United States v. Raymond Teeple , 447 F. App'x 712 ( 2012 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0043n.06
No. 10-2124
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jan 12, 2012
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
RAYMOND FRANK TEEPLE, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: SILER and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; and TARNOW, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Raymond Frank Teeple appeals the district court’s order modifying the
conditions of his supervised release.
In 1999, Teeple pleaded guilty to engaging in a sexual act with a person under twelve years
old, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), and abusive sexual contact with a person under twelve years
old, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 121 months in
prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release under certain conditions. In 2010, while
Teeple was on supervised release, a probation officer requested that the district court add to the
conditions of Teeple’s supervised release that he participate in sex offender assessment and
*
The Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
No. 10-2124
United States v. Teeple
treatment, which may include physiological testing such as polygraph and ABEL assessment.1 After
conducting a hearing on the issue, the district court amended the judgment of conviction to add the
additional condition to Teeple’s supervised release.
On appeal, Teeple argues that the district court erred by imposing the additional condition
because it was not necessitated by Teeple’s conduct, it was not reasonably related to the relevant
sentencing factors, and it constituted a greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary
under the circumstances. We review the imposition of a supervised-release condition for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 528 (6th Cir. 2006). A sentencing court may
impose an additional condition of supervised release at any time prior to the expiration of the term,
subject to three requirements: (1) the additional condition must be reasonably related to certain
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) it must involve no greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary for several sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a); and (3)
it must be consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(3), (e)(2); Carter, 463 F.3d at 529. The district court may modify the
conditions of supervised release regardless of whether circumstances have changed, United States
v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3010 (2011); United States v.
Davies, 380 F.3d 329, 332 (8th Cir. 2004), or whether the defendant has violated his existing
conditions. United States v. Lowenstein, 108 F.3d 80, 85 (6th Cir. 1997).
1
The probation officer testified that ABEL assessment involves an examiner showing a client
a series of images and looking for a physiological response demonstrating whether the client is
stimulated by the images.
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No. 10-2124
United States v. Teeple
The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the additional condition on
Teeple’s supervised release. The probation office’s use of polygraph testing, sex offender therapy,
and other assessment tools is reasonably related to Teeple’s status as a sex offender, the need to deter
further criminal conduct and to protect the public, and Teeple’s own correctional treatment. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). Further, the additional condition did not involve a greater deprivation of liberty
than was reasonably necessary. The probation officer testified that Teeple would only be required
to submit to an annual polygraph exam and that other assessment techniques and sex offender
therapy would be utilized only if the polygraph exam demonstrated a need for them. The probation
officer also testified that the therapy sessions, if necessary, would involve only a four-hour time
commitment each week. Finally, Teeple has not demonstrated that the additional condition is
inconsistent with any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
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