Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2006 )


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  •                             ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    GREG       ABBOTT
    December 15,2006
    The Honorable D. Matt Bingham                            Opinion No. GA-0492
    Smith County Criminal District Attorney
    Smith County Courthouse                                  Re:    Whether a proposed Smith ‘County
    100 North Broadway, 4th Floor                            incentive bonus plan for certain county
    Tyler, Texas 75702                                       employees complies with article III, section
    53 ofthe Texas Constitution (RQ-0486-GA)
    Dear Mr. Bingham:
    Gn behalf of a Smith County Commissioner, you ask whether a proposed Smith County
    incentive bonus plan for certain county employees complies with article III, section 53 of the Texas
    Constitution.’
    You inform us that the Smith County Commissioners Court (the “Commissioners Court”)
    is considering adopting an incentive bonus plan for employees in departments that report directly to
    the Commissioners Court-that      is, employees of the Commissioners Court, the records service, the
    veterans service, the physical plan[t], personnel, the probate court or courts, purchasing, the tire
    marshal, pre-trial, and road and bridge. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2; Smith County
    Incentive Plan, attached to Request Letter as Exhibit B, at 1 [hereinafter Incentive Plan]. Under the
    proposed incentive plan, employees whose annual job performance has been meritorious would be
    eligible for bonuses if they meet the following criteria:
    .     Full time employee with a minimum of one year [of] service at
    the end of the fiscal year.
    .     Annual     performance     evaluation   rating   of  [“Imeets
    expectationsr]   or above. Department Heads must have an
    annual    performance     evaluation  rating   of [“Iexceeds
    expectations[“] or above.
    .     Be an employee in good standing on the date incentive checks
    are distributed.
    ‘See Letter from Honorable D. Matt B&ham, Smith County Criminal District Attorney, to Honorable Greg
    Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, at 1 (May 11, 2006) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available   at
    http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].
    The Honorable D. Matt Bingham        - Page 2          (GA-0492)
    .     Department Heads must have a fully implemented      business plan
    approved by the Commissioners Court.
    Incentive Plan, supra at 1. Incentive payments will be distributed in the first quarter of the fiscal
    year based on performance in the prior fiscal year. See 
    id. You also
    inform us that the Incentive
    Plan would stipulate that it “is provided at the discretion of the Commissioners Court” and further,
    that the Commissioners Court “reserves the right to administer, modify or terminate the Plan with
    or without notice.” Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2.
    Certain Smith County Commissioners question the Incentive Plan’s constitutionality.      See
    
    id. You thus
    ask whether the Incentive Plan “meet[s] the requirements of [alrticle III, [slection 53
    of the Texas Constitution and what is the effect if any of an incentive bonus plan that does not
    include all county employees.” 
    Id. at 1.
    Article III, section 53 forbids the legislature “to grant, or to authorize any county.   to grant
    any extra compensation, fee or allowance to a public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after
    service has been rendered, or a contract has been entered into, and performed in whole or in part.”
    TEX. CONST.    art. III, 5 53. Consistently with article III, section 53, a county may not pay additional
    compensation to employees for work already performed. See City of Orange v. Chance, 
    325 S.W.2d 838
    , 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont           1959, no writ) (citing Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 
    70 S.W.2d 576
    , 582 (Tex. 1934)). But a county may provide bonuses based on performance if the
    county approved a bonus plan before employee recipients performed the work for which the bonuses
    are given. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0204 (2004) at 3-4; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JM-1253
    (1990) at 2-3.
    Your specific concern about the Incentive Plan’s validity relates to the stipulation that the
    Plan “is provided at the discretion of the Commissioners Court” and that the Commissioners Court
    reserves “the right to administer, modify or terminate the Plan with or without notice.” Incentive
    Plan, supra at 2; see Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2. You ask whether, given these stipulations,
    the Incentive Plan is “approved as part of an employee’s compensation prior to the employee
    rendering service.” Request Letter, supva note 1, at 2.
    The fact that the Incentive Plan makes the award of bonuses and administration of the plan
    a matter within the Commissioners          Court’s discretion does not render the Incentive Plan
    unconstitutional under article III, section 53. Article III, section 53 does not prohibit payments made
    for work performed under a contract or employment policy that provides merely for thepksibility
    of such payments. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0204 (2004) at 3 (quoting Tex. Att’y Gen. Op.
    No. K-0383 (2001) at 2). Thus, this office determined in 2004 that a school district could offer to
    certain teachers bonuses that were contingent on the availability of earmarked funds. See 
    id. at 3-4.
    Similarly, Smith County may, without running afoul of article III, section 53, provide for employee
    bonuses that are conditioned on the Commissioners Court’s approval.
    Under the same analysis, the fact that the Commissioners Court can modify or terminate the
    Incentive Plan does not render the Incentive Plan unconstitutional     under article III, section 53,
    The Honorable D. Matt Bingham        - Page 3          (GA-0492)
    provided that, absent the receipt of new consideration, no modification of the Incentive Plan results
    in a payment for services rendered prior to such modification. See 
    id. at 3.
    You also ask whether, “if the incentive plan is totally at the discretion of the commissioners
    court, . . the plan [is] tied to [an] employeerls performance.” Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2.
    Whether a particular plan is “tied to” employee performance is a question that requires the resolution
    of fact issues and is thus beyond the purview of the opinion process. Cf: Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
    GA-0156 (2004) at 10 (stating that fact questions cannot be answered in the opinion process).
    Further, article III, section 53 does not distinguish between bonuses based on merit and bonuses
    based on other criteria. Thus, an incentive plan that is not tied to an employee’s performance does
    not necessarily contravene article III, section 53.
    Finally, you ask “what is the effect if any of an incentive bonus plan that does not include all
    county employees.” Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. You are concerned in particular with the
    stipulation in the Incentive Plan that “Department Heads must have a fully implemented business
    plan approved by the Commissioners Court.” Incentive Plan, supra at 1; Request Letter, supra note
    1, at 3. You suggest that because of this stipulation an employee whose department head has not
    implemented an approved business plan would not be eligible for a bonus under the Incentive Plan.
    See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 3. You also express concern that an elected official could
    choose to exclude from the Incentive Plan employees in the official’s office who would otherwise
    be eligible to participate. See 
    id. at 2-3.
    The fact that the Incentive Plan excludes employees whose department heads have not
    implemented approved business plans or have otherwise chosen not to participate does not
    necessarily render the proposed plan invalid as a matter of law. You have not named any statute that
    would restrict a commissioners court’s authority to condition eligibility for bonuses in part on such
    a criterion, and we are not aware of any. A commissioners court has the power to “set the amount
    of the compensation” paid to county employees out of county funds. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODEANN.
    9 152.011~(Vernon 1999); see 
    id. 5 111.008.
    Compensation includes incentive or bonus plans. See
    Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JM-1253 (1990) at 2. In general, a commissioners court’s authority to set
    employee compensation is subject to review on an abuse-of-discretion          standard, and providing
    different benefits to different employees does not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.
    Cf: Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JM- 1160 (1990) at 2 (“The fact that one employee may receive greater
    sick leave than another employee would appear to be permissible so long as the additional benefits
    conferred under the guidelines are not dependent upon factors that might constitute an abuse of
    discretion.“).   Whether this particular criterion constitutes an abuse of a commissioners court’s
    discretion is a question of fact that cannot be resolved in the opinion process. Cj: Tex. Att’y Gen.
    Op. No. GA-0156 (2004) at 10 (stating that fact questions cannot be answered in the opinion
    process).
    While “[bloth the federal and Texas constitutions safeguard against       discrimination
    between classes of persons,” “[e]qual protection does not entitle every citizen to receive equal
    benefits each time government money is spent.” Richards IJ.League ofUnited Latin Am. Citizens,
    
    868 S.W.2d 306
    , 312 (Tex. 1993); We&r v. City of Sachse, 
    591 S.W.2d 563
    , 567 (Tex. Civ.
    The Honorable D. Matt Bingham        - Page 4          (GA-0492)
    App.-Dallas     1979, writ dism’d); see U.S. CONST.amend. 14,s 1; TEX. CONST.art. I, 5 3. Rather,
    a court generally will require only that a classitication “be rationally related to a legitimate state
    purpose.” 
    Richards, 868 S.W.2d at 3
    10-l 1.
    The general rule gives way, however, when the classification
    impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the
    classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on
    a “suspect” basis such as race or national origin. In those instances,
    the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the
    classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
    interest.
    
    Id. at 3
    11 (citations omitted).
    Among full-time employees who are eligible for bonuses because they have had favorable
    work evaluations, the Incentive Plan, in your view, may distinguish between those whose department
    heads have implemented an approved business plan and those whose department heads have not.
    This is not a suspect classification; nor does the inability to receive a bonus infringe upon a
    fundamental right. Cf: Mass. Bd. ofRet. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,3 12 nn.3 & 4 (1976) (listing rights
    that courts have identified as fundamental and classifications that courts have identified as suspect).
    Consequently, the classification established by the proposed Incentive Plan must, as a matter of law,
    be only rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Whether the proposed Incentive Plan is
    rationally related to a legitimate state purpose is a fact question that cannot be resolved in the opinion
    process, Cf: Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0156 (2004) at 10 (stating that fact questions cannot be
    answered in the opinion process).
    The Honorable D. Matt Bingham      - Page 5         (GA-0492)
    SUMMARY
    The Incentive    Plan proposed by the Smith County
    Commissioners      Court for certain county employees does not
    contravene article III, section 53 of the Texas Constitution unless
    employees are provided bonuses for work rendered before the plan’s
    adoption,    The fact that the proposed plan stipulates that bonus
    awards are within the Commissioners Court’s discretion does not
    itself render the plan unconstitutional.
    The opinion process cannot determine            whether the
    commissioners     court would abuse its discretion          or violate
    constitutional equal protection guarantees if employees’ eligibility for
    benefits under the proposed plan is contingent on their department
    heads’ actions.
    Very truly yours,
    Attorney General of Texas
    KENT C. SULLIVAN
    First Assistant Attorney General
    ELLEN L. WITT
    Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
    NANCY S. FULLER
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Kymberly K. Oltrogge
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: GA-0492

Judges: Greg Abbott

Filed Date: 7/2/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017