Victorick, Ex Parte David Lee v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                     PD-0030-15
    PD-0030-15                  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    Transmitted 1/5/2015 3:52:46 PM
    Accepted 1/14/2015 5:43:36 PM
    ABEL ACOSTA
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS                                             CLERK
    PD – _________ – 15
    DAVID LEE VICTORICK,
    Appellant
    vs.
    STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    On Discretionary Review from No. 09-14-00190-CR
    Ninth Court of Appeals, Beaumont
    Appealed From Trial Court No. 13-11-12323-CR
    435TH Judicial District Court, Montgomery County
    Motion To Extend Time To File
    Petition For Discretionary Review
    L.T. “Butch” Bradt #02841600
    14015 Southwest Freeway, Suite 4
    Sugar Land, Texas 77478-3550
    (281) 201-0700
    JANUARY 14, 2015             Fax: (281) 201-1202
    ltbradt@flash.net
    Attorney for Appellant,
    David Lee Victorick
    1
    To The Honorable Judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals:
    David Lee Victorick, Appellant, for good cause, moves for an extension
    of time of 31 days1 to file a petition for discretionary review and shows:
    1.    On December 10, 2014, the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed the
    Appellant’s conviction. See David Lee Victorick v. State of Texas,
    Docket No. 09-14-00190-CR, December 10, 2014. A copy of the judgment and
    opinion is attached to this Motion. As the Court can see, the Ninth Court of
    Appeals also disposed of Appellant’s appeal in Docket No. 09-14-00112-CR at
    the same time. While related, that appeal must be addressed separately.
    2.    As Appellant did not file a motion for rehearing, his Petition for
    Discretionary Review is due to be filed on January 9, 2014.
    3.    On December 11, 2014, counsel represented Juan Medina in the
    308TH Judicial District Court of Harris County in Cause No. 2014-01703-J, In
    the Interest of L.M. and J.M.. This was a termination of parental rights
    proceeding wherein CPS was seeking to terminate Mr. Medina’s parental
    rights. At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Medina’s parental rights were not
    terminated.
    4.    Counsel’s office was closed December 24 – 26, 2014, for
    1
    The 30TH day is a Sunday, therefore Appellant requests until the
    following Monday, the 31ST day.
    2
    Christmas. Counsel’s office was closed from noon December 31 through
    January 2, 2015, for New Years.
    5.    In addition to the foregoing, counsel was in trial on December 29,
    2014, in the 212TH Judicial District Court of Galveston County, Texas, in
    Docket No. 12-CV-0026, Spears v. Johnson. In addition to a day-long trial,
    there was the usual time spent the preceding week preparing for trial,
    consulting with witnesses, preparing exhibit lists, etc..
    6.    Counsel also had to prepare and file a motion for rehearing of the
    denial of a Petition for Review in the Texas Supreme Court in Docket No. 14-
    0562, Olga de la Cerda Cabrera, et al v. Palisades Collection, LLC,
    et al. The Petition for Review was denied on December 19, 2014 so the
    Motion for Rehearing had to be filed on or before January 5, 2015.
    7.    In addition to the foregoing, Counsel has had to research and
    prepare a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States Fifth Circuit
    Court of Appeals as against the Honorable Sam Lindsay, U.S. District Judge,
    relating to an order signed by Judge Lindsay in Docket No. 03-07-2020-CV.
    This mandamus will be filed the week of January 5, 2015.
    8.    On December 29, 2014, the Fifth Court of Appeals issued its
    majority opinion and dissenting opinion in Docket Nos. 05-13-00421-CR, 05-
    3
    13-00423-CR, 05-13-00424-CR and 05-13-00425-CR, State of Texas v.
    Albert G. Hill, III. Undersigned counsel spent a good portion of the day,
    December 30, 2014, researching the opinions and the dissents and discussing
    with co-counsel whether to move for rehearing, or rehearing en banc at the
    Dallas Court of Appeals or whether to proceed directly to this Honorable Court
    by way of Petition for Discretionary Review.
    9.    And counsel is in the process of finalizing a Petition for Writ of
    Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in the case of David Lee
    Victorick v. State of Texas, which results from the denial of Mr.
    Victorick’s Petition for Discretionary Review to this Court in Docket No. PD-
    0807-14. As the Petition for Discretionary Review was denied on October 15,
    2014, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari must be filed with the Supreme Court
    on or before January 13, 2015. As the Petition is being printed, it must be
    finalized and given to the printer no later than January 8, 2015.
    10.   Counsel is also set for trial on the two-week docket beginning
    January 5, 2015, in Cause No. 2008-17249, Bookmark Litigation
    Services vs. Robert Hinsley & Associates, pending in the 164TH Judicial
    District Court of Harris County. Due to the age of the case, the court
    coordinator has advised that the case will be going to trial on this docket. The
    4
    trial is a jury trial and is expected to last 3 – 4 days.
    11.   Although the Ninth Court of Appeals only issued one opinion, it
    disposed of Docket Nos. 09-14-00112-CR and 09-14-00190-CR in that single
    opinion. While the issues in the writ of habeas corpus are related to the direct
    appeal of Appellant’s conviction, they are distinct and this requires that two
    separate Petitions for Discretionary Review be filed with this Honorable
    Court.
    12.   Because of the foregoing, counsel for David Lee Victorick has not
    even been able to begin working on the two Petitions for Discretionary Review
    that he must file with this Court on behalf of Mr. Victorick. And, at the
    earliest, it will be the week of January 12, 2015, before he is able to begin this
    work.
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant, David Lee
    Victorick, requests the Court to grant him an extension of 31 days, until
    February 9, 2015, in which to file his Petition for Discretionary Review herein.
    Appellant prays for general relief.
    Respectfully submitted,
    L.T. BRADT, P.C.
    By: /s/ L.T. Bradt
    L.T. “Butch” Bradt #02841600
    14015 Southwest Freeway, Suite 4
    5
    Sugar Land, Texas 77478-3550
    (281) 201-0700
    Fax: (281) 201-1202
    ltbradt@flash.net
    Attorney for Appellant,
    David Lee Victorick
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I, the undersigned attorney, certify that a true and correct copy of the
    foregoing pleading was faxed to:
    Honorable Brett Ligon, District Attorney
    William J. Delmore, III, Ass’t District Attorney
    Jeff Hohl, Ass’t District Attorney
    207 W. Phillips, 2nd Floor
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    Fax: 936-760-6940
    E-mail: bill.delmore@mctx.org
    on January 5, 2015.
    /s/ L.T. Bradt
    L.T. Bradt
    6
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-14-00112-CR
    NO. 09-14-00190-CR
    ____________________
    EX PARTE DAVID LEE VICTORICK
    and
    DAVID LEE VICTORICK, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    _______________________________________________________           ______________
    On Appeal from the 435th District Court
    Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 13-11-12323 CR
    ________________________________________________________           _____________
    OPINION
    This matter involves two appeals filed by David Lee Victorick relating to his
    indictment and subsequent conviction for online solicitation of a minor. 1 See Tex.
    1
    We have considered three related matters filed by Victorick. Initially, we
    dismissed a petition for a writ of mandamus wherein Victorick sought to compel
    the presiding administrative judge to grant Victorick’s motion to recuse the trial
    1
    Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c) (West 2011). On March 7, 2014, the trial court
    denied Victorick’s pre-trial application for writ of habeas corpus asserting a claim
    of double jeopardy. Victorick filed a notice of appeal and requested that his trial be
    stayed pending the resolution of Appeal No. 09-14-00112-CR, but this Court
    denied the motion to stay. Victorick was tried, convicted, and sentenced to five
    years of imprisonment. Victorick filed a notice of appeal of the final judgment,
    docketed in Appeal No. 09-14-00190-CR. We affirm the order denying the
    application for a writ of habeas corpus and the judgment of conviction.
    ISSUES
    Victorick presents two issues in Appeal No. 09-14-00112-CR (the pre-trial
    request for habeas relief). First, he contends a bond order that issued after his arrest
    judge. See In re Victorick, No. 09-13-00483-CR, 
    2013 WL 5969469
    , at *1 (Tex.
    App.—Beaumont Nov. 6, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication). Next, we denied a petition for a writ of mandamus and prohibition
    filed by Victorick to compel the trial court to stay the trial pending the resolution
    of his appeal of the trial court’s denial of a pre-trial habeas application challenging
    the facial constitutionality of the statute creating the offense for which he was
    indicted. See In re Victorick, No. 09-13-00550-CR, 
    2013 WL 6885130
    , at *1 (Tex.
    App.—Beaumont Dec. 30, 2013, orig. proceeding, [leave denied]) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication). Finally, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of
    Victorick’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of Texas Penal Code section
    33.021(c). See Ex parte Victorick, No. 09-13-00551-CR, 
    2014 WL 2152129
    , at *1
    (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 21, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication). In the habeas appeal now before us, we granted Victorick’s motion to
    take judicial notice of the clerk’s record filed in Appeal No. 09-13-00551-CR. See
    Turner v. State, 
    733 S.W.2d 218
    , 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
    2
    on a previous indictment, which did not go to trial, constitutes punishment under
    the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause because the bond contained
    oppressive and onerous conditions that infringed upon his constitutional rights.
    Second, Victorick contends the oppressive and onerous conditions of his pre-trial
    bond on the indictment under which he was tried constitute punishment for double
    jeopardy purposes. In a motion to dismiss and with a suggestion of mootness, the
    State argues that Victorick’s conviction mooted the appeal of the denial of pre-trial
    habeas relief.
    Victorick presents three issues in Appeal No. 09-14-00190-CR (appeal of his
    conviction). First, he challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his
    conviction. Second, he contends he was deprived of an impartial magistrate. Third,
    Victorick contends the procedural rules that apply to recusal proceedings deprived
    him of due process because the rules do not provide for an interlocutory appeal.
    INDICTMENT AND CONVICTION
    The State initially indicted Victorick for online solicitation of a minor under
    subsection (b)(1) of section 33.021 of the Penal Code. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
    33.021. After subsection (b)(1) was found to be unconstitutional by the Texas
    Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Lo, Victorick was re-indicted under
    subsection (c) of section 33.021 for knowingly soliciting a fifteen year old girl to
    meet him with the intent that she engage in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or
    3
    deviate sexual intercourse with him. See 
    424 S.W.3d 10
    , 27 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2013). Victorick entered a not guilty plea and a jury found the appellant guilty as
    charged, and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for five years.
    MOOTNESS
    Before we address Victorick’s appellate issues we consider the State’s
    argument that Victorick’s appeal of the denial of the pre-trial request for habeas
    relief is moot. As a general rule, a habeas appeal relating to pre-trial bail is mooted
    by the subsequent conviction of the defendant because upon his conviction the
    habeas applicant is no longer being subjected to pre-trial confinement. See e.g.,
    Martinez v. State, 
    826 S.W.2d 620
    , 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Unlike a habeas
    claim concerning pre-trial bail in which the applicant seeks relief from an
    unconstitutional pre-trial confinement, if he is correct regarding his double
    jeopardy argument, Victorick may be entitled to relief from the sentence imposed
    in the judgment of conviction that has also been appealed to this Court. Therefore,
    Victorick’s pre-trial request for habeas relief is not necessarily mooted by his
    conviction.
    DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM
    The indictment accusing Victorick of online solicitation of a minor under
    section 33.021(c) of the Texas Penal Code alleged, in part, that Victorick, on or
    about June 2, 2013, did “knowingly solicit by text message, K.E., a minor, to meet
    4
    the defendant, with the intent that K.E. would engage in sexual contact and sexual
    intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse with the defendant[.]” After indictment,
    Victorick filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that he
    was being illegally confined because “[t]he Court has set conditions of bond that
    are not only oppressive, they have denied him constitutionally-guaranteed rights.”
    Victorick alleged that “Double Jeopardy forbids his trial on the present
    indictment.” Victorick’s petition for habeas relief contends that subjecting him to a
    trial and potential conviction and sentence for a second degree felony would
    violate the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibitions against multiple punishments
    because he had already been subjected to punishment within the scope of the
    Double Jeopardy Clause by conditions of his bond that prohibited him from: (1)
    possessing any firearms; (2) contacting the alleged victim’s family; (3) going
    within 100 yards of the residence of the alleged victim; (4) contacting any child
    under seventeen years of age; or (5) having any contact with any computer or
    internet connection. Victorick argues that the conditions of his bond effectively
    denied him his right to bear arms, to associate with his wife, to attend church, to
    move about freely and peaceably in public places, and to work. No evidence was
    offered in the pre-trial habeas hearing. The trial court denied the application.
    The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the
    same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . .” U.S. CONST.
    5
    amend. V. Victorick argues that placing him on bond under conditions that he
    contends are oppressive and onerous constitutes punishment for Fifth Amendment
    double jeopardy purposes. Citing United States v. Jorn, Victorick contends that
    judicial overreaching triggers double jeopardy protections. See 
    400 U.S. 470
    , 483-
    84 (1971) (plurality op.). Jorn held the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a re-trial
    after the trial court sua sponte discharged the jury without manifest necessity for
    calling a mistrial and without considering granting a continuance. 
    Id. at 487.
    Jorn
    was a successive prosecution case in which jeopardy attached with the seating of
    the jury in the first trial and terminated when the trial court discharged the jury;
    jeopardy would attach a second time with the seating of a new jury, thereby
    implicating the Fifth Amendment’s protection against successive prosecution. See
    
    id. at 484.
    Victorick argues the trial court erred in failing to apply the Jorn successive
    prosecution concept, notwithstanding the fact that jeopardy attached only once in
    his case. Victorick contends without citing any authority that by referring to the
    complaining witness as the “victim” in the order setting conditions of bond, the
    trial court determined that he had committed a crime and the entry of the order
    functioned as an adjudication of guilt. The law of this state is well settled that with
    respect to a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn, and
    for a bench trial jeopardy attaches when the defendant pleads to the charging
    6
    instrument. See Ortiz v. State, 
    933 S.W.2d 102
    , 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (The
    constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply until the
    defendant enters a plea before the trier of facts.). Jeopardy does not attach in a
    preliminary hearing regardless of what facts may be determined during the
    proceeding. See 
    id. Nevertheless, when
    the defendant has been subjected to a single trial, “the
    Double Jeopardy Clause ‘prevent[s] the sentencing court from prescribing greater
    punishment than the legislature intended.’” Ervin v. State, 
    991 S.W.2d 804
    , 807
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 
    459 U.S. 359
    , 366 (1983)).
    Factors considered in determining legislative intent include whether two provisions
    imposing separate punishments are contained within the same statutory section,
    whether they are phrased in the alternative, whether they are named similarly,
    whether they have common punishment ranges, whether they have a common
    focus or gravamen, and whether that common focus tends to indicate a single
    instance of conduct, whether the elements that differ between them can be
    considered the same under an imputed theory of liability which would result in the
    offenses being considered the same under the Blockburger test, and whether there
    is legislative history articulating an interest to treat the offenses as the same or
    different for double jeopardy purposes. 
    Ervin, 991 S.W.2d at 814
    (citing
    Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1932)).
    7
    The State cites cases from other jurisdictions, which hold that conditional
    pre-trial release cannot be considered punishment for purposes of the Double
    Jeopardy Clause because it serves a remedial rather than a punitive purpose and a
    bond condition is not based on a determination of guilt. See State v. Torres, 
    890 So. 2d 292
    , 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004) (conditions of pre-trial release
    requiring accused to attend sex offender treatment were not punitive and double
    jeopardy did not attach); accord Parent v. State, 
    900 So. 2d 598
    , 599-600 (Fla. Dist.
    Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004) (special conditions placed on pre-trial release of DUI
    defendant did not bar further prosecution under the double jeopardy clause);
    Halikipoulos v. Dillion, 
    139 F. Supp. 2d 312
    (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (pre-trial release
    condition requiring defendant to attend “stoplift” counseling program did not
    constitute punishment and court rejected double jeopardy argument). While not
    binding on this Court, the cases are instructive of the result reached in other
    jurisdictions.
    In Texas, the Code of Criminal Procedure provides rules for fixing the
    amount of the bond and the conditions of bond. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts.
    17.15 (West 2005), 17.40 (West Supp. 2014). “The bail shall be sufficiently high
    to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.” Tex.
    Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15. In setting the amount of the bond, “[t]he power
    to require bail is not to be used as to make it an instrument of oppression.” 
    Id. The 8
    magistrate considers “[t]he nature of the offense and the circumstances under
    which it was committed” and also considers “[t]he future safety of a victim of the
    alleged offense and the community. . . .” 
    Id. In Texas,
    “a magistrate may impose
    any reasonable condition of bond related to the safety of a victim of the alleged
    offense or to the safety of the community.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.40.
    Unlike the criminal offense of online solicitation of a minor that is contained
    within the Penal Code, the statutes that authorize a trial court to fix bail pending
    trial and to impose conditions on a defendant’s pre-trial release on bail function to
    ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial and to protect the community without
    requiring a finding of guilt. Compare Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.15,
    17.40, with Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c). We conclude that the clear intent of
    the Legislature as demonstrated in the plain language contained in articles 17.15
    and 17.40 was to permit a trial court to set reasonable conditions of bond as a
    requirement for pre-trial release and then to impose the penalty set out in the Penal
    Code for the offense if the defendant is later tried and convicted. See 
    Ervin, 991 S.W.2d at 814
    .
    Victorick argues that in his case, the trial court failed to follow the rules
    established by articles 17.15 and 17.40 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    and that the trial court imposed unreasonable conditions of bond. See Tex. Code
    Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.15, 17.40. He argues that the conditions impacted his
    9
    freedoms as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to such a degree that he has been
    punished before trial for the acts alleged in the indictment. The proper method to
    challenge a punitive bail condition is by filing either a motion to reduce bail or an
    application for a writ of habeas corpus for a bail reduction. See Stack v. Boyle, 
    342 U.S. 1
    , 6 (1951) (the proper procedure for challenging bail as unlawfully fixed is
    by motion for reduction of bail); Ex parte Young, 
    257 S.W.3d 276
    , 278 (Tex.
    App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (the accused may challenge the conditions
    attached to bail through a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus).
    Victorick petitioned for pre-trial habeas relief, but he sought only relief from
    the indictment and did not seek habeas relief from the order setting ancillary
    conditions of bond. Furthermore, he submitted no evidence regarding the
    oppressive nature of the conditions of bond. During the hearing on his pre-trial
    habeas petition, the State argued that the bond conditions were reasonable because
    they related to safety of the victim and the community. Considering that the
    indictment accused Victorick of online solicitation of a member of his household,
    and the use of a computer, electronic or texting device, the trial court reasonably
    could have determined that temporarily prohibiting his use of the internet and
    contact with the victim’s family was authorized by article 17.40, even though the
    conditions necessarily impaired Victorick’s freedom to communicate electronically
    and to associate with his family. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.40.
    10
    Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the application for
    writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we overrule both issues raised by Victorick in
    Appeal No. 09-14-00112-CR.
    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    In Victorick’s first issue in Appeal No. 09-14-00190-CR (appeal of his
    conviction), Victorick challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
    conviction of online solicitation of a minor. A person commits the offense of
    online solicitation of a minor if the person “over the Internet, by electronic mail or
    text message or other electronic message service or system, or through a
    commercial online service, knowingly solicits a minor to meet another person,
    including the actor, with the intent that the minor will engage in sexual contact,
    sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with the actor or another person.”
    See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c). Victorick argues the evidence at trial was
    insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did “knowingly solicit by
    text message, K.E., a minor, to meet the defendant, with the intent that K.E. would
    engage in sexual contact and sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse with
    the defendant,” as alleged in the indictment. Victorick contends that
    “communicating in a sexually explicit manner with a minor, even if with the intent
    to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, is legal.” He argues the
    evidence is legally insufficient to establish he violated the statute because the State
    11
    failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he solicited K.E. to meet him and
    that he acted with the intent that K.E. engage in sexual contact.
    The “Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that
    a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
    support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 895 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)). In evaluating
    the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have
    found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902
    n.19; Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
    The jury is the ultimate authority on the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight to be given their testimony. 
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894
    ; Penagraph v. State,
    
    623 S.W.2d 341
    , 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). We give full deference to the jury’s
    responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,
    and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. 
    Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13
    . If the record contains conflicting inferences, we must presume that
    the jury resolved such facts in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution.
    
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899
    n.13; Clayton v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 772
    , 778 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2007). We also determine whether the necessary inferences are
    12
    reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence
    when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
    Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778
    . We may not substitute our judgment concerning the weight and credibility of
    the evidence for that of the fact finder. King v. State, 
    29 S.W.3d 556
    , 562 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2000).
    Courts and juries no longer face the difficult task of excluding every
    reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt. Under the
    current standard of review, there is no reason to treat circumstantial
    evidence of an accused’s mental state any differently than
    circumstantial evidence of other elements. Just as circumstantial
    evidence is reviewed under the same standard as direct evidence,
    circumstantial evidence of intent is reviewed under the same standard
    as circumstantial evidence of other elements.
    Laster v. State, 
    275 S.W.3d 512
    , 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “As long as the
    verdict is supported by a reasonable inference, it is within the province of the
    factfinder to choose which inference is most reasonable.” 
    Id. at 523.
    In 2013, Victorick was employed as a high school coach and teacher. A year
    before the events at issue in this appeal, Victorick’s wife became concerned that
    Victorick might have developed a sexual attraction to K.E. His wife noticed that
    Victorick displayed a keen interest in the possibility that his step-daughter, K.E.,
    might be sexually active and the wife observed what appeared to be inappropriate
    sexual remarks in text messages from Victorick to K.E. Victorick explained to his
    wife that he had been “referring to . . . basketball, teaching her how to shoot,
    13
    dribble better, things of that nature[]” and that is what he meant when he sent K.E.
    a text message saying that “he could show her things and do things that, you know,
    some of those boys couldn’t.” Mrs. Victorick believed her husband, but she put
    locks on K.E.’s door and she would stay up until Victorick went to bed “to make
    sure that he wasn’t going in there and downloading from her phone[.]” There were
    times when Victorick was “acting like a jealous boyfriend[;]” for example, once he
    climbed a ladder to look into a neighboring cul-de-sac to observe K.E. and her
    boyfriend.
    On the date of the offense, Victorick, his wife, and K.E. were attending a
    graduation party at a friend’s home. Victorick was, according to his wife, “drinking
    excessively” at the party. After K.E. left the party and went to a nearby fast food
    restaurant with a boy, Victorick sent K.E. a text message asking, “Is your quickly
    done? Time to get back.” K.E. responded, “I’m pretty sure all we did was go get
    ice cream.” The exchange of messages between K.E. and Victorick continued as
    follows:
    K.E.: We need water
    Victorick: I.need then & sick me you willl love, where are you! Suck me!
    K.E.: Never
    Victorick: If you ever. You will h understand how good I I eat p[---]y, let me
    show you! You will. Love ir!!’ Ask the others!!
    14
    K.E.: F[---] you
    Victorick: Please let me eat you you will love, it quit f[---]ing, I love your,
    miore than you know!
    K.E.: F[---]ing for
    K.E.: Die 2
    K.E. showed the messages to Victorick’s wife, who understood that it
    referred to oral sex. A few weeks thereafter, K.E. called 9-1-1 about a physical
    altercation she had with Victorick. During the call, K.E. told the dispatcher that
    Victorick grabbed her by her hair and shoved her into the furniture, and also that
    he was “trying to get me to do things with him . . . sexual things.”
    K.E. testified at trial that she did not believe Victorick was trying to have
    sex with her, and that she believed he could have sent the messages because he was
    trying to keep her from having sex with more people. She does remember,
    however, telling her mother that she was “creeped out” by her stepfather, and she
    agreed that she called 9-1-1. A clinical psychologist testified for the State. He
    stated that he had counseled hundreds of children who were victims of sexual
    abuse. With respect to the Victorick case, he observed the testimony of K.E.,
    reviewed some but not all of the texts between Victorick and K.E, reviewed the
    statements given by K.E.’s mother and Victorick, and reviewed other items from
    2
    We use brackets and dashes to note our omission of some letters due to the
    profane nature of the words.
    15
    the reports. Further, he testified that abusers often “groom” their victims “[t]o
    foster that dependence and to foster that trust so that they can not only abuse the
    child and have access to them, but to the extent that they do harm the child in some
    way, the child may not tell about it, may even have positive relationships toward
    the person related to ways that they’ve been manipulated.” The psychologist stated
    that the testimony of K.E. that she did not want Victorick to get in trouble, or that
    she did not think the texts were intended to be sexual, or that she blamed herself,
    would be
    consistent with someone who has been groomed by a suspect,
    groomed to feel like, to the extent anything bad is happening, it’s my
    fault, rather than the other person’s fault, and groomed to take
    responsibility for that, rather than entertain the idea, which may be a
    hard idea to entertain, to the extent that a child wants to believe in
    their father and the goodness of their father and having a good
    relationship with the father, that can be a lot for a child to give up.
    And in some cases that I have worked on, they will try to deny or
    rationalize or even blame themselves for what’s happening rather than
    believe that their father might be trying to hurt them.
    A forensic examination of Victorick’s phone revealed an exchange of
    thousands of messages between Victorick and K.E. prior to July 25, 2013. Included
    within the messages are statements that demonstrate Victorick’s sexual interest in
    K.E.
    In his brief on appeal, Victorick further argues that his communications
    before the date of the offense were not illegal, “no matter how salacious, vulgar,
    16
    inappropriate or sexually explicit any of the text messages that Mr. Victorick sent
    before June 2, 2013, may have been[.]” He argues that the text message sent from
    his phone when K.E. went to the fast food restaurant did not request that K.E. meet
    him. Victorick contends that his messages, which express a present desire to
    engage in oral sex, appear to have occurred after K.E. returned to the party because
    they were made after K.E. asked Victorick for water. The alleged presence of
    Victorick and K.E. being in the same building at the time Victorick sent the
    messages would not, however, negate the element of the offense that the person
    “knowingly solicits a minor to meet another person, including the actor” with the
    intent that the minor will engage in sexual contact. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
    33.021(c). The jury could have reasonably concluded based upon the content of the
    messages, as well as the testimony and evidence in the record, that Victorick sent
    K.E. a text message that solicited K.E., a minor, to meet.
    “Meet” is not defined in the statute. “Words not specially defined by the
    Legislature are to be understood as ordinary usage allows, and jurors may thus
    freely read statutory language to have any meaning which is acceptable in common
    parlance.” Vernon v. State, 
    841 S.W.2d 407
    , 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
    “Accordingly, when determining the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury
    verdict, reviewing courts must not employ definitions of relevant statutory words
    which are different or more restrictive than the jurors themselves were legally
    17
    entitled to use.” 
    Id. Among its
    commonly understood terms, “meet” means, “to
    come near or in touch with by approach from another direction” and “in the basic
    sense pertinent here, [usually] implies no more than to come into the presence or
    company of whether by chance or design[.]” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L
    DICTIONARY 1404 (2002). The jury could, using the ordinary understanding of the
    word “meet,” find that Victorick solicited K.E. to meet him, and further that
    Victorick asked the victim to engage in a sex act that required physical contact
    between them.
    Victorick argues that the text message, “I.need then & sick me you willl
    love, where are you! Suck me!”, does not “solicit” K.E. “Solicit” is not defined in
    section 33.021 of the Texas Penal Code, and could be understood by the jury by its
    commonly defined terms, which include, “to approach with a request or plea” and
    “to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading[.]” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L
    DICTIONARY 2169 (2002). “Suck” is also found in the dictionary, and includes the
    meaning, “to draw in the mouth over or around an object. . . .” 
    Id. at 2283.
    The part
    of “me” to which Victorick referred could be understood by the jury to mean his
    genitals, especially in light of another communication from Victorick to K.E. in
    which Victorick suggested that they engage in oral sex. The jury could, using the
    ordinary understanding of the word “solicit,” find that Victorick asked or pleaded
    with K.E. to engage in oral sex.
    18
    Victorick contends that the evidence is legally insufficient because the mere
    presence of the text on his phone does not prove that he sent the message because
    there were college-age students at the party and one of them could have sent the
    message. The officer who examined Victorick’s phone testified that it was
    password-protected. It was reasonable for the jury to infer that Victorick sent the
    message. His wife saw him use the phone that night, and Victorick sent sexually
    explicit messages to K.E. on many other occasions.3 Because the inference that it
    was Victorick that sent the message from his password-protected phone was
    reasonable, the State was not required to exclude the possibility that someone else
    at the party used Victorick’s phone to send the messages to K.E. See 
    Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 521
    , 523.
    Viewing the totality of the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable
    to the verdict, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Victorick sent the
    messages to K.E. See 
    Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13
    . We conclude that the evidence is
    legally sufficient to support the verdict. Accordingly, we overrule issue one.
    3
    The testimony and evidence indicated that Victorick—a 58-year-old high
    school teacher and coach—spied upon K.E. when she was with her friends; he
    snuck into her room at night while she slept; he used the “notes” function of his
    cell phone to record his own thoughts regarding her sexual activity and to record
    his sexual attraction to her; and he sent many other text messages to K.E. that
    included requests to be permitted to perform what a jury could reasonably
    conclude were sex acts.
    19
    IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
    In his second issue in Appeal No. 09-14-00190-CR (appeal of his
    conviction), Victorick argues that the reference to the “victim” in the pre-trial order
    setting ancillary conditions of bond demonstrates that the trial judge pre-judged his
    guilt, and establishes that he was deprived of a fair and impartial tribunal, in
    violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See
    Tumey v. Ohio, 
    273 U.S. 510
    , 523 (1927). “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
    requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 
    349 U.S. 133
    , 136 (1955).
    The trial court used a pre-printed form that contained several references to
    the “victim” and “the victim’s family” which Victorick argues indicates that the
    trial court pre-judged his guilt before the trial. The document imposes conditions
    but includes no factual findings. The document was not prepared for use before the
    jury, nor is there any indication from the record that the pre-trial order setting
    ancillary conditions of bond was ever shown to the jury. Additionally, during the
    trial, when Victorick objected to the prosecutor’s reference to the complaining
    witness as “the victim” the trial court sustained the objection and instructed
    counsel to use the phrase “alleged victim” and instructed the jury that “any time
    . . . prosecutor uses the word ‘victim,’ that you take it as alleged victim.”
    Therefore, we conclude that the record does not support Victorick’s claim that the
    trial court deprived him of the presumption of innocence. We overrule issue two.
    20
    RECUSAL PROCEDURE
    In his third issue in Appeal No. 09-14-00190-CR (appeal of his conviction),
    Victorick challenges the constitutionality of the recusal procedure contained in
    Rule 18a(a)(3) and 18a(j)(1)(A) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R.
    Civ. P. 18a. Subsection (a)(3) of Rule 18a provides that a party may not seek
    recusal of the judge solely on account of the judge’s rulings in the case in which
    his recusal is sought. 
    Id. Subsection (j)(1)(A)
    states that an order denying a motion
    to recuse may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final
    judgment. 
    Id. Victorick argues
    that Rule 18a unconstitutionally denies a criminal
    defendant due process “[b]ecause the defendant will have been forced, as was Mr.
    Victorick, to a trial before a judge who has prejudged his guilt.”
    “Whenever we are confronted with an attack upon the constitutionality of a
    statute, we presume that the statute is valid and that the Legislature has not acted
    unreasonably or arbitrarily. [citation omitted] The burden rests upon the individual
    who challenges the statute to establish its unconstitutionality” as applied to him.
    Rodriguez v. State, 
    93 S.W.3d 60
    , 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing to Ex parte
    Granviel, 
    561 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)); Wood v. State, 
    18 S.W.3d 642
    , 650-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Victorick has not established that the
    trial court prejudged his guilt. Furthermore, Victorick has not shown that Rule 18a
    21
    is unconstitutional as applied to him or as applied to some hypothetical third party.
    Therefore, we overrule issue three.
    CONCLUSION
    Having overruled all of the issues that have been raised by the appellant in
    his appeals, we affirm the order denying the application for a writ of habeas corpus
    and we affirm the judgment of conviction.
    AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    LEANNE JOHNSON
    Justice
    Submitted on November 10, 2014
    Opinion Delivered December 10, 2014
    Publish
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
    22
    IN THE NINTH COURT OF APPEALS
    _____________________ _____
    09-14-00190-CR
    __________________________
    David Lee Victorick
    v.
    The State of Texas
    _________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the
    435th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 13-11-12323 CR
    _________________________________________________________________
    JUDGMENT
    THE NINTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on
    appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. IT
    IS THEREFORE ORDERED, in accordance with the Court’s opinion, that
    the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Leanne Johnson
    December 10, 2014
    AFFIRMED
    **********
    Copies of this judgment and the Court’s opinion are certified for
    observance.
    Carol Anne Harley
    Clerk of the Court