Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1984 )


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  •                                       The Attorney           General of Texas
    JIM MATTOX                                      February 21, 1984
    Attorney General
    SupremeCourt     Building      Mr. W. G. Kirklin                             Opinion No. ~~-126
    P. 0. BOX 12548                Chairman
    Austin. TX. 78711. 254S
    Texas Health Facilities Commission            Re:    Eligibility of    an
    51214752501
    Telex 9101874.1387
    P. 0. Box 50049                               individual to serve on the
    Telecopier  512,4750280        Austin, Texas   78763                         Texas   Health   Facilities
    Commission
    714 Jackson, Suite 700
    Dear   Mr.   Kirklin:
    Dallas, TX. 752U2-4506
    214/742-8944
    You ask whether Ms. Dora McDonald's appointment and continued
    service on the Texas Health Facilities Commission comply with article
    4824 Alberta Ave., Suite 160   4418h. section 202, V.T.C.S., and article 6252-9b, V.T.C.S.,
    El Paso, TX. 79905.2793
    respectively.    Additionally,   YOU    ask    whether  w     related
    9151533.3484
    constitutional or statutory impediments exist.
    I”
    3, Texas, Suite 700                 Article 4418h, section 2.02, V.T.C.S., provides in pertinent part
    HOUS,O~. TX. 77002-3111        that
    713/2236SB8
    [t]he governor shall not appoint to the commission
    806 Broadway, Suite 312
    any person who is actively engaged as a health
    Lubbock, TX. 79401-3479                      care provider or who has any substantial pecuniary
    806/747-5238                                 interest in a facility.
    Ms. McDonald is not a health care provider, nor does she have a direct
    4309 N. Tenth, Suite B
    McAlle”, TX. 78501-1685
    pecuniary interest in a health care facility.
    512/682-4547
    Mr. McDonald is a program consultant for Horizon Health
    Corporation, a corporation that provides specialized treatment
    200 Main Plaza, Suite 400
    San Antonio, TX. 78205-2797
    serviced in psychiatry and in substance abuse. Horizon Health owns
    5121225.4191
    one treatment facility in Texas and manages speciality units in three
    Texas hospitals. Mr. McDonald does no hiring or firing, nor is he
    engaged in expansion, purchasing, acquisition, or financial management
    An Equal OpportunityI          activities. Neither Mr. nor Ms. McDonald owns any interest in Horizon
    Affirmative Action Employer
    Health. Mr. McDonald is on a fixed salary, sharing directly in
    neither the profits nor losses of Horizon Health.           Thus, Ms.
    McDonald's only interest in a health care facility stems from her
    community property portion of her husband's fixed salary.
    Whether Ms. McDonald's community interest in her husband's salary
    constitutes a "substantial pecuniary interest" in a health care
    facility depends upon the extent of that interest under Texas law.
    The earnings of each spouse during marriage are community property.
    Family Code Q5.01; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Chase Manhattan
    p. 533
    Mr. W. G. Kirklin - Page 2      (J&l&) ,'1,,,.,
    ,.,
    Bank,  
    259 F.2d 231
    , 239 (5th Cir. 1958); Vallone v. Vallone, 
    644 S.W.2d 455
    , 458 (Tex. 1982~);Maben v. Maben, 
    574 S.W.2d 229
    , 232 (Tex.
    Cl". App. - Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
    Under Texas law each spouse owns a present, vested, undivided
    one-half interest in all community property, but the husband is the
    sole authorized manager of the general community property. However,
    the wife has managerial power over a special community composed of her
    income and the income of her separate property. Free v. Bland. 
    369 U.S. 663
    (1962), conformed to in 
    359 S.W.2d 297
    (Tex. 1962); Chase
    Manhattan 
    Bank, supra
    . The Texas Family Code, section 5.22, provides
    for separate management of certain community property:
    (a) During marriage, each spouse has the sole
    management, control, and disposition of
    the community property that he or she
    would have owned if single, including but
    not limited to:
    (1)   personal earnings;
    (2)   revenue from separate property;
    (3)   recoveries for   personal   injuries;
    and
    (4)   the increase and mutations of, and
    the revenue from, all property
    subject   to   his   or   her   sole
    management, control and disposition.
    The court    Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
    in
    
    610 F.2d 1282
    , 1288 (5th Cir. .1980), construed subsection (a)(2) of
    section 5.22 to create a "special community" or "sole management
    community" interest in the earning spouse.         The other spouse,
    receiving a community property interest by operation of law, "has only
    'ownership' in an almost abstract sense, with no concomitant direct
    management rights." The court noted that a spouse's management powers
    over his or her "sole management" portion of community property are
    described in exactly the same terms which section 5.21 uses for
    separate property. Thus, in Texas,
    a spouse is able, in the absence of fraud, to deal
    with sole management community as he or she might
    with his or her own separate property, free from
    any participation, consent, or interference by the
    other spouse.
    
    Id. at 1289.
    p. 534
    Mr. W. G. Kirklin - Page 3           (JM-126)
    Applying the Fifth Circuit's construction of subsection (a)(2) to
    subsection (a)(l), we conclude that Ms. McDonald has only abstract
    ownership of one-half of her husband's salary. Mr. McDonald may deal
    with his    salary "free from w          participstion, consent, or
    interference" by Ms. McDonald.        This is not a sufficiently
    "substantial pecuniary interest in a facility" to disqualify Ms.
    McDonald's'appointment under article 441811.
    Article 6252-9b. section 1, V.T.C.S.. states the Texas conflict
    of interest policy regarding the conduct of state officers and
    employees:
    [Nlo ,state~.officeror state employee shall have
    any  interest, financial‘ or otherwise, direct or
    indirect, or engage in any business transaction or
    professional activity or incur any obligation of
    any'nature which is in substantial conflict with
    the proper discharge of his duties in the public
    interest. (Emphasis added).
    Section 2(12) refers to a' "substantial interest" rather than "any
    interest" and defines it as follows:
    An individual has a 'substantial interest' in a
    business entity if he:
    (A)   has controlling interest in the business
    entity;
    (B)   has ownership in excess of 10 percent of
    the voting interest in the business
    entity or in excess of $25,000 of the
    fair market value of the business entity;
    (0    has any participating interest, either
    direct or indirect, by shares, stock, x
    otherwise, whether or not voting rights
    are included, in the profits, proceeds,
    or capital gains of the business entity
    in excess of 10 percent of them;
    @‘)   holds the position of a member of the
    board of directors or other governing
    board of the business entity;
    (E)   serves as an elected     officer   of   the
    business entity;
    (F)   is an employee of the business entity.
    (Emphasis added).
    p. 535
    .
    Mr. W. G. Kirklin - Page 4   (~~-126)
    Under these tests, considering Ms. McDonald's limited, non-managment
    community property interest in one-half of her husband's salary, she
    is not disqualified from serving on the commission.
    Because Ms. McDonald agreed to abstain in any matters in which
    her husband's employer is an applicant, a party,    or an interested
    person, the necessity of such abstention under article 6252-9b is not
    in issue. Assuming that the occasions for such abstention are
    infrequent, they will not substantially "conflict with the proper
    discharge of [her] duties in the public interest," -See V.T.C.S. art.
    6252-9b. 01.
    Ms.  McDonald has further agreed to disclose all potential
    conflicts.   Disclosure and abstention in particular proceedings
    wherein conflict exists are the primary concerns of the statute. See
    Final Report of the Public Servant Standards of Conduct AdvisG
    Committee (Aug. 1983); See also Attorney General Opinion H-269 (1974).
    Additionally, Ms. McDonald must comply with the financial disclosure
    provisions of article 6252-9b.      However, she need only file a
    financial statement of her own possibly conflicting financial
    activities and those activities of her snouss over which she has the
    right to exercise any degree of act&       control. Attorney General
    Opinion H-269.
    Based upon the given facts, we perceive no additional impediments
    to Ms. McDonald's appointment and service on the Texas Health
    Facilities Cosxnission.
    SUMMARY
    An   individual's    limited,   non-managerial,
    "abstract" community property interest in one-half
    of her husband's salary does not disqualify her
    from serving on the Texas Health Facilities
    Commission.
    JIM     MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    TOM GREEN
    First Assistant Attorney General
    DAVID R. RICHARDS
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    p. 536
    Mr.   W. G. Kirklin - Page 5   (JM-126)
    Prepared by Rick Gilpin
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Rick Gilpin, Chairman
    Jon Bible
    Colin Carl
    Susan Garrison
    Jim Moellinger
    Nancy Sutton
    Bruce Youngblood
    p. 537