Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1965 )


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  • Honorable R. L. Lattimore   Opinion    NO. c-462
    Criminal Mstrlct Attorney
    Hidalgo County              Re: Whether a corporation court
    Rdinburg, Texas             has jurisdiction on a complaint
    charging theft of personal pro-
    perty of the value of $5.00 or
    under, where such property is
    stolen from a retail establish-
    ment under conditions defined by
    Article 1436e, V.P.C. (The Shop-
    Dear Mr. Lattlmore:         lifting Statute)
    You recently requested an opinion of this office on
    the following question:
    II
    . . . /777here. . .property of the
    value of $500 or under is taken under
    conditions which constitute shoplifting,
    /Zs defined in Article 1436e, Vernon's
    Penal Code7 may the prosecution be instl-
    tuted in Corporation Court under the mis-
    $iEanor theft statute, Article 1422, P.
    Article 1436e, Vernon's Penal Code, is a special stat-
    ute defining the offense of shoplifting. Sullivan v. State,
    
    354 S.W.2d 168
    (Tex.Crim. 1962).  Article 1422 V      1 Penal
    Code, is a general penalty provision of the or&.n~~~hhZtft stat-
    ute, Article 1410, Vernon's Penal Code. Under Article 4, Vernon's
    Penal Code, a special provision controls over a general provision
    on the same subject, if there be a conflict.
    "An examination of Article 1436e and
    Article 1410 reveals a difference In the
    essential elements of each offense. First,
    and most Importantly, the Shoplifting Stat-
    ute does not require the element of want of
    consent essential to a prosecution under
    ordinary theft. Further, the Shoplifting
    Statute requires that the person be on the
    retail business premises legally. Obviously
    -220,0-
    Honorable R. L. Lattimore, page 2 (c-462)
    no such element is required under ordinary
    theft." Attorney General's Opinion W-1478
    (1962).
    Dy thus comparing the provisions of these articles,
    it will readily be found that the elements of the offenses are
    quite distinct, while there may be one or more common to ,both,
    and that these articles define different offenses. This being
    true, there is no conflict which would impair either statute's
    validity, and the clear meaning of Section 7 of Article 1436e
    would apply, giving the State the right of election between the
    offenses in a proper case. This provision of the Penal Code
    reads as follows:
    Article 1436e,   Section 7.
    "Sec. 7. Where property Is obtained in
    such manner that the acquisition thereof
    constitutes both shoplifting and some other
    offense, the party thus offending shall be
    amenable to prosecution at the state's elec-
    tion for shoplifting or for such other of-
    fense as may have been committed by him."
    Article 1423, Vernon's Penal Code, states that ,Arti-
    cle 1422 does not apply to theft of property from the person
    nor to cases of theft of any particular kind of property where
    the punishment is specially prescribed. Section 3 of Article
    1436e provides for special punishment for violation of the Shop-
    lifting Act. However, Section 7 of Article 1436e gives the State
    the election to prosecute an offending party for shoplifting or
    for such other offenses as may have been committed by him. It
    is the opinion of this office that if the State elects under
    Section 7 of Article 1436e,to prosecute an offending party for
    theft under Article 1410, this election would prevent Article
    1423 from applying and the punishment for violation of Article
    1410 would be prescribed by Article 1422.
    Jurisdiction for a violation of Article 1436e would
    lie In the County Court or District Court by reason of Section
    3 thereof.
    Jurisdiction for violation of Article 1410 would lie
    in either the Justice of the Peace Court or the Corporation
    Court if the property Involved is of the value .of five dollars
    or under. Article 60, V.C.C.P.; Article 5, Section 19 of the
    -2201-
    Honorable R. L. Lattlmore, page 3 (c-462)
    Constitution of the State of Texas; Article 62,     V.C.C.P., and
    Article 1195, V.C.S.
    The Court of Criminal Appeals:did notrule on the
    question presented herein In Sullivan v. 
    State, supra
    . In the
    Sullivan case the State elected t t    the accused under the
    Shoplifting Statute.   Under thesi fa?ts, the Court held:
    "It Is apparent that the legislature
    Intended to enact a special statute defin-
    lng.the instant offense. It /Art. 1436e,
    P.C., Shoplifting7 controls oVer the gener-
    al statute. firricle 5, Section 19, Texas
    Constitution %ind Article 60, C.C.PAF
    It is, therefore, the opinion of this office that
    where property of the value of $5,00 or under is taken under
    conditions which constitute either theft or shoplifting, the
    State may elect to try the accused either under the Shopllft-
    ing Statute in the County or District Court or under the mis-
    demeanor theft statute in the Justice of the Peace or Corpo-
    ration Court.
    SUMMARY
    Where property is obtained in such man-
    ner that the acquisition thereof constitutes
    both shoplifting and misdemeanor theft of
    property of the value of $5.00 or under, the
    party thus offending shall be amenable to
    prosecution at the State's election for shop-
    lifting or for misdemeanor theft. Where the
    State elects to prosecute for misdemeanor
    theft, jurisdiction of the complaint is in
    t&$stlce    of the Peace or the Corporation
    .
    Yours very truly,
    WAGGONER CARR
    Attorney General of Texas
    B9:
    Assistant Attorney General
    DHC/lh/br
    -2202-
    .   -.   -
    Honorable R. L. Lattimore, page 4 (C-462)
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    W. V. Geppert, Chairman
    Bob Flowers
    John Banks
    Sam Kelley
    Brady Coleman
    APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    By: T. B. Wright
    -2203-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C-462

Judges: Waggoner Carr

Filed Date: 7/2/1965

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017