Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1991 )


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    DAN MORALES                           December 121991
    ATTORNEY
    GENERAL
    Lionel Meno, Ph.D.                          opinion No.    DM-69
    Commissioner of Education
    Texas Education Agency                      Re: Whether a municipality can refuse to
    1701 North Congress Avenue                  issue building permits or certificates of
    Austin, Texas 78701-1494                    occupancy to a school district for failing
    to comply with municipal building code
    requirements on handicapped accessibili-
    ty where the school district has obtained a
    waiver under article 7 of the State
    Purchasing and General Services Act
    @Q-W)
    Dear Commissioner Meno:
    You ask whether the City of El Paso may refuse to issue building permits or
    certificates of occupancy to the El Paso Independent School District for failing to
    comply with municipal building code requirements on handicapped accessibility if
    the school district is in compliance with the accessibility standards and specifications
    adopted pursuant to article 7 of the State Purchasing and General Services Act,
    V.T.C.S. art. 601b. or has received a waiver from such compliance under section
    7.02(e) of that act. Your question, essentially. breaks down into two considerations:
    (1) whether article 7 of the State Purchasing and General Services Act preempts the
    field of handicapped accessibility to buildings, and (2) if article 7 of the State
    Purchasing and General Services Act does not preempt the field, whether El Paso’s
    regulation of handicapped accessibility through its building code is inconsistent with
    state legislation in this area.
    El Paso is a home-rule city existing and operating under article XI, section 5
    of the Texas Constitution. Under its building code all new construction, with
    enumerated exceptions, must meet accessibility standards that include requirements
    for doors, surfaces, slopes, steps, and other similar features of buildings that bear on
    accessibility to handicapped people. Article 7 of the State Purchasing and General
    Services Act states its policy as follows:
    p.   345
    Lionel Meno, Ph.D. - Page 2               (DM-69)
    The provisions of this article are to further the policy of the
    State of Texas to encourage and promote the rehabilitation of
    handicapped or disabled citizens and to eliminate, insofar as
    possible, unnecessary       barriers    encountered     by aged,
    handicapped, or disabled persons, whose ability to engage in
    gainful occupations or to achieve maximum personal
    independence is needlessly restricted when such persons cannot
    readily use public buildings.
    V.T.C.S. art. 6Olb, 8 7.01. Article 7 of the State Purchasing and General Services
    Act applies to, inter a&z, all buildings and facilities used by the public which are
    constructed in whole or in part by the use of the funds of any political subdivision of
    the state. Id 8 7.02(a). Pursuant to article 7, the General Services Commission has
    adopted rules which provide standards for accessibility to buildings covered by
    article 7. See 1 T.A.C. Q 115.51 et seq. Section 7.02(e) of the State Purchasing and
    General Services Act provides that the General Services Commission “shall have the
    authority to waive or modify accessibility standards and specifications when
    application of such standards and specifications is considered by the commission to
    be irrelevant to the nature, use, or function of a building or facility covered by this
    article.” The El Paso Independent School District sought and obtained such a
    waiver for certain buildings under its control.
    A home-rule city may    not enact an ordinance inconsistent with state
    legislation. Tex. Const. art. XI,
    5 5. However, within that limitation, a home-rule
    city enjoys broad discretion, and
    the entry of the state into a field of legislation does
    not automatically preempt that   field from city regulation. City of Richardson v.
    Responsible Dog Owners of Texas, 794 S.W.2d 17,19 (Tex. 1990). In Responsible Dog
    Owners, the Texas Supreme Court found that a comprehensive municipal animal
    control ordinance was not preempted by sections 1.08 and 42.12 of the Texas Penal
    Code1 despite “a small area of overlap in the provisions of the narrow statute and
    the broader ordinance.” 
    Id. The court
    further held that section 1.08 of the Penal
    ‘Section 1.0s of the Penal Code provides:
    No govemmental subdivision or agency may enact or enforce a
    law that makes any conduct covered by this code an offense subject
    to a criminal penalty.
    Section 42.12 of the Penal Code makes it an offense to keep a dog that kas engaged in vicious conduct
    without complying with certain prescribed standards.
    p.     346
    Lionel Meno, Ph.D. - Page 3          (DM-69)
    Code places no greater restriction on a home-rule city than does article XI, section
    5, of the Texas Constitution.
    Article 7 of the State Purchasing and General Services Act does not expressly
    state an intent to preempt the field of regulation that the act addresses. Certainly,
    the act contains no language such as that found in section 1.08 of the Penal Code
    limiting local enactments. If, as the supreme court teaches, section 1.08 of the Penal
    Code does no more than article XI, section 5, of the constitution in that respect, we
    do not think that an intent to preempt may be found by implication unless no other
    reasonable interpretation is available. Accordingly, we conclude that article 7 of the
    State Purchasing and General Services Act does not preempt the field of regulation
    of handicapped accessibility.
    Nor is municipal regulation of architectural barriers through a city building
    code necessarily inconsistent with the rules adopted pursuant to article 7 of the
    State Purchasing and General Services Act. The supreme court has held that a state
    law and a city ordinance will not be held repugnant to each other if a reasonable
    construction leaving both in effect can be reached. Responsible Dog 
    Owners, supra
    .
    As it is possible to comply with both the State Purchasing and General Services
    Commission’s rules and El Paso’s building code, the two are not in inherent
    conflict. While the building code may require more of a building owner, and may
    not provide for waivers, it has not been suggested that compliance with the building
    code will perforce result in noncompliance with the commission’s rules. Moreover,
    the accessibility standards of El Paso’s building code are designed to achieve
    precisely the goal stated in article 7: “to eliminate, insofar as possible, unnecessary
    barriers encountered by aged, handicapped, or disabled persons.”
    It would be anomalous to construe article 7 as limiting the adoption or
    enforcement of vigorous municipal regulations in harmony with the goals that article
    7 was enacted to achieve. The General Services Commission has recognized the
    role of municipal regulation in its rules adopted pursuant to article 7:
    Public officials are encouraged to assist in implementing the
    policy of the state through development and enforcement of local
    b+ilding~ codes and building permit regulations.     A building
    owner’s obligation to comply with the provisions of the Act and
    the rules and regulations set out in these sections may not be
    satisjied by a simple showing of compliance with local building
    codes or ordinances.
    P.   347
    Lionel Meno, Ph.D. - Page 4           (DM-69)
    1 T.A.C. 5 115.51 (emphases added). This provision makes clear that the General
    Services Commission sees the standards adopted by its rules as establishing a floor
    which ensures that state policy will be enforced even in jurisdictions whose building
    codes do not require accessibility. It suggests no attempt to override more stringent
    local regulation that is consistent with the purpose of its rules.
    Finally, we note that the General Services Commission has taken the
    position that a waiver granted pursuant to section 7.02(e) of the State’Purchasing
    and General Services Act does not preempt enforcement of a local building code.
    In a letter dated July 10, 1991, to the El Paso City Attorney’s Office, the legal
    counsel to the commission states:
    However, in light of the State’s express policy regarding
    architectural barriers, the limitations it has placed on the
    granting of waivers, and its silence on the issue of pre-emption
    of the powers of home rule cities, it is my opinion that Article 7
    of the Act does not pre-empt the [El Paso Building] Code if the
    Commission, pursuant to its authority, has exempted a building
    from architectural barrier compliance.
    We conclude that article 7 of the State Purchasing and General Services Act
    does not preempt the field of regulation with respect to architectural barriers. We
    have no basis for finding that a municipal building code is inconsistent with the rules
    adopted pursuant to article 7 where a reasonable construction, giving effect to both,
    is available. Accordingly, the City of El Paso may enforce the accessibility
    requirements of its building code with respect to buildings under the control of the
    El Paso Independent School District.
    SUMMARY
    The City of El Paso may refuse to issue a building permit or
    certificate of occupancy to the El Paso Independent School
    District for failing to comply with municipal building code
    requirements on handicapped accessibility, notwithstanding the
    fact that the school district is in compliance with the accessibility
    P-      348
    Lionel Meno, Ph.D. - Page 5          (DM-69)
    standards and specifications adopted pursuant to article 7 of the
    State Purchasing and General Services Act, V.T.C.S. art. 601b,
    or has obtained a waiver from such compliance under section
    7.02(e) of that act.
    DAN      MORALES
    Attorney General of Texas
    WILL PRYOR
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY (Ret.)
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    RENEA HICKS
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    MADELEINE JOHNSON
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by John Steiner
    Assistant Attorney General
    p.   349
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DM-69

Judges: Dan Morales

Filed Date: 7/2/1991

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017