Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1992 )


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    DAN MORALES                                      April 20,1992
    ATTORNEY
    GENERAL
    Honorable Mike Moncrief                            Opinion No. DM-106
    chairman
    General Issues Subcommittee                        Re: Whether services of auctioneers are
    Texas State Senate                                 “professional services” for purposes of laws’
    P. 0. Box 12068, Capitol Station                   governing the.. awarding of contracts by
    Austin Texas 78711-2068                            cities Andy counties, and related ques-
    tions @Q-152)
    Dear Senator MoncrieE
    You have requested an opinion from this office regarding competitive
    bidding requirements affecting municipalities, as codified in Local Government
    Code section 252.021. That section provides in pertinent part the following:
    (a) Before a municipality with 50,000 or more inhabitants
    may enter into a contract that requires an expenditure of more
    than $10,000 from one or more municipal funds, the
    municipality must comply with the procedure prescribed by this
    chapter for competitive sealed bidding or competitive sealed
    proposals.
    The legal department of the City of Fort Worth maintains that a contract between
    the city and an auctioneering company for services rendered within the statutory
    amount must be awarded in accordance with this statute. You have requested our
    opinion as to whether such services would instead be exempt from the competitive
    bidding requirements as professional services under Local Government Code
    section 252.022(a)(4), providing that chapter 252 does not apply to certain
    expenditures, including “a procurement for personal or professional services.”
    This office has recognized in previous opinions that “professional services”
    may encompass more than the services of physicians, attorneys, or others
    traditionally regarded as “professionals.“1 See Attorney General Opinions JM-940
    ‘CjI V.T.C.S. art. 664-4 (professional Services Procurement Act, prohibiting governmental
    entities from procuring the servicea of architects, optometrists, certified public accountants, physicians,
    surgeons, and registered engineers on the basis of competitive bids).
    p.    532
    Honorable Mike Moncrief - Page 2                 @M-l 0 6 )
    (1988) at 3 (citing Maryland Carual~ Co. v. Cmzy Waler Co., 
    160 S.W.2d 102
    (Tex.
    Civ. App.-Eastland 1942, no writ)); MW-344 (1981). Furthermore, opinions such as
    Attorney General Opinion JM-1136 (1990) have demonstrated that determinations
    as to whether particular services, other than those covered by the Professional
    Services Procurement Act, V.T.C.S. art. 664-4, are professional services for
    competitive bidding purposes, frequently involve fact questions that the opinion
    process cannot address. See also Attorney General Opinion JM-1038 (1989); Letter
    opinion No. 90-67 (1990).2
    In your case, the city of Fort Worth has made a determination, based upon its
    understanding of the law and facts, that the auctioneering services at issue are not
    professional services and must therefore be procured through competitive bidding.
    We find nothing in the law that would preclude such a decision. More importantly,
    the city could have decided to competitively bid the contract for auctioneering
    services even if it had come to the opposite conclusion regarding the nature of the
    services. Section 252.022 of the Local Government Code allows municipalities to
    exempt professional services from competitive bidding requirements; it does not,
    however, mandate that they do so. See Pattenv. Condo County.196 S.W.2d 833
    (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, no writ) (if competitive bidding laws do not apply to a
    particular county expenditure, commissioners court has discretion to determine
    whether or not good management requires use of a competitive bidding process).
    The only professional services that may not be competitively bid are those covered
    by the Professional Services Procurement Act           That act does not refer to
    auctioneering services.
    In conclusion, we believe that a municipality has discretion in the first
    instance to determine whether particular services, other than those covered by
    article 6644, V.T.C.S., are professional services for purposes of exemption from
    competitive bidding requirements under Local Government Code section 252.022.
    Moreover, we emphasize that Local Government Code chapter 252 serves to
    require municipalities to competitively bid most procurement contracts; it does not
    bar municipalities from competitively bidding even those projects that might
    conceivably be exempt from chapter 252.
    me cited opinioluprevidc&mlcguidancefor delemlining whether particular services are
    “profcMional’: iacluded as purveyors of “professioItal sclvias’ are “members of disciplioes rquiring
    special knowledge or attainment and a high order of leamhg, skill, and intelligence.” Attorney General
    Opinion JM-940 at 3. Furthemore, “several cases suggest that it comprehends labor sod skill that is
    ‘predominaotly mental or intellectual, rather thao phyaieal or manual.‘” Id (citingMe          (~JZIUI~
    CompMy).
    p.   533
    Honorable Mike Moncrief - Page 3       (DM-106 )
    SUMMARY
    The determination of the city of Fort Worth that
    auctioneering services are not professional services” for
    purposes of exemption from the competitive bidding require-
    ments imposed by Local Government Code chapter 252 is not
    contrary to law. Moreover, municipalities may procure services
    through a competitive bidding process even if such services
    qualify for an exemption under -Local Government Code section
    252.022, other than those services covered by article 664-4.
    V.T.C.S.
    DAN      MORALES
    Attorney General of Texas
    WILL PRYOR
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    RJSJEA HICKS
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    MADELEINE B. JOHNSON
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Faith S. Steinberg
    Assistant Attorney General
    p.     534
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DM-106

Judges: Dan Morales

Filed Date: 7/2/1992

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017