Precise Aerospace Mfg., Inc. v. Mag Aerospace Industries, LLC ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 08 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PRECISE AEROSPACE                            Nos. 18-55353 and 18-55356
    MANUFACTURING, INC., a California
    corporation; ROXANNE ABDI,                   D.C. No.
    2:17-cv-01239-RGK-JC
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                           MEMORANDUM*
    MAG AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES, LLC,
    DBA Zodiac Water & Waste Aero
    Systems,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted September 13, 2019
    Pasadena, California
    Before: RAWLINSON, OWENS, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
    Precise Aerospace Manufacturing, Inc. (Precise) and Roxanne Abdi (Abdi,
    and together, Appellants) appeal the dismissal of and the denial of leave to amend
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    their claim brought under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh claim)
    against MAG Aerospace Industries, LLC, doing business as Zodiac Water & Waste
    Aero Systems (MAG), the denial of their application to reopen discovery and
    continue scheduling deadlines, and the grant of summary judgment in favor of
    MAG on Appellants’ remaining claims.1
    We review the dismissal of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6) de novo, see United States ex rel. Anita Silingo v. WellPoint, Inc., 
    904 F.3d 667
    , 676 (9th Cir. 2018), and the denial of leave to amend for an abuse of
    discretion. See Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
    910 F.3d 1096
    , 1102 (9th Cir. 2018).
    Denial of a request for a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
    Singh v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 
    925 F.3d 1053
    , 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2019).
    We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and evaluating “whether there are
    any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied
    the substantive law.” Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified
    Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 
    896 F.3d 1132
    , 1142 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citation
    omitted).
    1
    MAG abandoned its cross-appeal, 18-55356, as indicated in its
    briefing and during argument.
    2
    1.     The district court did not err in dismissing the Unruh claim for
    Appellants’ failure to allege sufficient facts to infer that discriminatory motivation
    was not just possible, but plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678
    (2009). The allegation that Gil Lenhard (Lenhard), an executive at MAG, crudely
    told Abdi that she “had to put [her] balls on the table and take [a] risk,” did not
    raise a plausible inference of discriminatory motive. See Mackey v. Bd. of Trs. of
    Cal. State Univ., 
    31 Cal. App. 5th
    640, 663 (2019) (noting that a “mere offensive
    utterance” cannot sustain an Unruh Act claim in the context of employment
    discrimination) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Ramirez
    v. Wong, 
    188 Cal. App. 4th 1480
    , 1488 (2010) (noting that a “vulgar and highly
    offensive statement” did not rise to the level of harassment on the basis of sex)
    (citation omitted). The remaining general allegations, including that Lenhard “had
    and continues to have a serious problem with women[,]” made “further harassing
    and bullying telephone calls to Ms. Abdi[,]” and discriminated against his own
    employees “based on Zodiac’s female employees’ sex,” were properly construed
    by the district court as legal conclusions. See 
    Ramirez, 188 Cal. App. 4th at 1488
    (deeming conclusory an allegation that the defendant “on more than [one]
    occasion” committed similar sexist acts in violation of the Unruh Act). Neither did
    the district court abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. Even assuming
    3
    the pleading of inconsistent theories is permissible, Appellants’ theory that MAG
    never intended to honor its commitments failed to state a plausible claim under the
    Unruh Act. See 
    id. at 1485
    (observing that the plaintiffs did not state a claim under
    the Unruh Act because they failed to alleged “discriminatory behavior”) (citation
    omitted). Because amendment to assert this theory would have been futile, the
    district court acted within its discretion in denying leave to amend. See Andrews v.
    Sirius XM Radio Inc., 
    932 F.3d 1253
    , 1263 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding that there
    was no abuse of discretion where amendment would be futile).
    2.     The district court acted within its broad discretion in denying
    Appellants’ application to reopen discovery and to continue the motion and trial
    deadlines. See 
    Singh, 925 F.3d at 1076
    (upholding the denial of a continuance
    where the plaintiff did not identify specific facts that further discovery would have
    revealed).
    3.     The district court committed no error in granting summary judgment
    on the breach of contract claim, as the statute of frauds rendered any oral
    agreement unenforceable, and the contract did not fall into the “specially
    manufactured goods” exception. See Western Chance No. 2, Inc. v. KFC Corp.,
    
    957 F.2d 1538
    , 1542 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Cal. Com. Code §§ 2201(1), (3)(a).
    Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment on the breach of the covenant of
    4
    good faith and fair dealing must also stand. See Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 
    347 F.3d 1125
    , 1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that breach covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing claim fails where there are no contract terms to support the covenant).
    The district court also properly found that the fraudulent inducement
    exception to the economic loss doctrine did not apply. Even resolving all disputes
    in favor of Appellants, the evidence failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact
    regarding fraudulent intent. MAG’s retention of the toilet plans reasonably
    protected its intellectual property from those invited to the workshop who would
    not subsequently work on the project, and all invitees signed a non-disclosure
    agreement. The internal email statement that there were “no hard promises, just
    hard POs” in the industry, was made after the commencement of litigation. See
    Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 
    39 Cal. 3d 18
    , 30 (1985) (explaining that plaintiff must
    establish that defendant lacked intent to honor its contractual promises when made
    to succeed on a fraudulent inducement claim).
    AFFIRMED.
    5