Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    GREG         ABBOTT
    January 23,2012
    The Honorable Richard J. Miller                      Opinion No. GA-0909
    Bell County Attorney
    Post Office Box 1127                                 Re: Transportation of a patient after a preliminary
    Belton, Texas 76513                                  examination by a mental health facility (RQ-0990-GA)
    Dear Mr. Miller:
    You seek an opinion about what "mode of transportation may be used to transport a mentally
    ill person to Austin State Hospital ("ASH") or another appropriate facility after a preliminary
    examination by a mental health facility."l
    You note that section 574.045 of the Health and Safety Code ("Code") provides procedures
    and requirements for transportation of a mentally ill person who has been detained under two
    sections: sections 573.022 and 574.023. See Request Letter at 1. You describe a situation involving
    detention under a third section, section 573.021, under which a mental health facility initially
    conducts a preliminary examination of an individual. See 
    id. In the
    situation you describe, that
    mental health facility determines that there is a need to hospitalize the person at ASH or another
    similar facility. See 
    id. You state
    that "[t]here is no court involvement in such scenario, but it is not
    clear that the mental health facility is free under such circumstances to arrange for transportation of
    the patient on its own without court involvement." 
    Id. You ask
    "[i]n such [a] situation, maya
    patient be taken to ASH or a similar treatment facility by private conveyance arranged for by the
    initial health facility rather than requiring a court order under the provisions of Section 574.0457"
    ld. 2
    The primary concern of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
    Legislature. See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 
    340 S.W.3d 432
    , 439 (Tex. 2011). To
    determine that intent, we begin with the language of the statute. See 
    id. "We presume
    that the
    Legislature chooses a statute's language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while
    purposefully omitting words not chosen." 
    Id. In determining
    legislative intent, we also consider the
    purpose or the "object sought to be obtained." See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0759 (2010) at 6.
    ILetter from Honorable Richard J. Miller, Bell County Attorney, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General
    of Texas at 1 (Aug. 3, 2011), https:llwww.oag.state.tx.us/opin/index_rq.shtm1 ("Request Letter").
    2Though the initial statement of your question could suggest you are concerned primarily with only a method
    of conveyance, the situation you describe under section 573.021 and your concern about lack of court involvement
    suggests you are asking more generally about authority to transport a patient under section 573.021 . It is this question
    we address.
    The Honorable Richard J. Miller - Page 2 (GA-0909)
    We first consider the language of relevant provisions in chapters 573 and 574. Section
    574.045 applies to committed patients) or persons detained under only sections 573.022 and
    574.023. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.045(a) (WestSupp. 2011) ("The court may
    authorize ... the transportation of a committed patient or a patient detained under Section 573 .022
    or 574.023 ... ."). It does not include patients detained under section 573.02l. See 
    id. Moreover, sections
    573.022 and 574.023 themselves authorize, under different circumstances, the transportation
    of a mentally ill person to another facility. See 
    id. §§ 573.022(b)
    ("A mental health facility that
    has admitted a person for emergency detention under this section may transport the person to a
    mental health facility .... "), 574.023(a) (West 2010) ("A protective custody order shall direct a
    person authorized to transport patients under Section 574.045 to take the proposed patient into
    protective custody and transport the person immediately to a mental health facility .... "); see also
    
    id. §§ 573.025(a)(6),
    .026 (West 2010) (requiring transportation under section 573.022 be provided
    according to section 574.045). The language of the relevant provisions does not authorize the
    transportation of a mentally ill person under section 573.02l.
    Moreover, the express inclusion of sections 573.022 and 574.023 within the scope of section
    574.045 indicates that the Legislature knows how, and under what circumstances, to provide for the
    transportation of detained mentally ill persons, something it has not done with respect to section
    573 .021. See FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 
    22 S.W.3d 868
    , 884-85 (Tex. 2000)
    (relying on the principle of statutory construction that the Legislature knows how to enact laws
    effectuating its intent). We must presume that the Legislature did not include reference to section
    573.021 in section 574.045 for a reason. See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical 
    Co., 340 S.W.3d at 439
    ("We presume that the Legislature chooses a statute's language with care, including ... purposefully
    omitting words not chosen."). For us to opine that a mental health facility could employ section
    574.045 to transport a mentally ill person detained under section 573.021 would require us to insert
    language into the text of section 574.045. We decline to do so. See Energy Servo Co. of Bowie, Inc.
    V. Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 
    236 S.W.3d 190
    , 199 (Tex. 2007) (stating that "[0 Jnly when it is
    necessary to give effect to clear legislative intent can we insert, by interpretation, additional words
    or requirements into a statutory provision").
    While the statutory text resolves your question as explained above, it is appropriate in this
    context to consider the purpose of the Code as well. Because a person is deprived of liberty when
    involuntarily detained or committed, constitutional due process protections are implicated. See
    O'Connor V. Donaldson, 
    422 U.S. 563
    , 580 (1975) ("There can be no doubt that involuntary
    commitment to a mental hospital ... is a deprivation of liberty which the state cannot accomplish
    without due process of law."). The purpose of the Code includes providing access to humane care
    and treatment for persons suffering from mental illness and safeguarding the person's legal rights.
    See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 572.002 (West 2010); see also 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
    § 404.154 (2011) (Dep't of State Health Services, Rights of All Persons Receiving Mental Health
    3The situation you describe involves a person being detained for preliminary examination and thus does not
    involve a committed patient who may be involuntarily committed only upon court order. See generally TEx. HEALTH
    & SAFETY CODE ANN . §§ 574.034 (West 2010) (authorizing judge to order temporary inpatient mental health services
    upon certain findings with clear and convincing evidence), 574.035 (West Supp. 2011) (authorizing court-ordered
    extended inpatient mental health services).
    The Honorable Richard J. Miller - Page 3 (GA-0909)
    Services) (listing rights of persons receiving mental health services). The Code is a complex scheme
    that the Legislature implemented to balance those competing purposes.
    The sections about which you ask contain provisions that serve the Code's balance between
    detention and respect for a person's due process rights. Section 573.022 allows a person to be
    detained for emergency mental health treatment but only upon a written statement from a medical
    professional based on established standards that the person is in need of those services. See TEX.
    HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 573.022(a) (West Supp. 2011). And it generally requires the
    intervention of a court for subsequent transportation. See 
    id. § 573.022(b).
    Section 574.023 requires
    a court to make judicial findings within a limited period of time before allowing for continued
    detention under a protective custody order. See 
    id. §§ 574.023(b)
    (West 2010) (allowing detention
    until hearing is held under section 574.025), 574.025(b) (requiring probable cause hearing "not later
    than 72 hours after ... the proposed patient was detained under a protective custody order").
    Similarly, section 573.021 serves the balance of interests contemplated by the Code. Under
    chapter 573, a person may be detained without a warrant on the observations of a peace officer. 
    Id. § 573.001
    ("A peace officer, without a warrant, may take a person into custody if the officer ... has
    reason to believe and does believe that ... the person is mentally ill" and poses a substantial risk of
    harm to themselves or others); see also 
    id. § 573.002(a)
    (requiring an application for emergency
    detention). But section 573.021 authorizes a mental health facility only to temporarily accept, rather
    than admit, a person into the facility for the limited purpose of a preliminary examination. Compare
    
    id. § 573.021(a)
    ("A facility shall temporarily accept a person .... "), with 
    id. § 573.022(a)
    (West
    Supp. 2011) ("A person may be admitted to a facility for emergency detention .... ") (emphasis
    added). And section 573.021 generally restricts the emergency detention of the person to no
    longer than 48 hours. See 
    id. § 573.021(b)
    (West 2010). With these requirements, section 573.021
    minimizes the deprivation of liberty caused by a warrantless detention. Allowing the initial mental
    health facility to transport the person to another mental health facility without court involvement and
    absent a physician's written findings that the person is mentally ill and in need of immediate
    treatment would thwart the due process protections afforded by the Code and upsets the balance
    between medical treatment and protection of legal rights. In addition to construing the plain text of
    the statutes in question, as we have done, we must also avoid a conclusion that contravenes the
    purpose of the Code. See Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659,662
    (Tex. 1996) (stating that courts "reject interpretations of a statute that defeat the purpose of the
    legislation so long as another reasonable interpretation exists").
    In sum, the language of the relevant provisions of chapters 573 and 574, in addition to the
    purposes sought to be achieved by the Code, compel the conclusion that the Legislature intended to
    allow for transportation of a mentally ill person to ASH or a similar mental health facility only as
    provided by section 574.045. 4
    40 nce a preliminary examination under section 573.021 has been conducted and a physician has made the
    written statement containing his or her findings required by section 573.022, an initial mental health facility would be
    authorized to transport the patient to another mental health facility under sections 573.022 and 574.045.
    The Honorable Richard J. Miller - Page 4 (GA-0909)
    SUMMARY
    The Legislature provides for the transportation of a mentally
    ill person under section 574.045, Health and Safety Code. Section
    574.045 does not authorize transportation of a person who has been
    detained under section 573.021. Accordingly, a person may not,
    under section 573.021, be taken to the Austin State Hospital or
    similar treatment facility by private conveyance arranged for by the
    initial mental health facility that conducted the preliminary
    examination of the person.
    However, once a preliminary examination under section
    573.021 has been conducted and a physician has made the written
    statement containing his or her findings required by section 573.022,
    an initial mental health facility would be authorized to transport the
    patient to another mental health facility under sections 573.022 and
    574.045.
    Very truly yours,
    DANIEL T. HODGE
    First Assistant Attorney General
    DAVID J. SCHENCK
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    JASON BOATRIGHT
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Charlotte M. Harper
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: GA-0909

Judges: Greg Abbott

Filed Date: 7/2/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017