Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1982 )


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  •                                  The Attorney         General of Texas
    Msy 17, 1982
    MARK WHITE
    Attorney General
    Honorable Bennie Bock II               opinion No. Pg.&471
    Supreme Court Building         Chairman
    P. 0. Box 12543
    Committee on Environmental Affairs     Re:   Removal of timber from
    Austin. TX. 78711. 2548                                               _ .             .
    512l47525Ql
    Texas House of Representatives         land restricted   to use ror
    Telex 910/874-1367             P. 0. Box 2910                         public park and/or recreational
    Telecople~ 51214750288         Austin, Texas   78769                  purposes
    Dear Representative Bock:
    1507 MaIn SL. suite 1400
    DallP5. TX. 7s201-47oS
    214l742J3S44                        You have requested our opinion regarding the authority of the
    city of Rusk to sell timber rights to a 293.73 acre tract located in
    Cherokee County.    In addition, you inquire as to what form a
    4524 Alberta Ave.. Suite 180
    conveyance of timber should take; the application of articles 1019,
    El Paso, TX. 79905-2793
    915/-
    5421q, and 5421c-12, V.T.C.S.. to the proposed sale; and the
    disposition of proceeds from such sale.
    1220 Dallas Ave.. Suite 202         In your opinion request you state that the land in question was
    Houston. TX. 77W2-W85
    obtained by trading a portion of a 487.33 acre tract which was
    71-
    conveyed to the city of Rusk by the Sixty-second Legislature, Acts
    1971, chapter 526, at 1787 [herein ,referred to as Senate Bill No.
    808 Broadway. Suite 312        5201. The act specifies that "the land herein conveyed is to be used
    Lubbock. TX. 7S401CM79         by the city of Rusk for public park and/or recreational purposes. If
    SW747-522.0
    such land should be traded by the city of Rusk for other land, such
    other land shall be used for the same purposes." _Id. at 12.
    4309 N. Tenth, Suits B
    McAllen. TX. 75501-1885             Therefore, under the tenas of the grant, the tract in question is
    5w6S2.4547                     impressed with the same restrictions on use as the original 487.33
    acres conveyed by Senate Bill No. 520.
    2w MaIn Plaza. suite 400
    San Antonlo. TX. 75205-2797         Our answer to your inquiries will depend on the type of interest
    51212254181                    the city intends to convey. A timber deed which conveys title to
    standing timber, and contains language specifically granting a
    An Equal Opportunity/
    perpetual right to cut and remove, conveys an interest in land.
    Affirmative Actlon Employer    Lodwick Lumber Company v. Taylor, 
    98 S.W. 238
    (Tex. 1906).
    The city of Rusk is a general law city whose authority to convey
    an interest in land dedicated to park purposes is granted by statute.
    A sale of perpetual timber rights would therefore be by virtue of, and
    subject to, the requirements of articles 1017 and 1019, V.T.C.S.
    Zachry v. City of San Antonio, 
    305 S.W.2d 558
    (Tex. 1957); City of
    p. 1645
    Representative Bennie Bock II - Page 2   (MW-471)
    Dublin v. Barrett, 
    242 S.W. 535
    (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1922,
    writ dism'd w.0.j.).
    Article 1017 provides in part:
    The governing body of any incorporated city or
    town in this State, however incorporated, may sell
    and convey any land or interest in land owned,
    held or claimed as public square, (or.) park....
    The proceeds of any such sale shall be used only
    for the acquisition and improvement of property
    for the same uses as that so sold... such sales
    shall be made by an ordinance passed by such
    governing bodies which shall direct the execution
    of conveyance by the mayor or city manager of any
    such city or town.
    Article 1019 provides:
    No public square or park shall be sold, until
    the question of such sale has been submitted to a
    vote of the qualified voters of the city or town,
    and approved by a majority of the votes cast at
    such election.
    We conclude that a conveyance of perpetual timber rights to the
    subject tract, since it is an interest in real property, can be made
    only .after such conveyance has been approved by the majority of the
    voters in an election as provided by article 1019. The conveyance
    could then be made pursuant to city ordinance as provided by article
    1017. Proceeds from the sale could only be applied toward the
    acquisition or improvement of property used for public park and/or
    recreational purposes.
    We also conclude that the provisions of articles 5421q and
    5421c-12, V.T.C.S., are applicable to a sale of perpetual timber
    rights by the city of Rusk.
    Article 5421q reads in part as follows:
    Section 1.   No department, agency, political
    subdivision, county, or municipality of this state
    shall approve any program or project that requires
    the use or taking of any public land designated
    and utilized prior to the arrangement 'of such
    program or project as a park, or recreation
    area... unless such department, agency, political
    subdivision, county, or municipality, acting
    through its duly authorized governing body or
    p. 1646
    Representative Bennie Bock II - Page 3   (WW-471)
    officer, shall determine, after notice and a
    public hearing as required herein, that (1) there
    is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use
    or taking of such land, and (2) such program or
    project includes all reasonable planning to
    minimize harm to such land, as a park (or)
    recreation area... resulting from such use or
    taking; clearly enunciated local preferences shall
    be considered, and the provisions of the Act do
    not constitute a mandatory prohibition against the
    use of such area if the findings are made that
    justify the approval of a program or project.
    Sec. la.   The department, agency, board, or
    political subdivision having control of the public
    land is not required to comply with Section 1 of
    this Article if:
    (1)   The land is originally obtained and
    designated for another public use and          is
    temporarily used as a park, recreational area, or
    wildlife refuge pending its utilisation for the
    originally designated purpose;
    (2)   The program or project that requires the
    use or taking of the land being used temporarily
    as a park, recreation area, or wildlife refuge is
    the same program or project for which the land was
    originally obtained and designated; and
    (3)   The land was not designated by the
    department, agency, political subdivision, county,
    or municipality for use as a park, recreation
    area. or wildlife refuge prior to the effective
    date of Section la of this Act.
    Section la became effective September 1. 1975, while the city received
    the land in question in 1971. Thus, section la(3) does not apply to
    this land. We believe the sale of timber rights constitutes a taking
    or use of a park or recreational area, and we find nothing in the
    language of section la which would exempt the city from the
    requirements of the act.
    Article 5421c-12 provides that "no land owned by a ,political
    subdivision of the State of Texas may be sold" without publication of
    notice that the land is offered for sale and the procedures under
    which sealed bids to purchase the land may be submitted. While there
    has been no judicial determination as to whether article 5421c-12
    p. 1647
    Representative Bennie Bock II - Page 4 (MW-471)
    applies to a sale of less than fee simple interest, section 4 of the
    act provides:
    Any conveyance, sale or trade wade under the
    exemptions set forth in Section 2, shall never be
    for less than the fair market value of the land or
    interest being conveyed, sold, or traded, as
    determined by an appraisal obtained by the
    political subdivision, which shall be conclusive
    of the fair market value thereof.
    We construe the statutory phrase uan interest in land" in section
    4 of the act to apply to conveyances of less than fee simple title.
    Therefore, the city of Rusk would be required to publish notice and
    receive sealed bids prior to a sale of perpetual timber rights on the
    subject tract.
    The foregoing discussion has been premised upon the assumption
    that the city of Rusk intends to sell a perpetual timber right which
    would constitute a conveyance of an interest in the park land. With
    the exception of the application of article 5421q, different
    conclusions will result if the city intends to convey something less
    than a perpetual estate in the subject timber. In Texas, a conveyance
    of standing timber which specifies a limited time for cutting and
    removal, or is silent in this regard, is a sale of personalty which
    passes title to only those trees which are cut and removed within the
    specified time. It passes no interest in the land. Lodwick Lumber
    Company v. Taylor, supra; Boykin vi Rosenfield; 
    9 S.W. 318
    (Tex.
    1887). Therefore, such a couveyance by the city would not be subject
    to the provisioas of articles 1017, 1019, or 5421c-12, since, by their
    own terms, these statutes apply only to sales of land or an interest
    in land.    Article 5421q, however, applies to "E         of park or
    recreational areas.u (Emphasis added). In our opinion, the cutting
    and sale of timber is a "use" within the meaning of the statute, and
    the city of Rusk must comply with its provisions prior to any sale.
    The city of Rusk, as a general law city, has the general
    authority to convey personal property pursuant to article 962,
    V.T.C.S. The city is limited, however, in its exercise of this power
    with respect to timber growing on the subject tract. The terms of
    Senate Bill No. 520 restrict the use of the land granted therein, or
    laud obtained in trade, to use as a public park.         The city is
    precluded from effectuating a sale of timber if said sale constitutes
    using the land for something other than park or recreational purposes.
    Zachry v. City of San 
    Antonio, supra
    . We have found no authority, and
    we are not prepared to state categorically, that the removal of timber
    from park land is per se a non-conforming use. Such a determination
    is a factual matter which we are not empowered to determine. It is
    our view, however, that a particular use of a park or recreational
    p. 1648
    Representative Bennie Bock II - Page 5    (Mw-471)
    I
    area would likely be judicially upheld as permissible, if it would
    reasonably and probably contribute materially to the enjoyment of the
    land by members of the public. King v. City of Dallas, 374 S.W.Zd 707
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Dallas v.
    Etheridge, 
    253 S.W.2d 640
    (Tex. 1953). The removal of timber must
    therefor be directly related to the improvement of the land for park
    or recreational purposes.
    SUMMARY
    The city of Rusk is empowered to sell timber on
    land dedicated for park and/or recreational use.
    A sale of perpetual timber rights is a sale of an
    interest in real property. Therefore, the city
    must comply with the requirements of articles
    1017, 1019, 5421q, and 5421c-12.       A sale of
    limited timber rights is a sale of personalty, but
    constitutes a use of park land under 5421q. The
    proceeds of a sale of limited timber rights may be
    expended only for the improvement of the land for
    park or recreational purposes.
    MARK      WHITE
    Attorney General of Texas
    JOEN W. FAINTER, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    RICBARD E. GRAY III
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    Prepared by Bob Hughes
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Susan L. Garrison, Chairman
    Rick Gilpin
    Patricia Hinojosa
    Jim Moellinger
    p. 1649
    

Document Info

Docket Number: MW-471

Judges: Mark White

Filed Date: 7/2/1982

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017