Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1978 )


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  •                       The Attorney               General of Texas
    December   22,    1978
    JOHN L. HILL
    Attorney General
    Honorable Joseph N. Murphy, Jr.                  Opinion No. H- 1203
    Executive Director
    Employees Retirement System                      Re: Whether the state or a
    of Texas                                       political subdivision may estab-
    P. 0. Box 12337, Capitol Station                 lish a special program to make
    Austin, Texas 78711                              payments    to an employee on
    account of sickness.
    Deer Mr. Murphy:
    You ask: “May the State or any of its political subdivisions establish a
    special, separate, program to make payments to an employee on account of
    sickness, such payments not being e continuation of wages?” Your question
    pertains to the relationship of sick pay to “wages” as that term is used in the
    Social Security Act and as it has been interpreted by the Secretary of the
    Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The inclusion or exclusion of
    amounts paid public employees as “wages” determines the contribution to be
    made by public employers end employees, and the rate of benefits to be
    received ,by the employee.
    The Social Security    Act defines wages of public employees     to exclude
    sick pay as follows:
    [Tlhe term “wages” means remuneration paid . . . for
    employment . . . except that . . . such term shall not
    include -
    . . . .
    fb) The amount of any payment . . . made to . . . en
    employee . . . under a plan or system established by an
    employer which makes provision for his employees
    generally . . . on account of . . . sickness or accident
    disability. . . .
    42 U.S.C. S 409.
    The Secretary of Health, Education,       and Welfare has interpreted   this
    exclusion as follows:
    P-   5129
    Honorable Joseph N. Murphy, Jr.      -   Page 2        (H-1303)
    [Playments made by a governmental entity to en employee
    on sick leave are excluded from “wages” only if there is
    legal authority for the employer to make payments specif-
    ically on account     of sickness es distinguished   from
    authorization   to merely continue salary payments during
    periods of absence due to illness.
    SSR 72-56 (19721. (Compere the Commissioners of Internal Revenue’s Rev. Rul.
    65-275 (19651, applicable to exclusion of sick pay in 517 P.2d 989 
    (10th Cir. 1975), cert den., 423
    U.S. 1051(1976). The court interpreted the Secretary’s interpretation and clarified
    the matter as follows:
    [Tlo be excluded from “wages”, sick leave payments must be
    paid solely s account g sickness.       Such payments by a
    State - as opposed to e mere continuation of wages during
    periods of absence due to illness - would allegedly amount
    to an improper “donation” of State funds absent express
    w      authority for the State to appropriate funds for such
    use. . . .
    . . . .
    If . . . the State here has no authority to make “payments
    on account of sickness” such es would qualify to be excluded
    from “wages” under the Act, we hold thet the Secretary has
    the nuthority to bar the exclusion from “wages” of such
    payments irregerdless      of how they ere denominated or
    treated under the State’s “plan.”
    &at993.     (Footnote   omitted, emphasis in original).
    With this clarification of the context     in which your question is posed, we look
    to Texas law on the subject.        Pertinent     provisions of article 3 of the Texas
    Constitution are as follows:
    Sec. 44. The Legislature shall provide by law for the
    compensation of all officers, servants, agents and public
    contractors, not provided for in this Constitution, but shall
    not grant extra compensation to any officer, agent, servant,
    or public contractors, after such public service shall have
    been performed or contract entered into . . . : nor grant, by
    appropriation or otherwise, any amount of money out of the
    Treasury of the State, to any individual, on a claim, real or
    P-     5130
    Honorable Joseph N. Murphy, Jr.    -   Page 3      (H-13031
    pretended, when the same shell not have been provided for
    by pre-existing law. . . .
    Sec. 51. The Legislature shall have no power to make eny
    grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys
    to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or
    other corporations whatsoever. . . .
    Sec. 52. inhe Legislature shall have no power to authorize
    any county, city, town or other political corporation       or
    subdivision of the State to lend its credit or to grant public
    money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual,
    association or corporation whatsoever. . . .
    Sec. 53. The Legislature shall have no power to grant, or to
    authorize any county or municipal authority to grant, any
    extra compensation, fee or allowance to e public officer,
    agent, servant or contractor,       afler service has been
    rendered, or a contract has been entered into, and per-
    formed in whole or in pert; nor pay, nor authorize the
    payment of, any claim created against any county or
    municipality of the State, under any agreement or contract,
    made without authority of law.
    It is well established that these constitutional provisions do not prohibit the
    payment of benefits to employees under the terms of e contract of employment, or
    the expenditure of pub1                                            v. City of Dallas. 
    6 S.W.2d 738
    (Tex. 1928);                                            
    36 S.W.2d 653
    (Tex.
    Civ. App. - Corpus Ch                                            alveston v. Landrum,
    
    533 S.W.2d 394
    (Tex. Civ. App.                                      ref’d n.r.e.); Devon
    v. City of San Antonio, 443 S.W.?d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1969, writ a
    City of Orange v. Chance, 
    325 S.W.2d 838
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1959, no
    writ); Attorney General Opinions H-797, H-786 (1976); H-336 (1974); M-836 (19711;
    ww-215 0957); O-4140 (i94i).
    It is our opinion that sections 44, 51, 52, or 53 of article 3 of the Texas
    Constitution do not prohibit legislative authorization of an employment agreement
    between the state or R political subdivision and its employees for payment to be
    made’ to en employee under a plan or system established by the employer which
    makes provision for the employees or e class of employees generally on account of
    sickness or accident disability.
    In City of Orange v. Chance, the issue was whether section 53 of article 3 of
    the Constitution prohibits payment of money for accumulated sick leave under a
    statute after severance of employment.        The court described “sick leave” as
    follows:
    P-   5131
    Honorable Joseph N. Murphy, Jr.    -    Page 4     (H-1303)
    It wes an emolument        or grant which would help the
    employee if during his employment he was unable to work 2
    account of sickness. . . .
    
    Id. et 841.
    (Emphasis added). The court also said that the method or time of
    payment wes not significant. Thus, we believe it is clear that the Constitution does
    not prohibit the establishment of a public employee sick leave plan or system which
    meets the precise requirements      of the Secretary of Health, Education, end
    Welfare’s interpretation in SSR 72-56 (1972).
    SUMMARY
    Sections 44, 51, 52, or 53 of article 3 of the Texas
    Constitution   do not prohibit the state or a political
    subdivision from establishing a plan or system for sick leave
    payments for its employees.
    Attorney General of Texas
    APPROVED:
    Opinion Committee   ’
    P-   5132
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-1303

Judges: John Hill

Filed Date: 7/2/1978

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017