Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1950 )


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  •                          April 28, 1950
    Honorable W.~J. Murray, Jr., Chairman
    Railroad Commleslon of Texas
    Austin, Texaa
    Attention:     Honorable Bryan Bell
    Opinion NO. v-1048
    Re: Whether Articles 883,
    883(a), and 883(b),
    V.C.S., apply to,,motor
    bus companies trans-
    Dear Sir:                       porting baggage.
    The subject or your request ror an OplnlOn
    relatlng~-toappllcabllltgor Articles 883, 883(a),  and
    883(b), V.C.S., to motor bus companies 80 a8 to permit
    limitation or llablllty ror baggage transported, and
    whether these statutes requlre'a bond to be filed with
    the Commlsslon; has received careful study.
    You present two precise questions:
    "1. Do Articles 883, 883(a) and 883(b)
    ?.       of the Revised civil statutes or Texas apply
    to motor bus companies?
    "2. Do these Articles of the ~Revlsed
    Civil Statutes of Texas require that this
    bond be riled with the Railroad Commlsslon?"
    Section lc or Article 911a, V.C.S., derinee
    "Motor Bus Company" to mean:
    (I
    ... every corporationor person ...
    engaged ln the business or transporting
    persona ror compensationor hire loverthe
    pubilc hlghwaye within the State of Texae.
    ...
    Section 2 ol Article glla providea that:
    ..
    Hon. W. J. Murray, Jr., page 2   (v-1048)
    "All motor-bus companies, as defined
    herein, are hereby declared to be 'common
    carriera ....'
    Article 883 reads as follows:
    nRailroad companies and other common
    carriers or goods, wares and merchandise,
    for hire, within this State, on land, or in
    boats or vessels on the waters entirely
    wlthln this State, ,shallnot limit or re-
    strict their llablllty as it exists at com-
    mon law, by any general or special notice,
    or by inserting exceptions in the bill of
    lading or memorandum given upon the re-
    ceipt of the goods for transportation,or
    in any other manner whatever. Iso~speclal
    agreement made in contraventionof this
    Article shall be valid; provided, however,
    that 'arequlrement of'notice or olalm, con-
    sistent with the provisions or Ax-ticle~ 5546
    of the Re~vlsedCivil Statutes or Texas,
    1925, a8 a condition preoedent tokhe en-
    foraeme& or any claim for 108s; damage and
    delay,   or either or any of them, whether
    inserted in a bill of lading or other con-
    tract 0P arrangementror carriage, or
    otherwise provided, shall be valid and Is
    not hereby prohibited."
    Thla statute was originally enacted by the
    8th Legislature in 1860 a8 Se&Ion 1 of Chapter 44..It
    L,provided:
    *... That common carriers or goods,
    for hire, within this State, on land or In
    *boats, .or-vessels,on the waters entirely
    within the body of this State, shall not
    limit or restrict their liability, a8 it
    exists at common law, by any general or ac-
    tual notice, nor by lnaertlng exception8
    In the bill of lading, or memorandum given
    upon the receipt of the goods ror trana-
    portatlon, nor In any other manner, except
    by special agreement between the carrier
    and shipper, reduced to writing and signed
    .   .
    Hon. W. J. Murray, Jr., page 3   (v-1048)
    by the parties or their agents." (Emphasis
    added) Acts 8th Leg-s t%Q; Ch. 44, P. 38.
    In 1863 the 10th Legislature amended Section
    1 of the WAct concerning common carriers and defining
    their llablllt1ee In certain oases," to read:
    (I
    ... That railroad companies and
    other aommon cX%lTierS0r goods, wares, and
    merchandise for hire; within this State,
    on land, or In boats, or vc88e18, on the
    waters entirely wlthln'the body at this
    State#ahall not limit, or restrict their
    liability, as It exists at common law, by
    any general or spealal notice, nor by ln-
    sertlng exceptlons in the bill of Lading,
    nor memorandum given upon the reoelpt of
    the goods r0r transportation,.norIn any
    other manner, whatever. and no special
    agreement, made in contraventfonof tfi
    foregoing provIsions  or this seation sLl1
    be valid " (Em ha 1     dd d) Act8 10th
    L                %cg., l&3; ,.'I$ ;.'7.'
    Thus, under the 1860 Act, common carriers oi
    goods ror hire aould limit or restrlot llablllty as It
    eX18ted~at common law by *speolal agreement between the
    carrier and sfiipper." Btitthe Act or 1863.removed this
    rightand In effeat rested llablllty upon oa.rrlersOr
    &oodS. wares. and merchandise ror.hlre a8 it exi8tS at
    common law.
    L           : This provision or the Act as written iti1863
    was included in the revlelons or 1879, 1895, 1911, and
    1925, In precisely the rorm of the 1863 amendment. In
    1941, the Legislature again amended this statute (Ar-
    tlele 883, V.C.S.) by adding thereto,the iollorrlnglang-
    uage:
    II
    ... provided; however, that a re-
    quirement or notloe or claim, oonslstent
    with the provisions or Artlole 5546 of the
    Revised civil Statute8 of Texas, 1925, ~a8
    a condition precedent to the enforcement of
    any alalm for loss, damage and delay, or
    either or any of them, whether Inserted in
    .   .
    Hon. W. J. Murray, Jr., page 4    (v-1048)
    a bill or lading or contract or ermnge-.
    ment l’or carriage, or otherwise provided,
    shall be valid and IS not hereby prohlblt-
    ed." Act.847th Leg., R.S., 1941, Ch. 500,
    p. 805.
    In 1947, the statute was again amended by
    two new sections which are oodlfled as Arts.
    ii3";~ and 883(b) and read:
    "Art. 883(a). Declarationdr value; rates
    based on value; evidence
    "No specializedmotor aarrler~or other
    carrier for hire, Including the carriers
    referred to In said Article 883, shall be
    required to accept for transportationhouee-
    hdld goods, personal erreote or USed orrice
    furniture and equipment, unless the Shipper
    or owner thereof or his agent shall rlrst
    declare in writing the reasonable value
    thereor. The oarrler shall not be liable
    ln.damages ior an amount In excess of such
    declared value for the lose, destruction
    or damage or such property. The Railroad
    CO~88lOn Sha'llestablish adequate rates
    consistentwith such declared values to be
    assessed and aollected by such carriers.
    If the Railroad Commlaslon falls to estab-
    lish such rates, then in that event suah
    carriers are authorized to collect reason-
    able transportationcharges consistentwith
    the declared value of such property." Acts
    50th Leg., 1947, Ch. 327, p. 563.
    "Art.   883b.   Declaration of value.as evl-
    denoe
    "The declaration or value by the shlp-
    per shall not be admissible as evidence In
    any aourt a&ion unless the carrier at the
    time of acoeptance of such Shipment had or
    provlded and maintained in ioboe insurance
    in a solvent company authorized to do busl-
    nesa in TeJCaS,or bonds, in an amount equal
    to suah dealared value to protect the owner
    of such shipment against loss or damage
    thereto; provided, however, this requirement
    Hon. W. J. Murray, Jr., page 5   (V-1048)
    as to ln8urance or bonds shall not apply
    to steam or electrical railways." .I&.
    Article 883 prohibiting common carriers from
    llmltlng or restricting their llablllty as It exists at
    common law ~appllesto baggage transportedby common car-
    riers, as well asp-tocammodltles shipped as freight.
    The liability of oarrlers of baggage entrusted to their
    care Is that bf insurer and Is the same as the common
    law llablllty of carriers of goods. Burnet v. Rltter,;
    276,s.~.   347 (Tex. Clv. App. 1925); gTex. Jur. glb
    924, Carriers, Sew. 665, 674; Q-H. & S.A. Ry. v. i&9es'~'
    
    77 S.W. 234
    (Tex. Clv. App. 1903               . Hutahfn-
    8on on Crarrlere~ (3rd Ed. 1906), i4%7&;.*     '
    -
    As said in White v. St. Louis Southwestern
    a.     
    86 S.W. 962
    , 965 (Tex. Clv. App. 19051:
    ... there is no law .lnthis State flx-
    ”
    lng apeclflaallythe measme of llablllty
    0r carrleri3.~ror
    the iOSS.Or or damage to
    baggage. Their dutlea'and llabllltles are'
    the same as at common law, and at common law
    a common carrier for hire Is an Insurer of
    the Safety or baggage aommltted to its care
    ror transportatlon....~"
    It is an undoubted rule that statutes In iero-
    gatlon of the common law should be 8trlctPy conlltrued
    and we are not persuaded that Articles 883(a)and aadb)
    In any way permit common carriers 0r persons to limit
    or restrict their llablllty-fordamage to or loss of'
    w passengers'baggage as It exists at common law. We think
    the only purpose of House Bill 297 (Arts. 883(a) and
    883(b)) Is to permit oarrlere transporting as freight
    "householdgoods, personal erfects or used orrice fkrnl-
    ture and equipment as a alass of aommodltle8to limit
    or restrict their llablllty.~
    Under the Act "no specializedmotor carrier or
    other oarrler for hlre, lnaludlng the oarrlers referred
    to In Article 883, shall be required to accept ior tram-
    portatlon household goods,~personal'eff'ectsor used
    furniture and equipment, unless the shipper or owner
    thereof or his agent shall first declare In wrltlng the
    reasonable value thereof...."
    Hon. W. J. Murray, Jr., page 6   (V-1048)
    The Legislaturehas designated household goods,
    personal effects or used office furniture and equipment
    a class of commoditiesfor ease in dealing with numerous
    items slmllar In character and we think such a classl-
    flcatlon has a definite, valid objective and purpose.
    The 1947 Act provides that carriers shall not
    be required to accept the class of'commodltleaenumerat-
    ed therein unless the shipper declares the reasonable
    value thereof, and Article 6496, V.C.S., defines "shipper"
    as:
    "... any person, firm or corporation
    tendering rrelght for shipment, and any
    -consignor OF aonslgnee or any bill or glad-
    lng, or other person, firm or corporation
    having the right of consignor or consignee."
    'Phe1947 Act further provides that "the Rail-
    road Commlsslon shall establish adequate rates conslst-
    ent ~with such deolared values to be assessed and aollected
    byesuch carriers" and Ii the Commission rails to make such
    rates the oarrlers are authorized to collect transporta-
    ~tlon oharges consistent with the declaPed value. These
    portions of the statute are persuasive and Indicate an
    objective to Include within the statute the class of eom-
    modltles enumeratedwhen transportedas "freight" as dls-
    tingulahed from "baggage."
    In 2 Sutherland Statutory Construotlon (3rd Rd.
    1943), 395, it 18 Said:
    c             ”
    .where general words fOllOW specl-
    .   .
    flc Word8 In an enumerationdescribing the
    legal subject, the general words are con-
    'strued to embrace only objects similar In
    nature to those objects enumerated by the
    preceding specific words."
    Household goods as used in wills and tariffs
    embraces things domeatlc In nature purchased or aoqulred
    for we In and about the house, excluding articles of
    consumption and of trade. In Re Mltchell~s Will, 38 I.Y.
    Sup.26 673 (Sum. Ct. 1942).
    Baggage is "the trunks, valises, etc., which
    one carries on a journey...." Webster's New International
    ..’   -
    Hon. W. J. Murray, Jr., page 7   (V-1048)
    L
    Dictionary (2nd Ed. Unabridged, 1938). While baggage
    transportedby motor bus companies as a privilege grant-
    ed incident to carriage of passengers, conslderatlonfor
    which Is furnished by the purchase of a tloket, m&y be
    included wlthln the UnreStriCteddefinition of "personal
    -errects"it 18 not Included In the restricted meaning or
    'that term asaertalnedfrom the preaedlng words "houee-
    hold gOod8."
    Webster's New InternationalDlatlonaq (2nd
    Ed. Unabridged, 1938)  defines "personal effect8 as "ef-
    reds of a personal character: esp., as used In ~1118,
    tarirr laws, eta., suoh property especially appertaln-
    lng to ones person. The term may be restricted by words
    of narrower import to things 8jUSden generls, or where
    not restricted, as in a residuary legacy, 'paxinclude
    all artlales not employed In one'~sbUSine88.
    As used in tills, "personaleffects" is held
    to mean artlales similar in kind to apeclrl~ articles
    enumerated. ,Itla a broad expansive term and.uhen not
    restricted by cont~extembrace8 everythingwithin the
    L               deserlption of personal property, but when used~ln the
    expreaalon "household-furnitureand erreats" its meaning
    Is re8trloted to household goods. The words are not
    words or art, have no fixed meaning and:.areto be ln-
    terpreted In aucordance with use and may be restricted
    by appllcatloh of the rule ejusden generls to a partlcu-
    lar class or type or commodities or propert speclflcal-
    t
    ly mentioned. In Re Llppenoott'sEstatei 370fslj1;8,     59
    Pa. Supp. 1896); Child V. &ton,  183 At
    N.J. Ct. Chan. 1936) 48 C J 1046 Per&al 'Sec. 6;
    + In Re MIchaelson'sE&ate, i8'N.Y. &up.26 59,‘60     (Sum.
    .      .
    The problem here Is to determine the meaning
    the words "personal efredts' had in the leglslatlve
    vocabulary, and we think the meaning must be.ascertalned
    from the preaedlng words "householdgoods.*   Rad the'
    Legislature intended the words "personal eirects" to be
    used In their unreatr1cted 8enseh It would not ha;e em-
    ployed the more particular term household goods. The
    words npersonal efrects" must be construed in their or-
    dinary meaning Interpreted from the context of the
    statute In the light of the purpose sought to be ac-
    complished by Its enactment.
    -.   .
    Hon. W. J. Murray, Jr., page 8   (V-1048)
    In Popham v. Patterson, 
    121 Tex. 615
    , 
    51 S.W. 2d
    680 (1932), the court said:    ..
    "In construing statutes It is the duty
    of the court to ascertain the leglslative~
    Intent, and, when such Intent is once ar-
    rived at, It should be given errect; in fact,
    such intent Is the law. In determiningthe
    legislative intent, the court should not look
    alone to any one phrase, clause, or sentence
    of the Act, but to the entire Act; and this
    Includes the caption, the body of the Act,
    and the emergency clause...."
    Application of this rule makes It clear that
    the Legislature Intended to permit "specializedmotor
    carriers" and other carriers transportingas freight
    "householdgoods, persdnal effects or used office furnl-
    ture and equipment' as a class or commodltlesto re-
    strict llablllty. We find no intention expressed in
    the~1947 ijetor reasonably to be lmplled from Its terms
    to allow carriers of'persons for hire to llmlt or re-
    strict their llablllty as it exists at common law for
    loss of or damage to baggage of passengers transported
    Incident to the carriage of persons.
    In answer to your first question, we hold
    that Articles 883, 883(a)and 883(b)do not apply to
    motor bus companies. We believe that our answer to your
    first question appropriatelydisposes of your second
    question.
    .                            SUNMARY
    Articles 883, 883(a)and 883(b), v.c.s.,
    do not apply to motor bus companies so as to
    permit llmltatlon or.restrlctlonof llablllty
    for damage to or loss of baggage of passengers
    transported as an Incident to carriage of
    persons.
    Yours very truly,
    APPROVED:                            PRICE DANIEL
    Charles D. Mathews
    Executive Assistant
    Joe R. Greenfill                     Everett Hutchinson
    First Assistant                          ASSistallt
    EH:db
    

Document Info

Docket Number: V-1048

Judges: Price Daniel

Filed Date: 7/2/1950

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017