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 2017-09

Leslie Camick v. Christopher Smith , 698 F. App'x 41 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-2547
___________
LESLIE LYLE CAMICK,
a/k/a Wayne Camick
v.
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR
COWLEY COUNTY KANSAS, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;
LINDA LOOMIS, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR
COWLEY COUNTY KANSAS, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;
NICOLE HILLS, OFFICER FOR THE CITY OF WINFIELD
POLICE DEPARTMENT IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;
THE MUNICIPALITY OF COWLEY COUNTY KANSAS;
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR COWLEY COUNTY KANSAS;
CITY OF WINFIELD KANSAS, a/k/a THE CITY OF WINFIELD POLICE
DEPARTMENT
LESLIE LYLE CAMICK,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-08844)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 25, 2017
Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 29, 2017)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Leslie Lyle Camick appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil
action. We will affirm.
I.
In November 2016, Camick filed a civil rights complaint under
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that the Defendants
committed various constitutional violations against him between 2011 and 2013. The
claims arose out of incidents in New Jersey, New Mexico, and Kansas. Aware of the
two-year statute of limitations for filing his complaint, Camick addressed the issue in his
suit. He claimed that he was entitled to equitable tolling because an order from the U.S.
District Court for District of Kansas, where Camick was the subject of a federal criminal
case, prevented him from bringing his civil suit earlier. The New Jersey District Court
rejected this argument. The New Jersey District Court determined that the Kansas order
that Camick relied on did not bar him from filing his suit, and the New Jersey District
Court dismissed the case under the screening provisions of
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B).
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
Camick appeals. In his brief before this Court, he continues to press his equitable
tolling argument based on his interpretation of the Kansas order.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we exercise plenary
review over dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling,
    229 F.3d 220
    ,
223 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.
We conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed Camick’s action as barred
by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. A complaint pursuant to § 1983 is
“characterized as a personal-injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable state’s
statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.” Dique v. N.J. State Police,
    603 F.3d 181
    , 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t,
    892 F.2d 23
    , 25
(3d Cir. 1989)). In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year
statute of limitations on personal injury actions. See Dique,
    603 F.3d at 185
    ; see also
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. While state law governs the applicable statute of limitations,
federal law controls when a § 1983 claim accrues. Wallace v. Kato,
    549 U.S. 384
    , 388
(2007). Accrual occurs, and the statute of limitations begins to run, as soon as a plaintiff
has a complete cause of action. See
    id.
     Here, the incidents related to Camick’s § 1983
claims took place between 2011 and 2013. He did not file his complaint until November
2016, well after the two-year deadline.
3
Equitable tolling is appropriate where: (1) a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff
with respect to his cause of action; (2) the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting his
claims as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) the plaintiff asserts his
claims in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum. See Lake v. Arnold,
    232 F.3d 360
    , 370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000). In his complaint, Camick claimed that he was entitled
to equitable tolling because he has been prevented from his asserting his rights by the
Kansas District Court order. The New Jersey District Court, however, concluded that
equitable tolling was inappropriate because the Kansas order did not enjoin Camick from
filing pleadings in federal court.
We have reviewed the Kansas order in question, and we agree. While that order
cautioned Camick against engaging in retaliatory litigation, the order, in fact, denied a
request to enjoin Camick from litigating in federal court. Because Camick could not
amend his complaint to bring it within the applicable statute of limitations, the District
Court did not err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. See Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp.,
    293 F.3d 103
    , 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
IV.
For the reasons above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4