Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •   i   OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL . STATE OF TEXAS
    JOHN    CORNYN
    May 29,2002
    The Honorable J. E. “Buster” Brown                         Opinion No. JC-0509
    Chair, Committee on Natural Resources
    Texas State Senate                                         Re:    Whether section 402.909 of the Local
    P.O. Box 12068                                             Government    Code is applicable to the San
    Austin, Texas 7871 l-2068                                  Antonio Water System, and related questions
    (RQ-0489-JC)
    Dear Senator Brown:
    You have requested our opinion regarding the proper construction of a statute, enacted by
    the Seventy-seventh    Legislature as section 402.909 of the Local Government Code, that places
    certain restrictions upon a municipal water system’s authority to contract with former members of
    the board of the water system. Specifically, you ask whether the statute applies to the San Antonio
    Water System (SAWS), which was established in 1992. If the statute is applicable to SAWS, you
    ask two other questions about the authority of SAWS to contract with a former board member, or
    a law firm that employs him, under particular circumstances.   For the reasons set forth below, we
    conclude that section 402.909 has no application to SAWS.
    You indicate that in 1992 the City of San Antonio adopted an ordinance that “combined three
    water-related functions owned and operated by the city into a single system, the San Antonio Water
    Systems (SAWS), and established a board of trustees to manage the system?            The city council
    appointed a certain member to the board in September 1998. That member resigned effective April
    18,200l. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. You state that, “[ulnder applicable city ordinance
    and SAWS bylaws, no holding over applies to resigning board members and a vacancy is created
    on the effective date of a member’s resignation, in this case, on April 18,200l.” 
    Id. In any
    event,
    on May 17, 2001, the city council appointed another individual to fill the vacancy created by the
    resignation. See 
    id. “On June
    18,2001, the former board member began employment with a law
    firm which is interested in being considered to perform legal services for SAWS.” 
    Id. at 2.
    Section 402.909 of the Local Government Code is entitled, “Prohibited Employment                       of or
    Contracting With Former Trustee or Board Member” and provides:
    ‘Letter from Honorable J. E. “Buster” Brown, Texas State Senator, to Honorable John Comyn, Texas Attorney
    General,   at 1 (Jan. 3,2002) (on file with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Request Letter].
    The Honorable J. E. “Buster” Brown       - Page 2       (JC-0509)
    (a) This section applies to a municipality that creates a board of
    trustees or other board to manage and control a water, wastewater,
    storm water, or drainage utility system that the municipality owns.
    (b) The municipality or a board of trustees or other board described
    by Subsection (a) may not employ or contract with an individual who
    was a member of the board before the second anniversary of the date
    the individual ceased to be a member of the board.
    TEX. Lot.   GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 402.909 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (emphasis           added).
    Subsection (a) of section 402.909 specifically declares that it “applies to a municipality that
    creates a board of trustees.” (emphasis added). Section 3 11 .012(a) of the Government Code, which
    is part of the Code Construction Act, provides that “[wlords in the present tense include the future
    tense.” This rule of construction does not indicate, however, that the present tense includes thepast
    tense or theperfect tense. TEX.GOV’T CODEANN. 4 3 11 .012(a) (Vernon 1998). Had it intended that
    meaning, the legislature might easily have used the term “has created or shall create” instead of the
    single verb “creates.” The legislature might also have chosen to use the verb “operates.” “Operates”
    implies an ongoing activity. See X OXFORDENGLISHDICTIONARY847 (2d ed. 1989) (“Operate”
    means “[t]o be in working, exercise force or influence, produce an effect, act, work.“). “Creates,”
    on the other hand, suggests a one-time event. See III OXFORDENGLISHDICTIONARY1134 (2d ed.
    1989) (“Creates” means “[t]o bring into being, cause to exist; esp to produce where nothing was
    before . . . .“). Section 3 11 .Ol 1(a) of the Government Code provides that “[wlords and phrases shall
    be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” 
    Id. 8 3
    11 .Ol 1(a). Consequently, subsection (a) of section 402.909 would seem on its face to apply only
    to a municipality that creates the relevant board of trustees on or after the effective date of the
    statute. Section 43 of Senate Bill 1444, which enacted section 402.909 of the Local Government
    Code, provides:
    SECTION 43. This Act takes effect immediately if it receives a
    vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, as
    provided by Section 39, Article III, Texas Constitution. If this Act
    does not receive the vote necessary for immediate effect, this Act
    takes effect September 1,200l.
    The bill did in fact pass both houses of the legislature with a greater than two-third’s majority, and
    as a result, became effective on June 17,200l. See Act of May 26,2001,77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1423,
    $4 38,43,2001     Tex. Gen. Laws 5069,5078,5080.
    Although retroactive laws are prohibited by article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution,
    this provision “operates only to prohibit the application of statutes which disturb vested, substantive
    rights.” Ibarra v. State, 
    11 S.W.3d 189
    , 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). See McCain v. Yost, 
    284 S.W.2d 898
    (Tex. 1955); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm ‘n, 
    615 S.W.2d 947
    , 956
    The Honorable        J. E. “Buster” Brown - Page 3          (JC-0509)
    (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin      198 1, writ ref d n.r.e.). In our view, there can       be no doubt that the
    legislature could have made section 402.909(a) applicable to a board created         in 1992. Application
    of the statute to boards created before 2001 would not have impaired vested          or substantive rights.
    But the legislature did not explicitly opt to apply the statute in a retroactive    manner.
    Section     3 11.022 of the Government Code declares: “A statute is presumed to be prospective
    in its application     unless expressly made retrospective.” TEX.GOV’T CODEANN. 8 3 11.022 (Vernon
    1998). As the         court stated in Reames v. Police Officers’ Pension Bd., 
    928 S.W.2d 628
    (Tex.
    App.-Houston         [ 14th Dist.] 1996, no writ):
    In Texas, “[a] statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation
    unless expressly made retrospective.” Texas law strongly militates
    against the retroactive application of laws. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.
    v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 
    798 S.W.2d 580
    , 585 (Tex.
    App.-Houston      [ 1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). Texas courts apply
    statutes retroactively only if “it appears by fair implication from
    language used that it was the intention of the Legislature to make it
    applicable to both past and future transactions.” State v. Humble Oil
    & Refining Co., 
    141 Tex. 40
    , 169 S.W.2d 707,708-09 (1943).
    
    Id. at 63
    1 (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[t}he general rule is that there exists a presumption that
    an act is intended to operate prospectively and not retroactively. If there is any doubt, the intention
    will be resolved against retrospective operation of a statute.” Exparte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255,258
    (Tex. 1981). Although there can be no doubt that the legislature could, without violating article I,
    section 16 of the Texas Constitution, have applied section 402.909 to boards created before the
    effective date of the statute, the fact remains that the legislature did not in plain language explicitly
    do so. Because it must be presumed that a statute is to operate prospectively only, we believe it
    follows that section 402.909 ought to be deemed to operate prospectively only. As a result, section
    402.909 of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the board of trustees of the San Antonio
    Water System.
    Nothing in the legislative history suggests a contrary construction.       This statute was
    originally proposed in the House of Representatives as one of a group of floor amendments to Senate
    Bill 1444, a bill “relating to the general powers and authority of water districts.” Tex. S.B. 1444,
    77th Leg., R.S. (2001). Amendment three, which became section 402.909, was offered by
    Representative    Robert Puente and was adopted without objection in the House. See H.J. OF TEX.,
    77th Leg., R.S. 3 170 (2001). The Senate refused to concur in the House amendments and requested
    a conference committee. See S.J. OFTEX.,77th Leg., R.S. 2506 (2001). The conference committee
    report on Senate Bill 1444, including the amendment under consideration here, described therein as
    section 38 of the bill, was adopted by both houses on May 26, 2001. Senate Bill 1444 became
    effective on June 17,200l. On June 19,2001, the Senate Research Center filed its bill analysis of
    the enrolled version of Senate Bill 1444. The bill analysis contains an almost verbatim summary of
    The Honorable J. E. “Buster” Brown - Page 4          (JC-0509)
    section 38, but offers no additional comment. See SENATE COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES,BILL
    ANALYSIS,Tex. S.B. 1444,77th Leg., R.S. (2001).
    Because we conclude that section 402.909 is not applicable to the board created on behalf
    of the San Antonio Water System, we need not address your second and third questions.
    SUMMARY
    Section 402.909 of the Local Government Code, which places
    certain restrictions upon a municipal water system’s authority to
    contract with former members of the board of the water system, is
    prospective in its application and therefore does not apply to the San
    Antonio Water System created in 1992.
    JOHN     CORNYN
    Attorney General of Texas
    HOWARD G. BALDWIN, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    NANCY FULLER
    Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel
    SUSAN DENMON GUSKY
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Rick Gilpin
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee