United States v. Stacey ( 2007 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4900
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    MICHAEL STACEY, a/k/a Sadat,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior
    District Judge. (3:03-cr-00134-MU)
    Submitted:     May 30, 2007                   Decided:   July 9, 2007
    Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit
    Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    John H. Culver, III, KENNEDY COVINGTON LOBDELL & HICKMAN, LLP,
    Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert,
    United States Attorney, Karen S. Marston, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Michael Stacey appeals his conviction and sentence to 262
    months   in    prison     and   five   years     of    supervised   release   after
    pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    more than five hundred grams of cocaine and more than fifty grams
    of cocaine base in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    , 846 (2000).
    Stacey’s      attorney    has    filed    a    brief    pursuant    to   Anders   v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting, in his opinion, there
    are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising the issues of
    whether Stacey voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to appeal
    his conviction and sentence and whether the issues he wishes to
    raise are within the scope of his appellate waiver. The Government
    has not filed an answering brief or otherwise sought to enforce the
    appellate waiver.         Stacey has filed a pro se supplemental brief
    raising the issues of whether his appellate waiver precludes his
    appeal and whether his sentence as a career offender violates the
    Sixth Amendment.         Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    When the Government seeks to enforce an appellate waiver,
    and there is no claim that the Government breached its obligations
    under the plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver if the record
    establishes the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to
    waive the right to appeal and the issue being appealed is within
    the scope of the waiver.           United States v. Blick, 
    408 F.3d 162
    ,
    168-69 (4th Cir. 2005).          Because the Government has not sought to
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    enforce Stacey’s appellate waiver, we decline to consider whether
    the waiver is dispositive of this appeal.
    Stacey    was   sentenced     prior   to   the   Supreme   Court’s
    decision in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), based on
    a mandatory application of the sentencing guidelines.            He contends
    that the district court committed error under the Sixth Amendment
    by sentencing him as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4B1.1 (2003) without a jury finding
    that his two prior convictions for the sale and delivery of cocaine
    and for possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine were
    qualifying convictions.      He further contends that if he had been
    sentenced after Booker, he possibly would have received a lesser
    sentence. Because Stacey raised no objections at his sentencing in
    district court, we review his sentence for plain error.                United
    States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 540 (4th Cir. 2005).
    In the plea agreement, Stacey stipulated he was a career
    offender under USSG § 4B1.1 and that he was responsible for at
    least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base.               The
    probation officer determined Stacey was a career offender within
    the meaning of USSG § 4B1.1 because (1) the instant offense was a
    felony controlled substance offense; (2) Stacey was at least
    eighteen years old when he committed the offense; and (3) his two
    prior felony convictions for the sale or delivery of cocaine and
    for   possession    with   intent   to   sell    or   deliver   cocaine   were
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    controlled substance offenses.    The probation officer determined
    Stacey’s offense level was thirty-seven and his criminal history
    category was VI pursuant to USSG § 4B1.1(b). The probation officer
    applied a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
    With a total offense level of thirty-four, Stacey’s sentencing
    guideline range was 262 to 327 months in prison.
    Neither party objected to the presentence report.     At
    sentencing, Stacey affirmed he had reviewed the report and his
    counsel reaffirmed that he was a career offender.   The Government
    recommended a sentence at the low end of the guideline range, and
    Stacey agreed to the recommendation.    The district court adopted
    the guideline calculations in the presentence report and sentenced
    Stacey to the low end of his guideline range.
    On appeal, Stacey contends his sentence violates the
    Sixth Amendment because there was no jury finding that his prior
    convictions were qualifying offenses. However, his stipulation was
    an admission under Booker, and there was no Sixth Amendment error.
    See United States v. Revels, 
    455 F.3d 448
    , 450 (4th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 299
     (2006).    Moreover, the facts necessary to
    support the enhancement were inherent in Stacey’s prior convictions
    and were not required to be found by the jury.   See United States
    v. Thompson, 
    421 F.3d 278
    , 286 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 1463
     (2006).   Finally, Stacey’s claim for the first time on
    appeal that his prior convictions were not felonies because they
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    involved less than one gram of cocaine is without merit.             See State
    v. Hyatt, 
    390 S.E.2d 355
     (N.C. 1990).         Although the district court
    plainly   erred   by   imposing     a   sentence     under     the   mandatory
    guidelines, there is no nonspeculative basis in the record for
    concluding Stacey was prejudiced by the error.            See United States
    v. White, 
    405 F.3d 208
     (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 668
    (2005).
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.   We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.              This
    court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
    right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.    If the client requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel   may   move   in   this   court    for   leave   to   withdraw   from
    representation.    Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on the client.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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