Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1971 )


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  •                       September14, 1971
    Dr. J..W. Edgar                 Opinion No. M-950
    Commissioner of Education
    Texas Education Agency          Re: Questions relating to bid-
    201 East 11th Street                 lease procedure under
    Austin, Texas                        Section 2i.901, Texas Edu-
    'cation Code.
    Dear Dr. Edgar:
    You have requested'our opinion as to whether a lease con-
    tract by the Dallas IndependentSchool District for a computer
    is re uired by the provisions of Sec. 21.901, Texas Education
    Code.P'to be awarded on competitivebids or whether such contract
    may be entered into on a negotiatedbasis, whereby the best offer
    might be obtained from prospective lessors.
    Our opinion ia that such a contract may be'entered into on a
    negotiated basis and is not required to be awarded on competitive
    bids. Our conference with officials of the Dallas Independent
    School District convinces us that the proposed contract is in fact
    a lease and not a purchase contract.
    Section 20.40 of the Texas Education Code' authorizes certain
    expendituresfrom the public free school funds. Subdivision (c)
    of this Section, in its pertinent portion, reads as follows:
    "(c) Local school funds from district taxes,
    tuition fees of pupils not.~~en$itled
    to free tuifion
    and other local sources may be used for the purposes
    1. Derived from Art. 2752a, V.C.S.
    2. Derived from Art. 2827, V.C.S.
    -4649-
    Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 2      (M-950)
    enumeratedfor.stpte,andcounty funds and for
    purchasingapplianqes.andsupplies, for the,payment
    of insurancepremiums, janitors and other employees,
    for buying school sites, buying, building and repair-
    ing and rending school houses, and for other DUrDoses
    necessarv in the conduct of the public schools to be
    determined,bvthe board of trustees . . ." (Emphasis
    added.)
    Our opinion is that this,subd&&ion; in its underscored
    portion,authorizesthe board of trust,ees,  in its discretion,to
    lease the computer.,Weefind only one case construingthis Sectios
    ~be&nACity of Garland v. Garland I.S.D., 
    468 S.W.2d 110
    (Dallas ,:~
    CiV.A!pP.1971). .An,appeal,ofth$s,,~,decisiqn
    is pending in the
    Texas Supreme Court under the sarpestyle, their No. B-2858.
    The Court,ofCivil Appealsheld that th$s‘Section authorisedthe,
    board of trustees of the district to determinewhether'school
    funds should be used for paving pub& streets abutting,.its  school
    properties.
    Section 21.901 of,the.TexasEdqation Code is the controlling
    statutpryprovision relating to competitivebidding; its relevant
    portion,4s subdivision (a) which reads 'asfollows:
    "(a), All contractsproposed to be made by any Texas   '
    public school board for the,Purchaseof.any personal
    propertyshal.l,besubmitted to,competitivebidding when
    sa%d property is valued at $1,000 or more." (Emphasis
    ! aaaed.1
    The competitivebidding statute is limited to "purchases."A
    *purchase,involvesa sale and tran,sm$ssion of the ownershipand
    title to.propertyfrom one person or,entity to another. 73 CJS
    207, Property,Seq. 15bQ). ,,Itdoes not,necessarilyinclude or
    comprehenda mere leasing or renting of property, Contracts for
    the rentingqf real property,or the,hire,prrenting of chattels.
    or personaltyare not gegerally,qonsidered  within the provisions
    requiringcontracts for-work.s.upplie.s,or materials to be let.up"
    .cojapetitive,bidding. See: 43 Am.Jur..769,.Public.Works and,Con-
    tracts, Section 27; Ambrosich v. Eveleth, 200 firm. 473, 
    274 N.W. 635
    (Minn.Supp.1937), 
    112 A.L.R. 269
    , wherein it was held
    -4650-
    Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 3        (M-950)
    that a lease of real property by a municipality is not comprehended
    within the requirement for advertising for competitive bids for
    purchases of property, labor, materials, etc.: Scott v. Bloomfield,
    N.J. Super.592,229 A.2d 667 (19671, wherein it was held that public
    advertisement required of a municipality for the sale of land or any
    interest therein did not include a lease. The Court, in the case
    last cited, said, 229A.Zd at 673:
    11
    ...There is no reference in this statute to
    leasing, nor does the word lease appear.
    "A sale of property is fundamentally different
    from a lease since a sale transfersownership,  which
    includes both title and right to possession, while a
    lease grants only the use and enjoyment of the thing leased.
    51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 202."
    Our opinion is supported by the further general powers of the
    board of trustees set forth in other provisions of the Code,
    namely, Subchapter B. entitled, "Powers and Duties of Trustees,"
    and the first two sections thereof:
    Section 23.25 reads:
    "The board of trustees of an independent school
    district shall have the powers and duties described
    in this subchapter, in addition to any other powers
    and duties granted or imposed by this code or by law."
    Section 23.26, in its relevant portions. reads as follows:
    “(a) The trustees shall constitute a body
    corporate and in the name of the school district may
    acquire and hold real and personal property, . . .
    a,
    . . .
    "(c) All rights and titles to the school property
    of the district, whether real or personal, shall be
    vested in the trustees and their successors in office.
    I'..." (Emphasis added.)
    -4651-
    Dr. J. W.   Edgar, page 4      (M-950)
    Subsequent to receiving this opinion request,we asked the
    Dallas Independent School District to furnish us certain informa-
    tion concerning the term and expiration date of the proposed
    leane. In response to our inquiry, Dr. Nolan Estes, General
    Superintendentof the Dallas Independent School District, made the
    following statement in a letter dated September 8, 1971:
    "The DISD would like to lease a computer
    system and related support services beginning
    as soon as possible and terminatingAugust 31,
    1972. We do not intend to commit funds nor
    otherwise obligate the District beyond this
    current fiscal year. Any contract developed
    would expire August 31, 1972, and would require
    specific Board of Education action to renew the
    lease for each subsequent year."     .'
    Since this lease terminates'atthe end of the current fiscal
    year (August 31, 1972), it is our further opinion that the lease
    does not contravene the provisions of Section 52 of Article III
    of the Texas Constitution,which prohibit a county, city, town
    or other political corporation or subdivisionof the State from
    lending its credit.
    SUMMARY
    The Dallas Independent SchoolsDistrict is
    authorized to negotiate a lease contract
    for a computer without competitivebids.
    Arts. 20.40 and 2B.901. Texas Education
    Code.
    This lease terminates at the end of the
    current fiscal year, August 31, 1972.
    Therefore, it does not violate the provisions
    -4652-
    Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 5        (M-950)
    of Section 52 of Article III of the Texas
    Constitution,which prohibits school
    districts and other subdivisionsof the
    State from lending their credit.
    Yap.
    ?8 very truly,
    .q.?JL#~&<@
    Atto ,ey General of Texas
    li
    Prepared by Malcolm L. Quick
    Assistant Attorney General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Kerns Taylor, Chairman
    W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman
    James McCoy
    John Reeves
    Jerry Roberts
    Marietta Payne
    SAM MCDANIEL
    Acting Staff Legal Assistant
    ALFRED WALKER
    Executive Assistant
    NOLA WHITE
    First Assistant
    -4653-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M-950

Judges: Crawford Martin

Filed Date: 7/2/1971

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017