In Re: J.S.C., a Minor Appeal of: S.C. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: J.S.C., A MINOR              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: S.C.                     :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 62 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
    Orphans’ Court at No(s): 54 OC 2016
    IN RE: S.J.M., A MINOR              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: S.C.                     :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 63 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 2, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
    Orphans’ Court at No(s): 24 OC 2016
    IN RE: S.J.M., A MINOR              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: TIOGA COUNTY             :
    DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES        :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 64 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
    Orphans’ Court at No(s): 24 OC 2016
    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:                         FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2017
    S.C. (“Mother”)1 appeals from the December 2, 2016 order granting
    the petition filed by the Tioga County Department of Human Services
    (“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to J.S.C. (born in
    February 2015), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.2 Mother
    also appeals the December 7, 2016 order granting the petition filed by DHS
    to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to S.J.M. (born in August
    2012), whose biological father is L.V.N.3          DHS appeals the trial court’s
    December 7, 2016 order denying its petition to terminate the parental rights
    of L.V.N. to S.J.M. With respect to all three appeals, we affirm.
    The trial court set forth the relevant factual background of the appeal
    involving J.S.C. as follows:
    4. Upon discharge from the hospital, [J.S.C.] resided with
    his mother. . . .
    ...
    ____________________________________________
    1
    S.C. is also described in the record as S.E.C.
    2
    In the December 2, 2016 order, the trial court also granted the
    petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of M.J.G., who is
    J.S.C.’s biological father. M.J.G. has not filed an appeal from the termination
    of his parental rights, nor is he a party to the instant appeal.
    3
    We refer to J.S.C. and S.J.M. collectively as “Children”.
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    10. [J.S.C.] was removed from the care of [Mother] on
    October 27, 2015 and has remained in care since that
    time.
    11. During [J.S.C.’s] placement, the [DHS] Family Services
    Division has offered services to [Mother] and [M.J.G.].
    ...
    13. [Mother] has failed to consistently participate in
    recommended services.
    14. [Mother] has failed to follow            through    with
    recommended mental health counseling.
    15. [Mother] has been unable or unwilling to maintain
    consistent housing or employment.
    16. [Mother] has been inconsistent in meetings with
    providers including [Intensive Case Management (“ICM”)]
    and [Support, Teach, and Educate Parents (“STEPs”)].
    17. [Mother] has continued to struggle with maintaining a
    safe environment for [J.S.C.].
    18. [Mother] has exhibited erratic behavior including,
    during the pendency of the termination action, threatening
    self-harm by ingestion of an overdose of prescribed
    medication.
    Trial Court Opinion (J.S.C.), 12/2/16, at 1-2 (“Termination Op. (J.S.C.)”).
    The trial court set forth the relevant factual background of the appeals
    involving S.J.M. as follows.
    4. Upon discharge from the hospital, [S.J.M.] resided with
    his mother. . . .
    5. [S.J.M.] was removed from [Mother’s] care and placed
    on or about July 29, 2014.
    6. Prior to [S.J.M.’s] removal f[ro]m [Mother’s] home,
    [L.V.N.] had no contact with him and was not aware of his
    status as father until at or near the time of removal.
    -3-
    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    7. The [DHS] Family Services Division[] has continually
    offered services to [Mother] and has attempted to offer
    services to [L.V.N.].
    8. [Mother] has failed to follow through with the services
    offered by [DHS] Family Services Division.
    9. [L.V.N.] has accepted some services, but has struggled
    to maintain his sobriety and has been incarcerated for a
    substantial portion of [S.J.M.’s] placement.
    10. [L.V.N.] also has been forced to deal with a serious
    medical condition.
    11. [L.V.N.] specifically declined to have contact with
    [S.J.M.] during his period of incarceration.
    12. [L.V.N.] also elected not to pursue contact with
    [S.J.M.] upon his release from his most recent
    incarceration prior to the filing of the petition.
    13. [Mother] has been unwilling to maintain steady
    housing and employment from the time of placement until
    after the intent petition was filed.
    14. [Mother] has failed to [comply] with treatment
    recommendations for mental health throughout the
    placement.
    15. [Mother] has been inconsistent in meetings with
    providers including ICM and STEPs.
    16. [Mother] has continued to struggle with maintaining a
    safe environment for [S.J.M].
    17. [Mother] has exhibited erratic behaviors including,
    during the pendency of the termination action, threatening
    self-harm by ingestion of an overdose of prescribed
    medication.
    Trial Court Opinion (S.J.M.), 12/7/16, at 1-2 (“Termination Op. (S.J.M.)”).
    On April 5, 2016, DHS filed the petitions for the involuntary
    termination of the parental rights to S.J.M. of Mother and L.V.N. pursuant to
    section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On June 27, 2016, DHS filed the
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    petitions for the involuntary termination of the parental rights to J.S.C. of
    Mother and M.J.G., J.S.C.’s biological father, pursuant to section 2511(a)(1),
    (2), (5), and (b). At the time that DHS filed the petitions, Children resided
    with D.F. and his wife, J.F., (“the F.’s” or “Foster Parents”).
    On September 21, 2016, September 22, 2016, and October 26, 2016,
    the trial court held a hearing on the petitions to terminate the parental rights
    of Mother and the respective fathers to Children.        At the September 21,
    2016 hearing, DHS presented the testimony of:            its supervisor, Lindsey
    Hinman, N.T., 9/21/16, at 5, 139; Denise Feger, Ph.D., who is the vice-
    president of operations for Crossroads Counseling, as an expert in bonding
    and attachment issues, id. at 14; licensed psychologist Joseph McNamara,
    Ph.D., as an expert in clinical psychology, id. at 57-58; Kaleena Allen, who
    is the extensive case manager through Service Access and Management
    (“SAM”), id. at 65-66; Holly Doud, who took over the case from Ms. Allen at
    SAM, id. at 81; Jessica Becker, the STEPs provider for Tioga County, id. at
    100; Jamie Hulbert, the STEPs provider for SAM, id. at 113, J.F., who is the
    foster mother and L.V.N.’s first cousin, id. at 201, 208.         The trial court
    admitted the dependency records for Children into evidence. Id. at 13. On
    September 21, 2016, L.V.N.’s counsel presented the testimony of L.V.N.’s
    mother, A.C. Id. at 221. Mother’s counsel presented the testimony of Carl
    Linscott, a minister who runs a teen center that Mother attended, id. at 253-
    255, and the testimony of Mother’s sister, L.J, id. at 267.
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    On September 22, 2016, Mother presented the testimony of Donna
    Cummings, who is a family partner for Tioga Early Head Start, which is a
    home visitor position, N.T., 9/2/16, at 3; Robin Flynn, a family partner at
    Tioga Early Head Start who works out of the Elkland, Pennsylvania office, id.
    at 28; and Mother’s fiancé, T.K., his mother C.K., and his grandfather, T.M,
    id. at 43, 58, 66.   In addition, L.V.N. presented the testimony of L.V.N.’s
    supervisor, N.R., his girlfriend, S.A., and his father, L.V. Id. at 73-74, 79,
    90.
    On October 26, 2016, L.V.N. testified on his own behalf.             N.T.,
    10/26/17, at 3. Mother presented the testimony of D.H., who had resided in
    Mother’s home for a few weeks at the time of the hearing. id. at 62, and
    Mother testified on her own behalf, id. at 67.
    In the December 2, 2016 order, the trial court terminated the parental
    rights of Mother to J.S.C. pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b) of
    the Adoption Act.      In the December 7, 2016 orders, the trial court
    terminated the parental rights of Mother to S.J.M. pursuant to section
    2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and denied the petition to terminate
    L.V.N.’s parental rights to S.J.M.    In both the order terminating Mother’s
    parental rights to S.J.M. and the order denying the petition for termination
    of L.V.N.’s parental rights regarding S.J.M., the trial court provided that legal
    custody of S.J.M. would remain with DHS and his placement would remain
    with Foster Parents, pending further order of court.
    -6-
    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    On January 4, 2017 and January 6, 2017, Mother timely filed notices
    of appeal from the termination orders, along with concise statements of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
    On January 5, 2017, DHS timely filed a notice of appeal from the order
    denying the termination of L.V.N.’s parental rights to S.J.M, along with a
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.4
    In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
    adhere to the following standard:
    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
    standard when considering a trial court’s determination of
    a petition for termination of parental rights.           As in
    dependency cases, our standard of review requires an
    appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
    determinations of the trial court if they are supported by
    the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error
    of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated,
    an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
    reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
    Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
    discretion   only   upon      demonstration    of     manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
    As we discussed in [In re] R.J.T., [
    9 A.3d 1197
     (Pa.
    2010),] there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of
    discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed
    that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped
    to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record,
    where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
    relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
    ____________________________________________
    4
    We will dispose of the appeals in one Memorandum for ease of
    disposition.
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    hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d
    at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
    opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
    termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge
    to second guess the trial court and impose its own
    credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must
    defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
    supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions
    are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
    discretion.
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (some internal
    citation omitted).
    “In termination cases, the burden is upon [the petitioner] to prove by
    clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the
    termination of parental rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 
    985 A.2d 273
    , 276
    (Pa.Super. 2009).      We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and
    convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty
    and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
    without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    In re J.L.C., 
    837 A.2d 1247
    , 1251 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
    I.      Mother’s Appeal of the Termination of her Parental Rights
    In her brief on appeal regarding J.S.C., Mother raises the following
    issue:
    1. The trial court was provided with evidence of a bonding
    assessment that was performed in regards to the bond
    between Child and Mother, [L.V.N.], and foster parents,
    respectively.     The assessment and the associated
    testimony provided clear evidence that there is a bond
    between Mother and Child and that Mother desires to take
    care of her children. Did the trial court abuse its discretion
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    when it determined that terminating the rights of Mother
    was in the child’s best interest, when Mother and Child
    have the bond that they do?
    2. Each service provider who testified at the termination
    hearing who had worked with Mother in the months
    approaching the termination hearing acknowledged a
    marked improvement in both Mother’s housekeeping and
    Mother’s parenting ability (two of the primary concerns
    about Mother in the dependency matter). Mother also got
    a full-time job in the time preceding the termination
    hearing (a third concern in the dependency matter). Did
    the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined that
    the grounds for termination had been met, or that if they
    had, that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate, when
    Mother had been making a marked improvement in three
    areas that had been large concerns?
    Mother’s Br. (J.S.C.) at 3-4.
    In her brief on appeal regarding S.J.M., Mother raises the following
    issues:
    1. The trial court terminated the rights of Mother, while
    simultaneously determining that Father’s [L.V.N.’s] rights
    should not be terminated. Pennsylvania law repeatedly
    acknowledges that a Child is entitled to support from two
    parents. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it
    determined that terminating the rights of Mother was in
    the child’s best interest, while Father [L.V.N.] still retains
    his rights?
    2. The trial court was provided with evidence of a bonding
    assessment that was performed in regards to the bond
    between Child and Mother, [L.V.N.] and foster parents,
    respectively.     The assessment and the associated
    testimony provided clear evidence that there is a bond
    between Mother and Child, that Child is comfortable with
    Mother, and that Mother desires to take care of her
    children. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it
    determined that terminating the rights of Mother was in
    the child’s best interest, when Mother and Child have the
    bond that they do?
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    3. Each service provider who testified at the termination
    hearing who had worked with Mother in the months
    approaching the termination hearing acknowledged a
    marked improvement in both Mother’s housekeeping and
    Mother’s parenting ability (two of the primary concerns
    about Mother in the dependency matter). Mother also got
    a full-time job in the time preceding the termination
    hearing (a third concern in the dependency matter). Did
    the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined that
    the grounds for termination had been met, or that if they
    had, that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate, when
    Mother had been making a marked improvement in three
    areas that had been large concerns?
    Mother’s Br. (S.J.M.) at 3-4.
    Preliminarily, we conclude that Mother waived the first issue raised in
    her brief challenging the termination of her parental rights to S.J.M.
    (concerning the termination of her parental rights while not terminating
    L.V.N.’s parental rights) because she did not include it in her 1925(b)
    statement. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 
    893 A.2d 776
    , 797
    (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised
    in both his or her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and
    the Statement of Questions Involved in his brief on appeal).5
    To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree
    with any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with section 2511(b). In
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Further, even if Mother had preserved this issue, we would conclude
    it lacks merit. That the trial court determined DHS failed to present clear
    and convincing evidence to support the termination of L.V.N.’s parental
    rights does not affect the analysis of whether the trial court properly
    terminated Mother’s parental rights.
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    re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).         We conclude
    that the trial court in this case properly terminated Mother’s parental rights
    pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
    child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
    following grounds:
    ...
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
    neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
    to be without essential parental care, control or
    subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
    well-being and the conditions and causes of the
    incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
    not be remedied by the parent.
    ...
    (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
    rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
    of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
    solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
    inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
    medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
    parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
    subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
    any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
    described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
    the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
    To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the
    moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the
    following elements: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child
    to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
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    his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
    abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”         See In re
    Adoption of M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d 1266
    , 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003).
    Regarding the decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to J.S.C.
    under section 2511(a)(2), the trial court stated the following.
    [J.S.C.] was born [in February 2015] to [Mother].
    [J.S.C.’s] father, [M.J.G.], had no involvement with
    [J.S.C.] since his birth.    [J.S.C.] was removed from
    [Mother’s] care on October 27, 2015 and placed in a foster
    home with [Foster Parents,] where he has remained.
    Since [J.S.C.’s] removal, the Tioga County Department of
    Human Services Family Services Division has offered
    services to the parents. [M.J.G.] has not participated in
    services and maintained little or no contact with Family
    Services. [Mother] has remained in contact but struggled
    as discussed below.
    On June 27, 2016, Family Services filed the . . . Petition
    for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights naming both
    [Mother] and [M.J.G.] as respondents. Family Services
    specifies subsections (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(5) as grounds
    for termination.    Following a consolidated termination
    hearing occurring over portions of three days, and having
    considered the closing summations submitted thereafter,
    the Court determines that Petitioner has established by
    clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of
    both [M.J.G.] and [Mother] as to [J.S.C.] should be
    terminated.
    ...
    Since [J.S.C.’s] removal from [Mother’s] care, Family
    Services has offered a variety of supportive services to
    [Mother], including parenting skills through the STEPs
    program, Intensive Case Management, support within the
    home to address safety and health concerns and it has
    attempted to ensure [Mother] has access to and maintains
    appropriate mental health services.        [Mother] has
    frequently been unwilling to work with service providers.
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    She has been argumentative with providers and
    sometimes unwilling to implement the recommendations
    she was presented with. On various occasions, [Mother]
    has declined to cooperate with or even meet with service
    providers. Family Services has worked to help [Mother]
    maintain home conditions to safely allow visits in the
    home, but [Mother] is unwilling or at least unable to
    maintain safe, appropriate conditions on her own.
    [Mother] has, prior to the filing of the termination petition,
    been unable or unwilling to obtain employment. She also
    has been unable to maintain stable housing. Additionally,
    [Mother] has been unwilling to maintain necessary mental
    health services to address her needs.         She has been
    discharged by service providers for failing to attend
    appointments. The record establishes these difficulties
    have not occurred due to circumstances beyond [Mother’s]
    control. Dr. McNamara noted [Mother] has substantial
    cognitive abilities, but needed to follow through with
    support and mental health services. [Mother] simply failed
    to do so. The Court finds there is no credible likelihood
    that [Mother] will remedy the conditions which led to
    [J.S.C.’s] placement.     Rather, in the absence of a
    termination of [Mother’s] parental rights, [J.S.C.] would
    almost certainly be maintained in placement but denied
    permanency as [Mother] continues to present superficial
    cooperation, but no progress toward alleviating the many
    serious circumstances that prevent her from being a
    parent to him.
    Additionally, the evidence in the case also establishes
    [Mother’s] “repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
    neglect or refusal . . .” as [J.S.C.’s] parent causing him “to
    be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
    necessary for his physical or mental well-being . . .” as
    alleged by Petitioner pursuant to §2511(a)(2). [Mother]
    has been presented with the services discussed above in
    an effort to address the problems necessitating Family
    Service and Court Dependency involvement.            She has
    refused to accept and/or adopt the services and remedies
    offered.    There is no evidence to suggest that the
    incapacity and refusal will be remedied. In fact, the record
    indicates the contrary and establishes that [Mother] cannot
    or will not make the necessary changes.
    Termination Op. (J.S.C.), 2/2/17, at 2-6.
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    The trial court provided the following reasoning in support of its
    decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to S.J.M.
    [S.J.M.] was born [in August 2012] to [Mother].
    [L.V.N.], the biological father of [S.J.M.] was unaware of
    his status as father until [S.J.M.] was approximately one
    year old, at or about the time he was removed from
    [Mother’s] care.     Following the child’s removal from
    [Mother’s] home he was placed with [L.V.N.’s] mother,
    [A.C.], and step-father where he remained for nearly a
    year until medical concerns in the [C.] family forced [A.C.]
    to seek a change in [S.J.M.’s] placement[,] at which time
    he was placed with the [Foster Parents,] who continue to
    provide placement at this time.
    Petitioner asserts subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and
    (a)(8) of Title 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 as grounds for
    termination of parental rights. Turning to the parental
    rights of [Mother], the Court finds Petitioner has
    established grounds for termination.       As noted above,
    [S.J.M.] was removed from [Mother’s] care on October 27,
    2015, and the termination petition was filed on June 27,
    2016. . . .
    Since [S.J.M.’s] removal from [Mother’s] care, Family
    Services has offered a variety of supportive services to
    [Mother], including parenting skills through the STEPs
    program, Intensive Case Management, support within the
    home to address safety and health concerns and it has
    attempted to ensure [Mother] has access to and maintains
    appropriate mental health services.            [Mother] has
    frequently been unwilling to work with service providers.
    She has been argumentative with providers and
    sometimes unwilling to implement the recommendations
    she was presented with. On various occasions, [Mother]
    has declined to cooperate with or even meet with service
    providers. Family Services has worked to help [Mother]
    maintain home conditions to safely allow visits in the
    home, but [Mother] is unwilling or at least unable to
    maintain safe, appropriate conditions on her own.
    [Mother] has, prior to the filing of the termination petition,
    been unable or unwilling to obtain employment. She also
    has been unable to maintain stable housing. Additionally,
    [Mother] has been unwilling to maintain necessary mental
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    health services to address her needs.      She has been
    discharged by service providers for failing to attend
    appointments. The record establishes these difficulties
    have not occurred due to circumstances beyond [Mother’s]
    control. Dr. McNamara noted [Mother] has substantial
    cognitive abilities, but needed to follow through with
    support and mental health services. [Mother] simply failed
    to do so. The Court finds there is no credible likelihood
    that [Mother] will remedy the conditions which led to
    [S.J.M.’s] placement.     Rather, in the absence of a
    termination of [Mother’s] parental rights, [S.J.M.] would
    almost certainly be maintained in placement but denied
    permanency as [Mother] continues to present superficial
    cooperation, but no progress toward alleviating the many
    serious circumstances that prevent her from being a
    parent to him.
    ...
    Additionally, the evidence in the case also establishes
    [Mother’s] “repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
    neglect or refusal . . .” as [S.J.M.’s] parent causing him “to
    be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
    necessary for his physical or mental well-being . . .” as
    alleged by Petitioner pursuant to §2511(a)(2). [Mother]
    has been presented with the services discussed above in
    an effort to address the problems necessitating Family
    Service and Court [d]ependency involvement. She has
    refused to accept and/or adopt the services and remedies
    offered.    There is no evidence to suggest that the
    incapacity and refusal will be remedied. In fact, the record
    indicates the contrary and establishes that [Mother] cannot
    or will not make the necessary changes.
    Termination Op. (S.J.M.), 2/2/17, at 2-5.
    As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial
    court’s findings and credibility determinations, we conclude the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children
    under section 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.
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    The trial court must also consider how terminating Mother’s parental
    rights would affect the needs and welfare of Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
    § 2511(b).     This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental
    rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant
    to section 2511(b).    See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1008
    (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc).        In reviewing the evidence in support of
    termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as
    follows:
    [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
    met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
    of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs
    and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to
    include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
    stability.” In re K.M., 
    53 A.3d 781
    , 791 (Pa.Super. 2012).
    In In re E.M., [
    620 A.2d 481
    , 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court
    held that the determination of the child’s “needs and
    welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds
    between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
    should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
    permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 
    53 A.3d at 791
    .
    In re: T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013).
    When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
    expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
    well.    Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
    evaluation.”    In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
    citations omitted).
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this
    analysis:
    [C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent
    simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is
    not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s
    feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis,
    the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics
    as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect
    and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage
    and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the
    opinion that the biological connection between [the parent]
    and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
    considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a
    parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The
    psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in
    terms of the development of the child and [his or her]
    mental and emotional health than the coincidence of
    biological or natural parenthood.
    In re K.K.R.-S., 
    958 A.2d 529
    , 535 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs
    of the child.      See In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 763 (Pa.Super. 2008)
    (affirming involuntary termination of parental rights, despite existence of
    some bond, where placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best
    interests).     It is well-settled that “we will not toll the well-being and
    permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc); accord In re Z.S.W., 
    946 A.2d 726
    ,
    732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in
    the   hope     that   [a   parent]   will    summon   the   ability   to   handle   the
    responsibilities of parenting.”).
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    With regard to the termination of Mother’s parental rights to J.S.C.
    under section 2511(b), the trial court stated the following.
    Turning to the considerations contained in §2511(b), it
    is clear there is a relationship and bond between [J.S.C.]
    and [Mother]. It is equally clear that [J.S.C.] has bonded
    with the [F.’s] while placed there. [Mother] has not been
    able to offer safety, security and stability. After the filing
    of the termination petition, [Mother] chose to return to
    counseling and chose to obtain and maintain employment.
    The evidence establishes her difficulties were the result of
    circumstances within her control.
    Concerning the [F.’s], [J.S.C.] has made significant
    progress while placed there. [J.S.C.], while in placement,
    receives Early Intervention and Occupational Therapy
    services. Mrs. [F.] testified that [J.S.C.] is drastically
    improving. Mrs. [F.] also testified that she and her family
    are ready and willing to provide permanency for [J.S.C.]
    and will adopt him, if given the opportunity.
    It is clear there will be difficulty for all parties, most
    importantly [J.S.C.], if [Mother’s] parental rights are
    terminated. The existing bond will be severed between the
    two.     On balance though, the temporary challenges
    presently will be outweighed by the advancement of
    [J.S.C.’s] long-term best interest which will best be served
    by moving him out of the limbo and into a permanent
    home where his developmental, physical and emotional
    needs will be met.
    Termination Op. (J.S.C.) at 7.
    With regard to the termination of Mother’s parental rights to S.J.M.
    under section 2511(b), the trial court stated as follows.
    Turning to the considerations contained in § 2511(b), it
    is clear there is a relationship and bond between [S.J.M.]
    and [Mother]. It is equally clear that [S.J.M.] has bonded
    with the [F.’s] while placed there. [Mother] has not been
    able to offer safety, security and stability. After the filing
    of the termination petition, [Mother] chose to return to
    counseling and chose to obtain and maintain employment.
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    The evidence establishes her difficulties were the result of
    circumstances within her control.
    Concerning the [F.’s], [S.J.M.] has made significant
    progress while placed there. [S.J.M.], while in placement,
    receives Early Intervention and Occupational Therapy
    services. Mrs. [F.] testified that [S.J.M.] is drastically
    improving. Mrs. [F.] also testified that she and her family
    are ready and willing to provide permanency for [S.J.M.]
    and will adopt him, if given the opportunity.
    It is clear there will be difficulty for all parties, most
    importantly [S.J.M.], if [Mother’s] parental rights are
    terminated. The existing bond will be severed between the
    two.     On balance though, the temporary challenges
    presently will be outweighed by the advancement of
    [S.J.M.’s] long-term best interest[,] which will best be
    served by moving him out of the limbo and into a
    permanent home where his developmental, physical and
    emotional needs will be met.
    Termination Op. (S.J.M.) at 6.
    We find that there is competent evidence in the record that supports
    the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, and that there was
    no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights
    to Children under section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at
    826-27.
    II.     DHS’s Appeal of the Denial of the Petition to Terminate
    L.V.N.’s Parental Rights
    Next, we address DHS’s issues on appeal.         In its brief on appeal
    regarding S.J.M., DHS raises the following issues:
    1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in finding
    that the grounds for termination of parental rights of
    father [L.V.N.] under 23 P.S. [sic] § 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2),
    (a)(5), and (a)(8) were not met in that efforts by the
    father to remedy the conditions leading to the filing of the
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    termination petition were first initiated subsequent to the
    giving of notice of the filing of the petition[?]
    2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in
    determining that the best interest of the child would not be
    served by terminating the [f]ather’s [L.V.N.’s] parental
    rights[?]
    3. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in failing
    to address the impact of severing the sibling bond of S.J.M
    and his half[-]sibling for whom parental rights were
    terminated?
    DHS’s Br. (S.J.M.) at 3.6
    Here, regarding DHS’s petition for the termination of parental rights of
    L.V.N., the trial court discussed various provisions of 2511(a), but ultimately
    decided DHS failed to meet its burden under section 2511(b). The trial court
    stated the following:
    With regard to the parental rights of [L.V.N.], the Court
    for the following reasons determines that termination of
    his parental rights at this time is not appropriate.
    The evidence presented in this case demonstrates that
    while [L.V.N.] failed to exercise the appropriate level of
    parental support and control at times[,] the unique
    circumstances in this case do not warrant finding that it is
    in the best interest of [S.J.M.] that [L.V.N.’s] rights be
    terminated.     Specifically, the Court notes [L.V.N.] has
    undergone periods of incarceration including a term
    immediately prior to the filing of the petition now before
    the Court, [L.V.N.] has availed himself to substantial drug
    and alcohol treatment during the incarceration in
    significant effort to alleviate the conditions that previously
    prevented him from being an appropriate parent. The
    circumstances in [L.V.N.’s] life have at this time
    ____________________________________________
    6
    DHS stated its issues somewhat differently in its concise statement.
    We, nevertheless, find the issues sufficiently preserved for our review.
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    progressed in such a way that it appears reunification in
    the near future is an attainable goal.      [L.V.N.] has
    demonstrated an adequate ability to maintain his sobriety,
    employment and appropriate housing. The evidence also
    demonstrates that he has the necessary parenting skills to
    provide a safe home for [S.J.M.].
    While [L.V.N.’s] contact with [S.J.M.] was limited during
    the pendency of the dependency case, he did maintain
    some contact through visits conducted while [S.J.M.] was
    in his mother’s, [A.C.’s,] care. The Court further notes
    that [S.J.M.] has established and maintained significant
    contacts with [L.V.N’s] family, including but not limited to
    the child’s grandmother and grandfather. Severing all
    bonds with the [L.V.N.’s] family is not in his best interest.
    Termination Op. (S.J.M.), 2/2/17, at 6-7.
    We find that there is competent evidence in the record that supports
    the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, and that there was
    no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in ruling that L.V.N.’s parental rights
    to S.J.M. should not be terminated under section 2511(b) at this time under
    the individual circumstances of this case. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47
    A.3d at 826-27, 830-31 (discussing the abuse of discretion standard and
    citing In re R.J.T.); see also In re Adoption of: A.C., 2017 Pa. Super 143
    (May 12, 2017) (affirming trial court order denying the agency’s petition for
    the termination of the father’s parental rights where finding that CYS did not
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s rights should be
    terminated under section 2511(a)(1) was supported by record).7
    Finally, we address DHS’s contention that the trial court abused its
    discretion by separating S.J.M. from his half-sibling, J.S.C., through its
    refusal to terminate L.V.N.’s parental rights so that both Children may be
    adopted by Foster Parents.
    In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:      “focusing
    exclusively upon [the relationship between S.J.M. and J.S.C.], would compel
    the abandonment of consideration of any other bonds including the child’s
    bond to another half sibling fathered by [L.V.N.].”      Trial Court Opinion
    Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2511(a)(2)(ii) at 1.
    In In re R.N.J., the trial court terminated the parental rights of the
    mother to two of her children, even though the children to whom her
    parental rights had been terminated shared a foster home with a child as to
    ____________________________________________
    7
    As both the statute and our case law make clear, the focus under
    section 2511(b) is on the child. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d at 1008
    . We note that much of the trial court’s discussion focuses on Father’s
    conduct. That discussion is appropriate under 2511(b) to the extent that
    Father’s conduct is relevant to the best interests of Child. The trial court
    relied on the unique nature of this case and the relationship that Child has
    with Father’s family, as well as the steps Father has taken to make
    reunification an attainable goal, and determined that it would not be in
    Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. While a more
    extended discussion of Child’s interests might have been preferable, we will
    not second guess the trial court, who observed the parties and whose
    decision is not the result of “manifest unreasonable, partiality, prejudice,
    bias, or ill-will.” See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.”
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    whom her parental rights had not been terminated.               
    985 A.2d 273
    (Pa.Super. 2009).       This Court held that the trial court had not abused its
    discretion in concluding that the termination of the mother’s parental rights
    to the two children would best serve the children’s developmental, physical
    and emotional needs and welfare, and that the termination of the mother’s
    parental rights was proper. Id. at 279. We reasoned:
    The trial court considered each child’s situation
    independently.     It found that the children’s unique
    emotional needs and their respective relationships with
    Mother compelled DHS to tailor individualized permanency
    goals that best served each child’s needs and welfare. As
    the record supports the trial court’s determination, we will
    not disturb it.
    Id. at 280.
    Here, we have determined that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in concluding that the termination of the parental rights of Mother
    and M.J.G. served J.S.C.’s best interests, and that the termination of L.V.N.’s
    parental rights does not serve S.J.M.’s best interests. We have no reason to
    disturb that determination on the basis that J.S.C. may now be adopted by
    Foster Parents, and S.J.M. may not be adopted by them at this time. 8
    Finding no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm the trial court’s
    orders.
    ____________________________________________
    8
    In fact, the trial court’s order denying DHS’s termination petition as
    to L.V.N. directs that S.J.M. will remain with Foster Parents until further
    order of court.
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    J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
    Orders affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/20/2017
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