Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1978 )

The homey General cd Texas
April 12, 3.978
JOHN L. HILL
Attorney General
Honorable Felipe Reyna Opinion No. HA 1153
Criminal District a +t.xney
McLennan Cour~ty Courthouse Rez Whether a coin game which
Waco, Te%as . awards tokens redeemable for a
prize may be used in Texas.
Dear Mr. ,Reyna:
You have requested our opinion regarding the operation of a coin game
which awards tokens redeemable for a prize; You describe the game; called
theTreasurech~“ason~
consists -of a boxlike structure contahtii a coin
723bh.6”“.616 insert, a motor drive, and a wing fie7d.l ‘lhe player,
HkRaTx.na6 by means of a coin slot at the front of the machine,
71-1
inserts the coin on a playhig board covered with stacks
of coins of equal denomi@ation and the ‘playing token’
Which bMis the bksis of Fe object of the game. llm
play,er then manipt&tes his c&i over the dther coins
in the mt%hine’s playhig area by use of a ,.m&haiiiial
d&e; the object beii to remove one of the tokens
4n3N.Tal6l.sutmF
from the playhg area into a device to return it to~the
Md6mTx76661 player. The token fif reeoVeredI is then exchanged for
61-7 a prize.r
%33Md”Plu*SUi*UJ6
Under section 47.06 of the present Texas Penal Code, “a person
6mAnbmlo.lx.76m6 corn&s an off&e if he knowingly i . . possesses any gambling device that he
6-161 kmws ls designed for gambling purposes . . .” “Gambling device” is defined
as
any mechanical contrivance thet for a consideration
affords the player an opportunity to obtain anything of
value, the award of whi&h is determined by chance,
even though, accompanied by some skill, whether or not
the prize is automatically paid by the contrivance.
Section 47.01(3).
p. 4677
Honorable Pelipe Reyna - Page 2 UI-1153) .~
The prior Texas Penal Code did not make a distinction between games of
chance and games of skill. Adams v. Antonio, 88 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. -
- Waco 1935, writ ref’d). Marble machines, which appear to be closely akin to the
game at issue here, have been held to violate the gaming statutes. See, e.g.,
Barkley v. Conklin, 101S.W.%d 405 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1937, no writ); Speed v.
w ll0 S.W.%d 1245 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1937, no writ).
The statutory definition of “gambling device” apparently now requires proof
of at least some element of chance in the operation of a game. You state that the
operation of the “Treasure Chest” is dependent to some extent upon chance. Cn
the basis of that determination, we believe it is clear that the game, as you have
described it, is embraced within the statutory definition of “gambling device,” the
posse&on of which is prohibited by article 47.06 of the Penal Code.
SUMMARY
As described, a coin game known as the “Treasure Chest” is
a “gambling device,” the possession of which is prohibited by
article 47.96 of the Texas Penal Code.
Very truly yours,
C. ROBERT HEATH. Chairman
Opinion Committee ’
jst
‘P- 4678