Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1982 )


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  •                                    The Attorney             General of Texas
    January 21, 1982
    MARK WHITE
    Attorney General
    Supreme Court Building
    Ms. Joyce Tompkins                        Opinion No. MW-431
    P. 0. Box 12548
    Fort Bend County Auditor
    Austin, TX. 70711                P. 0. Drawer 549                          Ret Procedure to be followed
    512/475-2501                     Richmond, Texas   77469                   by justice of peace in forcible
    Telex 9101874-13S7                                                         entry and detainer actions and
    Telecopier   51Z47502SS
    writs of restitution
    IS07 Main St., Suite 1400        Dear Ms. Tompkins:
    Dallas. TX. 75201
    21417426944                            You ask whether, in an action of forcible entry and detainer. it
    is:
    4824 Alberta   Ave., Suite 180
    El Paso, TX. 79905                         the correct procedure for [a justice of the peace]
    915/53334S4                                to collect the monies for the writ of restitution
    before the forcible detainer is served?
    1220 Dallas Ave.. Suite 202
    Houston, TX. 77002
    Articles 3973 through 3994, V.T.C.S.. provide for an action of
    713fS5o.om                       forcible entry and detainer. Any justice of the peace of the precinct
    in which the property in question is situated has jurisdiction over
    such cause of action. V.T.C.S. art. 3973. Rules 738 through 755 of
    808 Broadway, Suite 312
    the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedure therein.
    Lubbock, TX. 79401
    8061747.5238
    Rule 748 states that:
    4309 N. Tenth, Suite S                     If the judgment or verdict be in favor of the
    McAllen. TX. 78501
    512682-4547
    plaintiff, the justice shall give judgment for
    plaintiff for restitution of the premises, costs,
    and damages; and he shall award his writ of
    2M) Main Plaza. Suite 400                  restitution. If the judgment or verdict be in
    San Antonio. TX. 78205                     favor of the defendant, the justice shall give
    5121225-4191
    judgment for defendant against the plaintiff for
    costs and any damages. No writ of restitution
    An Equal OpportunityI                      shall issue until the.expiration of five days from
    Affirmative Action EmptOyer                the time the judgment is signed.
    Rule 755 provides that:
    The writ of restitution, or execution, or both,
    shall be issued by the clerk of the county court
    according to the judgment rendered, and the same
    shall be executed by the sheriff or constable, as
    p. 1475
    Ms. Joyce Tompkins - Page 2   (MW-431)
    in other cases; and such writ of restitution shall
    not be suspended or superseded in any case by
    appeal from such final judgment in the county
    court.
    We understand from the context of your letter that you are
    essentially asking whether the following procedure is permissible; an
    aggrieved property owner files a written sworn complaint with a
    particular justice of the peace, said justice collects for the cost of
    executing the citation and, in addition, for the costs connected with
    issuing and executing a writ of restitution. The justice then
    allocates the charges for the writ of restitution between the county
    clerk and the sheriff or constable.
    In order to answer your question, we must focus upon other rules
    of procedure. Rule 523 reads as follows:
    All rules governing the district and county courts
    shall also govern the justice courts, insofar as
    they can be applied, except where otherwise
    specifically provided by law or these rules.
    Rules 143 et. seq. apply to district and county courts.   Rule 143
    states that:
    A party seeking affirmative relief may be ruled to
    give security for costs at any time before final
    judgment, upon motion of any party, or any officer
    of the court interested in the costs accruing in
    such suit, or by the 'court upon its own motion.
    If such rule be entered against any party and he
    failed to comply therewith on or before twenty
    (20) days after notice that such rule has been
    entered, the claim for affirmative relief of such
    party shall be dismissed.
    Rule 144 reads as follows:
    All bonds given as security for costs shall
    authorize judgment against all obligers in such
    bond for the said costs, to be entered in the
    final judgment of the cause.
    Rule 146 states that:
    In lieu of a bond for costs, the party required to
    give the same may deposit with the clerk of court
    or the justice of the peace such sum as the court
    p. 1476
    Ms. Joyce Tompkins - Page 3   N-431)
    or justice from time to time may designate es
    sufficient to pay the accrued costs.
    See also Rules 145 (Affidavit of Inability); 148 (Secured by other
    bond).
    Although some provisions of Rules 143 et. seq. were emended in
    1971, said provisions were the same in all material respects in 1966,
    when Mosher v. Tunnell. 
    400 S.W.2d 402
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1966,
    writ ref'd n.r.e.), was decided. In that case the court stated as
    follows:
    We are of the view that Rule 143 provides for a
    bond conditioned that the principal and the
    sureties will pay all costs es may be adjudged
    against the principal in trial of the case. It is
    1; effect an op;n bond to secure payment of
    whatever costs might accrue.        It does not
    authorize the court to fix a specific amount of
    the bond... Too, Rule 144 provides the bond shall
    authorize judgment against the obligers for said
    costs. This means such costs es shell be adjudged
    against the principal whatever be the amount...
    The deposit of court costs, as distinguished from
    a bond es security for costs, is provided for by
    Rule 146 end clearly contemplates a deposit only
    for accrued costs.... (Emphasis 
    added). 400 S.W.2d at 404-05
    .
    In Buck v. Johnson, 
    495 S.W.2d 291
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1973,
    no writ), the court, relying upon Mosher v. 
    Tunnell, supra
    . stated
    that:
    Taking [Rules 143, 146, end 1481 together... they
    mean this: When a party is ruled for costs, he is
    required to timely furnish and file an open end
    cost bond; however, the party may, at his option,
    in lieu of a cost bond file with the clerk such
    sums es the court may from time to time require to
    cover accrued costs. In other words, the option
    lies with the party ruled for costs, end not with
    the court, as to whether a cost bonds shell be
    furnished or a deposit in lieu of bond. (Emphasis
    in 
    original). 495 S.W.2d at 298
    . See also, Dilmore v. Russell, 
    519 S.W.2d 278
    (Tex.
    Cl". App. - Dallas 1975, no writ).
    p. 1477
    Ms. Joyce Tompkins - Page 4   (MW-431)
    A writ of restitution is a post-judgment remedy, the purpose of
    which is to restore the property at issue in the forcible detainer
    action to the party adjudged to be in rightful possession thereof. In
    a particular case, the writ may never issue. For example, the writ
    would not issue if the defendant prevails in the suit. If the writ
    does issue, it will issue only after judgment in the case is rendered
    -- to be precise, not less than five days after the judgment is
    signed. -See Rule 748.
    The cases discussed above highlight a crucial distinction between
    Rules 143 and 146. The former permits a court to rule the party
    seeking affirmative relief for costs,  in which event said party must
    furnish and file an open-end cost bond. This bond will secure payment
    of "whatever costs might accrue." Masher v. 
    Tunnell, supra
    , at 401.
    Under Rule 146, however, said party may elect to file with the clerk
    of the court such sums as the court may require to cover accrued
    costs. In short, Rule 143 contemplates a cost bond covering costs
    that r&&   accrue in the future, while Rule 146 permits the payment of
    costs already accrued.
    Based on the facts you present, we conclude that the precise
    procedure you describe is impermissible. The justice of the peace is
    in effect requiring complainants in forcible entry and detainer
    actions to pay for costs that might or might not accrue at the time
    they file their complaint. This cannot be done. First, at the time
    the complaint is filed, it will not be known whether a writ of
    restitution will ever issue. If such a writ is awarded, it may not
    issue until the expiration of five days after the judgment is signed.
    Thus, when the complaint is filed, the costs connected with the writ
    will not have "accrued" within the meaning of Rule 146. Second, Buck
    v. Johnson, m,     holds that the option lies with the party ruled for
    costs, not with the court, as to whether to furnish a cost bond or a
    deposit in lieu of a bond. Thus, even when the costs connected with
    the writ do accrue, the court could not order them paid in the manner
    prescribed in Rule 146.
    We emphasize, however, that although the justice may not proceed
    in the manner you describe, he may, pursuant to Rule 143, require the
    complainant to furnish security for costs at the time the complaint is
    filed, or thereafter.
    SUMMARY
    In an action of forcible entry and detainer,
    a justice of the peace may not collect the costs
    connected with a writ of restitution when the
    p. 1478
    Ms. Joyce Tompkins - Page 5    (MW-431)
    complaint is filed. He may, however, require the
    complainant to furnish security for costs.
    =@
    MARK      WHITE
    Attorney General of Texas
    JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    RICHARD E. GRAY III
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    Prepared by Jon Bible
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Susan L. Garrison. Chairman
    Jon Bible
    Rick Gilpin
    Jim Moellinger
    Bruce Youngblood
    p. 1479
    

Document Info

Docket Number: MW-431

Judges: Mark White

Filed Date: 7/2/1982

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017