Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1980 )


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  •                        The Attorney                General of Texas
    August      26,   1980
    MARK WHITE
    Attorney General
    Honorable Robert E. Stewart               Opinion No. NW-229
    Banking Commissioner
    Department of Banking                     Re: Time credit prices for prepaid
    2601 North Lamar                          funeral contracts
    Austin, Texas 78705
    Dear Commissioner Stewart:
    The Department of Banking is charged with the administration      of
    article 548b, V.T.C.S., which regulates the sale of prearranged or prepaid
    funeral merchandise.    Contracts therefor must be in writing on forms
    approved by the Department and must set forth the particulars of the
    merchandise, the professional services, and the facilities to be provided.
    V.T.C.S. art. 548b, S2. You ask:
    May a time price differential    be included in a
    contract for prearranged benefits when the payments
    on the contracts are on a deferred basis?
    The term “time price differential” is used in the Retail Installment
    Sales Act, chapter 6, of the Consumer Credit Code, to mean the amount
    paid for the privilege of purchasing goods and services, as there defined,
    that are to be paid out in installments over a period of time. V.T.C.S. art.
    5069-6.01(h). It signifies the difference between the seller’s “cash price” and
    his “credit price” for the goods and services sold A time price differential
    arising out of a credit sale does not constitute interest, and an authorized,
    bona fide charge &es not constitute      usury. V.T.C.S. arts. 5069-1.01, 5069-
    2.01(h); Rattan v. Commercial Credit Co., 131 SW. 2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. -
    Dallas 1939, writ rePd).
    We heve concluded that contracts for prearranged funeral benefits
    regulated by the department under article 548b may not properly include a
    “time price differential,” even though payments on the contracts are
    deferred,    because such contracts do not evidence “retail installment
    transactions” within the meaning of the Retail Installment Sales Act, nor
    “credit sales” within the meaning of articlea 5069-1.01 and 5069-2.01(h),
    V.T.C.S.
    Article 548b expressly provides that the date of death of the
    beneficiary of such a contract shall be the maturity date of the contract.
    y. S5(3). Moreover, it provides that the delivery of funeral merchandise
    P.   727
    Honorable Robert E. Stewart    - Page Two     (NW-229 1
    prior to death shall not constitute performance or fulfillment, either wholly or in part,
    of any such contract.    Id Sl. All monies paid by the purchaser cn the contract must
    be deposited in a trust-&id     for the use and benefit of the purchaser or beneficiary,
    except that a statutorily designated amount may be retained by the seller. 
    Id. S5(1), (2).
    The purchaser may cancel the contract at any time before maturity andxcover
    back all monies paid except such amounts retained.     
    Id. S5t4). See
    Falkner v. Memorial
    Gardens Assoc., 
    298 S.W.2d 934
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Ai&n 1957,writ rePd n.r.e.).
    In 1967 the Texas Legislature enacted the Consumer Credit Code,. declaring a
    need for “a comprehensive code of legislation to clearly define interest and usury,. . .
    to regulate credit sales and services, and place limitations on charges imposed in
    connection with such sales and services” in consumer transactions.        Acts 1967, 60th
    Leg., ch. 274 at 608. Chapter six thereof, the Retail Installment Sales Act, regulates
    retail installment transactions and allows the inclusion of time price differentials
    therein. See V.T.C.S. arts. 5069-6.01, 5069-6.02(9)(a). “Goods” are &fined in article
    5069-6.01tomean     tangible personal property when purchased for personal, family or
    household use and mt for commercial or business use, excluding money, things in
    action or intangible personal property.      The definition of “services” excludes the
    services of a professional person licensed by the state except when rendered in
    connection with the purchase of “goods.” V.T.C.S. art. 5069-6.01(a), (b).
    Funeral directors and embalmers are professional persons licensed by the state.
    V.T.C.S. art. 4582b.       Although funeral directors’ services are often rendered in
    connection with the purchase of tangible property, such as caskets and grave vaults,
    the purchaser of a prearranged funeral contract does not thereby acquire title to any
    specific goods. He acquires only the right to have tangible goods, as well as services,
    of a particular description provided at a future but uncertain time.
    The seller parts with no goods nor with the title to any specific goods prior to the
    death of the beneficiary, and the contract forms approved by the Department of
    Banking uniformly stipulate that the seller is under no obligation to deliver or provide
    any merchandise for which the stipulated purchase price has not been fully paid. See
    V.T.C.S. art. 548b, S2. Under such terms, no “sale” of funeral merchandise or servi=
    occurs until that time, and when it occurs it is a “cash sale,” not a “credit sale.”
    A “sale” consists of the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.
    Bus. & Corn. Code 62.106. See First National Bank v. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 
    487 S.W.2d 377
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Texa&%a 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.1. Goods must be both existing
    and identified before any interest in them can pass. Bus. & Corn. Code S2.105. See
    Bus. & Corn. Code SS2.102, 9.109, 9.203(d); 50 Tex. Jur. 2d rev. Sales S18 at 270 (196x
    The codes do not define a “credit sale,” nor have Texas cases been found that define
    the precise term, but Texas courts, in our opinion, would agree with the court in
    Parnell v. Baham, 
    228 So. 2d 53
    (La. App. - 4th Cir. 1969, writ rePd), where it was said:
    A ‘cash sale’ contemplates the concurrence of the payment
    with delivery and the transfer of ownership. . . . When delivery
    is made and ownership transferred by the seller to the purchaser
    upon an agreement that the purchaser will pay later - whether
    P.   728
    Honorable Robert E. Stewart     - Page Three      (Mw-229)
    it be hours, days, or longer - it is a credit sale. The seller parts
    with his goods upon the promise of the purchaser to pay.
    (Emphasis added)
    Cf. Rush v. Smitherman,     
    294 S.W.2d 873
    (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1956, writ
    i??d.)(similar facts).
    The effect of the contracts authorized by article 548b, V.T.C.S., and approved by
    the Department of Banking is to give the purchasers thereof an option to later acquire
    funeral goods and services of a particular description at specified prices, and to have
    the consideration paid for the option applied against the purchase price of the goods
    when acquired and the services when performed.
    An option to purchase is a contract supported by consideration whereby one party
    sells to another party the right, at the election of the latter, to purchase certain
    described property, for the price and upon the terms and conditions of the contract.
    Ferguson v. von Seggern, 
    434 S.W.2d 380
    (Tex. Civ. App. -Dallas 1968, writ rePd
    n.r.e.). Cf. Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Mouer, 
    520 S.W.2d 802
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin
    19751, wxdism’d,      
    531 S.W.2d 8051
    (Tex. 1975) (London option). It is not a sale of
    tangible property; it is the sale of a privilege to acquire tangible property.   Knox v.
    Brown, 
    277 S.W. 91
    (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925). -See 50 Tex. Jur. 2d rev. Sales S40 at 304
    (1969).
    Here, the buyer has a statutory right to elect at any time (prior to the maturity
    of the contract) to cancel the arrangement and pass up the purchase, forfeiting only
    the small retainage allowed the seller and recovering the remainder of all he has paid.
    Clearly, the initial transaction is not a sale of tangible property; it is but the sale of a
    privilege to acquire it later. As a consequence, neither the pie-code nor post-code
    cases cited to us as authority for a different result can be applicable here. Whether or
    not other distinctions might also be made, they all involved in contracts effecting bona
    fide sales of tangible property. See International Harvester Co. v. Rotello, 
    580 S.W. 2d
    418 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston-t        Dist.1 1979, no writ); Anguiano v. Jim Walter
    Homes, Inc., 
    561 S.W.2d 249
    (Tex. Civ. App. -San Antonio 1978, writ rePd n.r.e.);
    , 
    183 S.W.2d 657
                                                                             redit 
    Co., supra
    .
    SUMMARY
    A time price differential may not be included in contracts
    for prearranged or prepaid funeral benefits regulated by article
    548b, V.T.C.S.
    *M
    Attorney General of Texas
    p.   729
    .   -_
    Honorable Robert E. Stewart    - Page Four     (MW-229)
    JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    Prepared by Bruce Youngblood
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMFTEE
    C. Robert Heath, Chairman
    Jon Bible
    Cathy Frayer
    Susan Garrison
    Ride Gilpin
    Bruce Youngblood
    P.   730