El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., D/B/A Las Palmas Medical Center v. Laura Murphy , 518 S.W.3d 412 ( 2017 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
══════════
No. 15-0575
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EL PASO HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, LTD., D/B/A LAS PALMAS MEDICAL CENTER,
PETITIONER,
v.
LAURA MURPHY, RESPONDENT
══════════════════════════════════════════
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
══════════════════════════════════════════
Argued February 8, 2017
JUSTICE BOYD delivered the opinion of the Court.
El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., d/b/a Las Palmas Medical Center, appeals from a
judgment awarding damages to Laura Murphy on her claims for statutory retaliation and tortious
interference. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment based on a jury’s findings
that El Paso Healthcare retaliated against Murphy and interfered with her employment contract
after she reported that a physician failed to obtain a patient’s informed consent. We reverse the
court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment that Murphy take nothing.
I.
BACKGROUND
Laura Murphy is a certified registered nurse anesthetist. Beginning in 2001, Murphy
worked as an independent practitioner under contract with West Texas OB Anesthesia in El Paso.
West Texas OB had a contract to provide medical staff to El Paso Healthcare’s Las Palmas Medical
Center, where Murphy regularly worked in the labor-and-delivery unit. Murphy was not an
employee of El Paso Healthcare or Las Palmas, but she was required to obtain the approval of Las
Palmas’s credentialing committee before working at the hospital. Under these contractual
arrangements, Las Palmas would request staffing for particular assignments, and West Texas OB
would offer those shifts to Murphy and its other contractors. Neither Las Palmas nor West Texas
OB were required to offer Murphy any assignments, and she was not required to accept any
assignments that were offered.
While working an overnight shift at Las Palmas, Murphy interacted with a nineteen-year-
old patient who was a first-time expectant mother with gestational diabetes. This patient was under
the care of Dr. Frederick Harlass, a high-risk-delivery specialist. When Murphy arrived that night,
the patient’s cervix had not sufficiently dilated to allow for a vaginal birth, and her progress
appeared to be stalled. Harlass had advised the patient and nurses that he would deliver the baby
by Cesarean section if the patient did not dilate further within a particular amount of time. The
patient told Murphy that she was worried about having a C-section. Murphy told the patient that
she had the right to “ask the doctor what he wants to do and why he wants to do it.” She said, “You
remember you have the right to do that. You have the right to say who does what to your body.”
By 9 p.m., the patient had not further dilated, and Harlass ordered the C-section. The patient
asked to speak with Harlass before she signed the consent form for the procedure. Harlass and
another nurse, Olivia Juarez, went into the patient’s room to talk to her. Murphy remained outside.
Murphy estimated that Harlass was in the room with the patient for four or five minutes. When
Harlass came back out, he approached Murphy. He was very angry and said, “I don’t have to take
this crap.” He believed that Murphy had discouraged the patient from consenting to the C-section
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and, in doing so, had hampered a safe and successful delivery. Harlass explained to Murphy that
he “just told [the patient] that if she wanted a brain-damaged or dead baby, it wouldn’t be his
fault.” Murphy asked Nurse Juarez if Harlass really said this to the patient. Juarez confirmed that
he had, but added that “he wasn’t real nasty about it.” Murphy conceded not really knowing what
Juarez meant by this. After speaking with Harlass, the patient consented to the C-section. Harlass
successfully delivered the baby without complications.
Around 8 a.m. the following morning, Murphy visited with Las Palmas’s ethics
coordinator. Murphy complained about Harlass’s behavior around patients, his tendency to order
premature inductions and C-sections, and her belief that he failed to obtain the nineteen-year-old
patient’s informed consent. She also expressed apprehension about making the complaint, stating
that she feared doing so “may become the cause for [her] dismissal.” Sometime that same morning,
Harlass called West Texas OB and complained that Murphy had interfered with his treatment and
management of the patient. Shortly before eleven that morning, a West Texas OB partner left a
voice mail for Murphy, telling her that because of complaints by Harlass and another Las Palmas
physician, she should not return to work at Las Palmas until further notice. The next day, Murphy
sent letters to West Texas OB and to Las Palmas’s ethics coordinator, memorializing her
recollection of these events.
About a month later, Murphy had still not returned to work, and the chairman of Las
Palmas’s credentialing committee asked Murphy to attend a meeting. When Murphy inquired
about the purpose of the meeting, the committee coordinator refused to say. Fearing the committee
would revoke her credentials at Las Palmas, Murphy asked if her attorney could attend the meeting.
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When her request was denied, Murphy refused to attend the meeting and instead filed this suit
against El Paso Healthcare a few days later.
At trial, the court submitted jury questions on Murphy’s claims against El Paso Healthcare
for statutory retaliation and tortious interference with “the continuation of the business relationship
between” Murphy and West Texas OB. The jury found El Paso Healthcare liable on both causes
of action and found that Murphy sustained damages of $31,000 in lost wages and $600,000 for
past and future emotional pain, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and damage to her
reputation. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed.
— S.W.3d —. We granted El Paso Healthcare’s petition for review.
II.
STATUTORY RETALIATION
Texas Health and Safety Code section 161.135 provides the basis for Murphy’s statutory-
retaliation claim. It states that hospitals and other health facilities “may not retaliate against a
person who is not an employee for reporting a violation of law.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 161.135(a). A plaintiff alleging a violation of this section bears the burden of proof to establish
the claim, but the statute provides “a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was retaliated
against” under specified circumstances. Id. § 161. 135(c). One such circumstance arises if, within
sixty days “after the date on which the plaintiff made a report in good faith,” the hospital “transfers,
disciplines, suspends, terminates, or otherwise discriminates against the person.” Id.
§ 161.135(c)(1)(B).1
1
This provision’s full text states that the presumption of retaliation arises if, within sixty days after the
plaintiff made a report in good faith, the hospital “transfers, disciplines, suspends, terminates, or otherwise
4
Based on these provisions, the trial court submitted Murphy’s statutory-retaliation claim
by asking the jury whether “Murphy’s ethics report to El Paso Healthcare . . . [was] made in good
faith and [was] a cause of her transfer or adverse employment action.” With this question, the court
instructed the jury that “good faith” means that: “(1) Laura Murphy believes that the conduct
reported was a violation of law; and (2) Her belief was reasonable in light of the training and
experience.” The court then instructed the jury that, unless rebutted by El Paso Healthcare, the jury
could “presume that an adverse personnel action was taken because Laura Murphy reported a
violation of the law, if Laura Murphy suffers the adverse employment action within sixty (60) days
of making the report.” El Paso Healthcare objected to the court’s instructions, arguing that the
statute requires that Murphy reported conduct that would in fact constitute a “violation of law,”
not just that she made the ethics report with a reasonable belief that the conduct she complained
of violated the law. The trial court overruled the objection, and the jury answered “Yes” to the
question.
The court of appeals upheld the judgment based on statutory retaliation, concluding that
the record contains “some evidence that Dr. Harlass’s conduct violated the law” by failing to obtain
the patient’s informed consent, and that “Murphy reported a violation of law.” — S.W.3d —.
Based on these conclusions, the court did not reach El Paso Healthcare’s argument that “there is
no evidence that Murphy made her report in good faith.” — S.W.3d —.
discriminates against the person or a relative who is a volunteer in the facility or who is employed under the patient
work program administered by the department.” Id. § 161.135(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Murphy was not a volunteer
at Las Palmas or employed under a patient-work program, but El Paso Healthcare has not challenged the statute’s
applicability on that basis. For purposes of this case, we assume—without deciding—that the italicized clause modifies
the term “relative” but not the term “person.”
5
El Paso Healthcare argues that the court of appeals erred by upholding the judgment based
on evidence that Harlass violated the law and Murphy reported a violation of law because the trial
court never asked the jury those questions. Instead, the court asked the jury whether Murphy made
her ethics report in good faith, reasonably believing that Harlass violated the law. According to El
Paso Healthcare, the statute requires the plaintiff to prove that she reported conduct that in fact
violated the law, not just conduct that she reasonably believed violated the law, and it treats the
person’s good-faith reasonable belief merely as a basis for a presumption that the defendant
retaliated against the plaintiff. Based on this statutory construction, El Paso Healthcare argues that
we must reverse the judgment because the court of appeals affirmed based on a theory the trial
court never submitted to the jury. Alternatively, El Paso Healthcare argues that, even if the jury
question could be construed to ask whether Murphy reported conduct that in fact violated the law,
Murphy provided no evidence that Harlass’s alleged conduct as reported was in fact a violation of
law. Finally, El Paso Healthcare argues that, even if a good-faith belief that Harlass violated the
law were sufficient under the statute, no evidence supports the jury’s finding that Murphy reported
a legal violation in good faith.2
In response, Murphy contends that the statute merely required her to establish that she
reported conduct that she reasonably believed in good faith was a violation of law. In support,
Murphy relies heavily on this Court’s decisions construing the Texas Whistleblower Act. See TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 554.002(a). The Whistleblower Act prohibits governmental bodies from retaliating
2
El Paso Healthcare does not challenge the finding that it “retaliated” against Murphy or caused her to suffer
an “adverse employment action.”
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against an employee “who in good faith reports a violation of law by the employing governmental
entity or another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement authority.” Id.3 In City of
Elsa v. Gonzalez, this Court declined to decide whether the defendant had actually violated the law
because the Whistleblower Act “requires only a good-faith belief that a violation of law has
occurred.” 325 S.W.3d 622, 627 n.3 (Tex. 2010); see Univ. of Hous. v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851,
857 (Tex. 2013) (holding that employee’s belief that university guidelines were law satisfied the
subjective, but not objective, prong of a good-faith belief that he was reporting a violation of law).
Murphy points out that courts of appeals have relied on this interpretation of “good faith” in the
Whistleblower Act to construe similar “good faith” language in the Health and Safety Code. See
Milford v. Kelsey Seybold Med. Group, P.A., No. 11-00-00022-CV, 2000 WL 34233659, at *6
(Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 30, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“We see no reason
why a different definition [from that of the Whistleblower Act] should apply to whistleblower
claims under the Texas Health and Safety Code.”); Rathjen v. Mental Health Mental Retardation
Auth. of Harris Cty., No. 01-97-00993-CV, 1998 WL 1989746, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 6, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“[I]t has been held that an employee
who in good faith believes he is reporting a violation of law, regardless of whether his belief is
correct, is protected.”).
To resolve the parties’ dispute, our analysis “begins with the Legislature’s words,” looking
first to their plain and common meaning. Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., 996 S.W.2d
3
The previous version of the statute prohibited retaliation against an employee “who reports a violation of
law to an appropriate law enforcement authority if the employee report is made in good faith.” Act of May 23, 1983,
68th Leg., R.S., ch. 832, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4751 (amended 1993) (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002).
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864, 865–66 (Tex. 1999). In conducting this analysis, “we look at the entire act, and not a single
section in isolation.” Id. Our “text-based approach to statutory construction requires us to study
the language of the specific provision at issue, within the context of the statute as a whole,
endeavoring to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856,
867 (Tex. 2014). When the statute’s language “is unambiguous and does not lead to absurd results,
our search . . . ends there.” Tex. Adjutant Gen.’s Office v. Ngakoue, 408 S.W.3d 350, 362 (Tex.
2013).
A. Violation of Law
Section 161.135’s language provides some support for El Paso Healthcare’s argument that
the statute requires the plaintiff to prove that she reported conduct that in fact violated the law, not
just conduct that she reasonably believed violated the law. Subsection (a) expressly prohibits a
hospital from retaliating against “a person who is not an employee for reporting a violation of
law,” and makes no reference to whether a good-faith but incorrect report is sufficient. TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 161.135(a). Instead, the section only refers to “good faith” in
subsection (c)(1), which creates a rebuttable presumption “that the person was retaliated against”
if the hospital takes an adverse action within sixty days after “the plaintiff made a report in good
faith.” Id. § 161.135(c)(1).
On the other hand, subsection 161.135(c)(1)(B) refers only to a “report,” and thus
necessarily refers back to and incorporates subsection (a)’s reference to the “report[] [of] a
violation of law.” Id. And it does not expressly require the plaintiff to make the report in good faith
or condition the presumption on her doing so. Instead, it expressly conditions the presumption on
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the plaintiff making the report within sixty days, and seems more to assume that the report was
made in good faith. Id. We must read these provisions not only together, but also within the context
of the statute as a whole. Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 867. Doing so, we find clear guidance in the three
sections that immediately proceed section 161.135.
As Murphy points out, section 161.132 requires all persons “associated” with a hospital or
certain other health care facilities to report any conduct by a health-care facility or professional if
the person “reasonably believes or . . . knows of information that would reasonably cause a person
to believe that the . . . conduct . . . is or might be illegal.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 161.132(b). The next section then requires health-care facilities to require their employees and
other associated professionals to attend annual training “in identifying patient abuse or neglect and
illegal, unprofessional, or unethical conduct by or in the facility.” Id. § 161.133(a). Section 161.134
then prohibits a facility from retaliating against “an employee for reporting . . . a violation of law.”
Id. § 161.134(a) (emphasis added). And then—as discussed—section 161.135 prohibits a facility
from retaliating against “a person who is not an employee for reporting a violation of law.” Id.
§ 161.135(a) (emphasis added).
Reading these obviously related provisions together, we conclude that the statute promotes
reporting all conduct in the health-care context that a reasonable person would conclude constitutes
a violation of law. Consistent with that interpretation, we conclude that sections 161.134 and
161.135 promote reporting such conduct by protecting those who make such reports as section
161.132 requires. Construing section 161.135 to only protect a person who reports conduct that is
in fact a legal violation but not a person who has a good-faith belief that the conduct violates the
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law would be inconsistent with the section’s statutory context. In light of the statutory context, we
reject this construction and conclude that the statute’s protections shield the person from retaliation
for doing what the statute itself requires. Reading subsections 161.135(a) and 161.135(c)(1)(B)
both together and in context within the statute as a whole, we conclude that the statute does not
require the plaintiff to prove that the reported conduct in fact violated the law, but instead permits
the plaintiff to sue for retaliation if the plaintiff reported a violation of law in good faith.4
B. Good Faith
We now turn to El Paso Healthcare’s alternative argument that no evidence supports the
jury’s finding that Murphy had a good-faith belief that Harlass violated the law. As the trial court
correctly instructed the jury, this question presents a two-pronged inquiry. “‘Good faith’ means
that (1) the employee believed that the conduct reported was a violation of law and (2) the
employee’s belief was reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience.” Wichita Cty.
v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996); see City of Elsa, 325 S.W.3d at 626 (citing Tex. Dep’t
of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 320 (Tex. 2002)) (“This means that Gonzalez must have
believed he was reporting conduct that constituted a violation of law and his belief must have been
reasonable based on his training and experience.”).
The record here undisputedly contains evidence that supports the first prong: Murphy
herself testified that she subjectively believed that Harlass did not obtain the patient’s informed
4
We agree with El Paso Healthcare that the trial court submitted the claim based solely on the theory that
Murphy reported in good faith what she believed to be a violation and never asked the jury whether the reported
conduct in fact was a violation of law. In light of our construction of the statute, however, we need not consider El
Paso Healthcare’s argument that the record contains no evidence that the conduct Murphy reported in fact was a
violation of law.
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consent as the law requires. We agree with El Paso Healthcare, however, that no evidence in the
record demonstrates that Murphy’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable in light of her
training and experience.
Murphy testified that her belief was based on Harlass’s statements and demeanor after he
left the patient’s room. But Murphy admitted that she was not in the room during the “four or five
minutes” when Harlass spoke to the patient. She conceded that she did not know what Harlass said
to the patient or whether he had properly disclosed the risks to the patient during that time. Juarez,
the nurse who was present in the room with Harlass and the patient, told the hospital’s ethics officer
that Harlass “was professional with the patient and gave her appropriate informed consent.”
Although Harlass was angry when he left the patient, Murphy admitted that she could only assume
that Harlass had scared the patient and could only guess at what he told her. In short, Murphy’s
conclusion that Harlass did not obtain the patient’s informed consent as the law requires was
merely conjecture and surmise. Lacking any evidence to support Murphy’s subjective conclusion,
the record cannot support a finding that Murphy’s belief was objectively reasonable. No evidence
shows that Murphy reported a legal violation in good faith, and her retaliation claim must fail as a
matter of law.
III.
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
Even if she cannot recover for statutory retaliation, Murphy argues that the jury’s finding
of tortious interference also supports at least part of her damages award.5 Murphy claims that El
5
El Paso Healthcare argues that the tortious-interference claim cannot support any of the compensatory
damages the jury awarded. Although Murphy claims in her brief that her tortious-interference claim is an “alternative
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Paso Healthcare interfered with her business relationship with West Texas OB by requesting that
Murphy not be scheduled at Las Palmas while it conducted its investigation into Murphy’s and
Harlass’s complaints.
Question 3 of the jury charge asked whether El Paso Healthcare “intentionally interfere[d]
with the continuation of the business relationship between Laura Murphy and West Texas OB
Anesthesia.” The jury answered “Yes.” El Paso Healthcare contends that it cannot be liable for
any such interference because (1) its interference was legally justified, (2) Murphy failed to
establish that the interference was independently tortious or unlawful, and (3) no evidence supports
a finding that El Paso Healthcare interfered with the terms of Murphy’s existing contract with West
Texas OB. We reject the first two arguments but agree with the third.
A. Legal Justification
El Paso Healthcare argues that it cannot be liable for tortious interference because the
conduct by which it interfered with Murphy’s contract with West Texas OB was legally justified.
Legal justification is a defense to tortious interference when “one is privileged to interfere with
another’s contract” either by “a bona fide exercise of his own rights” or “if he has an equal or
superior right in the subject matter to that of the other party.” Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767
S.W.2d 686, 691 (Tex. 1989) (citing Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex. 1984);
Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex. 1976); Morris v. Jordan
Fin. Corp., 564 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). “The defense of
basis for the judgment,” she does not address whether the claim supports mental-anguish damages, and instead refers
only to the “retaliation” as the cause of her suffering. Because of our disposition of El Paso Healthcare’s other issues,
we need not address that issue here.
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legal justification or excuse,” however, “only protects good faith assertions of legal rights.”
Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1991). Here, the trial court asked
the jury in Question 4 whether El Paso Healthcare “interfere[d] because it had a good faith belief
that it had a right to do so,” and the jury answered “no.” El Paso Healthcare has not challenged
that finding here or in the court of appeals. Its failure to do so prevents us from reversing the trial
court’s judgment on this ground. See Pat Baker Co. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. 1998)
(“It is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s judgment absent properly
assigned error.”). It therefore cannot rely on its justification defense to defeat Murphy’s tortious
interference claim.
B. Independently Tortious or Unlawful Conduct
El Paso Healthcare next contends that it cannot be liable for tortious interference because
Murphy did not prove that El Paso Healthcare engaged in any independently tortious or unlawful
conduct. Texas law recognizes two types of tortious-interference claims: one based on interference
with an existing contract and one based on interference with a prospective business relationship.
See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2000). Tortious
interference with a prospective business relationship requires a finding that the defendant engaged
in independently tortious or unlawful conduct; interference with an existing contract does not. See
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 727 (Tex. 2001). El Paso Healthcare contends
that Murphy’s claim for tortious interference could only relate to a prospective business
relationship. It points to evidence that Murphy’s contract with West Texas OB was “oral, non-
13
binding,” and neither required West Texas OB to assign Murphy any shifts at Las Palmas nor
obligated her to work any shifts assigned.
Murphy admits that West Texas OB had no contractual obligation to assign her shifts, that
she had no contractual obligation to accept any such assignments, and that either party could
terminate their relationship at will. Nevertheless, she argues that their agreement can support a
claim for tortious interference with an existing contract.6 According to Murphy, the jury charge
asked only whether El Paso Healthcare interfered with an existing contract,7 and the jury found
that it did. Murphy contends that El Paso Healthcare waived its argument that she had to prove
independently tortious or unlawful conduct because it failed to object to the tortious-interference
question as submitted or to the omission of any question about independently tortious or unlawful
conduct.
We need not resolve these issues. Even assuming that (1) the jury found interference with
an existing contract; (2) Murphy’s agreement with West Texas OB could support a claim for
interference with an existing contract; and (3) El Paso Healthcare waived any argument that
6
Murphy relies on our decisions in Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 689 (“[T]he terminable-at-will status of a contract
is no defense to an action for tortious interference with its performance.”), and Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch
Associates, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1990) (“[T]he terminable upon notice status of the Fowler–Welch contract is
not a defense to an action for tortious interference with its performance.”). In Sturges, however, we suggested (without
discussion) that Sterner and Juliette Fowler involved claims for interference with prospective business relations. See
52 S.W.3d at 723 & n.57; see also Calvillo v. Gonzalez, 922 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that
chief of anesthesiology was justified as a matter of law to interfere with subordinate anesthetist’s schedule with the
hospital, which we referred to as “prospective business relations”).
7
The jury charge asked whether El Paso Healthcare interfered with “the continuation of” Murphy’s “business
relationship” with West Texas OB. Murphy argues that this question necessarily asked about an existing contract
because a relationship “can not ‘continue’ unless it exists in the first place.” The court of appeals agreed with Murphy,
holding that “the jury question made clear that Murphy’s claim was one for tortious interference with an existing
business relationship, and there is no doubt that . . . Murphy had an existing business relationship with West Texas
OB.” — S.W.3d at —.
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Murphy could only recover for interference with prospective business relations—all issues that we
need not and do not decide today—we conclude that no evidence supports the jury’s finding that
El Paso Healthcare interfered with Murphy’s existing contract.
C. Evidence of Interference
To prevail on a claim for tortious interference with an existing contract, Murphy had to
present evidence that El Paso Healthcare induced West Texas OB to “breach the contract,”
Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 794–95 (Tex. 1995), and thus interfered with Murphy’s
“legal rights under the . . . contract,” Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964
S.W.2d 276, 288 (Tex. 1998). Murphy alleged that El Paso Healthcare interfered with her existing
contract by causing West Texas OB to remove Murphy from the schedule at Las Palmas and stop
assigning her to shifts there. But as Murphy admits, an obligation to provide employment was not
a term of Murphy’s existing contract with West Texas OB. Although West Texas OB had agreed
to pay Murphy at a particular rate on a monthly basis for the hours she worked, it had not agreed
to schedule Murphy at Las Palmas, or indeed at any hospital. The evidence does not support a
finding that El Paso Healthcare interfered with Murphy’s legal rights under her existing agreement
with West Texas OB, so Murphy’s tortious-interference claim must fail.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Laura Murphy failed to establish that El Paso Healthcare illegally retaliated against her or
tortuously interfered with her contract with West Texas OB. We therefore reverse the trial court’s
judgment and render judgment that Murphy take nothing on her claims.
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___________________
Jeffrey S. Boyd
Justice
Opinion delivered: April 28, 2017
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