Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1978 )

The Attorney General of Texas
July 10, 1978
JOHN L. HILL
Attorney General
Honorable Stephen Davidchik Opinion No. H- 1205
Grayson County Attorney
Grayson County Courthouse Re: Whether state funding for
Sherman, Texas 75090 county school administration is
terminated at the end of current
terms.
Dear Mr. Davidchik:
You ask two questions about state funding for county school adminis-
tration. You first ask:
Does section, 17.94 of the Texas Education Code
terminate all state funds for the offices of county
tihool administrations, effective December 31,
1978, in counties with at least one common school
district?
Section 17.94 of’ the Education Code, enacted in 1975 as part of House
Bill 228, reads as follows:
After December 31, 1978, no state funds shall be
used to support the offices of county school super-
intendent or ex officio county school superintendent or
a board of county school trustees or a county school
board in counties with no common school districts,
rural high school districts, or independent districts
with less than one hundred fifty (150) ADA, but the
offices and boards may be supported by ad valorem tax
revenue generated in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter 18 of this code, or by funds provided by the
school districts in accordance with the provisions of a
voluntary contract as provided in Section 17.98 of this
Chapter.
(Emphasis added).
P- 4834
Honorable Stephen Davidchik - Page 2 (~-1205)
In Attorney General Opinion H-1136 (1978) we discussed the legislative intent
underlying House Bill 226. As introduced, House Bill 226 would have terminated
state funding for all county school administrations. It thus would have barred the
appropriation of any state money to support county administrations. See Tex.
Const. art. 3, S 44. However, amendments to House Bill 226 limited its appbcation
to “counties with no common school districts, rural high school districts, or
independent districts with less than one hundred fifty (150) ADA.” Thus, in counties
with even one of the enumerated districts, the legislature is not barred by section
17.94 from appropriating money to support the county school administration. These
counties remain under the provisions of sections 17.09 and 17.51 of the Education
Code, which expressly provide for the payment of county school trustees and
superintendents from the available school fund. Section 17.94 of the Texas
Education Code therefore does not terminate all state funds for county-school
administration in counties with at least one common school district.
Your second question concerns the validity and constitutionality of provisions
of the current appropriations act. The following line item was included in the
appropriation to the Texas Education Agency:
17. County Administration (from 3,800,OOO l,lOO,OOO
Available School Fund)
General Appropriations Act, Acts 1977, 85th Leg., ch. 872, at 3001. The following
rider limits this line item:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the funds in the
Item County Administration (from Available School Fund)
for the fiscal year ending August 31, 1979, shall only be used
until the current terms of those now in office expire.
& at 3011. Most terms will expire on December 31, 1978: We agree with you that
these provisions of the appropriation act effectively cut off state funding for
county~ school administration in virtually all counties for the period from January 1
to August 31, 1979. We believe the specific sum appropriated for county school
administration represents a ceiling on the amount that can be used for that
purpose. We .note that another rider appropriates the balance of the Available
School Fund:
For the purposes provided by law there is appropriated for
the biennium ending August 31, 1979, to the State Board of
Education, all income to and balances in the Available
School Fund and the State Textbook Fund, except as
otherwise appropriated by this Legislature, to be expended
and distributed in accordance with the laws of this State.
p. 4635
Honorable Stephen Davidchik - Page 3 (H-1205)
Id. at 3002. Although this provision could be interpreted as appropriating funds to
pay salaries of county superintendents and trustees in counties unaffected by
section 17.94, we do not believe the legislature intended it to supplement the
specific line item. But see Attorney General Opinions H-1035 (1977); M-1281 (1972).
You suggest that the legislature, in limiting the appropriation to current
terms, has violated article 3, section 44 of the Texas Constitution. This section
provides in part: “The Legislature shall provide by law for the compensation of all
officers, servants, agents and public contractors, not provided for in this
Constitution. . . .” This language relates to fixing the amount of compensation.
See Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ.
App. - Amarillo 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.1. See. e.g., Ed. Code, SS 17.09, 17.51, 17.52
(statutes fixing compensation of county school administrators.) It haS not been
interpreted to require the legislature to appropriate money for payment of the
salaries it sets. Other provisions of article 3, section 44 bar the legislature from
appropriating money to any person unless preexisting law authorizes the appropria-
tion. See Fort Worth Cavalry Club, Inc. v. Sheppard, 83 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1935).
We believe that the quoted language of article 3, section 44 merely directs the
legislature to enact general laws relating to compensation, which will provide
preexisting law for an appropriation.
We do not believe the rider reoresents an attemot to reoeal eeneral law bv
the appropriations act in violation of article 3, section 35 Gf ~the constitutio<
Moore v. Sheppard, 192 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1946). In Linden v. Finley, 49 S.W. 578
(Tex. 1899). the Supreme Court considered an appropriations act provision which
forbade the payment of officer’s fees under &rcumstances where general law
allowed them. The court determined that the appropriations act did not change
general law but merely limited payment of fees during the term of the act. In our
opinion, the rider limiting funding for county school administration does not
attempt to repeal general law. It validly directs the expenditure of appropriated
funds -and thus doesnot violate article 3;section 35. -See-Jessen Associate~~Inc. v.’
Bullock, ,531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1975).
We believe the appropriation act provisions you inquire about are constitu-
tional and valid. Thus, at the end of current terms, there will be no appropriation
earmarked for the support of county administrations that continue to exist. See
+ Attorney General Opinions H-1008 (1977); H-507 (1974); V-R3 (1947). -
SUMMARY
Section 17.94 of the Education Code does not terminate
state funding for county school administrations in counties
with one common school district, one rural high school
p. 4836
Honorable Stephen Davidchik - Page 4 (~-1205)
district, or one independent district with less than one
hundred fifty scholastics. Such counties are still under the
provisions of sections 17.09 and 17.51 of the Education Code.
The appropriation act provisions which terminate support of
all county administrations at the end of current terms are
constitutional and valid.
Very truly yours,
Attorney General of Texas
Opinion Committee
p. 4837