Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2002 )


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  •  * OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL . STATE OF TEXAS
    JOHN     CORNYN
    February 12,2002
    Mr. Jeff Moseley                                          Opinion No. JC-0464
    Executive Director
    Texas Department of Economic Development                  Re: Whether article III, section 19 of the Texas
    P-0. Box 12728                                            Constitution requires a Texas Department of
    Austin, Texas 787 1 l-2728                                Economic     Development       governing   board
    member to resign from office in order to run for
    the Texas Legislature   (RQ-0457-JC)
    Dear Mr. Moseley:
    You ask about the effect of article III, section 19 of the Texas Constitution on a Texas
    Department of Economic Development (“DED”) governing board member who wishes to run for
    office as a state legislator. Under article III, section 19, holders of “lucrative” state and federal
    offices are ineligible to serve in the Texas Legislature. We conclude that because members of the
    DED governing board do not hold “lucrative” office, article III, section 19 is not relevant to a board
    member’s eligibility to run for legislative of&e or to serve as a legislator.
    You explain that a member of the DED governing board “wishes to seek party nomination
    in the primary to be a candidate for the Texas House of Representatives for a term beginning in
    January 2003 .“l You ask the following questions about article III, section 19 of the Texas
    Constitution:
    1. Is a board member who does not receive compensation, but who
    is entitled to receive reimbursement for actual expenses, eligible
    to serve in the Legislature during the term for which he or she
    was appointed?
    2. Does it make        any difference      if the board member         waives
    reimbursement?
    ‘Letter from Mr. JeffMoseley, Executive Director, Texas Department ofEconomic Development, to Honorable
    John Cornyn, Texas Attorney General (Oct. 23,200l) (on file with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Request Letter].
    Mr. Jeff Moseley    - Page 2                       (JC-0464)
    3. If required, when must the board member resign in order to seek
    party nomination for the Texas Legislature?
    4. If the board member does not have to resign to seek party
    nomination in the primary for the Texas Legislature, at what point
    must he or she resign in order to serve in the Legislature?
    Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.
    Article III, section 19 of the Texas Constitution   provides as follows:
    No judge of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General,     clerk
    of any court of record, or any person holding a lucrative office    under
    the United States, or this State, or any foreign government          shall
    during the term for which he is elected or appointed, be eligible   to the
    Legislature.
    TEX. CONST. art. III, 5 19 (emphasis      added). Your first three questions ask about the implications
    of this provision for a board member’s eligibility to run for legislative office. As we explain below,
    article III, section 19 applies only to holders of “lucrative office,” a term that does not include
    members of the DED governing board. Given that a member of the DED governing board does not
    hold a “lucrative office” under article III, section 19, that constitutional limitation does not apply to
    the board member at issue. Article III, section 19 does not require the board member to resign from
    office in order to run for legislative office and will not affect the member’s eligibility to serve should
    he or she be elected to office.
    As the board at issue is responsible for the governance of the DED, a state agency, its
    members are clearly “officers” within the meaning of article III, section 19, see TEX. GOV’T CODE
    ANN. ch. 481, subch. A (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2002) (authority of DED governing board); Aldine
    Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Standley, 
    280 S.W.2d 578
    , 583 (Tex. 1955) (test for determining whether a
    person is an officer for purposes of constitutional dual-office-holding provisions is whether person
    exercises “‘sovereign mnction[s] of the government . . . largely independent of the control of
    others”‘) (quoting Dunbar v. Brazoria County, 224 S.W.2d 738,740-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
    1949, writ refd)), but the board members do not hold lucrative office. The term “lucrative office”
    has been the subject of several judicial opinions. These cases hold that an officer who receives a
    salary, fees, or any other compensation holds a “lucrative office” within this provision.          See
    Whitehead v. Julian, 
    476 S.W.2d 844
    , 845 (Tex. 1972). An office is lucrative even if the
    officeholder’s compensation is quite insignificant, such as a small per diem. See, e.g., Dawkins v.
    Meyer, 825 S. W.2d 444,446-47 (Tex. 1992) (state agency board member who received $30 per diem
    in addition to expenses held a lucrative office within the meaning of art. III, 8 19); Willis v. Potts,
    377 S.W.2d 622,623 (Tex. 1964) (city council member who received $10 per diem in addition to
    expenses held a lucrative office within the meaning of art. III, 8 19). Reimbursement for expenses
    Mr. Jeff Moseley    - Page 3                       (JC-0464)
    alone, however, does not render an office lucrative. See 
    Whitehead, 476 S.W.2d at 845
    (mayor who
    received only $50 monthly expense allowance and whose expenses exceeded the allowance did not
    hold a lucrative office within the meaning of art. III, 9 19).
    Under section 48 1.0043(c) of the Government Code, a member of the DED governing board
    “may not receive compensation for service on the governing board. A member is entitled to receive
    reimbursement,     subject to any applicable limitation on reimbursement provided by the General
    Appropriations Act, for actual and necessary travel expenses incurred in performing services as a
    member of the governing board.” TEX. GOV’T CODEANN. 4 48 1.0043(c) (Vernon 1998). Because
    these board members do not receive compensation and receive reimbursement only for their actual
    and necessary expenses, a member of the DED governing board does not hold a “lucrative office”
    under article III, section 19 as that term has been construed by the Texas Supreme Court.
    Your final question asks, “[i]f the board member does not have to resign to seek party
    nomination . . . , at what point must he or she resign in order to serve in the Legislature?” Request
    Letter, supra note 1, at 1. Again, article III, section 19 does not apply to a member of the DED
    governing board and has no implications for when a member must resign in order to serve in the
    legislature. We note, however, that should the board member be elected to serve in the legislature,
    he or she will automatically resign her membership on the DED governing board upon qualifying
    for the legislature by operation of the constitutional dual-office-holding   prohibition-article XVI,
    section 40.
    Under article XVI, section 40(d), “[n]o member of the Legislature of this State may hold any
    other office or position of profit under this State, or the United States, except as a notary public if
    qualified by law.” TEX. CONST. art. XVI, 9 40(d). We have not located any judicial or attorney
    general opinion addressing whether in this provision the term “office” applies to both paid and
    unpaid offices. We conclude here that the term “office” applies to any office, paid or unpaid. This
    special dual-office-holding prohibition for legislators is in addition to the general prohibition against
    holding more than one paid office in subsection (a) of section 40. See 
    id. 4 40(a)
    (“ No person shall
    hold or exercise at the same time, more than one civil office of emolument . . . . “). If we were to
    construe “office” to apply only to paid offices, then subsection (d) of section 40 would be redundant
    of subsection (a) and would be rendered meaningless and inoperative. In order to give the term
    “office” meaning, we construe subsection (d) to prohibit a legislator from holding any other state or
    federal office, even if the office is not paid. See Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 
    49 S.W.3d 342
    ,
    344 (Tex. 2001) (courts avoid a construction that renders any constitutional provision meaningless
    or inoperative). Accordingly, the term “office” embraces an unpaid state office such as membership
    on the DED governing board.
    In sum, article XVI, section 40(d) prohibits a person from serving as both member of the
    DED governing board and as a legislator. As qualification for and acceptance of a second office
    would operate as an automatic resignation from the first office, see Pruitt v. Glen Rose Indep. Sch.
    Mr. JeffMoseley      - Page 4                       (JC-0464)
    Dist., 
    84 S.W.2d 1004
    (Tex. Con-u-&n App. 1935, judgrn’t adopted), the board member would
    automatically resign from the DED office upon qualifying for the legislature.
    SUMMARY
    Because a member of the Texas Department of Economic
    Development governing board does not hold a “lucrative” office
    within the meaning of article III, section 19 of the Texas Constitution,
    that constitutional provision is not relevant to a board member’s
    eligibility to run for legislative office or to serve as a legislator.
    Article III, section 19 does not require a board member to resign from
    office in order to run for legislative office and would not affect a
    member’s eligibility to serve should he or she be elected to office.
    However, article XVI, section 40(d) of the Texas Constitution
    prohibits a state legislator from holding an unpaid state office and
    would preclude a person from serving as both a member of the
    Department of Economic Development governing board and as a
    legislator.
    Attorney General of Texas
    HOWARD G. BALDWIN, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    NANCY FULLER
    Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel
    SUSAN DENMON GUSKY
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Mary R. Crouter
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee