Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2010 )


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  •                                 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    GREG        ABBOTT
    September 24, 2010
    The Honorable Frank J. Corte Jr.                          Opinion No. GA-0803
    Chair, Committee on Defense and
    Veterans' Affairs                                      Re: Whether a facility must have a license to
    Texas House of Representatives                            perform medical abortions, and whether drugs to
    Post Office Box 2910                                      induce an abortion must be ingested in the presence
    Austin, Texas 78768-2910                                  of the prescribing physician (RQ-0859-GA)
    Dear Representative Corte:
    You initially asked for our opinion regarding whether a facility must have a license to
    perform medical abortions. 1 You subsequently asked for our opinion regarding "whether drugs that
    are administered for the purpose of inducing an abortion must be ingested by the patient in the
    presence of the physician who has prescribed them for her."2 We have consolidated your two
    requests and consider the questions together.
    Abortion facilities in Texas are licensed and regulated under chapter 245 of the Health and
    Safety Code, the Texas Abortion Facility Reporting and Licensing Act (the "Act"). See generally
    TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 245.001-.023 (West 2010); see also 
    id. § 245.001
    (setting
    out short title). With specified exceptions,3 the Act requires that all abortion facilities be licensed.
    See 
    id. § 245.003(a).
    In addition, the Act imposes reporting and other requirements on abortion
    facilities, and it provides methods for dealing with violations. See, e.g., 
    id. §§ 245.011
    ("Reporting
    Requirements; Criminal Penalty"); 245.012 ("Denial, Suspension, Probation, or Revocation of
    License"); 245.013 ("Injunction"); 245.014 ("Criminal Penalty"); 245.015 ("Civil Penalty"); 245.017
    ("Administrative Penalty"). The Act also authorizes the Board of the Department of State Health
    lRequest Letter (Oct. 5,2009) (with attachments) [hereinafier Oct. Request Letter].
    'Request Letter (Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafier Jan. Request Letter].
    'The Act exempts (I) hospitals licensed under the Texas Hospital Licensing Law; (2) physicians' offices,
    licensed under subtitle B, title 3, Occupations Code, that perfonn fewer than a specified number of abortions; and (3)
    ambulatory surgical centers licensed under chapter 243, Health and Safety Code. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
    ANN. § 245.004(a) (West 2010) (reflecting two different subsections (a)); see also Brief of Lisa Hernandez, General
    Counsel, Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs. at I (Nov. 20, 2009) (on file with the Opinion Committee).
    The Honorable Frank Corte Jr. - Page 2              (GA-0803)
    Services4 ("DSHS") to adopt rules to implement chapter 245 and to impose minimum standards on
    abortion facilities. See 
    id. §§ 245.009
    ("Adoption of Rules"), 245.010 ("Minimum Standards").
    The licensing requirement of chapter 245 applies to an "abortion facility." See 
    id. § 245.003(a).
    An "abortion facility" is defined as "a place where abortions are performed." 
    Id. § 245.002(2).
    Thus, to address your question whether a facility must have a license, we must
    determine whether a medical abortion that you describe as involving the use of drugs is an "abortion"
    under chapter 245.
    Chapter 245 defines an abortion as
    an act or procedure performed after pregnancy has been medically
    verified and with the intent to cause the termination of a pregnancy
    other than for the purpose of either the birth of a live fetus or
    removing a dead fetus. The term does not include birth control
    devices or oral contraceptives.
    
    Id. § 245.002(1).
    The plain language ofthe definition of abortion does not distinguish between the
    termination of a pregnancy through surgical or medical means. See 
    id. ; cf
    United States v. Ollison,
    555 F.3d 152,160 (5th Cir. 2009) (construing the term "employee" in statute and noting that plain
    language did not distinguish between "high-level" and "low-level" employees); Exparte Hernandez,
    
    165 S.W.3d 760
    , 763 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet.) (noting language of statute did not
    distinguish between different kinds of pardons). The definit,ion of abortion therefore is not limited
    to a particular means of accomplishing an abortion. Instead, the definition of abortion includes
    simply an act or procedure as specified by section 245.002(1). See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
    ANN. § 245.002(1) (West 2010).
    Texas courts rely on dictionaries to determine the meaning of terms not defined in statute.
    See CenterPoint Energy Entex v. R.R. Comm 'n, 208 S.W.3d 608,619 (Tex. App.-Austin2006, pet.
    dism'd) (explaining that Texas courts may rely on commonly used dictionaries to discern the plain
    meaning of statutory terms) (citing Powell v. Stover, 
    165 S.W.3d 322
    , 326 (Tex. 2005». The
    common meaning of the term "act" is "[sJomething done or performed, esp. voluntarily; a deed."
    BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 27 (9thed. 2009); see also TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (West
    2005) ("Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar
    and common usage."); State v. West, 
    826 P.2d 940
    , 943 (Mont. 1992) (defining "act" to mean "a
    thing done or that which is done"). The word "procedure" is commonly defined to mean "[aJ
    specific method or course of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1323 (9th ed. 2009); see United
    States v. Berkos, 
    543 F.3d 392
    , 398 (7th Cir. 2008); see also In re United States, 
    665 F. Supp. 2d 1210
    , 1217 (D. Or. 2009) (defining "procedure" to mean "a series of steps taken to accomplish an
    4The "Board" referred to is the former Texas Board of Health, now the Texas Department of State Health
    Services. See Act ofJune 2,2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 198, §§ 1.09, 1.19, 1.26,2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 611, 618-23,
    636-37,641,729.
    The Honorable Frank Corte Jr. - Page 3                   (GA-0803)
    action" or "a specific method or course of action"). Accordingly, an abortion under chapter 245
    involves a deed or something done or a specific method or course of action intended to cause the
    termination of a pregnancy as specified by subsection 245.002(1).
    In your request letter, you generally describe a medical abortion as one caused by the use of
    drugs. See Oct. Request Letter at 4-5 (describing the use of drugs, primarily Mifeprex® known
    colloquially as "RU-486," to induce abortions). Prescribing or providing5 a drug is a deed or
    something done or a specific method or course of action, and thus is an act or procedure under the
    common definitions of those terms. If the prescribing or providing of a drug is done with the
    requisite intent to terminate a pregnancy that has been medically verified, then the prescribing or
    providing of the drug is an abortion under chapter 245. Accordingly, unless expressly exempted, a
    facility performing such an act or procedure within the scope of subsection 245.002(1) is an abortion
    facility that must be licensed under chapter 245.
    Because our analysis of this question is focused on medical abortions generally and because
    questions of intent involve factual considerations that fall outside the purview of an attorney general
    opinion, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the prescribing or providing of any particular
    drug is an abortion as defined by subsection 245.002(1).0 See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. GA-0581
    (2007) at 3 ("Whether a particular action is performed ... intentionally is a fact question. "); see also
    GA-0726 (2009) at 3 ("We cannot find and resolve questions of fact in an attorney general
    opinion."). As the agency charged with implementation of the Act, DSHS may make that
    determination in the first instance. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 245.005(d) (West
    2010) (authorizing DSHS to issue abortion facility license), 245.009 (authorizing DSHS to adopt
    rules).
    You also inquire whether a drug that is provided with the intent to induce an abortion must
    be ingested by the patient in the presence of the prescribing physician. 7 See Jan. Request Letter
    S"'Provision' means the supply of one or more unit doses of a drug, medicine, or dangerous drug." TEX.OCC.
    CODE ANN. § l57.002(a)(2) (West2004); see also 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 169.2(8) (2010) (Tex. Med. Bd., Defmitions)
    (defining "provision").
    'Our research indicates that drugs commonly used to induce an abortion may have medical uses other than the
    termination of a pregnancy. For instance, the drug methotrexate, a drug sometimes used in combination with another
    drug to induce an abortion, is also used in the treatment of cancer. See Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft,
    
    444 F.3d 502
    , 512 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing doctor's testimony regarding abortifacient uses of methotrexate as well
    as its use as a cancer agent).
    'In your requests, you include material related to a specific protocol of use for a particular drug. See Oct.
    Request Letter (attached materials pertaining to Mifeprex®); Jan. Request Letter at I (referring to previously submitted
    materials pertaining to Mifeprex®). You aver that the protocol requires the drug to be ingested by the patient in the
    presence of the physician. See Oct. Request Letter at 4-5. The protocol merely requires that the drug be taken by the
    patient in the doctor's office, not in the physical presence of the physician. See id (attached Patient Agreement with
    respect to the use ofMifeprex® (mifepristone) requiring patient to agree to "take Mifeprex in my provider's office").
    The Honorable Frank Corte Jr. - Page 4          (GA-0803)
    at 1. In averring that Texas law requires such a result, you direct us to section 157.001 of the
    Occupations Code and section 245.010 of the Health and Safety Code. See 
    id. at 1-2.
    Section
    157.001(a)(l) authorizes a physician to delegate a medical act to a qualified and properly trained
    person under specified conditions. TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 157.001(a)(1) (West 2004). One of
    the conditions is that the medical act is not an act in violation of any other statute. See 
    id. § 157.001
    (a)(l )(C). Section245.01 O(b) ofthe Health and Safety Code provides that only a physician
    may perform an abortion. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(b) (West 2010).
    You argue that Health and Safety Code section 245.01 O(b) limits Occupations Code section
    157.001 (a)( 1) and precludes a physician from delegating the performance of an abortion to another
    health care professional. See Jan. Request Letter at 1-2. Even assuming your construction of these
    two statutory provisions is in accordance with the legislative intent, neither statute imposes any
    requirement on the patient taking a drug provided to induce an abortion. See TEx. Occ. CODE ANN.
    § 157.001 (a)(l) (West 2004) (providing general delegation authority to physician); TEx. HEALTH &
    SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(b) (West 2010) (requiring abortion be performed by physician).
    Nothing in section 157.001(a)(l) or section 245.010(b) mandates that a patient ingest such drugs in
    the presence of the physician. See TEx. OCC. CODE ANN. § 157.001(a)(1) (West 2004); TEx.
    HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(b) (West 2010). Rather, it appears generally that a patient
    may consume prescribed drugs away from the physician's office. See 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 169.4
    (2010) (Tex. Med. Bd., Providing, Dispensing, or Distributing Drugs) (authorizing physician to
    "provide, dispense, or distribute drugs for use or consumption by the patient away from the
    physician's office or after the conclusion of the physician-patient encounter"). Additionally, in our
    examination of other statutory provisions regulating the medical profession, we find no provision
    that requires a patient to ingest drugs in the presence of the physician. See generally TEx. Occ.
    CODE ANN. §§ 151.001-165.160 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) ("Physicians" title 3, subtitle B). The
    Legislature could have included the requirement that a patient ingest a drug in the presence ofthe
    physician. The Legislature did not do so. The Legislature cannot expect the Attorney General to
    impose standards that the Legislature has falled to impose. We thus cannot conclude that a patient
    must ingest drugs that are provided with the intent to induce an abortion in the presence of the
    prescribing physician.
    The Honorable Frank Corte Jr. - Page 5        (GA-0803)
    SUMMARY
    Except as expressly exempted, chapter 245, Health and Safety
    Code, requires an abortion facility to be licensed. The prescribing or
    providing of a drug, not otherwise excluded as a birth control device
    or oral contraceptive, and done with the requisite intent to terminate
    a medically verified pregnancy, may be an abortion under section
    245.002(1). Whether the prescribing or providing of a particular drug
    is an abortion is a fact question that must be determined by the Texas
    Department of State Health Services in the first instance.
    Texas statutes do not require a patient to ingest drugs that are
    provided to the patient with the intent to induce an abortion in the
    presence of the prescribing physician.
    DANIEL T. HODGE
    First Assistant Attorney General
    DAVID J. SCHENCK
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    NANCY S. FULLER
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Charlotte M. Harper
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee