People v. Hoggard , 2017 COA 88 ( 2017 )

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA88
Court of Appeals No. 14CA1393
Douglas County District Court No. 13CR145
Honorable Paul A. King, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Shawna Lee Hoggard,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Furman and Terry, JJ., concur
Announced June 29, 2017
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Meghan M. Morris, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 During the course of a heated child-custody dispute,
defendant Shawna Lee Hoggard forwarded to the court-appointed
child and family investigator (CFI) a chain of e-mails between her
and her ex-husband. Hoggard allegedly falsified that e-mail chain
by adding five sentences that made it appear that her ex-husband
had threatened her. As a result of that alleged falsification,
Hoggard was charged with (and ultimately convicted of) second
degree forgery and attempt to influence a public servant. Hoggard
appeals those convictions.
¶2 On appeal, Hoggard contends that the jury was erroneously
instructed on both charges. First, she contends that the trial court
constructively amended the second degree forgery charge by
instructing the jury on the uncharged and more serious offense of
felony forgery. Second, she contends that the trial court erred in its
instruction on attempt to influence a public servant by instructing
the jury that the “intent” element applied only to one element of the
offense, when, in fact, the intent element applies to two additional
elements of the offense as well.
¶3 Hoggard acknowledges that she did not raise either of the
alleged errors that she identifies on appeal during trial, but
1
contends that those instructional errors require reversal of her
convictions as plain error. The People contend that appellate review
is entirely barred because Hoggard either invited the error or waived
her right to review by not objecting at trial when given the
opportunity to do so. The People further argue that even if we
conclude that appellate review is appropriate, the instructions do
not merit reversal under the plain error standard.
¶4 We reject the People’s argument that the invited error or
waiver doctrines bar appellate review under the circumstances of
this case and, instead, conclude that the instructional errors are
subject to plain error review. We further conclude that the trial
court committed obvious instructional error in both instances. But
we disagree that the trial court’s error as to the second degree
forgery charge effected a constructive amendment of that charge or
constituted plain error. We finally conclude that there is no
reasonable probability that the trial court’s failure to instruct the
jury on the required mental state for each element of the attempt to
influence a public servant charge contributed to Hoggard’s
conviction of that offense and, therefore, was not plain error. We
affirm.
2
I. Background
¶5 In the course of her investigation, the CFI received an e-mail
from Hoggard forwarding a chain of what purported to be prior
correspondence between her and her ex-husband. The forwarded
e-mail chain included a threat ostensibly made by Hoggard’s
ex-husband. The CFI forwarded the e-mail chain to Hoggard’s
ex-husband with the threatening language highlighted and asked
what his intent was in writing the e-mail. He responded that he did
not write the threatening portion of the e-mail. He sent the CFI a
copy of what he said was the original e-mail, which did not contain
the threatening language. Hoggard’s ex-husband then contacted
the police to report that an e-mail in his name had been falsified.
¶6 Hoggard provided the investigating police officer with access to
her e-mail account, including a folder of correspondence with her
ex-husband. The officer found a version of the e-mail identical to
that which had been forwarded to the CFI, except that it did not
include the threatening language. But when the officer accessed
Hoggard’s sent folder, he found the version of the e-mail containing
the threatening language.
3
¶7 Hoggard was charged with attempt to influence a public
servant, a class 4 felony, and second degree forgery, a class 1
misdemeanor.
¶8 As discussed at greater length below, the prosecutor tendered
to the court an instruction for second degree forgery that tracked
the elements of felony forgery and an instruction for attempt to
influence a public servant that did not set the mens rea element of
intent out as a separate element. At the jury instruction
conference, neither side requested any changes to the instructions
tendered by the prosecution.
¶9 Hoggard appeals both convictions based on independent
contentions of unpreserved instructional error.
II. Reviewability of Instructional Error
¶ 10 The People argue that, as a threshold matter, the doctrines of
invited error and waiver preclude appellate review of Hoggard’s
instructional error claims. The People contend that defense counsel
approved the disputed jury instructions, thereby either inviting the
errors of which Hoggard now complains or waiving any right to
appellate review of the asserted instructional errors. We disagree.
4
A. Invited Error
¶ 11 The invited error doctrine is premised on “the rule that a party
may not complain on appeal of an error that [s]he has invited or
injected into the case.” People v. Zapata, 779 P.2d 1307, 1309
(Colo. 1989). The doctrine applies “where [a] party expressly
acquiesces to conduct by the court or the opposing party,” Horton v.
Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 619 (Colo. 2002), and precludes appellate
review of instructional error if that error was “injected by the
defendant as a matter of trial strategy,” Zapata, 779 P.2d at 1309.
Invited error may also be found where an “omission [by counsel] is
strategic.” People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 119 (Colo. 2002). The
invited error doctrine, however, “does not preclude appellate review
of errors resulting from attorney incompetence” or from
inadvertence. People v. Gross, 2012 CO 60M, ¶ 9 (citing Stewart,
55 P.3d at 119).
¶ 12 We conclude that defense counsel’s failure to object to the
instructional errors does not amount to invited error.
¶ 13 With respect to the jury instruction on the charge of attempt
to influence a public servant, the crux of Hoggard’s defense to that
charge was that she did not act with the intent necessary to satisfy
5
the “attempt[] to influence a public servant” and “by means of
deceit” elements. She asserts that the instruction is erroneous
because it did not specify the culpable mental state required for
those very elements. Given the juxtaposition between trial strategy
and the asserted error in the instruction, we discern no plausible
strategic motive for defense counsel’s failure to object, and,
therefore, conclude that counsel’s failure was an oversight, not a
strategy. See Stewart, 55 P.3d at 119 (finding no invited error
based on, inter alia, “the heavy reliance [defendant] placed on [a]
theory during trial”). Thus, invited error does not apply here.
¶ 14 As to the jury instruction on second degree forgery, we note
that the only distinction between the two offenses is that felony
forgery requires additional proof that the falsified document was of
a particular type. Because the type of document at issue (an
e-mail) was never contested at trial, we are persuaded that defense
counsel’s failure to object was, likewise, the result of inadvertence,
and that any error was not invited.
B. Waiver
¶ 15 The lines distinguishing the doctrine of invited error from that
of waiver are not precisely drawn. See People v. Rediger, 2015 COA
6
26, ¶ 56 (cert. granted Feb. 16, 2016) (citing decisions treating
“implied waiver” as synonymous with “invited error”); People v.
Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 937 n.7 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Invited error is
akin to waived error.”). Although divisions of this court have
recently clarified the parameters of waiver, see People v. Rail, 2016
COA 24, ¶¶ 27-41; Rediger, ¶¶ 51-60, the precise contours of the
waiver doctrine in Colorado are not yet clearly settled.1 Each
division of this court that has analyzed the waiver issue, however,
has held that waiver requires some “affirmative conduct,” albeit to
varying degrees. See, e.g., People v. Yoder, 2016 COA 50, ¶ 10
(finding waiver where counsel objected to certain protective order
provisions, but stated that he had no objection to others); Rail,
¶¶ 36-37 (finding instructional error claim waived by “affirmative
conduct”); Rediger, ¶¶ 59-61. Although Rediger provides the closest
analogy to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the
1 The Colorado Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review
whether the division in Rediger “erred in applying the waiver
doctrine as a complete bar to appellate review” on the basis of
defense counsel’s statement that counsel was “satisfied” with the
tendered jury instruction, but where defense counsel was unaware
that the tendered instruction erroneously included an uncharged
offense. See People v. Rediger, No. 15SC326, 2016 WL 1746021
(Colo. Feb. 16, 2016) (unpublished order).
7
facts before us are distinguishable, though not markedly, from
those presented in Rediger.
¶ 16 In Rediger, the court ordered the prosecutor to prepare
proposed jury instructions before trial, and ordered defense counsel
to file any objections within two days following the submission of
the prosecutor’s proposed instructions. Rediger, ¶ 45. The
proposed instructions included elemental instructions under a
different subsection of the statute than was charged in the
information. Id. Defense counsel did not object. Id. During jury
selection, the court described the charges against the defendant
using the erroneous instruction, and defense counsel did not object.
Id. at ¶ 46. After the close of evidence and following a jury
instruction conference, the court asked if defense counsel was
“satisfied with the instructions”; defense counsel responded, “Yes.
Defense is satisfied.” Id. at ¶ 47. The court then instructed the
jury using the erroneous instruction; again, defense counsel did not
object. Id. at ¶ 48. Based on these circumstances, the Rediger
division concluded that, through counsel’s “affirmative conduct,”
the defendant had waived any claim of instructional error or relief
based on any alleged constructive amendment. Id. at ¶ 64.
8
¶ 17 Here, the prosecution’s proposed jury instructions were
provided on the morning of the first day of trial, without the
opportunity to deliberate and object that had been present in
Rediger. Further, the errors in the instructions alleged by Hoggard
were not evident during the court’s initial reading of the charges to
the jury, again in contrast to Rediger. Finally, at the close of the
jury instruction conference, defense counsel merely said that there
was no objection from the defense, and did not affirmatively state
that the defense was “satisfied” with the instructions, as was relied
on in Rediger. Thus, Rediger is factually distinguishable, albeit
thinly.
¶ 18 To the extent, however, that a fair reading of Rediger’s waiver
analysis reaches the facts presented here — and there is a sound
argument that it does, see Rediger, ¶ 57 (noting that “[n]o Colorado
case has tempered waiver by distinguishing mere general
acquiescence from other forms of affirmative conduct”) — we
respectfully decline to follow it. This is a run-of-the-mill example of
an unpreserved jury instruction appeal: the prosecution tendered
instructions; the court asked if there were any objections; both
sides simply said, “no”; and the court gave the instructions as
9
tendered. This is the heartland of plain error instructional review.
Indeed, if failing to object to an instruction is waiver and objecting
is preservation, the space remaining for plain error review in the
instructional error context diminishes nearly to the point of
vanishing.
¶ 19 Refusing to find waiver here does not give the defendant a free
pass for failing to timely object; she must still run the daunting
gauntlet of plain error review to obtain any relief. Moreover, finding
waiver here would have perverse consequences. If simply stating
“no objection” constitutes waiver barring even plain error review,
then counsel’s only readily apparent option to avoid waiver is to
take no position at all (or refuse to answer) when asked by the trial
court if there is any objection. The practical effect of not objecting
when invited to do so and taking no position is the same: conveying
to the court that no particularized objection comes to defense
counsel’s mind. But the latter creates an unnecessarily
antagonistic trial environment by obligating prudent defense
counsel to “take no position” each time the trial court invites input
but no specific objection comes to mind.
10
¶ 20 Thus, we hold that waiver does not bar appellate review under
the circumstances presented here. See People v. Perez-Rodriguez,
2017 COA 77, ¶ 28 (holding that counsel’s statement of “no
objection” in response to “the court’s inquiry [that] grouped all
twenty-four instructions” together “does not establish deliberate
conduct sufficient to support invited error or waiver”); see also
United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125, 1130 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012)
(holding that defense counsel had not waived right to appeal by
replying, “No, Your Honor” when trial court asked whether there
were objections to jury instructions); United States v. Zubia-Torres,
550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here must be some
evidence that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, beyond
counsel’s rote statement that she is not objecting . . . .”). We next
turn to the merits of Hoggard’s appeal.
III. Second Degree Forgery Instructional Error
¶ 21 The trial court gave the jury the following elemental
instruction for second degree forgery:
The elements of the crime of Second Degree
Forgery are:
1. That the defendant,
11
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the
date and place charged,
3. with intent to defraud,
4. falsely made, completed, or uttered a
written instrument,
5. which was or purported to be, or which was
calculated to become or represent if completed
an instrument which does or may evidence,
create, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest,
obligation, or status; namely, an email.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 22 While paragraphs one through four correctly describe the
elements of second degree forgery, paragraph five is an element of
felony forgery,2 not second degree forgery.
¶ 23 As relevant here, felony forgery is described as follows:
(1) A person commits forgery, if, with intent to
defraud, such person falsely makes, completes,
alters, or utters a written instrument which is or
purports to be, or which is calculated to
become or to represent if completed:
...
2 The two offenses are “forgery,” which is a class 5 felony, and
“second degree forgery,” which is class 1 misdemeanor. For the
sake of clarity, we refer to the former as “felony forgery” in this
opinion.
12
(c) A deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment,
commercial instrument, promissory note,
check, or other instrument which does or may
evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or
otherwise affect a legal right, interest,
obligation, or status . . . .
§ 18-5-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2016 (emphasis added).
¶ 24 Second degree forgery covers all other written instruments:
A person commits second degree forgery if,
with intent to defraud, such person falsely
makes, completes, alters, or utters a written
instrument of a kind not described in section
18-5-102 . . . .
§ 18-5-104(1), C.R.S. 2016 (emphasis added).
¶ 25 Under this comprehensive statutory scheme, it is always a
crime when a person “with intent to defraud, . . . falsely makes,
completes, alters, or utters a written instrument,” but it is only a
felony when the written instrument is of a type specified in section
18-5-102(1).
¶ 26 Hoggard argues that her conviction for second degree forgery
must be reversed because the trial court constructively amended
the second degree forgery charge when it gave an instruction that
tracked the elements of felony forgery. Although the trial court’s
forgery instruction was erroneous, we conclude that the erroneous
13
instruction neither effected a constructive amendment nor
constituted plain error. We, therefore, affirm the conviction.
A. There Was No Constructive Amendment
¶ 27 A constructive amendment occurs when a court “changes an
essential element of the charged offense and thereby alters the
substance of the charging instrument.” People v. Rodriguez, 914
P.2d 230, 257 (Colo. 1996). Constructively amending a charge
violates a defendant’s constitutional due process rights because it
subjects the defendant to the risk of conviction for an offense that
was not originally charged. Id. In other words, a constructive
amendment presents a risk that a defendant’s conviction is based
on conduct different than what was charged in the information.
See People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 461 (Colo. 2005) (“To prevail
on a constructive amendment claim, a defendant must demonstrate
that either the proof at trial or the trial court’s jury instructions so
altered an essential element of the charge that, upon review, it is
uncertain whether the defendant was convicted of conduct that was
the subject of the grand jury’s indictment.” (quoting United States v.
Milstein, 401 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2005))). Here, the erroneous jury
instruction did not result in the government proving conduct
14
different than what was charged; instead, the government
unnecessarily assumed the burden of proving everything that was
charged and more.
¶ 28 In People v. Riley, 2015 COA 152, a division of this court
considered an instructional error identical to the one presented
here and concluded that the trial court’s error constructively
amended the charge against the defendant. Id. at ¶ 15. In reaching
its conclusion, however, the Riley division specifically rejected the
People’s argument that the erroneous instruction did not effect a
constructive amendment and reversal was not warranted because
second degree forgery is a lesser included offense of felony forgery.
Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. That is where we part ways with the division in
Riley. See People v. Isom, 2015 COA 89, ¶ 17 (cert. granted on other
grounds Nov. 23, 2015) (A division of the court of appeals is not
bound to follow the precedent established by another division “if
our analysis leads us to a different result.”).
¶ 29 The Riley division relied exclusively on the “statutory
elements” test to conclude that second degree forgery is not a lesser
included offense of felony forgery. Riley, ¶ 16 (citing People in
Interest of H.W., III, 226 P.3d 1134, 1138 (Colo. App. 2009)); see
15
also § 18-1-408(5)(a), C.R.S. 2016. We agree with the Riley division
that second degree forgery is not a lesser included offense of felony
forgery under the “statutory elements” test. But the statutory
elements test is not the exclusive test for determining whether an
offense is a lesser included offense of another. See Reyna-Abarca v.
People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 51 n.3 (recognizing that section 18-1-
408(5)(c) provides a distinct basis from the “strict elements” test for
determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense); People
v. Raymer, 662 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Colo. 1983) (“We neither held nor
implied . . . that subsection (5)(a) of section 18-1-408 constituted
the only test of a lesser included offense.”).
¶ 30 We decline to follow Riley because we conclude that second
degree forgery is a lesser included offense of felony forgery under
the test set forth in section 18-1-408(5)(c) — a test which the Riley
division was never asked to consider and did not address.
¶ 31 Section 18-1-408(5)(c) provides:
(5) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in an offense charged in the
indictment or the information. An offense is so
included when:
...
16
(c) It differs from the offense charged only in
the respect that a less serious injury or risk of
injury to the same person, property, or public
interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices
to establish its commission.
¶ 32 After considering the “single-distinction” test set forth in
section 18-1-408(5)(c), we conclude that second degree forgery is a
lesser included offense of felony forgery. The mens rea and actus
reus elements for both forgery offenses are identical; to commit
either offense, a person must, “with intent to defraud, . . . falsely
make[], complete[], alter[], or utter[] a written instrument.” The
offenses differ only with respect to the type of document involved in
the crime. See § 18-5-102(a)-(h), C.R.S. 2016. The second degree
forgery offense does not enumerate types of documents that give
rise to a misdemeanor charge. Instead, the statute states that “[a]
person commits second degree forgery if” that person falsifies “a
written instrument of a kind not described in section 18-5-102 or
18-5-104.5.” § 18-5-104 (emphasis added).
¶ 33 The catch-all structure of the second degree forgery statute
allows a defendant to be fairly convicted of the misdemeanor offense
without a particularized finding as to the type of document that was
falsified. The distinction between the offenses, therefore, boils down
17
to felony forgery’s requirement that the falsified document be of a
particular type. Second degree forgery does not require proof of
that element. Because this is the only distinction between the two
offenses, we hold that second degree forgery is, indeed, a lesser
included offense of felony forgery under the test set forth in section
18-1-408(5)(c). And, therefore, instructing the jury on felony forgery
was not a constructive amendment because Hoggard was both
charged with and convicted of second degree forgery, a lesser
included offense of felony forgery.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error
¶ 34 Having concluded that there was no constructive amendment,
we turn to whether Hoggard has shown plain instructional error.
See Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 733 (Colo. 2006) (unpreserved
claims of instructional error are reviewed for plain error). To
reverse a conviction for plain error, we must find that (1) an error
occurred; (2) the error was obvious; and (3) the error so undermined
the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast doubt on the
judgment’s reliability. People v. Helms, 2016 COA 90, ¶ 14. “As
applied to jury instructions, the defendant must ‘demonstrate not
only that the instruction affected a substantial right, but also that
18
the record reveals a reasonable possibility that the error contributed
to [her] conviction.’” People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005)
(quoting People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001)).
¶ 35 We cannot find plain error here. While the trial court made an
instructional error and that error was obvious, Hoggard was not
prejudiced by the error. As noted above, the only distinction
between the offenses is that felony forgery specifies certain types of
documents that give rise to a felony charge. But the type of falsified
document (an e-mail) was never disputed at trial. Therefore, there
is no reasonable likelihood that the instructional error affected the
outcome of the trial. Hoggard was charged with and convicted of
second degree forgery. While the jury was erroneously instructed
on felony forgery, Hoggard’s defense to that uncharged offense is
necessarily the same as the defense she put on at trial. Thus, we
cannot identify any plausible way in which the trial court’s error
affected the outcome of the trial.
¶ 36 We, therefore, conclude that Hoggard’s conviction for second
degree forgery, a lesser included offense of the instructed offense,
must be affirmed, notwithstanding the instructional error. Cf.
People v. Shields, 822 P.2d 15, 22 (Colo. 1991) (finding no plain
19
error where “[n]ot only did the instructional error committed . . . not
prejudice the defendant, it inured to his benefit”); cf. People v.
Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1006-07 (Colo. 2003) (sustaining
conviction for lesser included offense where jury was erroneously
instructed on greater offense and convicted); see also id. at 1006
(citing Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 305-06 & n.15
(1996), to note that the United States Supreme Court has
“approv[ed] the practice of substituting conviction for a lesser
included offense when a conviction for a greater offense is reversed
on grounds exclusively related to the greater offense”).
IV. Attempt to Influence a Public Servant
¶ 37 Hoggard next argues that her conviction for attempt to
influence a public servant must be reversed because the trial court
did not instruct the jury on the required mens rea for each element
of the offense, thereby violating her constitutional due process
rights. She contends that, by including the intent requirement in
only one element, the instruction contravened the statutory
presumption that a mental state specified for an offense applies to
all elements of that offense. Hoggard argues that the trial court’s
erroneous jury instruction is plain error. We disagree.
20
¶ 38 We review this issue of unpreserved instructional error
challenge for plain error.
A. The Instruction Was Erroneous
¶ 39 The attempt to influence a public servant statute reads as
follows:
Any person who attempts to influence any
public servant by means of deceit or by threat
of violence or economic reprisal against any
person or property, with the intent thereby to
alter or affect the public servant’s decision,
vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter
which is to be considered or performed by him
or the agency or body of which he is a member,
commits a class 4 felony.
§ 18-8-306, C.R.S. 2016.
¶ 40 Because the statute prescribes the culpable mental state of
“intent” for one element, the same mens rea must be proved for
each element of the offense, unless an intent to limit its application
“clearly appears.” § 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. 2016; accord People v.
Coleby, 34 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. 2001); People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12,
¶ 11. No such intent clearly appears in the attempt to influence a
public servant statute — and neither party contends otherwise.
Therefore, the mens rea requirement of “intent” applies to each
element of the offense.
21
¶ 41 The trial court gave the following instruction on the charge of
attempt to influence a public servant:
The elements of the crime of Attempt to
Influence a Public Servant are:
1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the
date and place charged,
3. attempted to influence a public servant,
4. by means of deceit,
5. with the intent to alter or affect the public
servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action
concerning any matter,
6. which was considered or performed by
the public servant or the agency or body of
which the public servant was a member.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 42 Although the trial court’s instruction on the charge tracked
the text of the statute, it did not expressly require the jury to find
that Hoggard acted with intent as to the third and fourth elements
of the crime — namely, that she intended to attempt to influence a
public servant, and that she intended to do so by means of deceit.
See Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 663-64 (Colo. 2005); People v.
Suazo, 87 P.3d 124, 128 (Colo. App. 2003) (finding an instruction
22
erroneous when the mens rea element of “knowingly” was included
in only one of the two conduct elements). Nor did the instruction
set off the mens rea requirement as a separate element. See People
v. Bornman, 953 P.2d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 1997) (collecting cases
in which the court found no reversible instructional error because
the trial court had offset the mens rea requirement as a stand-alone
element of jury instructions); see also COLJI-Crim. 8-3:09 (2016)
(setting off the intent requirement as a separate element for the
offense of attempt to influence a public servant).
¶ 43 The People contend that setting off the mens rea element
separately is not necessary here because “attempt[ing] to influence”
someone or acting “by means of deceit” are inherently intentional
acts, even without explicitly attaching any mens rea element. This
argument would have some purchase if this were a general intent
offense requiring only knowing conduct. But because this is a
specific intent offense requiring intentional conduct, we are not
persuaded.
¶ 44 Attempt is not inherently intentional; instead, attempt usually
shares the same mental state required for the predicate offense. Cf.
§ 18-2-101(1), C.R.S. 2016 (defining criminal attempt to include
23
“acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of an offense”). This is even true for an offense where
an attempt alone is sufficient to complete the crime. For example,
merely a “knowing” mens rea is required to convict a person of
menacing, which includes the element of “attempt[ing] to place
another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”
§ 18-3-206(1), C.R.S. 2016; see also People v. Lopez, 2015 COA 45,
¶¶ 50-54 (discussing jury instruction defining “attempt” in the
menacing context). The absence of any mens rea requirement for
the “attempt[] to influence” element is slightly more problematic
where, as here, the jury was not provided with any definition of
“attempt.” In short, “attempt[] to influence” is not inherently
intentional when disconnected from a mens rea element, making
the lack of a mens rea requirement attached to the element
erroneous.
¶ 45 The same holds true for “by means of deceit.” In Auman, the
supreme court determined that failure to attach the “knowingly”
mens rea to the “without authorization or by deception” element of
theft was plain error. 109 P.3d at 665-72 (emphasis added). In so
holding, the majority was unpersuaded by the partial dissent’s
24
contention that “the concept of acting ‘by deception’ carries with it
an inherent requirement of knowledge.” Id. at 673 (Mullarkey, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Here, the culpable
mental state is “with intent,” not merely knowingly. Cf. Brown v.
People, 239 P.3d 764, 767 (Colo. 2010) (“Under Colorado law, the
requirement that a defendant act knowingly is also satisfied where a
defendant satisfies the more-exacting ‘intentional’ standard.”)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also § 18-1-503(3) (setting
forth the hierarchy of culpable mental states). Thus, we are not
persuaded that acting “by means of deceit” is inherently intentional
conduct, particularly when untethered to a mens rea element.
¶ 46 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s instruction on
attempt to influence a public servant was erroneous.
B. The Error Was Obvious
¶ 47 “Generally, an error is obvious when the action challenged on
appeal contravenes (1) a clear statutory command; (2) a well-settled
legal principle; or (3) Colorado case law.” People v. Dinapoli, 2015
COA 9, ¶ 30. We conclude that the instruction was contrary to
legal principles that were settled at the time of trial.
25
¶ 48 Various cases have held that the mens rea element applied to
all substantive elements of the offense and that the presumptive
way in which that is conveyed in a jury instruction is to set out the
mens rea as a separate element. See, e.g., Auman, 109 P.3d at
663-66; People v. Bossert, 722 P.2d 998, 1011 (Colo. 1986) (“[T]he
mens rea term ‘knowingly,’ offset as it is from the conduct element,
modifies all conduct described in [the conduct element].”); People v.
Stephens, 837 P.2d 231, 234 (Colo. App. 1992) (finding no
instructional error “because ‘knowingly’ precedes and is offset from
the other elements and is followed by a comma”). In 2005, our
supreme court in Auman held that the trial court committed plain
error when it gave the jury a theft instruction that “failed to
expressly modify the ‘without authorization’ element of the crime of
theft with the culpable mental state of ‘knowingly.’” 109 P.3d at
663-64.
¶ 49 In People v. Garcia, 2017 COA 1, a division of this court ruled
that a failure to set off the “knowingly” element of a sexual assault
offense did not satisfy the obviousness prong of plain error. Id. at
¶¶ 10-12. In that case, however, the instruction given by the trial
court tracked the Colorado Model Jury Instruction available at the
26
time of trial for that offense. Id. at ¶ 10. The division in Garcia
concluded that, because the instruction given at trial tracked the
then-available model jury instruction, the error was not obvious.
Id. at ¶ 11.
¶ 50 In contrast, there was no model jury instruction for this
offense at the time of Hoggard’s trial. Thus, the trial court had
neither the guidance nor the safe harbor available to the trial court
in Garcia. But at the time of trial there was a well-established
practice of formulating jury instructions so that the mens rea
requirement was offset from the other elements of the crime. See,
e.g., Auman, 109 P.3d at 663-64; Bornman, 953 P.2d at 954
(collecting cases where appellate courts found no reversible
instructional error because the trial court had offset the mens rea
requirement as a stand-alone element of jury instructions). Doing
so adequately informs the jury that the mens rea requirement
applies to all elements of the offense. See Bornman, 953 P.2d at
954. That practice was not followed here. Further, absent contrary
guidance for this offense, the supreme court’s decision in Auman
provides sufficient notice to render the error obvious. Accordingly,
the trial court’s error was obvious at the time of trial.
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C. There is No Reasonable Possibility the Error Contributed to
Hoggard’s Conviction
¶ 51 In her opening brief, Hoggard argued that because the
evidence was circumstantial, the investigation was cursory, and in
a statement to law enforcement she denied knowing that the e-mail
at issue was altered, there is a reasonable probability that relieving
the People of the burden of proving that she acted intentionally with
respect to acting by deceit and attempting to influence a public
servant contributed to her conviction. The People did not respond
to this argument in their answer brief; instead they relied
exclusively on their invited error and waiver arguments and their
contention that the instruction was not erroneous (or at least not
obviously erroneous) to urge affirmance of the conviction. As
discussed above, we are not persuaded by those arguments. But to
reverse we must be convinced “not only that the instructions
affected a substantial right, but also that the record reveals a
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.”
People v. Chase, 2013 COA 27, ¶ 59 (citing Miller, 113 P.3d at 750);
cf. People v. Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 55 (“[A]n appellate court is
authorized to disregard a harmless error even when a harmless
28
error argument has not been made in the briefs.” (citing United
States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1991))).
¶ 52 We assess prejudice by looking at the record as a whole,
including all of the instructions and the jury’s other verdicts. See
Chambers v. People, 682 P.2d 1173, 1178 (Colo. 1984). As
discussed below, other portions of the jury’s verdicts that were
untainted by the identified error make us certain that the
instructional error did not contribute to the conviction. See People
v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 2008)
(looking to jury’s verdict on a separate charge to conclude that any
instructional error was not plain error because there was no
reasonable possibility that such error contributed to defendant’s
conviction).
¶ 53 First, the jury’s verdict on the second degree forgery charge
fatally undermines Hoggard’s prejudice argument with respect to
the lack of a mens rea requirement being attached to the “by means
of deceit” element. In rendering its verdict on that charge, the jury
explicitly found that Hoggard, “with intent to defraud, falsely made,
completed, or uttered a written instrument,” that instrument being
the same e-mail at issue in the attempt to influence a public
29
servant charge. (Emphasis added.) This verdict cures any
prejudice from the instruction’s failure to attach “with intent” to “by
means of deceit” in the attempt to influence a public servant
instruction. Cf. People v. Freda, 817 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. App.
1991) (holding that “with intent to defraud” is “identical” to “by
deception,” making it inconsistent for a jury to find the former but
not the latter) (citation omitted).
¶ 54 Second, while “with intent” was not attached to the third
element — “attempted to influence a public servant” — the jury, in
rendering its verdict on attempt to influence a public servant,
explicitly found that Hoggard acted “with intent to alter or affect the
public servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any
matter,” in the fifth element of that charge.3 (Emphasis added.) It
simply cannot be cogently argued that Hoggard intended to “alter or
affect the public servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action” but
3 Although the issue was raised in the trial court, we express no
opinion as to whether a CFI qualifies as a “public servant” under
the statute, as this issue was not raised by either party on appeal.
See People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 70 n.14; Amos v.
Aspen Alps 123, LLC, 298 P.3d 940, 959 n.16 (Colo. App. 2010), as
modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 18, 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 2012 CO 46.
30
that, in doing so, she did not also intend to attempt to influence
that same public servant. Thus, we conclude that the inclusion of
“with intent” in the fifth element cured any error in omitting that
requirement in the third element.
¶ 55 We conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the
trial court’s instructional error contributed to Hoggard’s conviction,
and, therefore, it was not plain error. Accordingly, we affirm the
conviction.
V. Conclusion
¶ 56 We affirm the convictions for second degree forgery and
attempt to influence a public servant.
JUDGE FURMAN and JUDGE TERRY concur.
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