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Honorable Charles H. Jungmlchel Opinion No. M-357 Chairman, House Committee on Urban Affairs Re: Constltutlonallt of State Capitol Building House Bill No. 18 4, Austin, Texas 61st Legislature Dear Mr. Jungmlchel: By recent letter you have requested an opinion concerning the constitutionality of House Bill No. 184, which relates to membership of cities in municipal organl- zations. We quote from.the pertinent provisions of House Bill No. 184 as follows: "Section 1. DEFINITIONS. In this Act, unless, the context requires a different definition, (1) 'city' means any incorporated city, town, or village In the State of Texas; and (2) lmunlclpal organlzatlon~ means any group organized to promote cooperation among cities in handling municipal affairs. Sec. 2. AUTHORITY TO JOIN MUNICIPAL ORQANIZATIONS. Any city may join any munlcl- pal organization by adopting a resolution which states the name of the organization which the city 1s joining and the purpose for which the city Is joining the organiza- tion. The city may also pay any necessary membership dues. Sec. 3. WITHDRAWING MEMBERSHIP. Any city which joins a municipal Organi,ZatiOn under the provisions of this Act may wlth- draw from membership in the organization on a majority vote of the members of the governi.;gydy of the city. . . LIMITATION OF POWER. Mem- bership in any municipal organization shall not limit the powers of the city. . .' The only constitutional question which appears to be raised is found in Section 2 where the cities are author- -1763- , Hon. Charles H. Jungmlchel, page 2' 1zedto"pay any necessary membership dues". In regard to thla question, you are referred to Section 51 and 52 of Article III, and Section 3 of Article XI of the Texas Constitution. Section 51 of Article III, Vernon's Texas Constl- tutlon, is quoted, in part, as follows: "The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any lndl- vldual, association of individuals, munl- clpal 0: other corporation whatsoever; . . . . Section 52'of Article III, Vernon's Texas Constl- tutlcn,ls quoted, in part, as follows: "The Legislature shall have no power to authorize any county, city, town or other political corporation or subdivision of the State to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value'ln aid of, or to any lndlvldual, association or corporation whatsoever, or to become a stockholder in such co$poratlon, association or company; . . . . Section 3 of Article XI, Vernon's Texas Constltu- tlcn,ls quoted as follows: "No county, city, or other municipal corporation shall hereafter become a sub- scriber to the capital of any private corporation or association, or make any appropriation or donation to the same, or in anywise loan its credit; but this shall not be construed to in any way affect any obligation heretofore undertaken pursuant to law." Insofar as Section 3 of Article XI is concerned, the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of Barrln ton vs. Coklnos,
161 Tex. 136,
338 S.W.2d 133(196&the -- 0 state constitutional test to be utilized when anplying Section 3 of Article XI to a particular authorization or expendl- ture of public funds. -1764- Hon. Charles H. Jungmlchel, page 3 The court atated at page 140: "Under the Constitution of 1869 and a statute enacted by the Legislature in 1871, the counties and munlclpalltles of Texas were authorized to ald such construction by taking stock in and making loans or donations to railroad companies. The primary purpose of Article XI, Section 3, Is to deprive these political subdivisions of that power. It does not prohibit all business dealings with prl- vate corporations and associations, but munl- clpal funds or credit may not be used simply to obtain for the community and its citizens the general benefits resulting from the operation of such an enterprise. On the other hand an expenditure for the direct accomplishment of a legitimate public and municipal purpose is not rendered unlawful by the fact that a privately owned business may be benefited thereby." In regard to Sections 51 and 52 of Article III. Vernon's Texas Constitution, the-supreme Court in Brazes- Ri;;;&T;o$ty v. Carr,
405 S.W.2d 689, (Tex.Sutim) e reasoning found in Barrington v.
Coklnos, supra, and cited ,numerous cases dealing with them- tutlonal provlslona involved in this request, and you are referred to the discussion on pages 693 and 694 therein. An analysis of the above quoted cases leads to the conclusion that an authorized expenditure of public funds 1s constitutionally sound where the expenditure in question is for a legitimate public and municipal purpose. The issue, whether the expenditures authorized for membership dues to the organizations defined by H. B. 184 constitute a public and municipal purpose, is lnitlal- ly a legislative function. "It would not be.of value now to attempt to thoroughly define or discuss what are public purposes. No exact definitioncan be made. Suffice it to say that, unless a court can say the purposes for which public funds are expend- ed are clearly not public purposes, it would not be justlfled in holding Invalid a legislative act or provision in a city charter providing -1765- Hon. Charles H. Jungmlchel, page 4 funds for such purposes." Davis v. Clt
123 Tex. 39, 67 md 103e ?%3?&4,. We cannot say that the purposes for which the cities are being authorized to expend money by House Bill 184 are not public purposes. On the contrary, in the light of previous acts of the Legislature, i.e. Articles 1OllL and 1Ollm. Vernon's Civil Statutes, authorizing joint municipal planning and cooperation, it is our opln- ion that the authorized expenditure in House Bill 184 would be for a public purpose. This very question has been considered in other jurisdictions and it has been held that it is a public purpose for cities to belong to an organization of cities, as is the payment of dues thereto and the sending of its officials to the conventions held by such an organization. City ofposevllle v. Tulley,
131 Pa. 2d395 (Cal. ; of Kalamazoo,
25 N.W.2d 787(Mlch.Sup. hlte, 194 Pa.2d 435 (Ariz.Sup. 1948); State a erman,v.E.2d a35 (Ohio 1951); 169 A.L.R. T;TIB; kP--- Baaed upon the above discussions, and our analy- sis of the bill in question, it 1s our opinion that the bill in question is constitutional. SUMMARY House Bill No. 184, 61st Leglslature is constitu:lonal and does not violate Sections 51 and 32 of Article III or Section 3 of Article XI of the Texas Constitution. Vex$ truly yours, rney Qeneral of Texas Prepared by James C. McCoy Assistant Attorney General -1766- Hon Charles H. Jungmlchel, page 5 APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Kerns Taylor, Chairman George Kelton, Vice-Chairman Joseph H. Sharpley Lenny Zwlener Bill Craig James Quick W. V. GEPPERT Staff Legal Assistant - 1767 -
Document Info
Docket Number: M-357
Judges: Crawford Martin
Filed Date: 7/2/1969
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/18/2017