Lewis v. Twenty-First Century Bean , 638 F. App'x 701 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS      Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                    January 6, 2016
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    ANTHONY LEWIS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                 No. 15-3188
    (D.C. No. 2:15-CV-02322-JAR-TJJ)
    TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY BEAN                            (D. Kan.)
    PROCESSING,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    _________________________________
    Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Mr. Anthony Lewis sued his former employer, Twenty-First Century
    Bean Processing, after he was terminated. He alleged both age and race
    discrimination. The district court granted Twenty-First Century’s motion
    for summary judgment on both claims, and we affirm.
    *
    The parties have not requested oral argument, and we do not believe
    oral argument would be helpful. As a result, we are deciding the appeal on
    the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
    This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
    under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
    But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
    I.   Mr. Lewis’s Probationary Status and Firing
    Mr. Lewis, an African-American male who was 47 years old at the
    relevant times, applied for a job with Twenty-First Century. After an
    interview, Mr. Lewis was hired for a warehouse job, subject to a 30-day
    probationary period. At the end of the probationary period, Mr. Lewis was
    to be evaluated to determine whether he could remain an employee.
    Of the 25 work days in Lewis’s probationary period, he was absent 4
    days, found sleeping twice, and observed more than once texting and
    talking on a personal cellphone. His supervisor’s warnings about sleeping
    and using his cellphone on the job were met with argument. These lapses
    implicated Twenty-First Century’s written policy, which informed
    employees that unsatisfactory conduct or unacceptable behavior (such as
    failure to report to work regularly and punctually) could result in
    termination. Based on these infractions, Twenty-First Century fired Mr.
    Lewis after the end of the probationary period. Mr. Lewis’s position was
    filled by an older employee.
    Mr. Lewis sued Twenty-First Century, alleging age discrimination
    under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
    (2012), and race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
    1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012). The district court granted
    Twenty-First Century’s motion for summary judgment on both claims.
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    Mr. Lewis appealed. Because Mr. Lewis proceeds pro se, we construe
    his arguments liberally but “do not assume the role of advocate.” See
    United States v. Viera, 
    674 F.3d 1214
    , 1216 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting
    Yang v. Archuleta, 
    525 F.3d 925
    , 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008)).
    II.    Our Standard of Review
    We engage in de novo review, applying the same standard that the
    district court applied and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
    to Mr. Lewis. McBride v. Peak Wellness Ctr., Inc., 
    688 F.3d 698
    , 703 (10th
    Cir. 2012). Summary judgment was appropriate if “there [was] no genuine
    dispute as to any material fact and [Twenty-First Century was] entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    III.   The Burden-Shifting Framework
    When a plaintiff alleges discrimination but offers no direct evidence
    of discrimination, the district court considers summary judgment motions
    under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework.
    
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802–805 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears
    the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
    Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 
    483 F.3d 1106
    , 1113 (10th Cir. 2007). If a
    plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
    to articulate a facially nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 
    Id. If the
    defendant satisfies that burden, the employee would bear the burden to
    prove the defendant’s actions were discriminatory, which the employee
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    could do by showing defendant’s “proffered reason is a pretext for illegal
    discrimination.” 
    Id. (quoting Ingels
    v. Thiokol Corp., 
    42 F.3d 616
    , 621
    (10th Cir. 1994)).
    IV.   The Age Discrimination Claim
    Mr. Lewis alleges age discrimination under the Age Discrimination
    and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012). Proceeding pro se, Mr.
    Lewis appears to be arguing that the district court erred in concluding he
    had not established a prima facie case of age discrimination. Because the
    district court concluded that Mr. Lewis had not presented any direct
    evidence of discrimination, the court analyzed Mr. Lewis’s age
    discrimination claim under McDonnell Douglas. In doing so, the court
    determined that Mr. Lewis had not established a prima facie case because
    he had failed to provide evidence that his work was satisfactory. In our
    view, that conclusion was proper. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment to Twenty-First Century on the age
    discrimination claim.
    V.    The Race Discrimination Claim
    Mr. Lewis also alleges race discrimination under Title VII of the
    Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012). Again
    finding no direct evidence of discrimination, the district court analyzed
    Mr. Lewis’s claim under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
    Douglas. The court assumed without deciding that Mr. Lewis had
    4
    established a prima facie case of race discrimination. Thus, the burden
    shifted to Twenty-First Century to show a nondiscriminatory reason for
    terminating Mr. Lewis.
    As evidence of a non-discriminatory purpose, Twenty-First Century
    pointed out that Mr. Lewis had missed too many work days, slept at work,
    used his personal cellphone at work, and reacted argumentatively when
    warned about his cellphone usage. After finding that any one of these
    policy violations could serve as a nondiscriminatory reason for the firing,
    the court placed the burden on Mr. Lewis to show by a preponderance of
    the evidence that Twenty-First Century’s explanation was pretextual. The
    district court concluded that Mr. Lewis was unable to meet this burden, and
    we agree for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court.
    VI.   Conclusion
    We affirm the award of summary judgment to Twenty-First Century.
    Entered for the Court
    Robert E. Bacharach
    Circuit Judge
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