Sergio Musquiz, Jr. v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                       No. 07-15-00288-CR
    In the
    FILED IN
    7th COURT OF APPEALS
    Court of Appeals                   AMARILLO, TEXAS
    For the                   10/13/2015 11:11:00 AM
    VIVIAN LONG
    Seventh District of Texas                    CLERK
    At Amarillo
    Trial Court Cause No. B 18288-1002
    In the 242nd District Court
    of Hale County, Texas
    SERGIO MUSQUIZ, JR.,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _________________________________________________________________
    ANDERS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW
    _________________________________________________________________
    TROY BOLLINGER
    State Bar No. 24025819
    600 Ash Street
    Plainview, Texas 79072
    Tel.: (806) 293-2618
    Fax: (806) 293-8802
    troy@laneybollinger.com
    Attorney for Appellant
    CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
    The undersigned Counsel states that he has diligently reviewed the entire
    appellate record in this case and certifies to this Honorable Court that this brief is
    in compliance with the requirements Anders v. California, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    (1967),
    Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); and Currie v. State, 
    515 S.W.2d 684
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1974). Unfortunately for the Appellant, this appeal is without
    merit. A review of the record reflects no reversible error and no grounds on which
    an appeal can be predicated. Counsel for Appellant has filed a motion to withdraw
    from representation. See also filed – “Motion to Withdraw”.
    The undersigned has posted a copy of this brief to the Appellant. Counsel
    has further informed Appellant by letter that it is this Attorney’s opinion that the
    appeal is wholly without arguable grounds. Counsel further informs Appellant that
    he has the right to view the appellate record and to file pro se an appellate brief
    should he so desire. Appellant has been informed that he has the right to request
    that the Court make the record available to him and to grant him an extension of
    time for the filing of a pro se brief.
    In preparing the following brief, Appellant Counsel has striven to exceed all
    the requirements and expectations of a reviewing Court when receiving an Anders’
    brief. In doing so, Counsel followed the Anders’ Guidelines specifically
    promulgated by other Texas Appellate Courts. This Counsel was unable to find
    guidelines specifically created and published by this Honorable Court. However,
    we have created this brief to comport with the Guidelines promulgated by sister
    Courts such as the Thirteenth (Corpus Christi) and Fourteenth (Houston) Courts of
    Appeals. These Guidelines were found at
    http://www.13thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/court/anders.asp and
    http://www.14thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/pdf/AndersGuidelines.pdf respectively.
    /s/ Troy Bollinger           .
    TROY BOLLINGER
    State Bar No. 24025819
    600 Ash Street
    Plainview, Texas 79072
    Tel.: (806) 293-2618
    Fax: (806) 293-8802
    troy@laneybollinger.com
    Attorney for Appellant
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Appellant waives oral argument. Oral argument would not significantly aid
    the court in determining the legal and factual issues presented in this appeal.
    NAMES OF ALL PARTIES TO TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT
    Appellant:
    SERGIO MUSQUIZ, JR.
    Counsel for Appellant on Appeal:
    TROY BOLLINGER
    SBN: 24025819
    600 Ash Street
    Plainview, TX 79072
    (806) 293-2618 Telephone
    (806) 293-8802 Fax
    troy@laneybollinger.com
    Counsel for Appellant at Revocation of Community Supervision:
    Terry McEachern
    109 East 6th Street
    Plainview, Texas 79072
    (806) 293-2668
    Counsel for the State:
    Wally Hatch, District Attorney of Hale County, Texas
    Meredith Bridges, Assistant District Attorney
    Address for the above listed State’s attorneys:
    HALE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
    225 Broadway, Suite 1
    Plainview, TX 79072
    (806) 291-5241
    Trial Judge:
    THE HONORABLE Kregg Hukill, Judge Presiding
    i
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................i
    NAMES OF ALL PARTIES TO TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT ..........................................i
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....................................................................................................1
    ISSUE PRESENTED.....................................................................................................................6
    STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................................................6
    ARGUMENT & EXPLANATION...............................................................................................8
    A)       Anders briefs in general...................................................................................................8
    B)       Required Elements .........................................................................................................12
    1.        Sufficiency of the Indictment ....................................................................................12
    2.        Compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13 and, if
    appropriate, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 s.ct. 1473 (2010). ........................................13
    3.        Whether the issue of competency was raised prior to sentencing, so as to warrant
    any inquiry by the court, and whether appellant was mentally competent when
    the court accepted the plea........................................................................................15
    4.        Whether the Appellant’s plea was freely and voluntarily made. ..........................16
    5.        Sufficiency of evidence, including a recitation of elements and the facts and
    evidence adduced at trial relevant to the offense upon which the conviction is
    based............................................................................................................................16
    6.        Any failure on the part of Appellant’s trial counsel to object to fundamental
    error. ...........................................................................................................................17
    7.        Whether the sentence imposed was within the applicable range of punishment.17
    8.        Whether the written judgment accurately reflects the sentence that was imposed
    and whether any credit was properly applied.........................................................18
    C)       Any Error From The Initial Plea Has Been Waived ........................................18
    D)       Revocation proceedings ............................................................................................20
    1.)       Standard .....................................................................................................................20
    ii
    2.)        Application .................................................................................................................21
    3.)        Analysis.......................................................................................................................23
    E)    Examination of the record to determine if the appellant was denied
    effective assistance of counsel. .........................................................................................23
    CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................25
    PRAYER.......................................................................................................................................27
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................27
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................................................28
    iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Anders v. California, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    (1967) ..........................................................................passim
    Anthony v. State, 
    962 S.W.2d 242
    (Tex.App - Fort Worth 1998) ................................................19
    Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    at 826-27 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) ............................................11
    Brumbalow v. State, 
    933 S.W.2d 298
    , (Tex.App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref’d) ...................................21
    Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tex. Crim.App.1993).........................................................20
    Currie v. State, 
    516 S.W.2d 684
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1974) ......................................................2, 9, 10
    Ex Parte Harrington, 
    310 S.W.3d 452
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ..................................................24
    Ex Parte Wilson, 
    956 S.W.2d 25
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) .............................................................26
    Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) ....................................................................11
    High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1978).............................................................2, 10
    Holiday v. State, 983 S W.2d 326, 327 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist] 1998) ...........................19
    In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    at 407 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) ...................................................
    8 Jones v
    . State, 
    589 S.W.2d 419
    , 421 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).........................................................21
    Joseph v. State, 
    3 S.W.3d 627
    , 640 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)................6, 20
    Manuel v. State, 
    994 S.W.2d 658
    (Tex.Crim.App - 1999) ...........................................................18
    McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 
    486 U.S. 429
    n.10 (1988).......................................8, 9
    Mitchell v. State, 
    193 S.W.3d 153
    (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) .........................11
    Naquin v. State, 
    607 S.W.2d 583
    , (Tex.Crim.App.1980) .............................................................21
    Padilla v. Kentucky, 
    130 S. Ct. 1473
    (2010)..................................................................................13
    Rodriguez v. State, 
    799 S.W.2d 301
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) ........................................................12
    Russell v. State, 
    685 S.W.2d 413
    , (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, pet. ref’d) ...............................21
    Sowells v. State, 
    45 S.W.3d 690
    (Tex.App.- Waco 2001, no pet)...................................................9
    iv
    Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)..............................................2, 9, 10, 12
    Stephens v. State, 
    35 S.W.3d 770
    (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) .........................26
    Strickland v. Washington 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984)............................................................................23
    Statutes
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Section 1.14(b) ......................................................................12
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 1.15 ..........................................................................16
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13 ........................................................................13
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(1) ...............................................................14
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(2) ...............................................................14
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(3) ...............................................................14
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(4) ...............................................................14
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(5) ...............................................................15
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(l)-(5) ..........................................................15
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 42. 12, Section 23(b)................................................19
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 42.12.........................................................................19
    Texas Penal Code, Sections 19.02 .................................................................................................12
    v
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Sergio Musquiz, Jr., Appellant, was indicted in cause number B 18299-1002
    in the 242nd District Court of Hale County, Texas for the charge of “Prohibited
    Substances or Items in a Correctional Facility”, alleged to have occurred on
    November 28, 2009 [Clerk’s Record (hereinafter CR), p153]. Matt Hawkins was
    originally appointed as Appellant’s Counsel pre-trial (or pre-plea) as evidenced by
    the “Order Appointing Attorney” found in Clerk’s Record [CR, p20]. The Court
    (the Honorable Judge Self) entered its standard “Standard Discovery Order” on
    February 24, 2010 [CR, pp. 29-31].
    Trial Counsel filed no motions pretrial. The State provided required
    disclosures [CR, pp. 34-35]. The present case was set for a “Guilty Plea” on May
    3, 2010 [CR, p37].
    On May 3, 2010 the Appellant entered a plea of “Guilty” to the indictment as
    charged to the Trial Court [CR, p55]. At the plea, the Defendant was represented
    by Sara Smitherman. On that day the cause was pled for a Five (5) Years
    confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
    with the sentenced ordered suspended. The Defendant was placed on probation for
    1
    five (5) years [CR, p55]. Prior to accepting the plea, the Defendant executed
    required plea forms including:
    1) Waiver of Jury Trial (State’s Exhibit #2), [CR, p43],
    2) Admonishment of Rights, [CR, pp. 44-45],
    3) Stipulation of Evidence (State’s Exhibit #1), [CR, pp. 41-42].
    Ms. Smitherman signed each of the required plea papers and admonishments [CR,
    pp. 41-48].
    Following the execution of the plea paperwork and the admonition from the
    bench, the Trial Court entered a specific “Certificate of Findings” which included:
    “…his (Defendant’s) waiver of Jury Trial was knowingly and voluntarily and
    intelligently entered with full knowledge of the consequences of waiving the same”, and
    “…the foregoing warnings and rights were explained by the Court to the Defendant and
    acknowledged by him and the Court finds that he understands them, that his waiver of these
    rights and plea of Guilty was knowingly, freely and intelligently made, and that the Defendant is
    mentally competent to stand trial”. [CR, p46]
    The Trial Court found evidence sufficient to find the Appellant guilty of the
    offense charged and (following the plea agreement); the Court suspended the
    sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for a period of five (5) years.
    Sentence additionally included a $2,000.00 fine and court costs ($335.00).
    2
    Judgment was pronounced in open court on May 3, 2010 and “signed and entered”
    on May 6, 2010 [CR, pp. 55-56].
    Defendant was placed on community supervision following the Guilty plea
    entered on May 3, 2010. Conditions of the community supervision were
    immortalized in written orders [CR, pp. 53-54].
    The Appellant had a rocky time on probation. Mr. Musquiz was voluntarily
    (by agreement) sent off to SAFPF [CR, pp. 63-65]. Appellant successfully
    completed this program [CR, pp. 73-75].
    Following his release from SAFPF, the State filed a “MOTION TO
    REVOKE PROBATION” on January 20, 2012 [CR, pp. 76-79]. For these
    proceedings, the Trial Court appointed Jody Myatt as counsel for Mr. Musquiz
    [CR, p83].
    Following appointment of Counsel, the matter was set for a hearing on
    February 28, 2012 [CR, p86]. Appellant retained private Counsel, one Sara F.
    Moore, to handle the revocation [CR, p91]. At the February 28 setting, the
    Defendant was continued on probation and extended five (5) years until May 3,
    2020 [CR, pp. 107-109].
    In its motion, the State alleged that the Appellant had used alcohol, failed to
    keep his officer informed, had failed to pay moneys as required, had failed to
    3
    perform community service as ordered, and had failed to complete a drug
    counseling program [CR, pp. 77-78]. At the hearing, the Appellant pled “NOT
    True” to the allegations in the Motion but the Court found the allegations to be
    True [CR, p107].
    The Court entered an “ORDER CONTINUING DEFENDANT ON
    COMMUNITY SUPERVISION” which lays out allegations, findings, and the
    modifications to Appellant’s probation ordered by the Court [CR, pp. 107-109].
    The Court specifically ordered that the Appellant’s fines and fees be recalculated
    and all delinquencies be reworked to zero ($0) [CR, p110].
    Unfortunately, the State filed another “Motion to Revoke Community
    Supervision” [CR, pp 111-114]. In its motion, the State alleged that the Appellant
    had new law violations, used drugs, failed to keep his officer informed, had failed
    to pay moneys as required, and failed to perform community service [CR, pp. 111-
    113]. This motion was filed on March 19, 2015 [CR, p113].
    For these proceedings, the Trial Court appointed Terry McEachern as
    counsel for Mr. Musquiz [CR, p120]. Mr. McEachern filed a discovery motion in
    the matter [CR, pp. 122-127].
    The State filed a (much more detailed) “Amended Motion to Revoke
    Community Supervision” on May 22, 2015 [CR, pp. 128-131].
    4
    The hearing on this amended Motion was eventually held on June 15, 2015
    [Reporter’s Record {hereinafter RR}, p3]. At the hearing, the Appellant pled
    “True” to some violations and “Not True” to others [CR, pp. 142-144]. After the
    plea of “True” (to some violations), the Court found some specific allegations true
    and revoked Appellant’s probation and sentence the Appellant to:
    “the original sentence in this matter which was a period of five years and the
    payment of a $2,000 fine” [RR, pp. 15-16].
    At the hearing and after the plea of “true”, the State called Marty Mejorado
    (probation officer) to testify [RR, pp. 8-11] and rested.
    The Defense called the Appellant [RR. pp. 12-14]. Appellant’s testimony
    showed remorse, asked for help with treatment, and accepted responsibility for his
    actions. It did not, however, refute the State’s Motion or Appellant’s own
    Stipulated violations.
    Following testimony, the Trial Court specifically revoked the Appellant’s
    community supervision [RR, p15] and reinstated the original sentence of five (5)
    years confinement [RR, p16]. Reasons for this revocation specifically included
    new law violations, drug use, violation of curfew, failure to pay, and failure to
    perform community service. These reasons were specifically annotated in the
    “Judgment Revoking Community Supervision” [CR, pp. 153-154].
    5
    The undersigned attorney was appointed to represent Appellant on the 10th
    of July, 2015 [CR, p165]. Appellant filed a pro se Notice of Appeal on July 16th,
    2015 [CR, p167].
    ISSUE PRESENTED
    Counsel believes there are no arguable grounds for appeal remaining from
    the Appellant’s cause that rise to reversible error.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The relevant facts and procedural points were all discussed in the
    “Statement of the Case, above. The Appellant pled “Guilty” to the allegations in
    the original case [CR, pp. 41, 43, & 55]. The Appellant further pled “True” to the
    final allegations that he violated the terms of his community supervision at the
    Revocation Hearing [CR, p153] and [RR, p7].
    The Trial Court, after the revocation hearing, found the Appellant had
    violated his terms of community supervision. The Trial Court sentenced Appellant
    to a term of incarceration. It is from this finding and revocation that the Appellant
    today attempts to appeal. However, the status of the case law is clear. If the Trial
    Court can prove up one violation, then that Court does not abuse its discretion by
    doing so. Joseph v. State, 
    3 S.W.3d 640
    , Tex. App. 14th – Houston. As was shown
    from the plea and the testimony [RR, pp. 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 26, & 27], the
    6
    Appellant admitted violating his community supervision. No legally valid reasons
    were raised to excuse these violations in the record. Because of this, the Trial
    Court was (unfortunately for the Appellant) well within its rights to revoke the
    Appellant.
    What the Appellant wanted (and still fervently wishes) was to request further
    help in rehabilitation and redemption. He wanted help for his relapse and to be
    able to continue to care for his family [RR, pp. 12-13]. Unfortunately, while these
    are admirable, they are not legal issues which can overturn a Trial Court’s
    decision. From the Trial Court’s own discussion [RR, p15] he was receptive to the
    Appellant’s argument, but was not convinced that adequate efforts had not already
    been made.
    7
    ARGUMENT & EXPLANATION
    A) Anders briefs in general1
    An attorney has an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous
    appeal. In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    at 407 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). If an
    appointed attorney finds, following a professional and conscientious evaluation of
    the record, that an appeal would be frivolous, his obligation to his client is to seek
    leave to withdraw. Anders v. California, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    (1967). Counsel’s
    obligation to the Appellate Court is to assure it, through an Anders brief, that such
    a complete review of the record has been undertaken and that the request to
    withdraw is well-founded. 
    Id. A wholly
    frivolous appeal is one that “lacks any basis in law or in fact.”
    McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 
    486 U.S. 429
    at 438 n.10 (1988). A
    reviewing Court must resolve doubtful issues in the Appellant’s favor. 
    Id. In the
    brief which accompanies his motion to withdraw, Counsel must make references to
    the trial record as well as to any applicable statutes, rules, and cases that lead
    Counsel to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Sowells v. State, 
    45 S.W.3d 1
    Appellate Counsel is aware of the Justices’ general preference against Anders briefs in general and in specific.
    Counsel took to heart the Honorable Chief Justice’s remarks at the Advanced Criminal Law seminar earlier this
    year. However, in a second revocation with a true plea, Counsel is at a loss. My office has scoured the record but
    there just is nothing here that will support a winning brief.
    8
    690 at 691 (Tex.App.- Waco 2001, no pet). The brief must contain references to
    anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, even though Counsel
    believes that the argument will not succeed or is frivolous. Anders v. 
    California, supra
    ; Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).
    Counsel is not required to make arguments that would not be made on behalf
    of a client who has retained Counsel for an appeal. Counsel is not required to
    make arguments for which there is no merit. Currie v. State, 
    516 S.W.2d 684
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1974). If Counsel concludes that there are no arguable grounds
    for appeal, then Counsel should so state and should make references to the record,
    statutes, and cases which support that conclusion. Stafford v. 
    State, supra
    ; High v.
    State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). When discussing the record,
    Counsel must discuss the evidence introduced at trial and must provide the
    Appellate Court “with ready references to the record.” Stafford v. 
    State, supra
    at
    510 n. 3; High v. 
    State, supra
    . Conclusory statements in the brief are insufficient.
    Anders v. 
    California, supra
    ; High v. 
    State, supra
    ; Currie v. 
    State, supra
    .
    Counsel must furnish a copy of the motion to withdraw and a copy of the
    brief to appellant and must (also) advise Appellant of his right to review the record
    and to file a pro se brief. Counsel must certify or otherwise show the Appellate
    Court that Appellant has been furnished with a copy of the motion and brief and
    9
    that Appellant has been advised of his right to obtain the record and to file a pro se
    brief.
    After Appellant raises the points that he wishes to raise, or the time has
    passed for him to do so, the Appellate Court must conduct an independent
    examination of the proceedings and determine whether the appeal is indeed wholly
    frivolous. Anders v. 
    California, supra
    ; Mitchell v. State, 
    193 S.W.3d 153
    (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). If the Court finds that the appeal is
    frivolous and that there are no arguable grounds for appeal, it will grant the motion
    to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. Garner v. State, 
    300 S.W.3d 763
    at 766 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). Although a reviewing Court may issue
    an opinion explaining why the appeal lacks arguable merit, it is not required to do
    so. 
    Id., at 767.
    If the Court determines that there are arguable grounds, it will
    abate the appeal and remand the cause to the Trial Court with instructions that the
    Trial Court appoint new and different Counsel to represent Appellant on appeal to
    present those arguable grounds, as well as any others that new Counsel might wish
    to present. Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    at 826-27 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).
    The Appellate Court does not make a decision on the merits of any issue, except to
    determine whether an appeal is wholly frivolous and that there either are or are not
    arguable grounds for appeal. Anders v. 
    California, supra
    ; Stafford v. 
    State, supra
    .
    An Appellant may challenge a holding that there are no arguable grounds for
    10
    appeal by filing a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal
    Appeals. 
    Bledsoe, supra, at 827-828
    , fn 6.
    B) Required Elements
    1. Sufficiency of the Indictment
    The Clerk’s Record reflects that the Appellant was indicted for the felony
    offense of “Prohibited Substances or Items in a Correctional Facility” [CR, p22].
    The indictment complied with all the requirements of charging the above offense
    per Texas Penal Code, Sections 22.02.
    No motion to quash the indictment was filed or requested. Any claim of a
    defect or want of sufficient notice was waived by the failure to file a motion to
    quash the indictment. Rodriguez v. State, 
    799 S.W.2d 301
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1990);
    and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Section 1.14(b).
    2. Compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article
    26.13 and, if appropriate, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 s.ct. 1473
    (2010).
    In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth
    Amendment requires Defense Counsel to provide affirmative, competent advice to
    noncitizen defendants regarding immigration consequences of guilty pleas and that
    absence of such advice may be a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 
    130 S. Ct. 1473
    at 1482-84 (2010).
    11
    There is no evidence or indication of any kind within the Record that the
    Appellant is not a United States citizen. The Appellant neither raised nor currently
    raises a complaint that Counsel at the plea failed to conduct Padilla’s required
    warnings. Further, the admonishments of the Court include the required
    immigration admonishments [CR, p44]
    With respect to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13 (“Plea of
    Guilty”), written admonishments were signed by the Appellant, which indicated
    his understanding of the following:
     Range of punishment. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article
    26.13(a)(1).
    The Appellant signed an “ADMONITION OF RIGHTS” [CR, pp. 52-53]
    that properly admonished him that the offense he was pleading guilty to carried a
    punishment of “CONFINEMENT FOR A TERM FROM 2 TO 10 YEARS IN
    PRISON AND AN OPTIONAL FINE NOT TO EXCEED $10,000.00” [CR, p44].
    This admonishment is, in fact, the true and correct range of punishment for the
    offense which the Appellant pled “Guilty”;
     Admonishment regarding the fact that any recommendation of punishment
    by the prosecutor is not binding on the Court, but that if the Court chose to
    reject the agreement, the Defendant could withdraw his guilty plea. Texas
    Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(2).
     Admonishment that if the punishment assessed by the Court did not exceed
    the punishment recommended by the prosecutor, the Trial Court must give
    12
    its approval before any appeal could be undertaken (except for matters
    raised by written motions filed prior to trial. Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure26.13(a)(3) ..
     Admonishment informing the Defendant that if he is not a U.S. citizen, his
    plea of guilty or nolo contendere could result in deportation. Texas Code of
    Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(4).
    As with the range of punishment, he Appellant signed an “ADMONITION OF
    RIGHTS” containing each piece of appropriate language [CR, pp 44-45].
     Admonishment concerning sex offender registration for certain offenses.
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.13(a)(5).
    There was no such admonishment, as the Appellant’s charged offense does
    not carry such consequences [CR, pp. 55 & 153].
    From the above, it is clear that the Trial Court provided all the
    admonishments necessary under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article
    26.13(a)(l)-(5), and that the Appellant indicated that he understood each of them.
    3. Whether the issue of competency was raised prior to
    sentencing, so as to warrant any inquiry by the court, and
    whether appellant was mentally competent when the court
    accepted the plea.
    There is no suggestion that the Appellant’s competency was an issue in this
    case. There were no motions filed in the case regarding possible incompetency or
    insanity. At the motion to adjudicate hearing, the Appellant did not complain of
    any mental problems and testified that he had never been treated for any kind of
    13
    mental problem [RR, p5]. Defense Counsel stated that she believed the Appellant
    to be competent [RR, p5].
    4. Whether the Appellant’s plea was freely and voluntarily made.
    Each and every one of the required admonitions is present and covered by
    the Trial Court. Following the execution of the plea paperwork, the Trial Court
    entered a specific “Certificate of Findings” which included:
    “…the Court having informed the Defendant that he has the right to a Jury
    Trial and having made inquiry as to whether his waiver of Jury Trial was
    knowingly and voluntarily and intelligently entered with full knowledge of the
    consequences of waiving the same and the Waiver is accepted.”,
    and
    “…the foregoing warnings and rights were explained by the Court to the
    Defendant and acknowledged by his and the Court finds that he understands them,
    that his waiver of these rights and plea of GUILTY was knowingly, freely and
    intelligently made, and that the Defendant is mentally competent to stand trial”.
    [CR, p46]
    14
    5. Sufficiency of evidence, including a recitation of elements and
    the facts and evidence adduced at trial relevant to the offense
    upon which the conviction is based.
    Article 1.15, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., provides that the State offer
    sufficient proof to support any judgment, even one based upon a guilty plea before
    the Court. This was accomplished in this case through the admission of a written
    “Stipulation of Evidence” [CR, p41]. The Appellant filled out this stipulation
    (State’s Exhibit #1 at Guilt / Innocence) which accurately set out the allegations of
    the indictment [CR, p22].
    6. Any failure on the part of Appellant’s trial counsel to object to
    fundamental error.
    It is unclear what “fundamental error” could have existed in this case. The
    indictment was correctly pled and the undersigned has certainly not detected any
    other fundamental errors to which an objection should have been posed.
    7. Whether the sentence imposed was within the applicable range
    of punishment.
    Here also, the Appellant is clearly unhappy with the final result from the
    revocation. Unfortunately, the Appellant was indicted and pled to a felony offense.
    To these charges, he pled guilty [CR, pp. 55]. This made the punishment range (as
    discussed above) two (2) years to ten (10) years confinement in the Institutional
    Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The punishment also
    included the possibility of a fine not to exceed $10,000.00. Therefore, the sentence
    15
    which was assessed was well within the available range of punishment. The Court
    allowed a previous revocation to pass and sent the Appellant to SAFPF (the most
    strenuous treatment the state can provide). Even though the Appellant clearly
    desires another chance, the sentence ordered is both totally legal and what he
    originally pled to.
    8. Whether the written judgment accurately reflects the sentence
    that was imposed and whether any credit was properly
    applied.
    The final judgment (JUDGMENT REVOKING COMMUNITY
    SUPERVISION) in cause number B 18299-1002 accurately reflects a conviction
    for “PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES OR ITEMS IN A CORRECTIONAL
    FACILITY” [CR, p153]. The judgments accurately list the offense as a “3RD
    DEGREE FELONY”. The judgments reflect a “FIVE (5) YEAR” sentence. As to
    credit for time served, the judgment states the previous time periods that the
    Appellant spent in confinement and that time was to be credited to the Appellant
    [CR, p153]. The Appellant has raised no complaints as to any errors in the time so
    ordered.
    C) Any Error From The Initial Plea Has Been Waived
    A defendant placed on community supervision may raise issues relating to
    the conviction only in appeals taken when community supervision is originally
    imposed. Manuel v. State, 
    994 S.W.2d 658
    at 661 (Tex.Crim.App – 1999).
    16
    The failure to timely appeal from a conviction resulting in community
    supervision waives the right to appeal. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article
    42.12, Section 23(b), Anthony v. State, 
    962 S.W.2d 242
    at 245 (Tex.App - Fort
    Worth 1998). In this case, no notice of appeal was given at the time Appellant
    received community supervision. No attempt to appeal was offered before, during,
    or after the initial proceedings which created the Appellant’s deferred adjudication
    probation. The only notice of appeal was filed after Appellant’s community
    supervision was finally revoked following this motion and hearing [CR, p153]. A
    Defendant whose community supervision is revoked may only appeal issues from
    the revocation. Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 42 12, Section 23(b), Holiday
    v. State, 983 S W.2d 326, 327 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist] 1998). An issue
    regarding the original plea granting community supervision may not be raised on
    an appeal filed after community supervision is revoked. 
    Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661
    .
    In this matter, the Appellant did NOT attempt to refute the allegations of the
    original charge at any point in the record.
    D) Revocation proceedings
    1.) Standard
    The burden of proof is on the State to show by a preponderance of the
    evidence that the probationer violated a condition of probation as alleged in the
    17
    motion to revoke in any proceeding to revoke any community supervision. Cobb v.
    State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tex. Crim.App.1993). The State satisfies this burden
    when the greater weight of credible evidence before the court creates a reasonable
    belief that it is more probable than not that a condition of probation has been
    violated as alleged in the motion to revoke. Joseph v. State, 
    3 S.W.3d 627
    , 640
    (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
    When there is evidence to support a revocation, the Appellate Courts must
    review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. Reviewing Courts
    must give deference to the Trial Court as the sole trier of facts, the credibility of
    the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the evidence presented. Russell v.
    State, 
    685 S.W.2d 413
    , 419 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, pet. ref’d); and see
    Jones v. State, 
    589 S.W.2d 419
    , 421 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). This review is
    conducted under the abuse of discretion standard. Naquin v. State, 
    607 S.W.2d 583
    , 586 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). When the standard of review is abuse of
    discretion, the record must simply contain some evidence to support the decision
    made by the Trial Court. Brumbalow v. State, 
    933 S.W.2d 298
    , 300 (Tex.App.-
    Waco 1996, pet. ref’d).
    2.) Application
    In this case, the Trial Court specifically ruled that the Defendant violated his
    conditions of community supervision by:
    18
    1) Defendant committed an offense,
    2) Defendant used marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine,
    3) Defendant violated curfew,
    4) Defendant failed to pay, and
    5) Defendant failed to perform community service [CR, p154].
    These specific allegations may be found in the filed Amended Motion to
    Revoke [CR, pp. 128-131]. The State’s proof supporting for each is as follows:
    It is an unavoidable fact that the Appellant signed a Stipulation of Evidence
    [CR, pp. 142-144] to the relevant violations. In addition, he pled true to each
    before the Trial Court:
    THE COURT: At this time you would have the right to have the allegations
    against you read out loud here in open court, or you can waive reading those allegations.
    What do you wish to do?
    THE DEFENDANT: I wish to waive those.
    THE COURT: To the allegations in the State's Amended Motion to Revoke
    Community Supervision, other than Allegation 1-C which has been abandoned, how do
    you plead, true or not true?
    THE DEFENDANT: True.
    THE COURT: Sir, are you pleading true because the allegations are true and for
    no other reason?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [RR, p7]
    The Appellant provided all the State needed for evidence to support the
    decision made by the Trial Court. The Appellant violated the terms of his
    19
    probation (more than once). The Appellant admitted not performing his probation.
    There is really no question as to whether this is supported to the preponderance
    standard.
    3.)Analysis
    The record does NOT support a challenge to any of the findings which
    support the revocation order. The burden any Appellant carries when appealing an
    order revoking community supervision is to challenge ALL the findings. Joseph v.
    State, 
    3 S.W.3d 640
    . The record does not even challenge a single finding. The
    finding of a single violation will support an order of revocation. Joseph at 640.
    Here, the ONLY evidence that exists is that it is more likely than not that the
    Appellant violated the conditions of probation alleged in the motion. Thus, the
    Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Appellant’s probation.
    Joseph at 640.
    E) Examination of the record to determine if the appellant was
    denied effective assistance of counsel.
    Every Appellant is absolutely entitled to effective assistance of Counsel
    throughout the trial. In Strickland v. Washington 
    466 U.S. 668
    at 694 (1984), the
    Supreme Court set out the two-part test for judging ineffective assistance of
    Counsel. To obtain relief under this test, an applicant must show:
    1) “that his counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally deficient.”, and
    20
    2) “there is a reasonable probability—one sufficient to undermine confidence
    in the result—that the outcome would have been different but for his
    counsel’s deficient performance.” Ex Parte Harrington, 
    310 S.W.3d 452
    at
    458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
    There is no evidence in the record that either original or final Counsels’
    performances were deficient. The only possible question we could contemplate
    concerns the Appellant’s contentions that did not spend enough time with any of
    his Counsels at the Trial Court level. However, as discussed above, this is outside
    the record, not supportable by the available evidence, and a remedy is not available
    in this direct appeal in the absence of evidence. There is simply nothing in the
    record to support this issue (if it exists at all). Even the Appellant does not say any
    original or subsequent Trial Counsel was ineffective in any specific performance.
    When discussing Counsel at the adjudication hearing, there appears that
    there was nothing more he could bring to the table. The Appellant pled guilty, got
    on probation, and failed. One does not wish to sound harsh, but drug use and new
    law violations will get one revoked 9 times out of ten. While any Counsel might
    have approached the case differently, there is no indication of any lack of
    professional treatment or performance. In light of these facts, it is unclear what
    else could have been done.
    21
    It IS clear that the performance was well within the boundaries of what is
    professionally acceptable. The record does NOT “affirmatively demonstrate” any
    potential ineffectiveness. There was NO reasonable probability that the outcome of
    this hearing would have been different but for Counsel’s actions. Nothing in the
    record comes even close to establishing this. To claim ineffective assistance at the
    adjudication in this particular set of facts would be frivolous.
    CONCLUSION
    Unfortunately, Appellate Counsel can find no valid arguable grounds
    remaining from the Appellant’s plea of Guilty or from the revocation hearing
    finally assigning punishment. For the reasons stated above, there is simply no
    valid argument still to present.
    A copy of the entire appellate record (which consists of one volume of the
    Clerk’s Record and one volume of the Reporter’s Record) has been sent to the
    Appellant at his current address, which is:
    Sergio Musquiz, Jr.
    c/o Yolanda Musquiz
    PO Box 1011
    Hale Center, TX 79041
    (address confirmed by Appellant on 10/12/2015)
    22
    The undersigned has also sent a letter with the copy of the record, explaining
    further the import of this brief and how the Appellant might pursue issues on an
    11.07 writ that cannot be raised on direct appeal. A copy of this brief is also being
    sent to the Appellant, as is the attached Motion to Withdraw. Anders v.
    
    California, supra
    and Stephens v. State, 
    35 S.W.3d 770
    at 771 (Tex.App.-Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders brief is properly
    directed to the Appellate Court, not the Trial Court).
    The undersigned has informed the Appellant that he may, should this Court
    grant the undersigned’s Motion to Withdraw, pursue the matter on his own.
    Further, the Appellant is notified of his right to pursue discretionary review in the
    Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex Parte Wilson, 
    956 S.W.2d 25
    , 27 (Tex.Crim.App.
    1997).
    PRAYER
    For the reasons stated above, the undersigned prays that he be allowed to
    withdraw from representing the Appellant in this case, and that the Appellant be
    given the opportunity to file his own brief, should he so desire.
    Respectfully Submitted,
    /s/ Troy Bollinger          .
    TROY BOLLINGER
    23
    State Bar No. 24025819
    600 Ash Street
    Plainview, Texas 79072
    Tel.: (806) 293-2618
    Fax: (806) 293-8802
    troy@laneybollinger.com
    Attorney for Appellant
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    Pursuant to Tex.R. App. Pro. R. 9.5(a) & (e), I certify that on or about
    October 13, 2015, I presented a copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Brief with the
    District Attorney’s Office for Hale County, and mailed a copy to Appellant.
    /s/ Troy Bollinger           .
    TROY BOLLINGER
    Counsel for the Appellant
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I, Troy Bollinger, attorney for Sergio Musquiz, Jr., Appellant, certify that
    this document was generated by a computer using Microsoft Word which indicates
    that the word count of this document is 6,072 words as required by Tex.R. App. P.
    9.4 (i).
    /s/ Troy Bollinger           .
    TROY BOLLINGER
    Counsel for the Appellant
    24