Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1978 )

The Attorney General of Texas
December 12, 1978
JOHN 1. HILL
Attorney General /?i5q-/@f
Honorable Robert E. Owen Opinion No. PI- 12 7 g
Coke County Attorney
Robert Lee, Texas 76945 Re: Whether a county located
in a hospital district may provide
ambulance service.
Dear Mr. Owen:
You ask whether Coke County may provide ambulance service for its
citizens. Part of Coke County is included in the West Coke County Hospital
District, Acts 1963, 58th Leg., ch. 315, at 825, while the rest of the county is
included in the East Coke County Hospital Dmtrict, Acts 1969, 61st Leg., ch.
444, at 1485. Roth hospital districts were created pursuant to article IX,
section 9, of the Texas Constitution, which provides in part:
[Alny district so created shall assume full respon-
sibility for providing medical and hospital care for its
needy inhabitants. . . . [Alfter its creation no other
municipality or political subdivision shall have the
power to levy taxes or issue bonds or other obligations
for hospital purposes or for providing medical care
within the boundaries of the district. . . .
Similar language appears in the enabling statutes of each hospital
district. See Acts 1969, 61st Leg., ch. 444, S 3, at 1485; Acts 1963, 56th Leg.,
ch. 3l5, m, 19, at 825. You suggest that ambulance service constitutes
“medical care” within the Constitution and enabling acts, so that the county
may not levy taxes or issue obligations of indebtedness in order to provide it.
See Attorney General Opinions H-454, H-367 (1974).
We believe your question has been answered by Attorney General
Opinion M-385 (1969). That opinion concluded that the Terry County Hospital
District, created under the authority of article IX, section 9, could operate an
ambulance service in cooperation with Terry County and a city within the
district. It found provision of an ambulance service to be an auxiliary
function of a hospital district and determined that a district could undertake
it, but did not have the exclusive duty to do so. See Attorney General
Opinion C-759 (1966). The operation of an ambulance &&ice by the hospital
p. 5056
Honorable Robert E. Owen - Page 2 (H-1279)
district did not preclude a similar undertaking by another political subdivision
within the district cr the cooperative effort inquired about.
We believe Attorney General Opinion M-385 reached the correct result. See
Attorney General Opinion H-976 (1977). More recent authorities support x
conclusion by characterizing the provision of ambulance service as not solely a
hospital or medical function. In m 507 S.W.2d 324
(Tex. Civ. AIID. - Corous Christi 1974. no writ) the court described ambulance
service as “k%dred to ihe police or fire service.” It stated that this “service is
incident to the police power of the state: i.e. to protect the health, safety, and
general welfare of its citizens” We relied on the views of the Ayala court in
Attorney General Opinion H-562 (1975), which determined that rural fire prevention
districts, established pursuant to article 3, section 48d of the Constitution, could be
given statutory authority to provide emergency ambulance service. See also
Attorney General Opinion M-231 (1968) (operation of emergency ambulance service
by firemen).
Consequently, we do not believe that the establishment of hospital districts in
Coke County divests the county of its authority to provide ambulance service
within the district. See V.T.C.S. art. 4418f; Attorney General Opinions H-976
0977); M-806 (197B; M-385 (1969); C-772, C-759 (1966).
SUMMARY
A county, wholly, included within hospital districts
established pursuant to article IX, section 9 of the Texas
Constitution, may provide ambulance service.
Attorney General of Texas
.~
ad
C. ROBERT HEATH. Chairman
Opinion Committee
Ml
p. 5057