Parks, Josey Wales ( 2015 )

PD-1597-14
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 1/2/2015 2:28:03 PM
Accepted 1/12/2015 5:19:06 PM
NO. PD-1597-14 ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 02-13-00016-CR
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
JOSEY WALES PARKS,
Appellant
JANUARY 12, 2015
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 9
of Tarrant County, Texas in Cause No. 1263051
Hon. Brent Carr, Presiding
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
L. PATRICK DAVIS
SBN 00795775
115 N. Henderson Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
(817)870-1544
(817)870-1589 fax
ATTORNEY FOR
APPELLANT/PRO BONO
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Josey Wales Parks
Represented by:
Trial/Appeal:
Hon. L. Patrick Davis
SBN 00795775
115 N. Henderson Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
(81 7)870-1544
(817)870-1589 fax
COMPLAINANT Represented by: Trial/Appeal
The State ofTexas Hon. Joe Shannon, Jr.
Tarrant County District Attorney
401 W. Belknap Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76196
(817)884-1400
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Interested Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Statement Regarding Oral Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Grounds for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
(1) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this
Court's opinion in State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002)?
(2) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this
Court's opinion in Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011)?
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ground for Review No. 1 ..................................... 3
Ground for Review No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Certificate of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix:
Memorandum Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
State Cases
Cantu v. State, 817 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ............ .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3' 9
Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .......... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ........ .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .......... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,8,12,13
Curry v. State, 808 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ........... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6' 8
Davis v. State, 831 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.· Crim. App. 1992) ........... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Dubose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) .......... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ......... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Garza v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 147, 48 S.W.2d 625 (1930) ......... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .......... .
....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 12,13
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 9
Horton v. State, 986 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no pet.) ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Jones v. State, 579 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ........... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) .......... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
iii
McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ........ .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Perez v. State, 818 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
19 91, no pet. ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ........... .
. . . . . . . •. . •. . •. •. . . . . . . . . •. ••. . •. . •••. . ••. . •. . •. . •. . •. . . . •. . . . . .4
Sherlock v. State, 632 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ........ .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
State v. Davila, 169 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (TeK. Crim. App. 2002) ......... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 2,6,7,9
Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ...... .
............ ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .... 9,11,12
Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ........ .
.. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..5
Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ............ .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Texas Constitution
TEX. CONST. art. I, §9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,8,10,13
Texas Codes, Statutes, and Rules
TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b)(Vernon2012) ........... .
•. . •. . . •. . •. ••. . . . ••. •. . . . . •. . . ••. ••••. . ••. . . . . . •. . •. . . . . . . . . . . .4
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01 (Vernon 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,8,13,14
United States Constitution
U.S. CONST. amend IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,8,10,13
iv
Federal Cases
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ••. •. •. . •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ••. . •. . ••. ••. •. . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . •. . . . . . . •. . . . . •. . •. . •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
v
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant does not believe oral argument would aid this
Honorable Court in reaching a decision as this case rests on sound
case law from this Court. The grounds raised in this petition have
already been plowed by this Court.
vi
TO THE JUDGES OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
NOW COMES JOSEY WALES PARKS, Appellant herein, and files this his
Petition for Discretionary Review of the judgment of the Second
Court of Appeals for the State of Texas.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 19, 2012, Appellant was sentenced to six (6) months
deferred adjudication probation in the County Criminal Court No. 9
of Tarrant County, Texas, in cause number 1263051 for the offense
of Possession of Marijuana, under 2 ounces and assessed a fine of
$150.00 as a result of a plea of guilty. (C.R., Vol. 1, p. 24). On
August 2, 2012, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to
suppress after an evidentiary hearing was conducted and provided
its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. (R.R.,
Vol. 2, pp. 82-84). The trial court gave its permission to appeal.
Appellant timely gave his Notice of Appeal specifically complaining
of the denial of his suppression motion. (C. R. , Vol. 1, p. 31) .
--FACTUAL STATEMENT--
The memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals adequately sets
out the disputed, factual background between the parties.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment and delivered a memorandum opinion on September 18, 2014.
Appellant's timely filed motion for rehearing was denied on October
23, 2014. Appellant's timely filed motion for extension of time to
1
file his petition for discretionary review was granted on December
5, 2014. Appellant's petition for discretionary review is timely
if filed on or before December 29, 2014.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
(1) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this Court's
opinion in State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)?
(2) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this Court's
opinion in Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)?
Ground I and Ground II will be argued separately.
ARGUMENT
On September 18, 2014, the Fort Worth Court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court in a memorandum opinion holding, inter
alia, that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining
that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant and that
the evidence seized subsequent to Appellant's illegal detention had
no bearing on the procurement of the search warrant and the items
seized thereafter. The Fort Worth Court's opinion conflicts and
ignores this Court's decisions in both Steelman and Crider. See
Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Judge
Cochran, writing for the majority, assumed the day began at 12:00
am as well when the affidavit/record recited no time); State v.
Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding the
mere odor of marijuana, standing alone, emitting from a residence
does not give officers probable cause to believe Appellant was in
2
possession of marijuana in their presence). The Fort Worth Court
does not have the luxury of disagreeing with the decisions of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Horton v. State, 986 S.W.2d
297, 300 (Tex. App. -Waco 1997, no pet.) (intermediate appellate
courts are duty bound to apply the law as interpreted by the Court
of Criminal Appeals) (opinion of Davis, C. J.) . Accordingly,
Appellant seeks discretionary review from this Court.
GROUND FOR REVIEW NO. 1
(1) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this Court's
opinion in State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)?
GENERAL APPLICABLE STANDARDS
The trial court is the sole judge of credibility of the
witnesses ln a suppression hearing and, absent an abuse of
discretion, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed. Perez
v. State, 818 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
no pet.); see also Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997) . Such findings are reviewed on an abuse of discretion
standard and "will not be disturbed on appeal unless no reasonable
review of the facts shown in the appellate record could support the
trial court's ruling." Dubose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493, 497-98
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Cantu v. State, 817 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991).
3
When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence on the basis of
a Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant bears the burden of
proof. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Once the defendant establishes that a ( 1) search or seizure has
occurred and that (2) no warrant was obtained, the burden of proof
shifts to the State. Id. If the State is unable to produce
evidence of a warrant, then it must prove the reasonableness of the
search or seizure. Id.
In the case at bar, Appellant argues that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of his
detention because they were obtained as a result of an
unconstitutional detention. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961);
see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 2012); TEX.
CONST. art. I, §9; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is undisputed that
Littlejohn did not have a warrant to either detain Appellant or to
arrest him. Thus, the State had the burden to affirmatively
establish that Appellant had committed an offense or was about to
commit an offense before Littlejohn made the detention. Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997);
see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2012).
For government officials to be able to conduct investigative
detentions, they must have reasonable suspicion based on specific,
4
articulable facts which, when combined with rational inferences
from those facts, would lead the officer to conclude that a
particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in
criminal activity. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). Articulable facts must amount to "more than a mere
inarticulable hunch, suspicion, or good faith suspicion that a
crime was in progress." Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609, 612
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
Littlejohn testified that he conducted a "knock and talk" of
Appellant's residence on September 20~ 2011. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 30).
Littlejohn was unclear what time the "knock and talk" occurred.
(R.R., Vol. 2, p. 32). At the time of the "knock and talk,"
Littlejohn smelled the odor of marijuana emitting from Appellant's
house. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 18). After the short conversation,
Littlejohn left Appellant's residence and went back to the Crowley
Police Department. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 20). Littlejohn was then
instructed by Wallace to go back to the residence, set up
surveillance and make sure no one left the home so that Wallace
could obtain a search warrant for the residence. (R.R., Vol. 2, p.
21). Littlejohn went back to the house and observed Appellant ride
his bike and walk his dog. Id. Littlejohn then initiated a second
conversation with Appellant and detained him, at the direction of
Wallace, by placing him in the back of his patrol car. (R.R., Vol.
5
2, pp. 22-23). Littlejohn testified that his primary objective in
detaining Appellant was the odor of the marijuana. (R.R., Vol. 2,
pp. 33-34). A search warrant was later signed by a magistrate for
Appellant's residence at 11:34 am the same day. (R.R., Vol. 2, p.
40,46; Vol. 3, SX-1). The warrant was executed at approximately
12:00 pm and the search took approximately two (2) hours. (R.R.,
Vol. 2, 53) .
The question for this Court to decide is simply whether the
initial arrest of Appellant could be legally made without a warrant
or did the prolonged detention become an arrest. This Court has
already held that the mere odor of marijuana, standing alone,
emitting from a residence does not give officers probable cause to
believe Appellant was ln possession of marijuana in their presence.
Steelman, 93 S.W.3d at 108. Secondly, the mere tip, standing
alone, provided by Valerio's mother that Appellant was selling
marijuana to her son does not constitute probable cause. Id. The
tip was never substantiated and Appellant was never charged with
dealing drugs. Id.
Finally, "a detention that is not temporary and reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference, is unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth
Amendment." Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). Both Littlejohn and Wallace erroneously thought Appellant
was in possession of marijuana based on the mere smell of marijuana
6
emitting from Appellant's residence. (R.R., Vol. 2, pp. 33-34, 54).
Wallace even stated that fact in his affidavit for the search
warrant which the trial court adopted in its findings 1 of fact and
again stated it in his testimony as well: " ... Was he in possession
of it? I say yes, he was because it was in his residence." (R.R.,
Vol. 3, SX-l(p. 1 of 5); (R.R., Vol. 2, pp. 46,82). But no one
could remember neither the time of day the "knock and talk"
occurred, nor when the subsequent detention of Appellant occurred,
nor when the discovery of marijuana in Appellant's home occurred:
Q. [DEFENSE]: Again, I guess the timing here -- You don't
recall what time you did the knock and talk that day?
A. [LITTLEJOHN]: Not o££hand, no, sir.
(R.R., Vol. 2, p. 32) (emphasis added).
Without the time, one can only assume from the record that the
day began at 12:00 am on September 20, 2011, and Appellant was in
the back of the patrol car until at least two (2) hours after 11:34
am when the magistrate signed the search warrant as Wallace stated
the search of the residence took nearly two ( 2) hours after he
Wallace admitted at the hearing that although he states
Appellant committed the offense of possession of marijuana on
September 19, 2011, in his affidavit for the search warrant, the
date was actually September 20, 2011. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 46; Vol. 3,
SX-1 (p. 1 of 5). The trial court judge incorporated said clerical
error in his findings of fact. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 82). Wallace did,
however, get the date correct in his affidavit on when Littlejohn
smelled the odor of marijuana at the residence. (R.R., Vol. 3, SX-1
(p. 2 of 5) .
7
arrived with the signed warrant at noon. (R.R., Vol. 2, pp. 52-53).
That's nearly fourteen (14) hours that Appellant is sitting in the
back of the patrol car. Accord Crider, 352 S.W.3d at 710 (Judge
Cochran, writing for the majority, assumed the day began at 12:00
am as well when the affidavit/record recited no time); see Davis,
947 S.W.2d at 243. Did Littlejohn smell it at 12:01 am, 1:00 am,
2:00am, 3:00am, 4:00am, 5:00am, 6:00am, 7:00am, 8:00am, 9:00
am, 10:00 am, 11:00 am???
Thus, the longer the time gap between those events, the more
likely the detention evolved into an arrest based on the record
before this Honorable Court. Regardless o£ the time e~ement, the
continued detention of Appellant was based upon the officers'
conclusion that Appellant was in possession of marijuana based on
the smell of marijuana which Steelman has already held, as a matter
of law, is an erroneous belief and conclusion. Littlejohn,
following the orders of Wallace, exceeded the scope of any alleged
Terry detention in believing the odor of marijuana emitting from
one's residence equals possession of marijuana. It does not.
Thus, Appellant's warrantless detention, under these circumstances,
was an unlawful seizure of his person which led to the procurement
of a search warrant for his residence where marijuana was
subsequently discovered. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art.
I, §9; accord Davis, 947 S.W.2 at 243-44. Accordingly, all
evidence seized after said illegal arrest must be suppressed. TEX.
8
CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a)(Vernon2012).
GROUND FOR REVIEW NO. 2
(2) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this Court's
opinion in Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)?
GENERAL APPLICABLE STANDARDS
The trial court is the sole judge of credibility of the
witnesses in a suppression hearing and, absent an abuse of
discretion, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed. State
v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also
Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 85. Such findings are reviewed on an abuse
of discretion standard and "will not be disturbed on appeal unless
no reasonable review of the facts shown in the appellate record
could support the trial court's ruling." Montanez v. State, 195
S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cantu, 817 S.W.2d at 77.
But when the trial court's rulings do not turn on the credibility
and demeanor of the witnesses, this Honorable Court reviews de novo
a trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact. Estrada
v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
When reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant,
this Honorable Court applies a highly differential standard in
keeping with the constitutional preference for a warrant.
Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 819-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Under this standard, this Court will uphold the magistrate's
9
probable cause determination "so long as the magistrate had a
'substantial basis for .... conclud[ing]'uthat probable cause
existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Swearingen,
143 S.W.3d at 810. A request for a warrant must be supported by a
sworn affidavit that sets out facts sufficient to support a finding
of probable cause. TEX. CONST. art. I, §9; U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (c) (Vernon 2012). In
determining whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant, a
magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the affidavit and
must interpret the affidavit in a common sense and realistic
manner. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W .. 2d 482, 510 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997).
Under the Fourth Amendment, an affidavit is sufficient if,
from the totality of the circumstances reflected in the affidavit,
the magistrate was provided with a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39; U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, §9. Statements made during a motion
to suppress hearing do not factor into the probable cause
determination; rather, appellate courts examine only the four
corners of the affidavit to determine whether probable cause
exists. Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) .
10
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
In support of probable cause for issuance of the search
warrant in the case at bar, the affidavit of Wallace stated the
date that Littlejohn detected the smell of marijuana emitting from
Appellant's residence, but he failed to state the time said event
took place.
Said affidavit is, therefore, fatally defective. First, there
is nothing in the affidavit telling the magistrate at what time the
alleged incident took place. Sherlock v. State, 632 S.W.2d 604, 608
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Crider, 352 S.W.3d at 710. An affidavit is
inadequate if it fails to disclose ~acts which would enable the
magistrate to ascertain the event upon which probable cause was
founded was not so remote as to render it ineffective. Jones v.
State, 579 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), citing, Garza v.
State, 120 Tex. Crim. 147, 48 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1930). Here, the
affidavit is defective because the facts stated therein are not
shown to be closely related to the time of the issuance of the
warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause to search
Appellant's residence for marijuana. The record shows the search
warrant was issued by the magistrate at 11:34 am on September 20,
2011. Without knowing what time on September 20, 2011, Littlejohn
made contact with Appellant and smelled the marijuana, the issuing
magistrate was simply left to guess. Accord Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d
812-13 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
11
In failing to inform the magistrate as to when Littlejohn
arrived at "876 Oarlock Drive, Crowley, Tarrant County, Texas" and
smelled marijuana at Appellant's residence, the magistrate had no
information as to whether any evidence of marijuana could still be
found at Appellant's residence. Logically, the longer the time gap
between the initial detention and the eventual signing of the
search warrant, the less likely marijuana will be found in
Appellant's home. Crider, 352 S.W.3d at 710. In the case at bar,
there is a gap of nearly twelve (12) hours.
The affidavit in the case at bar does not state probable cause
to issue a search warrant for App~llant' s residence. Because
September 20, 2011, started at 12:00 am, the question as to when
Littlejohn detected the smell of marijuana remains unanswered. Did
he smell it at 12:01 am, 1:00 am, 2:00 am, 3:00 am, 4:00 am, 5:00
am, 6 : 0 0 am, 7 : 0 0 am, 8 : 0 0 am, 9 : 0 0 am, 1 0 : 0 0 am, 11 : 0 0 am? ? ?
Without the time stated in the affidavit, the search warrant could
not issue. Crider, 352 S.W.3d at 710; accord State v. Davila, 169
S.W.3d 735, 739-40 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.); see Davis v.
State, 831 S.W.2d 426, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Gordon v. State,
801 S.W.2d 899, 914-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Thus, the seizure
of Appellant's residence under these circumstances was an unlawful
search and seizure. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, §9.
Therefore, the evidence seized by virtue of the invalid warrant is
subject to suppression under Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of
12
Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a)(Vernon
2012) .
TCCP Article 38.23
However, it is an exception to the provisions of TCCP Article
38.23(a) if the evidence was obtained by a police officer acting in
good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
based upon probable cause. Id. art. 38.23(b). In the
distinguishable case at bar, however, the good-faith exception
should not be applied because as stated above, there was no finding
of probable cause by the magistrate in the instant case as required
under the specific language of TCCP .Article 38.23 (b). Id. It is
well founded that an affidavit under "Art. 38.2 3 (b) requires a
finding o£ probab~e cause, while [the federal good-faith exception
is] more flexible in allowing [an] officer's belief in probable
cause [to be] reasonable. Thus, we must direct our attention to
the validity of the warrant and affidavit without recourse to any
'good faith' exception to the warrant requirement." Curry v. State,
808 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The search warrant for Appellant's residence was wholly
lacking of any information to support an independent judgment that
probable cause existed for the issuance of same. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d
at 915-16, quoting, Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564
( 1971) ("The decisions of this Court concerning Fourth Amendment
13
probable-cause requirements before a warrant for either arrest or
search can issue require that the judicial officer issuing such a
warrant be supplied with su:f:ficient in:formation to support an
independent judgment that probable cause exists for the
warrant") (emphasis added); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (b)
(Vernon 2012) . Therefore, the good-faith exception is not
applicable in the case at bar. Id.
CONCLUSION
Littlejohn's own testimony supports a finding of no probable
cause to justify the arrest of Appellant for possession of
marijuana and the subsequent procurement of a search warrant for
Appellant's residence where marijuana was later discovered. In the
alternative, if the initial detention was based on reasonable
suspicion, said detention exceeded its scope and became a full
blown arrest based on the totality of the circumstances and the
record before this Honorable Court. Therefore, the evidence
obtained subsequent to said illegal arrest must be suppressed.
An affidavit in support of a search warrant is inadequate if
it fails to disclose facts which would enable the magistrate to
ascertain that the event upon which probable cause was founded was
closely related to the time of the issuance of the search warrant
to justify a finding of probable cause for same. Because the
officer's affidavit failed to provide the time of day necessary for
the issuance of a search warrant for Appellant's residence relating
14
to the offense of Possession of Marijuana under 2 ounces, the
evidence obtained subsequent to said illegal search must be
suppressed.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays this Honorable
Court grant this Petition for Discretionary Review and after a full
review hereon reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand
said case for entry of an Order suppressing all illegally obtained
tangible evidence after the illegal detention of Appellant for the
reasons stated herein and in accordance with the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, Article I, section 9 of the
Texas Constitution and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure and for any other relief Appellant may be justly
entitled.
RESPECT FULL
L .-r
L. PATRICK
SBN 00795775
115 N. Henderson Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
(817)870-1544
(817)870-1589 fax
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT /PRO BONO
15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was hand-delivered to Hon. Joe Shannon, Jr., Tarrant
County District Attorney, 401 W. Belknap Street, Fort Worth, Texas
76196, and sent via certified mail to Hon. Matthew Paul, State
Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Austin, Texas 78711 on
December 29, 2014.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 9. 4 ( i) ( 3) of ;the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure, I, L. Patrick Davis, hereby state that this document
contains approximately 3,548 words exclusive of that contained in
the Appendix and those sections inapplicable to said Rule.
16
A
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00016-CR
JOSEY WALES PARKS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 9 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1263051
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
I. Introduction
Crowley police officers detained Appellant Josey Wales Parks while they
sought a search warrant for his home, where they subsequently discovered
marijuana. Parks pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana, two ounces or less,
in exchange for six months of deferred adjudication community supervision, a
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
fine, and court costs after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. Parks
appeals the denial of his motion to suppress in two points pertaining to the
search warrant affidavit and his detention. We affirm.
II. Motion to Suppress
When the trial court determines probable cause to support the issuance of
a search warrant, there are no credibility determinations. State v. McLain, 337
S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011 ). Instead, the trial court is constrained to
the four corners of the affidavit. /d. Accordingly, when reviewing a magistrate's
probable cause determination, we apply the deferential standard of review
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004 ). Under that standard, we uphold the probable cause determination
"so long as the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a
search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.
Ct. at 2331 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725,
736 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980)); see Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 811; see also
McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271; Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010).
Further, we may not analyze the affidavit in a hyper-technical manner;
rather, we must interpret the affidavit "in a commonsensical and realistic manner,
recognizing that the magistrate may draw reasonable inferences. When in doubt,
2
we defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made."
McClain, 337 S.W.3d at 271. Probable cause exists when, under the totality of
the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found at the specified location. /d. at 272. "The focus is not on
what other facts could or should have been included in the affidavit; the focus is
on the combined logical force of facts that are in the affidavit." State v. Duarte,
389 S.W.3d 349, 354-55 (Tex. Grim. App. 2012). As long as the magistrate had
a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, the magistrate's
probable cause determination will be upheld. McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271.
We have summarized the following pertinent information from Investigator
Wallace's search warrant affidavit, which he signed on September 20, 2011:
• In the two months prior to the search warrant application on September 20,
2011, the Crowley Police Department received up to twenty reports of
burglary and thefts in Parks's neighborhood.
• "On or about September 19, 2011, ... Parks ... did then and there commit
the offense of Possession of Marijuana . . . in that he did then and there
possess marijuana inside his residence .... "
• On September 19, 2011, Lachelle Henton advised Crowley Police Officer
McCurtain that her juvenile son T.V. had been stealing property from
residences in their neighborhood and trading the stolen property with Parks,
who lived across the street from them, in exchange for marijuana.
• On September 19, 2011, Henton went to Parks's house to confront Parks
about providing T.V. with marijuana. He admitted to her that he provided
marijuana to T.V. in exchange for property, and she admonished Parks to stay
away from her son and to stop providing him with marijuana.
• On September 20, 2011, Officer McCurtain told Investigator Wallace what
Henton had told him about stolen property possibly being located at Parks's
residence.
3
• On September 20, 2011, Officers McCurtain and Littlejohn went to Parks's
residence and conducted a "knock and talk" with Parks. Parks told them
about his friendship with T.V. but denied providing T.V. with marijuana or
receiving any property from him.
• Officer McCurtain, who was previously employed as a narcotics interdiction
officer and due to his training and experience had become familiar with the
odor of fresh marijuana, and Officer Littlejohn reported that they detected the
overwhelming odor of fresh marijuana coming from inside Parks's residence
while they talked with Parks in the open doorway of his residence.
• Officer Littlejohn began surveillance of Parks's residence, saw an unidentified
female enter the residence with a key, and saw Parks transport several boxes
with unknown contents from a truck parked in the driveway into the residence.
"It was determined at that point to detain ... Parks and the female in the
residence in order to protect any evidence from destruction."
• Officer Littlejohn approached Parks outside the residence, detained him,
secured him in the back of his patrol unit, and gave him his Miranda warnings.
Parks then waived his rights and agreed to answer questions.
• Officer Littlejohn knocked on the door, detained the female who answered it,
and placed her in the back of Officer McCurtain's patrol unit. She waived her
rights, agreed to answer questions, and told Officer McCurtain that she had
an amount of marijuana in a green bag that was located just inside the
residence by the doorway.
• Officer Harold Cussnick with the Fort Worth Police Department K-9 Unit was
asked to come to the residence; his K-9 partner Kelev had a positive alert to
the presence of narcotics at the residence's front door.
The face of the warrant reflects that the magistrate signed it at 11:33 a.m. on
September 20, 2011.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Littlejohn testified that he and Officer
McCurtain decided to conduct a "knock and talk" with Parks after receiving T.V.'s
mother's credible tip regarding her son's crime spree and his exchanging the
4
stolen goods for marijuana with Parks, a neighbor across the street. 2 They went
to Parks's home at some point in the morning between 8:00 a.m. and "before
lunch" and spoke with Parks for around five minutes. Both officers detected a
strong odor of marijuana coming from inside the house when Parks opened the
front door. Parks told them that he did not want to speak with them and that "he
knew the kid but, you know, he wasn't doing any of the buying" of the stolen
property.
After conversing with Parks, the officers returned to the police station and
talked with Investigator Wallace. Officer Littlejohn said that Investigator Wallace
told them to return to Parks's house and make sure nobody left while he
procured a search warrant for the house. After returning to Parks's house, the
officers saw Parks leave the house to ride his bike and walk his dog. Officer
Littlejohn relayed this information to Investigator Wallace, who told him to detain
Parks. Officer Littlejohn testified that he approached Parks, took Parks's cell
phone, and placed him in the back of his patrol car3 and that Parks was detained
from concern that he might otherwise destroy the evidence. While Parks was
detained, a Fort Worth K-9 unit arrived and alerted outside the home to the
2
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (stating that a
police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock
because that is no more than any private citizen might do).
3
0fficer Littlejohn further testified that he did not activate the lights on his
patrol car and that he did not handcuff Parks before placing him in the patrol car.
5
presence of drugs. 4 Officer Littlejohn testified that Parks was detained for thirty
minutes to an hour before the search warrant was executed and that police
recovered a stolen Wii game console and a small amount of marijuana from
Parks's residence.
Investigator Wallace testified that he had sent Officers Littlejohn and
McCurtain back to the residence to prevent Parks from removing or destroying
the evidence and that he asked for a K-9 unit to be sent out. Investigator
Wallace said that he waited to hear the results from the K-9 unit before he started
drafting the search warrant and that it usually took him thirty to forty-five minutes
to "bang out a warrant like this."
On cross-examination, Investigator Wallace stated that the search warrant
affidavit contained a typographical error in that the first statement in the affidavit
recited that Parks had committed possession of marijuana on or about
September 19, 2011. Investigator Wallace testified that he had intended for that
date to read September 20, 2011, 5 and that he had based the affidavit on the
September 20, 2011 events-the "knock and talk" at Parks's residence, the
4
Cf. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18 ("The government's use of trained
police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). Parks does not argue that
Jardines retroactively applies to the K-9's alert; he does not address the alert at
all.
5
0fficer Littlejohn stated that he thought the police had arrested Parks for
possession on September 19, but he also agreed that the conversation with
T.V.'s mother had occurred on September 19 before the September 20 "knock
and talk" and the arrest.
6
marijuana odor smelled by the officers, and the K-9 unit's alert. Investigator
Wallace further testified that he arrived at the residence around noon to conduct
the search.
The trial court recited into the record that the two references to September
19 in the affidavit were typographical errors; 6 that all of the events occurred on
September 20, 2011; and that based on the smell of marijuana that the officer
recognized based on his training and experience, there was sufficient probable
cause to believe that there were potential controlled substances in the house.
The trial court adopted the affidavit's factual recitation as the chronology of
events that led to the search warrant and expressly stated that the detention did
not lead to recovery of any evidence that was sought to be used against Parks.
And it concluded that the search warrant led to the recovery of the evidence at
issue and that the search warrant was valid on its face because, despite the
typographical errors, it was supported by probable cause.
In his second point, Parks complains that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to suppress because the affidavit failed to state what time Officer
6
As set out above in our summary of the affidavit's contents, there were
actually three references to September 19; only one of them-the allegation that
Parks committed possession of marijuana "on or about September 19, 2011 "-
appears to be incorrect in light of the record. We must uphold the trial court's
ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law
applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling.
State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v.
State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974
(2004).
7
Littlejohn smelled the marijuana odor coming from his house, leaving the
magistrate to guess whether drugs could still be found there.
The affidavit reflects that Henton, a named informant, spoke directly to
Parks, who admitted to her that he had supplied her son with marijuana. See
Matamoros v. State, 901 S.W.2d 470, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (upholding the
validity of a search warrant affidavit when it specified a named informant who
supplied the information upon which probable cause was based and was
sufficiently detailed to suggest direct knowledge on the informant's part).
Further, Henton's information was corroborated by the fact that the officers then
went to Parks's residence and smelled an "overwhelming odor of fresh
marijuana" coming from inside the house. The affidavit also reveals that through
his training and experience as a narcotics interdiction officer, Officer McCurtain
was familiar with the odor of fresh marijuana. Finally, the affidavit indicates that a
female inside the residence told the officers that there was marijuana inside
Parks's residence.
The record reflects that the search warrant was issued and executed at
11:34 a.m. on September 20, 2011-the same day on which the officers detected
the odor of fresh marijuana coming from inside Parks's residence. Further, the
affidavit stated that the Crowley Police Department had received "up to twenty
reports of burglary" in Parks's neighborhood during the previous two months. In
conjunction with Henton's tip that her son had been stealing from his neighbors'
homes and trading the stolen goods to Parks in exchange for marijuana, the
8
magistrate could have reasonably inferred that Parks had been engaging in
continuous drug transactions during the two months leading up to the search of
his residence. See Jones v. State, 364 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Grim. App. 2012)
("We have suggested that time is a less important consideration when an affidavit
recites observations that are consistent with ongoing drug activity at a
defendant's residence."), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 370 (2012); Thibault v. State,
No. 02-06-00449-CR, 2008 WL 45757, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 3,
2008, pet. refd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that when the
affidavit recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature
such as a course of conduct, the passage of time between the occurrence of
events set out in the affidavit and the time the search warrant was issued
becomes less significant).
We defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have
made, and here, the magistrate could have determined that the information was
still sufficiently fresh to issue the search warrant without the specific time that the
officers smelled the marijuana pinpointed in the affidavit. See McLain, 337
S.W.3d at 272; cf. Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704, 708-11 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (requiring a specific time in a DWI search-warrant affidavit for blood
evidence due to alcohol's dissipation from bloodstream). Therefore, we conclude
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that sufficient
probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at
354-55; McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271. We overrule Parks's second point.
9
In his first point, Parks argues that his detention was an arrest without
probable cause that led to the search warrant's procurement. Parks sought
suppression of all tangible evidence seized from his residence and any of his
statements. The record reflects that his statements, if any, were not offered or
admitted into evidence, and it supports the trial court's conclusion that the other
evidence was recovered pursuant to the search warrant, which we have already
concluded was properly supported by probable cause. 7 Therefore, even
assuming that the seizure itself was unlawful, because there was no evidence
resulting from the detention for the trial court to suppress, we overrule Parks's
first point. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005).
Ill. Conclusion
Having overruled both of Parks's points, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, DAUPHINOT, and WALKER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: September 18, 2014
7
Parks does not explain how the detention could have led to the search
warrant's procurement when, as set out above, the search warrant application
was based primarily on the tip from T.V.'s mother, the fresh marijuana odor, and
other circumstances that led to Parks's detention while the police pursued the
warrant.
10