he went inside
    without wearing his jacket and received a written warning from Ms. Kuhns for violating
    “[d]ress code for office.” Ms. Kuhns noted on the warning that the next warning could
    result in termination. Employee then walked through Employer’s reception area and
    stated “this is unf_cking believable.” Employee testified that he did not intend for
    anyone to hear him and that his comment was not directed at any particular person.
    Rather, he stated that he was frustrated with having been, in his opinion, unfairly
    disciplined. Additionally, he testified that he believed Employer had assigned him tasks
    outside his restrictions in an effort to make him quit.
    Employee returned to work the next day and was again asked to clean the parking
    lot. He complied and, upon completion, entered Employer’s building and requested a
    copy of his write-up, which Ms. Kuhns provided. He also requested a copy of the dress
    code, which was not provided. Ms. Kuhns then instructed Employee to see her in her
    office, at which time he was terminated. Ms. Kuhns testified that the termination was due
    to Employee’s unacceptable use of profanity in the workplace the previous day. She also
    testified that Employer had a “good reputation in the community” and that saying the “f-
    word” in the workplace was unprofessional. She considered Employee’s language to be
    insubordination and stated that he “was dismissed for his misconduct for what he said in
    the lobby, with people out in the lobby.” For his part, Employee admitted that what he
    said was unprofessional and “obscene,” that people were in the lobby, and that his
    termination was due to what he said rather than his attire. He also acknowledged having
    received an employee handbook stating that grounds for dismissal included
    “insubordination,” “unprofessional conduct,” and “lewd behavior.”
    An individual assigned to work the front desk, Denny Molsberry, testified that she
    was able to hear Employee’s comment and that, at the time he made the comment, two
    prospective employees were in the waiting area. She stated that, based on their reactions
    when Employee left the building, it was clear that they heard him as well.
    Employee asserted that he was entitled to temporary partial disability benefits
    because his termination was pretextual and that he was justifiably frustrated Employer
    was not providing work within his restrictions. The trial court was unpersuaded and
    denied Employee’s request for temporary partial disability benefits. Employee appealed,
    and the record was received by the Appeals Board Clerk on December 2, 2015.
    3
    Standard of Review
    The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision is statutorily mandated
    and limited in scope. Specifically, “[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and
    conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of
    the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2014). The trial court’s
    decision must be upheld unless the rights of a party “have been prejudiced because
    findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers’ compensation judge:
    (A)    Violate constitutional or statutory provisions;
    (B)    Exceed the statutory authority of the workers’ compensation judge;
    (C)    Do not comply with lawful procedure;
    (D)    Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or
    clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion;
    (E)    Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material
    in the light of the entire record.”
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). Like other courts applying the standards
    embodied in section 50-6-217(a)(3), we will not disturb the decision of the trial court
    absent the limited circumstances identified in the statute.
    Analysis
    Employee contends that his termination was pretextual and, as such, should be
    disregarded and temporary disability benefits ordered. Employer responds that Employee
    was terminated for using profane language in the workplace, which it considered to be
    insubordination, unprofessional conduct, and lewd behavior, all of which were prohibited
    by an employee handbook Employee admitted receiving. The trial court ruled that
    Employer’s decision to terminate Employee was reasonable. We agree.
    As the name implies, an injured worker is entitled to temporary partial disability
    benefits, a category of vocational disability distinct from temporary total disability, when
    the temporary disability is not total. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(1)-(2) (2014).
    Specifically, while temporary total disability refers to the employee’s condition while
    completely unable to work because of the injury until the worker recovers as far as the
    nature of the injury permits, “[t]emporary partial disability refers to the time, if any,
    during which the injured employee is able to resume some gainful employment but has
    not reached maximum recovery.” Williams v. Saturn Corp., No. M2004-01215-WC-R3-
    CV, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1032, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Nov. 15, 2005).
    However, even though an employee has a work-related injury for which temporary
    benefits are payable, an employer may still enforce workplace rules. Carter v. First
    Source Furniture Grp., 
    92 S.W.3d 367
    , 368 (Tenn. 2002). Thus, a termination due to a
    4
    violation of workplace rules may relieve an employer of its obligation to provide
    temporary partial disability benefits, provided the termination was related to the
    workplace violation. See Marvin Windows of Tenn., Inc. v. Gardner, No. W2011-01479-
    WC-R3-WC, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 403, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel June 8, 2012).
    When confronted with such a case, courts must “consider the employer’s need to enforce
    workplace rules and the reasonableness of the contested rules.”
    Id. at 10.
    An employer
    will not be penalized for enforcing a policy if the court determines “(1) that the actions
    allegedly precipitating the employee’s dismissal qualified as misconduct under
    established or ordinary workplace rules and/or expectations; and (2) that those actions
    were, as a factual matter, the true motivation for the dismissal.” Durham v. Cracker
    Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., No. E2008-00708-WC-R3-WC, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 3, at
    *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 5, 2009).
    Applying these principles to this case, it is undisputed that Employer had a policy,
    reflected in its employee handbook, prohibiting “insubordination,” “unprofessional
    conduct,” and “lewd behavior.” The handbook made clear that such behavior constituted
    grounds for dismissal, and it is uncontroverted that Employee had received the handbook.
    It is also undisputed that Employee used profanity in the lobby of Employer’s premises
    and was overheard by other people. Employee admitted that what he said was
    unprofessional and “obscene.” Employee’s supervisor, Ms. Kuhns, testified that
    Employer had a “good reputation in the community” and that she considered Employee’s
    language to be unprofessional, disrespectful, and insubordinate. She also testified that
    Employee’s language was a violation of Employer’s rules. None of this evidence was
    contradicted. Thus, we have no difficulty concluding “that the actions allegedly
    precipitating the employee’s dismissal qualified as misconduct under established or
    ordinary workplace rules and/or expectations.”
    Id. Employee makes much
    of the fact that he was not given a copy of the dress code
    and argues that, in any event, the dress code did not apply to him. However, the record is
    clear that Employee was terminated for his actions in the lobby, not for what he was
    wearing or not wearing. Ms. Kuhns testified that Employee “was dismissed for his
    misconduct for what he said in the lobby, with people out in the lobby.” Employee
    himself admitted that his termination was due to his profane language rather than his
    attire. We also note that, although Employee testified he did not direct his language at
    any particular person and did not intend to be overheard, the area where he chose to make
    his comment contained other people who did hear what he said. Given these
    circumstances, we likewise have no difficulty concluding that “those actions were, as a
    factual matter, the true motivation for the dismissal.”
    Id. Finally, Employee argues
    that his termination should be disregarded because
    Employer failed to accommodate his restrictions. The trial court correctly found that,
    while it may have been difficult to complete some of the tasks assigned to Employee
    without using his left arm, it was not impossible to do so. The trial court also correctly
    5
    noted that Employee had performed these tasks for several months without requesting
    any change in his assignments or asking Dr. Petty to change his restrictions. Employee
    never complained about being unable to perform the tasks given to him and, according to
    Ms. Kuhns, she would have given him different responsibilities had he done so. Ms.
    Kuhns also testified that she instructed Employee to work within his restrictions and to
    notify her if he needed help. This evidence was uncontradicted as well. Accordingly, the
    trial court’s decision is affirmed.
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate
    against the trial court’s decision or violate any of the standards identified in Tennessee
    Code Annotated section 50-6-217(a)(3). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision
    and remand the case for any further proceedings that may be necessary.
    6
    TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
    WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
    Mario Mace                                               )   Docket No. 2015-06-0059
    )
    v.                                                       )
    )    State File No. 88006-2014
    Express Services, Inc.                                   )
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the
    referenced case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service
    on this the 11th day of December, 2015.
    Name                    Certified   First Class   Via   Fax       Via     Email Address
    Mail        Mail          Fax   Number    Email
    William Hicky                                                        X    will@hickylaw.com
    Gregory Fuller                                                       X    ghfuller@mijs.com
    Kenneth M. Switzer,                                                  X    Via Electronic Mail
    Chief Judge
    Penny Shrum, Clerk,                                                  X     Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov
    Court of Workers’
    Compensation Claims
    Matthew Salyer
    Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
    220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
    Nashville, TN 37243
    Telephone: 615-253-1606
    Electronic Mail: Matthew.Salyer@tn.gov
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015-06-0059

Citation Numbers: 2015 TN WC App. 47

Judges: Marshall L. Davidson III, David F. Hensley, Timothy W. Conner

Filed Date: 12/11/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/9/2021