Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2002 )


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  • t*-   OFFICE     0~   THE    ATTORNET   GENERAL   . STATE   OF   TEXAS
    JOHN        CORNYN
    May 15,2002
    Mr. 0. C. “Chet” Robbins                                                  Opinion No. JC-0505
    Executive Director
    Texas Funeral Service Commission                                          Re: Whether a casket constitutes “funeral
    333 Guadalupe, Suite 110                                                  merchandise” for purposes of Chapter 65 1 of
    Austin, Texas 78701                                                       the Occupations Code, and related questions
    (RQ-0477-JC)
    Dear Mr. Robbins:
    You have asked this office three questions: whether a casket constitutes funeral merchandise;
    whether the sale of a casket for the burial of a person deceased at the time of the sale constitutes an
    act of funeral directing, if all that is being sold is the casket and no services associated with the
    disposition of the body are being provided; and, if so, whether such a sale violates section
    651.459(a)(7) of the Occupations Code if the seller is not an employee, agent, subcontractor or
    assignee of a licensed funeral home.’ We conclude that, while a casket indeed constitutes funeral
    merchandise, the simple sale of a casket, without more, is not an act of funeral directing and
    accordingly does not violate the provision about which you ask.
    Texas law distinguishes between prepaid funeral arrangements, authority over the licensing
    of which is vested in the Finance Commission by chapter 154 of the Finance Code, and funeral
    directing, which under chapter 65 1 of the Occupations Code is the province of the Funeral Service
    Commission. Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2. We understand your question to be confined to the
    sale of caskets at the time they are needed for the immediate disposition of a dead human body, and
    it is that situation that we will address.
    Section 65 1.459 of the Occupations                Code provides, in relevant part
    (a) A person violates this chapter if the person:
    (7) performs acts of funeral directing or embalming in a
    capacity other than that of an employee, agent, subcontractor, or
    ‘Letter from Mr. O.C. “Chet” Robbins, Texas Funeral Service Commission, to Honorable John Comyn, Texas
    Attorney        General, at 2 (Dec. 6,200l) (on file with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Request Letter].
    Mr. O.C. “Chet” Robbins       - Page 2           (JC-0505)
    assignee of a licensed funeral establishment         that has contracted      to
    perform those acts.
    TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. 9 65 1.459(a)(7) (Vernon 2002). Section 65 1.OOl of the Occupations            Code
    defines “[fluneral directing” as
    acts associated with or arrangingfor the disposition of a dead human
    body, performed by a person for compensation, from the time of first
    call until:
    (A) inumment,        interment,   or entombment        services    are
    complete; or
    (B)    the body is permanently       transported out of this state.
    
    Id. 5 65
    1.001(7) (emphasis added).     “First call” is defined in relevant part as
    the beginning of the relationship and duty of a funeral director to take
    charge of a dead human body and have the bodypreparedfor          burial
    or disposition by embalming, cremation, or another method.
    
    Id. 5 65
    1.001(5) (emphasis added).     The same section further defines “[fluneral merchandise”    as
    merchandise     sold primarily for use in:
    (A)   a funeral ceremony;
    (B)   embalming;   or
    (C) the care and preparation of a dead human body for
    burial, cremation, or other disposition.
    
    Id. 8 651.001(9).
    The Occupations Code does not define the particular acts which are acts of funeral directing,
    nor does it more particularly describe funeral merchandise. Accordingly, you seek to know whether
    a casket is such merchandise, and whether the sale of a casket for an imminent burial, without more,
    constitutes funeral directing. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2.
    As we understand it, the question arises because there are now commercial enterprises which
    market caskets, but provide no other funeral services. See, e.g., Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi,
    
    124 F. Supp. 2d
    434,436 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658,660 (E.D.
    Tenn. 2000); State ex rel. State Bd. of Embalmers and Funeral Directors v. Stone Casket Co., 976
    Mr. O.C. “Chet” Robbins      - Page 3          (JC-0505)
    P.2d 1074, 1075 (Okla. App. 1998). We take it that your concern is whether such enterprises           are
    engaged in the activity you have jurisdiction to regulate.
    We conclude that a casket is certainly funeral merchandise.       The definition of funeral
    merchandise, as set forth above, includes “merchandise sold primarily for use in . . . the care and
    preparation of a dead human body for burial. . . .” TEX. Oct. CODEANN. 9 65 1.001(9)(C) (Vernon
    2002). The Oxford English Dictionary defines casket in the sense intended here as “A coffin. U.S.”
    II OXFORDENGLISHDICTIONARY941 (2d ed. 1989). It further defines coffin as “The box or chest
    in which a corpse is enclosed for burial.” III OXFORDENGLISHDICTIONARY440 (2d ed. 1989).
    Similarly, Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition defines casket as “A coffin, esp.
    an expensive one. Chiefly U.S.,” and coffin as “A chest or case for the reception of a corpse,
    commonly of wood or metal.” WEBSTER’SNEW INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY,SECONDEDITION
    416’5 19 (1947). As these definitions make plain, a casket is used primarily to receive a dead body,
    and consequently is within the statutory definition of funeral merchandise.
    In addition to this authority, common experience justifies one in describing a casket as
    funeral merchandise, in the statute’s sense of “merchandise sold primarily for use in a funeral
    ceremony.” See TEX. OCC. CODEANN. 5 651.001(9)(A). While a small number of caskets may be
    sold for other uses, such as to serve as theatrical props, we think it safe to assume that the vast
    majority are used for that purpose for which they were designed, as repositories                for
    dead human bodies. A casket, then, is in our view one of the items clearly contemplated by the
    statutory definition of “funeral merchandise” in section 65 1.OOl of the Occupations Code. See 
    id. tj 65
    l.OOl(9).
    However, while a casket is funeral merchandise, the sale of caskets alone does not
    constitute the practice of funeral directing. While it might be argued that such sales are “associated
    with . . . the disposition of a dead human body,” in the sense that the caskets are sold to those who
    intend to use them for that purpose, no “first call” occurs in this context, and the sale does not
    directly involve the disposition of a body.            See 
    id. 9 65
    l.OOl(7).      It is clear from the
    statutory definition of “first call,” as set out above, that what distinguishes a funeral director is the
    “duty . . . to take charge of,” and prepare for burial or other disposition, a dead human body. See 
    id. 5 65
    1.001(5). Absent such a duty, the activity under discussion here is not funeral directing.
    Moreover, there would be other consequences to a contrary interpretation that this activity
    constitutes funeral direction. Pursuant to section 65 1.602 of the Occupations Code, it is a criminal
    offense to act as a funeral director without a license. See 
    id. 5 65
    1.602(a)( 1). “An offense under this
    section is a Class B misdemeanor.” 
    Id. 5 65
    1.602(b). Accordingly, were we to conclude that the
    sale of a casket was engaging in funeral directing without a license in violation of section
    65 1.459(a)(7), it would be a criminal offense. See 
    id. 6 65
    1.602. But it is well-established that penal
    statutes should be strictly construed. See, e.g., Domizio v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 54
    S.W.3d 867,872 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied) (usury statutes, because penal in nature, must
    be strictly construed); Hoxie Implement Co., Inc. v. Baker, 65 S.W.3d 140,153 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
    2001, pet. denied) (same); Martin v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 
    44 S.W.3d 190
    , 195 (Tex.
    Mr. O.C. “Chet” Robbins           - Page 4              (JC-0505)
    App.-Houston      [ 14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (attorneys’ fee recovery provisions penal in nature,
    to be strictly construed); Thomas v. State, 
    3 S.W.3d 89
    ’92 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, judgm’t aff d)
    (Texas Securities Act penal, to be strictly construed). We would be loath to imply potential criminal
    liability in the context presented.*
    2We note that federal courts in at least two jurisdictions have recently struck down state statutes that explicitly
    proscribed the sale of caskets without a funeral director’s license as unconstitutional.  Casket Royale, Inc., 
    124 F. Supp. 2d
    at 440 (Mississippi statute fails “rational relationship” test and violates Due Process and Equal Protection clauses);
    
    Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 660
    (Tennessee statute does same); but see Stone Casket 
    Co., 976 P.2d at 1076
    (Oklahoma statute held to have rational basis in protection of public health).
    Mr. O.C. “Chet” Robbins    - Page 5         (JC-0505)
    SUMMARY
    While a casket constitutes funeral merchandise        for the
    purposes of chapter 65 1 of the Occupations Code, the sale of a casket
    for an imminent burial, without more, does not constitute an act of
    funeral directing.
    Attorney General of Texas
    HOWARD G. BALDWIN, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    NANCY FULLER
    Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel
    SUSAN DENMON GUSKY
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    James E. Tourtelott
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JC-505

Judges: John Cornyn

Filed Date: 7/2/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017