Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2010 )


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  •                                ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    GREG        ABBOTT
    November 4,2010
    The Honorable Florence Shapiro                            Opinion No. GA-0816
    Chair, Committee on Education
    Texas State Senate                                        Re: Authority of the Dallas County Commissioners
    Post Office Box 12068                                     Court to retain independent legal counsel ill
    Austin, Texas 78711-2068                                  particular circumstances (RQ-0870-GA)
    Ms. Virginia Porter
    Dallas County Auditor
    509 Main Street, Suite 407
    Dallas, Texas 75202
    Dear Senator Shapiro and Ms. Porter:
    You both ask questions about the authority of the Dallas County Criminal District Attorney
    to represent the County in civil matters and how that authority corresponds with the Dallas County
    Commissioners Court's authority to retain independent legal counsel in particular circumstances.'
    The two sets of questions together require us to analyze the following three subjects: (l) the division
    between the Dallas County Commissioners' authority to retain counsel and the Dallas County
    Criminal District Attorney's authority to represent Dallas County in civil matters and which county
    official or officials have the authority to select special counsel to represent the County; (2) whether
    conflict of interest or a statutory bar prohibits the Criminal District Attorney from performing his
    function under that section; and (3) the lawfulness of contracts entered into by the Dallas County
    Commissioners Court for employment of special counsel. 2 We will address these issues seriatim.
    I.     The Division of Authority Between the Dallas County Commissioners Court and the
    Criminal District Attorney with Regard to Civil Matters
    Section 44.157 of the Government Code outlines the duties specific to the Dallas County
    Criminal District Attorney and confers broad authority over criminal matters and a duty to represent
    the state in criminal matters in Dallas County, except where that duty is assigned elsewhere by
    statute. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 44.1 57(a)-(b) (West 2004). Notably, that section does not confer
    any authority to represent the County in civil matters. 
    Id. In analyzing
    a similar statute specific to
    1See Shapiro Request Letter at   1; Porter Request Letter at 1 (available at http://www.texasattorueygeneral.gov).
    'We understand all of the questions to relate to Dallas County. We limit our answers accordingly.
    The Honorable Florence Shapiro - Page 2                        (GA-08l6)
    Ms. Virginia Porter
    the Galveston County Criminal District Attorney, the Texas Supreme Court provided the following
    explanation:
    [W]e understand section 44.184 to impose a duty on the Criminal
    District Attorney to represent the county if requested, but not to
    deprive the Commissioners Court of the option of availing itself of
    the advice of other counsel when the legal matter to be addressed is
    not one within the Criminal District Attorney's exclusive domain.
    Guynes v. Galveston Cnty., 
    861 S.W.2d 861
    , 864 (Tex. 1993). Indeed, courts have "upheld the
    power of a commissioners court to hire counsel to assist it or other officials in carrying out their
    responsibilities so long as the statutory duties of other county officials are not thereby usurped." Id
    at 863.
    While the Legislature has expressly authorized the "commissioners court of a county
    with a population of more than 1.25 million [to] employ an attorney as special counsel ... to
    ... represent the county in any suit brought by or against the county," TEx. Loc. GOV'TCODEANN.
    § 89.001(a}-(b) (West 2008), it has also prescribed the method for selection of special counsel:
    If the county does not have a county attorney, the district attorney or
    criminal district attorney shall select the special counsel. The
    selecting officer shall determine the terms and duration of
    employment of the special counsel, subject to the court's approval.
    
    Id. § 89.001(c)
    (emphasis added).3
    When interpreting statutes such as this, we ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent
    as expressed by the statute's language. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621,625 (Tex.
    2008). Where the text is clear, it is determinative of the Legislature's intent. Entergy Gu!fStates,
    Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433,437 (Tex. 2009). Based on the plain language of section 89.001,
    while the commissioner's court has the authority to determine whether to pursue or defend a claim
    in court, it is for the criminal district attorney to "select the special counsel." TEX. LOc. GOV'T CODE
    ANN. § 89.001 (West 2008); see also Driscoll v. Harris Cnty. Comm'rs Ct., 
    688 S.W.2d 569
    , 573
    (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.) (applying predecessor to section 89.001,
    and finding that, "if there was no county attorney, then the district attorney or criminal district
    attorney was to participate in the process of employing special counsel"). Thus, we conclude that
    Local Government Code section 89.001 designates the Dallas County Criminal District Attorney as
    the officer authorized to select special counsel to represent the County in a suit brought by or against
    the County.
    'Dallas County does not have a county attorney, but "[tlhe criminal district attorney has all the powers, duties,
    and privileges in Dallas County that are conferred by law on county and district attorneys in the various counties and
    districts." TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 44.157(b) (West 2004).
    The Honorable Florence Shapiro - Page 3                       (GA-0816)
    Ms. Virginia Porter
    II.       Effect of Statutory Bar or Conflict
    Senator Shapiro asks whether the Dallas County Criminal District Attorney is "precluded
    from representing Dallas County in civil matters" because he is a state prosecutor as defined
    in section 41.006 of the Government Code. Shapiro Request Letter at 2. TEx. GOY'T CODE ANN.
    § 46.001(3) (West Supp. 2010). We find nothing in chapter 46 that expressly precludes the Dallas
    County Criminal District Attorney from representing the County in civil matters. Fnrthermore, we
    note that other officials listed as state prosecutors in section 46.002 are authorized to represent their
    respective counties in all matters pending before the conrts of their jurisdiction, not just criminal
    matters. See, e.g., 
    id. §§ 45.244
    (West 2004), 46.002(3)(West Supp. 2010). Thus, the fact that the
    Dallas County Criminal District Attorney is defined as a state prosecutor in chapter 46 of the
    Government Code does not preclude him from representing the county in civil matters.
    Senator Shapiro also asks whether the Dallas County Criminal District Attorney's authority
    to select a special counsel changes "where a conflict of interest exists for the District Attorney."
    Shapiro Request Letter at 1. In enacting section 89.001, the Legislature is fairly "presumed to have
    enacted [it] ... with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it." Acker v. Tex.
    Water Comm 'n, 790 S.W.2d 299,301 (Tex. 1990). The Legislature requires that criminal district
    attorneys be lawyers subject to the State Bar's ethical rules. See TEx. GOy'T CODE ANN. § 41.001
    (West 2004) (requiring district attorneys to be licensed attorneys); 
    id. § 81.071
    (subjecting licensed
    attorneys to the disciplinary jurisdiction ofthe state supreme conrt and state bar). Thus, when the
    Legislature enacted section 89.001 in 1987 it surely anticipated that the county or district attorney
    in the populous counties to which that provision applied would be subject to ethical constraints,
    including conflict of interest rules. Accordingly, we believe that a conrt construing section 89.001
    would likely find that a criminal district attorney could not select counsel for a commissioners conrt
    where he or she is actually laboring under an ethical conflict in making that selection.'
    III.     Lawfulness of Contract Entered into by a Commissioners Court Without Prior
    Approval of the Criminal District Attorney
    Ms. Porter asks whether a contract for private "counsel representing the County negotiated
    by Dallas County's Commissioners Conrt, without approval of the District Attorney, is lawfully
    made or null and void.,,5 Porter Request Letter at 1. We note at the outset that this office does not
    'This opinion does not address any pending accusation of conflict ofinterest. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-
    0557 (2007) at 3 (noting that discussing a particular disciplinary violation is beyond the scope of the opinion process).
    The question whether a conflict exists is for the Crhninal District Attorney and the Conunissioners Court to negotiate
    in the first instance and for an appropriate court to the extent agreement cannot be reached. See, e.g., TEx. CODE CRIM.
    PROC. ANN. art. 2.07 (West 2005) (authorizing the 'Judge ofthe court" in which the district attorney represents the state
    to appoint "any competent attorney to perform the duties of the office" where the district attorney is "disqualified" or
    "unable to perform").
    'We assume that the representation Ms. Porter is concerned about falls within the parameters of subsection
    89.001(b) ofthe Local Government Code.
    The Honorable Florence Shapiro - Page 4              (GA-0816)
    Ms. Virginia Porter
    approve, review, or comment on the terms of a particular contract in the opinion process. Tex. Att'y
    Gen. Op. No. GA -074 3 (2009) at 1-2. Therefore, a determination as to whether a particular contract
    is lawful or void is outside the scope of the opinion process. 
    Id. at 2.
    However, we can address
    general legal principles that may be relevant to whether a contract is permitted under the law. 
    Id. As noted
    above, a commissioners court has the authority to retain counsel for the purpose of
    rendering advice and counsel. There is no statutory requirement that the criminal district attorney
    endorse such a contract in order for it to be valid. However, in counties subject to section 89.001
    of the Local Govemment Code, where the engagement goes further and includes authorization to
    "represent the county in any suit brought by or against the county," the engagement is to be made
    by the county, district, or criminal district attorney. An engagement made in violation of this
    requirement could be ratified or voided at his or her election, subject to the possibility of a disabling
    conflict or other disability detailed above, in which case the issue would be resolved by an
    appropriate civil court.
    The Honorable Florence Shapiro - Page 5           (GA-0816)
    Ms. Virginia Porter
    SUMMARY
    Although the Dallas County Criminal District Attorney has
    broad authority over most criminal matters and a duty to represent the
    state in those matters in Dallas County, he does not have a duty to
    represent Dallas County in all civil matters. However, the Dallas
    County Criminal District Attorney does have the power to select
    counsel and to determine the terms and duration of the engagement
    where the representation will include filing or defending a suit by or
    against the County.
    While the Dallas County Criminal District Attorney is not
    barred from exercising this or any other power on account of his
    status as a state prosecutor under the statutory provision defining and
    constraining that office, he is subject to ethical rules governing
    conflicts of interest that could preclude him from selecting counsel.
    Whether such a conflict exists is a matter for the Criminal District
    Attorney and the County Commissioners to determine in the first
    instance and, barring agreement, as an ancillary matter for the civil
    court.
    DANIEL T. HODGE
    First Assistant Attorney General
    DAVID J. SCHENCK
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    NANCY S. FULLER
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Virginia K. Hoelscher
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: GA-0816

Judges: Greg Abbott

Filed Date: 7/2/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017