Weston Street Hartford, LLC v. Zebra Realty, LLC ( 2019 )


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    WESTON STREET HARTFORD, LLC v.
    ZEBRA REALTY, LLC
    (AC 40415)
    DiPentima, C.J., and Sheldon and Moll, Js.*
    Syllabus
    The plaintiff sought a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the
    defendant from, inter alia, maintaining a parking lot within an easement
    granting the plaintiff a right-of-way over certain property owned by the
    defendant. The defendant filed a counterclaim, seeking, inter alia, a
    judgment declaring that it had the right to relocate the right-of-way at
    its own expense provided that it would be similar in size to the existing
    right-of-way and that it would not impose any additional burden on the
    plaintiff, as well as a permanent injunction directing the plaintiff to
    release the right-of-way upon its relocation by the defendant. The trial
    court rendered judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff’s complaint,
    concluding that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief because
    it had failed to establish that the defendant’s actions were interfering
    with the plaintiff’s use of the right-of-way. The court also rejected the
    defendant’s counterclaim insofar as the defendant sought a right to
    relocate the existing right-of-way and an order directing the plaintiff to
    release the right-of-way upon its relocation. Thereafter, the defendant
    appealed, and the plaintiff filed a cross appeal with this court. Held:
    1. The trial court properly rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the counts
    of the defendant’s counterclaim relating to the defendant’s request to
    relocate the right-of-way and for an order directing the plaintiff to release
    the right-of-way; notwithstanding the defendant’s claim to the contrary,
    there was no meaningful difference between the unilateral modification
    of an easement that this court in Alligood v. LaSaracina (122 Conn.
    App. 473) found to be improper and the unilateral relocation of an
    easement that the defendant sought in the present case, as either change
    is improper without the mutual consent of the landowner and the ease-
    ment owner, and this court rejected the defendant’s claim that Alligood
    was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and declined to over-
    rule Alligood.
    2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly
    rendered judgment in the defendant’s favor on the plaintiff’s complaint
    and denied the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief: in concluding that
    the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that its inability to use the right-
    of-way would necessarily result but for the issuance of the requested
    injunction, and, thus, was not entitled to its requested injunctive relief,
    the trial court applied the correct standard of law set forth in Karls v.
    Alexandra Realty Corp. (
    179 Conn. 390
    ), which requires a party seeking
    injunctive relief to show that there a substantial probability that but for
    the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer irreparable
    harm; moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
    plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief under the circumstances of the
    case and in light of the extraordinary nature of injunctive relief, as the
    court fully acknowledged that parking in the right-of-way would interfere
    with the plaintiff’s access to the right-of-way but that this harm was not
    likely to befall the plaintiff but for the issuance of the requested
    injunction.
    Argued January 22—officially released October 15, 2019
    Procedural History
    Action for, inter alia, a temporary and permanent
    injunction prohibiting the defendant from maintaining
    a parking lot within a right-of-way, and for other relief,
    brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
    of Hartford, where the matter was transferred to the
    judicial district of Tolland; thereafter, the defendant
    filed a counterclaim; subsequently, the matter was tried
    to the court, Bright, J.; judgment for the defendant
    on the complaint and in part for the plaintiff on the
    counterclaim, from which the defendant appealed and
    the plaintiff cross appealed to this court. Affirmed.
    Steven Lapp, with whom, on the brief, was Daniel
    J. Klau, for the appellant-cross appellee (defendant).
    Mario R. Borelli, with whom, on the brief, was Frank
    A. Leone, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    MOLL, J. The present case arises from a dispute
    between the plaintiff, Weston Street Hartford, LLC, and
    the defendant, Zebra Realty, LLC, concerning a right-
    of-way easement held by the plaintiff that runs over
    property owned by the defendant. The defendant has
    appealed and the plaintiff has cross appealed from the
    judgment rendered, after a court trial, on the plaintiff’s
    complaint and the defendant’s counterclaim. On appeal,
    the defendant claims that the trial court, in rendering
    judgment in favor of the plaintiff on counts one and
    two of the counterclaim, incorrectly determined that
    Alligood v. LaSaracina, 
    122 Conn. App. 473
    , 
    999 A.2d 836
     (2010), applies to the present case and prohibits
    any landowner from relocating an easement without
    the consent of the easement holder. In the alternative,
    the defendant contends that the Restatement (Third),
    Property, Servitudes § 4.8 (3) (c), is a more logical
    extension of Connecticut easement law than the rule
    adopted by this court in Alligood.1 On cross appeal, the
    plaintiff claims that, upon finding that the defendant’s
    use of the servient estate interfered with the plaintiff’s
    intended use of the easement, the court should have
    rendered judgment in its favor on its complaint and
    granted its request for an injunction prohibiting interfer-
    ence by the defendant. We disagree with both parties’
    claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    The following procedural history and facts, as found
    by the trial court, are relevant to the parties’ claims.
    The plaintiff is the owner of real property located at
    170 Weston Street in Hartford, and the defendant is the
    owner of adjacent real property located at 145 West
    Service Road in Hartford. The properties are located
    in an area zoned for commercial or industrial use. When
    facing Weston Street, the back right corner of the plain-
    tiff’s property abuts the rear of the defendant’s property.
    The portion of the plaintiff’s property that abuts the
    defendant’s property was formerly known as Lot 13.
    In 1979, Gennaro Russo transferred his ownership of
    145 West Service Road to Dalchard Warehouse, Inc.
    (Dalchard Warehouse), by deed, which provided in rele-
    vant part that 145 West Service Road was subject to a
    right-of-way in favor of what was then Lot 13 (right-of-
    way).2 At the time of this transfer, Russo still owned
    the lots that would become 170 Weston Street as it
    exists today, namely, Lots 6 through 13 of an area known
    as the Fox Press Subdivision. In 1980, Russo’s owner-
    ship of Lots 6 through 12 was transferred to Charter
    Oak Bank & Trust Company (Charter Oak) by way of
    foreclosure by sale, and, thereafter, Russo transferred
    his ownership of Lot 13 to Charter Oak by quitclaim
    deed. The combined transferred parcels eventually
    became known as 170 Weston Street. Consequently, Lot
    13 no longer exists as a separate lot.
    In April, 1998, Dalchard Warehouse quitclaimed its
    interest in 145 West Service Road to Bechard, LLC. In
    November, 2006, Belchard, LLC, transferred the prop-
    erty to the defendant by warranty deed, which provided
    in relevant part that 145 West Service Road was encum-
    bered by ‘‘[a] Right-of-Way, 25 feet in width, as reserved
    in a deed dated August 29, 1979 and recorded in Volume
    1723 at Page 277 of the Hartford Land Records.’’
    In June, 2011, the plaintiff acquired 170 Weston
    Street. The deed transferring ownership of 170 Weston
    Street to the plaintiff specifically references the right-
    of-way, describing it as follows: ‘‘[T]he right to use a
    25 foot right-of-way for the benefit of that portion of
    these premises previously known as Lot No. 13, for
    ingress and egress to West Service Road as reserved
    in a deed from Gennaro A. Russo, Debtor in Possession
    to Dalchard Warehouse, Inc. Dated August 29, 1979 and
    recorded in Volume 1723, Page 277 of the Hartford
    Land Records.’’
    In August, 2011, the plaintiff entered into a three
    year lease agreement with Capitol Transportation, LLC
    (Capitol Transportation), pursuant to which Capitol
    Transportation was to use a portion of the plaintiff’s
    property at 170 Weston Street as a school bus terminal
    and storage and transportation facility. Thereafter,
    approximately 135 school buses and/or vans, which
    were used to transport students enrolled in the Hartford
    public and magnet schools, were regularly parked on
    the plaintiff’s property in an area that includes, but is
    not limited to, former Lot 13. At this time, the defendant
    operated and continued to operate an adult entertain-
    ment establishment and night club, known as the Mynx
    Cabaret, on its property at 145 West Service Road. The
    parking lot surrounding the Mynx Cabaret contained
    eighty-five parking spaces, including twenty-five to
    thirty of which were located in the right-of-way.
    In September, 2011, the plaintiff commenced an
    action against the defendant, seeking a temporary and
    permanent injunction prohibiting and restraining the
    defendant from maintaining a parking lot on the right-
    of-way or from obstructing the plaintiff’s right to pass
    over the right-of-way. See Weston Street Hartford, LLC
    v. Zebra Realty, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district
    of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (first action).
    The defendant filed a counterclaim, seeking, inter alia,
    a permanent injunction enjoining the plaintiff from
    asserting any right to use the right-of-way and a declara-
    tory judgment with respect to the parties’ rights to the
    right-of-way. See id.
    On March 11, 2013, in the first action, the trial court
    rendered judgment, after a court trial, in favor of the
    defendant on the plaintiff’s complaint and in favor of
    the plaintiff on the defendant’s counterclaim. In its
    memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the
    plaintiff had established the existence of the right-of-
    way but had failed to prove that the defendant’s actions
    or inactions were materially interfering with the plain-
    tiff’s use of the right-of-way because one particular util-
    ity pole, which was located in the public right-of-way,
    was obstructing the right-of way, and the plaintiff had
    not established that the utility pole could be relocated.
    The court also concluded that the plaintiff’s intended
    use would overburden the right-of-way because some
    of the buses that would be utilizing it would do so to
    travel to and from property not intended to be benefit-
    ted by the right-of-way, i.e., property other than former
    Lot 13, and, therefore, such use was not permitted.
    Additionally, the court rendered a declaratory judgment
    that the plaintiff was still the owner of the right-of-way
    and specified as follows: ‘‘The right-of-way shall run
    with the land benefitted, that being former Lot 13, and
    the land burdened, that being 145 West Service Road,
    whether there is other access to former Lot 13. The
    right-of-way to be maintained by the owner or owners
    of former Lot 13. The right-of-way may not be used to
    benefit any other property into which former Lot 13
    was merged.’’3
    Following the conclusion of the first action, the plain-
    tiff began considering alternative uses for former Lot 13
    involving the right-of-way. Between July and November,
    2014, the plaintiff arranged for and paid over $60,000
    to move three utility poles outside of the right-of-way,
    including the utility pole that was in the city of Hart-
    ford’s (city) control. In March or April, 2015, the plaintiff
    notified the defendant that it was developing a new
    plan for former Lot 13.
    In August, 2015, the plaintiff commenced the present
    action against the defendant. In its complaint, the plain-
    tiff alleged, inter alia, that it was the owner of the right-
    of-way, that the defendant materially interfered and
    continues to materially interfere with the plaintiff’s use
    of the right-of-way by maintaining a parking lot in the
    right-of-way and by failing to sign an application or a
    letter of authorization enabling the plaintiff to obtain
    a curb cut permit from the city, and that such interfer-
    ence has caused and will continue to cause irreparable
    injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought the following
    relief: (1) a temporary and permanent injunction prohib-
    iting and restraining the defendant from maintaining a
    parking lot within the right-of-way or from obstructing
    the plaintiff’s right to use the right-of-way; (2) an order
    requiring the defendant to sign documentation that may
    be required to enable the plaintiff to obtain a curb cut;
    and (3) costs.
    On November 20, 2015, the defendant filed an answer,
    special defenses, and a five count counterclaim. As part
    of its first special defense, the defendant alleged that
    the plaintiff’s intended use will overburden and consti-
    tutes an impermissible misuse of the right-of-way. In
    its counterclaim, the defendant alleged, inter alia, that:
    it has a right to relocate the right-of-way (count one);
    it would be equitable to deny the plaintiff’s request for
    injunctive relief and to enter injunctive relief in favor
    of the defendant, compelling the plaintiff to release the
    right-of-way upon its relocation by the defendant (count
    two); the defendant was not materially interfering with
    the plaintiff’s use of the right-of-way (count three); the
    defendant has no duty to sign curb cut permit applica-
    tions or otherwise authorize the plaintiff to make unnec-
    essary alterations and/or modifications to the defen-
    dant’s property to make use of the right-of-way (count
    four); and a permanent injunction should enter prohib-
    iting the plaintiff from making unnecessary alterations
    and/or modifications to the defendant’s property to
    access the right-of-way (count five). The defendant
    sought a variety of relief, most relevantly: (1) a declara-
    tory judgment that it has the right to relocate the right-
    of-way on its property, at its own cost and expense, such
    that the relocated right-of-way is substantially equal in
    dimension, utility, and convenience to the plaintiff as
    the current right-of-way and that the relocated right-of-
    way would not impose any additional burden on the
    plaintiff; and (2) a permanent injunction ordering the
    plaintiff to release the right-of-way upon its relocation
    by the defendant in the manner described previously.4
    Meanwhile, in October, 2015, the plaintiff submitted
    a curb cut application to the city, which the city deemed
    unacceptable.5 A curb cut was not necessary for the
    plaintiff to gain access to the right-of-way.6 In Novem-
    ber, 2015, with the assistance of a surveyor, the plaintiff
    began preparing a site plan for former Lot 13 upon
    which the plaintiff intended to construct a parking lot
    that would be accessed using the right-of-way.
    In January, 2016, the defendant prepared two concept
    plans to relocate the right-of-way on its property. The
    defendant intended to reconfigure its parking area to
    maintain approximately the same number of parking
    spaces utilized by patrons while also providing the
    plaintiff with access across its property to former Lot
    13. The plaintiff had no interest in either alternative,
    however, and would not consider any alternative to the
    right-of-way. The defendant did not establish that the
    city would approve these alternative concept plans.
    On March 15, 2016, the plaintiff submitted a planning
    and zoning application to the city for approval of its
    site plan. According to the site plan, former Lot 13
    would serve as a parking lot, containing seventy-nine
    parking spaces, and would be fenced off from the
    remainder of 170 Weston Street such that the only
    means of access to the parking lot would be by way of
    the right-of-way. The plaintiff’s current tenants, Spe-
    cialty Corporation, Inc. (Specialty),7 and Hertz Corpora-
    tion (Hertz), which operate a school bus depot and sell
    out of service rental cars, respectively, would use the
    parking lot as an accessory to their principal uses of
    170 Weston Street. On June 20, 2016, the plaintiff sub-
    mitted a revised site plan. Per the revised site plan, the
    plaintiff intended for the parking lot to be used for
    passenger vehicle parking for tenants, employees, and
    invitees of Specialty and Hertz, and as passenger vehicle
    parking for concert and sporting event attendees. On
    July 12, 2016, the city approved the revised site plan.
    The plaintiff did not establish that it obtained from the
    city a permit or license to utilize former Lot 13 as a
    parking lot for public use, however.
    On April 18, 2017, following a court trial held on July
    12 and 13, 2016, and the submission of posttrial briefs
    from both parties, the court issued a memorandum of
    decision. With respect to the plaintiff’s complaint, the
    court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, con-
    cluding, inter alia, that the plaintiff was not entitled to
    injunctive relief because it had failed to establish that
    the defendant’s actions were causing imminent harm
    or currently interfering with the plaintiff’s use of the
    right-of-way. With respect to the defendant’s counter-
    claim, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plain-
    tiff on counts one, two, and five, dismissed the third
    count, and, with respect to the fourth count, issued a
    declaratory judgment that, on the basis of the facts as
    they existed before the court, the defendant had no
    duty or obligation to assist the plaintiff in obtaining a
    curb cut permit.
    On May 5, 2017, the defendant appealed from the
    court’s judgment on the first and second counts of its
    counterclaim.8 On May 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed a
    cross appeal from the court’s judgment on its complaint.
    Additional facts and procedural history will be provided
    as necessary.
    I
    We first address the defendant’s claim on appeal. The
    defendant argues that, in rendering judgment in favor
    of the plaintiff on the defendant’s counterclaim, the trial
    court erred in concluding that Alligood v. LaSaracina,
    supra, 
    122 Conn. App. 473
    , was controlling precedent.
    Specifically, the defendant contends that Alligood
    should be limited to its facts and should not be broadly
    applied so as to preclude the relocation, as opposed to
    the modification, of any right-of-way by the owner of
    servient land without the consent of the owner of the
    dominant estate. In the alternative, the defendant con-
    tends that Alligood is inconsistent with controlling Con-
    necticut Supreme Court precedent, which has relied
    on the Restatement (Third) of Property in Connecticut
    easement cases, and that § 4.8 (3) (c) of the Restatement
    (Third) of Property is more consistent with general
    principles of Connecticut easement law and public pol-
    icy. We disagree.
    Central to the defendant’s claim is the question of
    whether a servient landowner must obtain consent from
    the owner of the dominant estate to relocate an ease-
    ment on the servient estate. As this is a question of law,
    our review is plenary. See Abrams v. PH Architects,
    LLC, 
    183 Conn. App. 777
    , 788, 
    193 A.3d 1230
    , cert.
    denied, 
    330 Conn. 925
    , 
    194 A.3d 290
     (2018) (‘‘[i]t is
    axiomatic that matters of law are entitled to plenary
    review on appeal’’).
    To answer this question, we first turn to Alligood. In
    Alligood, the defendants unilaterally altered a section
    of the plaintiffs’ right-of-way across the defendants’
    property by eliminating the circular turnaround at the
    end of the right-of-way. Alligood v. LaSaracina, supra,
    
    122 Conn. App. 475
    . On appeal, and in agreement with
    the plaintiffs, this court determined that the trial court
    applied the incorrect standard of law to the plaintiffs’
    request for injunctive relief and that the defendants’
    unilateral alteration of the location and dimensions of
    the right-of-way was improper. Id., 476. In so holding,
    we adopted and applied the general rule adhered to
    by a majority of jurisdictions, namely, that ‘‘once the
    location of an easement has been selected or fixed,
    it cannot be changed by either the landowner or the
    easement owner without the other’s consent.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Id.
    Our adoption of the majority approach was not
    dependent upon any distinction between the relocation
    or modification of an easement. See id., 476–77 (collect-
    ing cases applying majority rule to easement modifica-
    tion and relocation). Rather, we adopted the majority
    approach, over that set forth in § 4.8 (3) (c) of the
    Restatement (Third) of Property, which provides:
    ‘‘Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement,
    as defined in § 1.2, the owner of the servient estate is
    entitled to make reasonable changes in the location or
    dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner’s
    expense, to permit normal use or development of the
    servient estate, but only if the changes do not . . .
    (c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was
    created.’’ We reasoned: ‘‘[W]e believe that the attributes
    of the majority rule, namely, uniformity, stability, pre-
    dictability and judicial economy, outweigh any
    increased flexibility offered by the Restatement
    approach.’’ Alligood v. LaSaracina, supra, 122 Conn.
    App. 478. Applying the majority rule to the factual cir-
    cumstances of the case, we determined that the defen-
    dants’ alteration of the plaintiffs’ right-of-way was
    improper because ‘‘[t]he defendants did so without the
    plaintiffs’ consent.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 478–79.
    Accordingly, per our legal precedent, no meaningful
    difference exists between the unilateral modification
    of an easement, as in Alligood, and the unilateral reloca-
    tion of an easement, as sought by the defendant in the
    present case; under the majority rule, either change is
    improper without consent from both the landowner and
    easement owner.9
    Moreover, although the defendant contends that we
    should distinguish Alligood from the present case on
    the basis that Alligood involved the modification, rather
    than a relocation, of an easement—and, therefore, apply
    § 4.8 (3) (c) of the Restatement (Third) of Property
    instead of the majority rule—§ 4.8 (3) (c) does not sup-
    port such distinction. As recited previously, § 4.8 (3)
    (c) of the Restatement (Third) of Property provides in
    relevant part: ‘‘Unless expressly denied by the terms of
    an easement . . . the owner of the servient estate is
    entitled to make reasonable changes in the location or
    dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner’s
    expense, to permit normal use or development of the
    servient estate, but only if the changes do not . . .
    (c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was
    created.’’ (Emphasis added.) As demonstrated by its
    express terms, § 4.8 (3) (c) does not distinguish
    between the relocation and modification of an
    easement.10
    Likewise, the defendant’s contention that Alligood
    is inconsistent with our Supreme Court precedent is
    unsupported, as the defendant points to no case in
    which our Supreme Court has adopted § 4.8 of the
    Restatement (Third) of Property or suggested that § 4.8
    is a necessary corollary to sections upon which our
    Supreme Court has relied, namely, §§ 4.9,11 4.10,12 and
    8.313 of the Restatement (Third) of Property, which con-
    cern the use and enforcement of servitudes. Moreover,
    in Alligood, we expressly acknowledged the intended
    purpose of § 4.8 of the Restatement (Third) of Property,
    namely, ‘‘to permit development of the servient estate
    to the extent it can be accomplished without unduly
    interfering with the legitimate interests of the easement
    holder,’’ while rejecting it in favor of the majority rule.
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alligood v. LaSara-
    cina, supra, 
    122 Conn. App. 477
    .
    By arguing further that Alligood is inconsistent with
    the general principles of Connecticut easement law and
    public policy, the defendant essentially asks that we
    overrule Alligood. ‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that one panel of
    this court cannot overrule the precedent established by
    a previous panel’s holding. . . . As we often have
    stated, this court’s policy dictates that one panel should
    not, on its own, [overrule] the ruling of a previous panel.
    The [overruling] may be accomplished only if the appeal
    is heard en banc.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    LM Ins. Corp. v. Connecticut Dismanteling, LLC, 
    172 Conn. App. 622
    , 632–33, 
    161 A.3d 562
     (2017); see also
    Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 
    330 Conn. 400
    , 417, 
    195 A.3d 664
     (2018) (‘‘[t]he doctrine of
    stare decisis counsels that a court should not overrule
    its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and
    inescapable logic require it’’ [internal quotation
    marks omitted]).
    In the present case, relying on the majority rule
    adopted in Alligood, the trial court rejected the first
    and second counts of the defendant’s counterclaim, in
    which the defendant sought both a declaratory judg-
    ment that it has the right to relocate the right-of-way
    unilaterally and an injunction requiring the plaintiff to
    release its rights in the existing right-of-way if the relo-
    cated right-of-way were substantially equal in dimen-
    sion, utility, and convenience. In accordance with our
    adoption of the majority approach in Alligood, and in
    light of our foregoing discussion, we decline to limit
    Alligood in the manner requested by the defendant,
    and we conclude that the trial court properly rendered
    judgment in favor of the plaintiff on counts one and
    two of the defendant’s counterclaim.
    II
    We turn now to the plaintiff’s cross appeal. The plain-
    tiff claims that, upon finding that the defendant’s use
    of the servient estate interfered with the plaintiff’s
    intended use of the easement, the trial court should
    have rendered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on its
    complaint and granted its request for an injunction pro-
    hibiting additional interference by the defendant. In
    support of its claim, the plaintiff argues that the court
    erred by holding the plaintiff to an incorrect and more
    burdensome standard with respect to whether it would
    suffer irreparable harm to its easement rights. The plain-
    tiff argues in the alternative that the court abused its
    discretion when it denied its request for injunctive
    relief. We disagree.
    We are mindful of the following standard of review.
    ‘‘A prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound
    discretion of the court and the court’s ruling can be
    reviewed only for the purpose of determining whether
    the decision was based on an erroneous statement of
    law or an abuse of discretion. . . . Therefore, unless
    the trial court has abused its discretion . . . the trial
    court’s decision must stand. . . . How a court balances
    the equities is discretionary but if, in balancing those
    equities, a trial court draws conclusions of law, our
    review is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Commissioner of Correction v. Cole-
    man, 
    303 Conn. 800
    , 810, 
    38 A.3d 84
     (2012), cert. denied
    sub nom. Coleman v. Arnone, 
    568 U.S. 1235
    , 
    133 S. Ct. 1593
    , 
    185 L. Ed. 2d 589
     (2013).
    A
    First, we address the plaintiff’s argument that the
    court applied the incorrect legal standard when
    determining whether the plaintiff was entitled to injunc-
    tive relief. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court
    erroneously relied upon Karls v. Alexandra Realty
    Corp., 
    179 Conn. 390
    , 
    426 A.2d 784
     (1980), to require that
    it demonstrate an ‘‘actual disturbance’’ of its easement
    right in order to establish irreparable harm, even though
    Connecticut law requires only that the holder of an
    easement right demonstrate the existence of a substan-
    tial probability of interference with such right. There-
    fore, according to the plaintiff, it demonstrated irrepara-
    ble harm by virtue of the court’s finding that parking
    in the right-of-way by the defendant’s employees and
    customers will interfere with the plaintiff’s intended
    use of the right-of-way.
    The following legal principles and precedent are rele-
    vant to the plaintiff’s argument. It is well established
    that ‘‘[a] party seeking injunctive relief must demon-
    strate that: (1) it has no adequate remedy at law; (2) it
    will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction; (3) it
    will likely prevail on the merits; and (4) the balance of
    equities tips in its favor.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, 
    327 Conn. 53
    , 59 n.5, 
    171 A.3d 409
     (2017). ‘‘[T]he owner of
    [an] easement is entitled to [injunctive] relief only if he
    can show that he will be disturbed or obstructed in the
    exercise of his right to use it.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Welles v. Lichaj, 
    136 Conn. App. 347
    , 354, 
    46 A.3d 246
    , cert. denied, 
    306 Conn. 904
    , 
    52 A.3d 730
     (2012).
    In Karls, the trial court issued an injunction
    restraining the defendant14 from using a fourteen foot
    wide right-of-way, which provided access to the plain-
    tiffs’ and defendant’s properties, after concluding, inter
    alia, that the construction of the defendant’s house vio-
    lated certain zoning ordinances. Karls v. Alexandra
    Realty Corp., supra, 179 Conn. 393–94. ‘‘The plaintiffs’
    central complaint [was] that the right-of-way [was] inad-
    equate for use by six families and that such an excessive
    use would result in irreparable injury to them.’’ Id., 395.
    On appeal, our Supreme Court considered, inter alia,
    whether the injunction issued by the trial court was
    improper in light of the facts found. Id., 399.
    In making its determination, our Supreme Court was
    guided by several key legal principles governing the
    issuance of injunctions: ‘‘The issuance of an injunction
    is the exercise of an extraordinary power which rests
    within the sound discretion of the court, and the justi-
    ciable interest which entitles one to seek redress in an
    action for injunctive relief is at least one founded on
    the imminence of substantial and irreparable injury.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401. In other
    words, ‘‘[t]he extraordinary nature of injunctive relief
    requires that the harm complained of is occurring or
    will occur if the injunction is not granted. Although an
    absolute certainty is not required, it must appear that
    there is a substantial probability that but for the issu-
    ance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer
    irreparable harm.’’ Id., 402. ‘‘The plaintiff seeking injunc-
    tive relief bears the burden of proving facts which will
    establish irreparable harm as a result of that violation.’’
    Id., 401.
    In consideration of the foregoing legal principles and
    the facts found by the trial court, our Supreme Court
    in Karls concluded that it could not agree with the
    court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had satisfied their
    burden of proving the substantial likelihood that irrepa-
    rable harm would result from the defendant’s violation.
    Id., 401–402. Our Supreme Court reasoned: ‘‘[A]lthough
    the plaintiffs have shown that they may possibly suffer
    irreparable harm, i.e., emergency vehicles blocked by
    a car stuck in the right-of-way, they have failed to dem-
    onstrate that such harm is imminent or that it will
    necessarily be caused by the defendant’s violation of the
    zoning regulations. In the absence of such a showing,
    an injunction cannot be issued.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.
    According to our Supreme Court, the harm complained
    of was not imminent in light of the trial court’s finding
    that the alleged harm was only a possibility and the
    fact that the injunction would not become effective
    until one year after it was issued. Id., 403.
    In the present case, the trial court concluded, inter
    alia, that ‘‘parking in the right-of-way by the defendant’s
    employees and customers will interfere with the plain-
    tiff’s reasonably intended use of the right-of-way, at
    least during Specialty’s hours of operation,’’ but deter-
    mined that the plaintiff did not establish irreparable
    harm. The court explained: ‘‘In this case, it is undisputed
    that the plaintiff’s rights have not yet been disturbed.
    Specialty’s buses are still parked on former Lot 13. The
    plaintiff has not constructed its planned parking lot.
    Nor is there any evidence that Specialty will take advan-
    tage of the fifty parking spaces [that] the plaintiff has
    committed to provide under the lease amendment. The
    position of the plaintiff here is similar to that of the
    plaintiffs in Karls. While it is entirely possible that its
    access to the right-of-way may be impaired, such impair-
    ment is not imminent. In fact, it is contingent on a
    number of events that have yet to occur. In addition,
    the court has no way of knowing if the defendant will
    still be operating in the manner it has been if and when
    the planned parking lot is built and is being used by
    Specialty’s employees. For these reasons, the plaintiff
    is not entitled to the injunctive relief it has requested.’’15
    (Emphasis added.)
    The foregoing explanation demonstrates that the
    court correctly applied Karls to the factual circum-
    stances of the present case. Essentially, relying on
    Karls, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff had
    failed to demonstrate that the alleged harm (i.e., the
    plaintiff’s inability to use of the right-of-way because
    of the defendant’s use of its parking lot within the right-
    of-way) would necessarily result but for the issuance
    of the requested injunction; not only was the parking
    lot not yet constructed on former Lot 13, it was unclear
    to the court whether Specialty would ever use any of
    the parking spaces afforded to it under the amended
    lease; see footnote 7 of this opinion; or whether the
    defendant would be operating its business in the same
    manner once the parking lot was actually constructed.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court applied
    the correct standard of law when determining whether
    the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief.16
    B
    We next address the plaintiff’s alternative argument
    that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
    the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. The plaintiff
    argues that a fair balancing of the equities supports the
    conclusion that an injunction should have been issued
    by the court in the present case.
    The following legal principles are relevant to the
    plaintiff’s argument. ‘‘The granting of an injunction rests
    within the sound discretion of the trial court and [i]n
    exercising its discretion, the court . . . may consider
    and balance the injury complained of with that which
    will result from interference by injunction. . . . The
    relief granted must be compatible with the equities of
    the case. . . . The action of the trial court will not be
    disturbed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury v. Phoe-
    nix Soil, LLC, 
    128 Conn. App. 619
    , 627–28, 
    20 A.3d 1
    (2011); see also Baruno v. Slane, 
    151 Conn. App. 386
    ,
    397 n.9, 
    94 A.3d 1230
     (‘‘[T]he granting of injunctive
    relief, which must be compatible with the equities of
    the case, rests within the trial court’s sound discretion.
    . . . Those equities should take into account the gravity
    and wilfulness of the violation, as well as the potential
    harm to the defendants.’’ [Emphasis omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 
    314 Conn. 920
    ,
    
    100 A.3d 851
     (2014). ‘‘In determining whether there has
    been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presump-
    tion should be given in favor of the correctness of the
    court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only [when]
    an abuse of discretion is manifest or [when] injustice
    appears to have been done.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC, 187 Conn.
    App. 604, 645, 
    203 A.3d 645
    , cert. denied, 
    331 Conn. 907
    ,
    
    202 A.3d 1022
     (2019).
    In the present case, as described previously, the court
    initially determined that ‘‘parking in the right-of-way by
    the defendant’s employees and customers will interfere
    with the plaintiff’s reasonably intended use of the right-
    of-way, at least during Specialty’s hours of operation.’’
    In making this determination, the court acknowledged,
    inter alia, that ‘‘the plaintiff’s intended use of former
    Lot 13 as a parking lot [was] far from theoretical’’—
    due to the plaintiff’s removal of the three utility poles
    obstructing the right-of-way, the plaintiff’s submission
    of detailed site plans to the city, the city’s approval of
    the revised site plan, and the creation of the amended
    lease with Specialty—and, ‘‘[t]hus, it [was] reasonably
    expected that the plaintiff may someday make use of
    the former Lot 13 as a parking lot for Specialty’s employ-
    ees and will use the right-of-way for access to that lot.’’
    (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, the court found that it
    was possible that the plaintiff’s access to the right-of-
    way may be impaired but concluded that such impair-
    ment was not imminent because ‘‘it [was] contingent
    on a number of events that [had] yet to occur,’’ such
    as Specialty’s use of fifty new parking spaces that it
    was provided under the amended lease agreement.
    The foregoing discussion by the trial court demon-
    strates that it fully acknowledged that parking in the
    right-of-way would interfere with the plaintiff’s access
    to the right-of-way but also recognized that this harm
    was not likely to befall the plaintiff but for the issuance
    of the requested injunction. Under these circumstances,
    and in light of the extraordinary nature of injunctive
    relief, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion
    when it denied the plaintiff’s request for an injunction.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
    the date of oral argument.
    1
    On the appeal form filed by the defendant, the defendant indicated that,
    in addition to the trial court’s judgment with respect to its counterclaim, it
    is appealing from the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff’s intended
    use of the easement at issue does not overburden the easement or the
    defendant’s property. In its principal appellate brief, the defendant recog-
    nizes that it raised the matter of overburdening as a special defense to the
    plaintiff’s complaint and that it was not aggrieved by the trial court’s judg-
    ment on the plaintiff’s complaint, which was rendered in its favor. The
    defendant nonetheless explains that it ‘‘intends to brief its claims of error
    arising from the trial court’s analysis and decision on the issue of overburden-
    ing, as alternative grounds for affirmance’’ of the court’s judgment on the
    plaintiff’s complaint. In its appellate brief on the cross appeal, the defendant
    briefs, inter alia, these claims of error. Because we affirm the judgment of
    the trial court with respect to the plaintiff’s complaint, we need not reach
    the defendant’s alternative grounds for affirmance.
    2
    Specifically, the 1979 deed provided that 145 West Service Road was
    ‘‘[s]ubject to a Right-of-Way in favor of that piece of real property designated
    Lot No. 13 on said map, said Right-of-Way being more particularly bounded
    and described as follows:
    ‘‘NORTHERLY:       By Lot No. 14B, as shown on said map, 341.63 feet,
    more or less;
    ‘‘EASTERLY:        By West Service Road, 25 feet;
    ‘‘SOUTHERLY:       By the non-burdened portion of Lot No. 14A, 345 feet,
    more or less; and
    ‘‘WESTERLY:        By Lot No. 13, as shown on said map, 25 feet,
    more or less.
    ‘‘Said Right-of-Way is for the purpose of providing ingress and egress for
    all purposes, to said Lot No. 13 and shall run with the land benefited and
    the land burdened regardless whether there is other access to Lot No. 13.
    Said Right-of-Way to be maintained by the owner or owners of said Lot
    No. 13.’’
    3
    The plaintiff did not appeal from the court’s judgment in the first action.
    4
    The defendant requested the following additional relief: a declaratory
    judgment that it has the right to use its property in any manner that does
    not unreasonably interfere with the plaintiff’s use of the right-of-way, includ-
    ing using the area for parking subject to certain conditions; a declaratory
    judgment that the plaintiff has no right to make unnecessary alterations
    and/or modifications to the defendant’s property to access the right-of-way,
    the plaintiff’s intended alterations and/or modifications are unnecessary,
    and the defendant has no duty to sign curb cut permit applications or
    otherwise authorize the plaintiff to make unnecessary alterations and/or
    modifications to its property to access the right-of-way; a permanent injunc-
    tion prohibiting the plaintiff from making unnecessary alterations and/or
    modifications to the defendant’s property to access the right-of-way; costs;
    and such other relief deemed fair, just, and equitable by the court.
    5
    The city returned the plaintiff’s curb cut application and noted that it
    required the submittal of full A-2 surveys for the plaintiff’s and the defen-
    dant’s lots. The plaintiff submitted an A-2 survey, but the defendant did not.
    Thus, the city never reconsidered the plaintiff’s curb cut application.
    6
    A curb does not obstruct access from West Service Road to the right-
    of-way, and, according to the trial court, the area at issue in the curb cut
    application appears to be traversable.
    7
    Under the August 12, 2014 lease executed by the plaintiff and Specialty,
    Specialty had the full right to use and occupy former Lot 13. The trial court
    found that, pursuant to the terms of a February 29, 2016 amendment to that
    lease, however, ‘‘the plaintiff can require Specialty to remove its buses and
    vans from former lot 13 in exchange for Specialty having the right to utilize,
    for employee parking, a maximum of fifty of the [seventy-nine planned]
    parking spaces to be constructed.’’
    8
    See footnote 1 of this opinion.
    9
    The defendant argues that Alligood does not, and should not, prevent a
    servient landowner from prospectively obtaining court relief to compel the
    relocation of an easement over the unreasonable opposition of the easement
    holder. We disagree. If granted, such relief would be contradictory to the
    majority rule, which provides that the location of an easement cannot be
    changed without consent from both the landowner and the easement holder
    once the location of an easement has been selected or fixed.
    10
    Furthermore, the defendant cites no authority, and we are aware of
    none, supporting the application of § 4.8 (3) (c) of the Restatement (Third)
    of Property in this manner.
    11
    Section 4.9 of the Restatement (Third) of Property provides: ‘‘Except
    as limited by the terms of the servitude determined under § 4.1, the holder
    of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that
    does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude.’’
    12
    Section 4.10 of the Restatement (Third) of Property provides: ‘‘Except
    as limited by the terms of the servitude determined under § 4.1, the holder
    of an easement or profit as defined in § 1.2 is entitled to use the servient
    estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment
    of the servitude. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the use may change
    over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommo-
    date normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefited by
    the servitude. Unless authorized by the terms of the servitude, the holder
    is not entitled to cause unreasonable damage to the servient estate or
    interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment.’’
    13
    Section 8.3 of the Restatement (Third) of Property provides: ‘‘(1) A
    servitude may be enforced by any appropriate remedy or combination of
    remedies, which may include declaratory judgment, compensatory damages,
    punitive damages, nominal damages, injunctions, restitution, and imposition
    of liens. Factors that may be considered in determining the availability and
    appropriate choice of remedy include the nature and purpose of the servi-
    tude, the conduct of the parties, the fairness of the servitude and the transac-
    tion that created it, and the costs and benefits of enforcement to the parties,
    to third parties, and to the public.
    ‘‘(2) Except when failure to enforce servitudes in common-interest com-
    munities or general-plan developments provides the basis for modification
    or termination due to changed conditions under § 7.10, property owners
    or an association of property owners may enforce the servitudes against
    subsequent similar violations by the same or different parties unless, under
    the circumstances then prevailing, enforcement would be unreasonable
    or inequitable.’’
    14
    The plaintiffs filed suit against multiple defendants in Karls, but we
    refer only to the defendant homeowner for ease of discussion.
    15
    In the preceding paragraph of its memorandum of decision, the trial
    court stated: ‘‘The court agrees with the defendant that a claim of interfer-
    ence with an easement or right-of-way, as opposed to breach of a restrictive
    covenant, requires proof of irreparable harm, or, at the very least, that the
    holder of the easement’s rights have been actually obstructed or disturbed.
    In fact, even in the cases relied upon by the plaintiff, the court held that
    injunctive relief was warranted because the defendant had in fact disturbed
    the plaintiff’s rights.’’ In light of this particular language, the plaintiff argues
    in part that the court incorrectly concluded that, in order to establish irrepa-
    rable harm, the plaintiff must prove that ‘‘the holder of the easement’s
    rights have been actually obstructed or disturbed.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) We disagree. Despite the court’s inclusion of the clause ‘‘at the
    very least,’’ which suggests in isolation that the court believed that the
    plaintiff must meet a higher legal standard than our precedent requires, the
    court goes on to correctly apply Karls to the factual circumstances of the
    present case.
    16
    In light of Karls, the plaintiff argues that interference with an easement
    in and of itself is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a substantial
    probability of harm to an easement holder’s rights, and it cites multiple
    cases in support, namely, Leabo v. Leninski, 
    182 Conn. 611
    , 
    438 A.2d 1153
    (1981), Gerald Park Improvement Assn. v. Bini, 
    138 Conn. 232
    , 
    83 A.2d 195
     (1951), New London v. Perkins, 
    87 Conn. 229
    , 
    87 A. 724
     (1913), Dewire
    v. Hanley, 
    79 Conn. 454
    , 
    65 A. 573
     (1907), Schwartz v. Murphy, 74 Conn.
    App. 286, 
    812 A.2d 87
     (2002), cert. denied, 
    263 Conn. 908
    , 
    819 A.2d 841
    (2003), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 820
    , 
    26 S. Ct. 352
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 61
     (2005), and
    Simonds v. Shaw, 
    44 Conn. App. 683
    , 
    691 A.2d 1102
     (1997). We disagree.
    In each of these cases, there was no real question as to whether the plaintiffs
    would ever actually use the easements or whether the easements were or
    would be obstructed by the defendants; rather, the plaintiffs had already
    been using or attempting to use the easements in the manner intended and
    were prevented from doing so, or it was highly likely that they would be
    prevented from doing so, by the defendants’ interference. By contrast, in
    the present case, the trial court was not convinced of the substantial probabil-
    ity that but for the injunction the plaintiff would be prevented from using
    the right-of-way in the manner intended because, although the court found
    that the parking in the right-of-way by the defendant’s employees and cus-
    tomers will interfere with the plaintiff’s reasonably intended use of the
    right-of-way, such harm was not imminent as the plaintiff had not yet
    constructed the planned parking lot on former Lot 13, there was no evidence
    before the court to suggest that Specialty would use the parking spaces in
    said parking lot, and the court ‘‘ha[d] no way of knowing if the defendant
    [would] still be operating in the manner it [had] been if and when the planned
    parking lot [was] built and [was] being used by Specialty’s employees.’’