Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1990 )


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    November 8, 1990
    Honorable Mike Driscoll         Opinion No.   JR-1241
    Harris County Attorney
    1001 Preston, Suite 634         Re:   Authority of a county to
    Houston, Texas 77002            trim, remove, or sell trees
    from county road rights-of-way
    (RQ-1970)
    Dear Mr. Driscoll:
    You ask three questions regarding Harris tiounty#s
    authority with respect to trees and shrubs growing within
    the rights-of-way of county roads. Your first question is:
    To what extent can the county        trim,
    remove, sell or otherwise dispose of trees dr
    shrubs from the right-of-way of county' roads
    or prevent the planting of such trees and
    shrubs without being required to compensate
    owners of the fee upon which the right-of-way
    exists?
    Counties under their~authority to open and lay out roads 'may
    acquire the rights-of-way for such roads by dedication,
    purchase, condemnation, or prescriptive easement.        See
    V.T.C.S. art. 6702-1, subch. A (the County Road and Bridge
    Act) : 36 D. Brooks, County and Special District Law,
    85 40.7, 40.25 (Texas Practice 1989). Your question and
    brief indicate that you are concerned about the situation
    where the property interest the county has acquired in the
    right-of-way is in the nature of an easement, the fee
    interest being retained by the owner of the property abut-
    ting the right-of-way. &8 43 Tex. Jur. 3d Riohwavs 5 116
    (1985).
    We caution at the outset that resolution of the issues
    presented in your first question might ultimately depend on
    the facts of the particular case -- u,    the provisions of
    the conveyance, condemnation proceeding judgment, or dedica-
    tion under which the county acquired the particular right-
    of-way in question.    We cannot anticipate every factual
    p. 6600
    . .
    Honorable   Mike   Driscoll - Page 2   (JW-1241)
    situation that might arise.    The following discussion   of       .
    pertinent legal authority is offered for your guidance.
    We think it is clear that the Harris County Commis-       .
    sioners Court in exercising a right-of-way easement general-
    ly has authority to prevent the planting of trees and shrubs
    within the right-of-way and to remwe or cause to be removed
    trees or shrubs growing there, when the court makes a
    reasonable finding that the trees or shrubs would interfere
    with the right-of-way purposes for which the easement was
    obtained. m     Harris County Road Law, 5s 1, 16, Special
    Laws, Acts 1913, 336 Leg., ch. 17, at 64 (Harris County
    Commissioners Court to have control of all roads laid out or
    constructed by the county and of all matters in connection
    with the construction or maintenance of such roads): &
    5 12 (condemnation authority): ia, 5 33 (Harris County Road
    Law cumulative of other laws); V.T.C.S. art.         6702-1,
    5 2.002(b)(l) (under the County Road and Bridge Act, commis-
    sioners court may make and enforce all reasonable and
    necessaq rules for the construction and maintenance of
    county roads except as prohibited by law): j&        5 2.004
    (condemnatiFd;th;iity).     We note, too, that where the
    trees or              determined to impair' visibility for
    motorists using the county road in question, Harris County
    as one with a population of 950,000 or more has authority
    under subchapter F of article 6702-1, through its commis-
    sioners cou*, to define sight distances at intersections
    and to prohibit and provide for the removal ~of trees and
    shrubs obstructing such sight distances (presumably both
    within and without the area of the right-of-way). In the
    absence of a showing of fraud or gross abuse of discretion,
    the commissioners court's determinations as to the need for
    removal of trees and shrubs in the right-of-way          for
    right-of-way purposes would be conclusive. See.,!&&
    Pd.   co.     Penn 
    131 S.W.2d 131
    (Tex. Civ. App. - San
    Antonio 19:9, writ'ref'd).
    As to whether the owner of the underlying fee in the
    right-of-way is entitled to compensation for removal of
    trees or shrubs from the right-of-way, though we note some
    possible inconsistencies among the Texas cases, we think
    that the cases dealing most directly with this question
    P- 6601
    Honorable Uike Driscoll - Page 3       (JW-1241)
    indicate that the   fee   owner   generally has nc right to   com-
    .pensation.l
    In a decision approved by the supreme court, the
    Commission of Appeals in mv    of  Fort Ijg.rth
    v. Gw
    169 S.W.Zd 149 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1943, opinion adopted):
    ruled that fee owners could not enjoin the city#s destruc-
    tion of curbs, sidewalks, trees, or shrubs in the street
    right-of-way, even where those improvements had been in-
    stalled by the fee owners in compliance with a city ordi-
    nance, when the city, the right-of-way easement holder,
    later widened the street. The court stated that the facts
    of the case did "not disclose a private right invested in
    any of the plaintiffs in relation to the street or to any of
    the improvements in the street." &    at 150.
    Subsequently, in e                          Worth   175
    S.W.Zd 427 (Tex. Civ. APP. - Fort Worth 1943, writ ;ef#d)
    one of the unsuccessful m          plaintiffs sued the city
    for damages occasioned by the city*s removal of the trees
    and shrubs. The WO~COII&court, citing m,          ruled that
    "the plaintiff had nc property rights in    the grounds and
    imprwements placed thereon    by him."    ;TB, at 430.    It
    affirmed the trial court's sustaining of the defendant
    city's position that there had been no showing that the city
    *had abandoned any of its rights and privileges under the
    law to use the whole of said street for such public purposes
    as were required under all changing circumstances." IBL at
    428.
    Where a right-of-way easement is acquired, by condemna-
    tion at least, the fee owner is presumed to have been fully
    compensated at such time for the damages to his property,
    including appurtenances such as trees, which will arise from
    1. Section 2.418 of article 6702-l provides that the
    commissioners court "shall     pay the    owner an    amount
    sufficient to cover     the loss of     the value of     the
    obstruction, if any, incurred by the owner by reason of the
    removal" of ObStNCtiOnS  to sight distances under subchapter
    F. As the commissioners court‘s authority under subchapter
    F is not limited to the area within the right-of-way but
    also extends to land held in fee outside the right-of-way
    easement, we do not think that section 2.418 in itself
    requires payment for removal of trees and shrubs within the
    right-of-way easement.
    P- 6602
    Honorable   Hike   I?~Ascoll- Page 4   (JM-1241)
    the proper use of the easement.
    m,        175 S.W.Zd 243 (Tex. I9m
    ackncwledge that as the taking of an easement for        road
    purposes by condemnation generally leaves the condemnee with
    little or no use of the right-of-way area, he is often
    entitled to damages equivalent to those he could have for
    the taking of the whole fee.       -  W,                  251
    S.W.Zd 953 (Tex. 1952).    While the fee owner may have a
    right to use portions of the right-of-way for growing trees
    or crops, his right extends only so far as it does not
    interfere with the paramount rights of the easement holder
    to use the right-of-way for road purposes. &S 43 Tex. Jur.
    3d &ichwavg 5 117, and authorities   cited there. J. Sackman,
    Nichols Law of Eminent Domain, at 5.45(3), states the law
    thusly:
    The trees and herbage in a public highway
    are the property of the owner of the fee. He
    has the right to use any portion of the way
    not needed for public travel, for     growing
    grass, crops, or trees, either for their
    produce or for improving the appearance and
    enhancing the comfort of his premises.    For
    any injury to the trees and herbage that is
    not the result of the proper exercise of the
    highway easement he is entitled to compensa-
    tion as fully as if the highway did not
    exist. The owner's rights in thentrees and
    herbage are, however, like all his rights
    within the limits of the way, subordinate to
    the rights of the public. When the trees or
    herbage interfere with the proper exercise of
    the highway easement they must give way. For
    this reason trees may be cut down or trimmed
    in order to widen the wrought portion of the
    highway, or to accommodate rails and wires
    laid by public service corporations in the
    highway, for any purpose which is classed as
    within the highway easement, without compen-
    sation to the owner of the fee.
    As changing road and traffic conditions require, the
    public right-of-way easement holder may, by widening the
    paved portion of the roadway or clearing a greater pa*    of
    the unpaved portion, make fuller utilization of its easement
    rights. WcCraw v. Dallas, 420 S.W.td 793 (Tex. Civ. App. -
    P. 6603
    Honorable   Mike   Dtiscoll - Page 5   (J&l-1241)
    1967, 'writ ref*d n.r.e.).z In such cases, we think, activi-
    ties by the fee holder in the right-of-way which had not
    previously been inconsistent with the public's use of it for
    right-of-way purposes may over time come to interfere with
    the paramount public use and have to give way. m    m
    and HOlCOPb, suma: U                   H. & s     Rv. co. v
    atv of Easy,           249 S.Wwex.         Civ?App.    - San'
    Antonio 1923), rev d on other crounpS    
    260 S.W. 841
    (Tex.
    Comm'n App. 1924, judgm't adopted) (pl;intiff on notice that
    city could, when need arose, have improvements plaintiff had
    erected in public right-of-way removed, and he could not
    recover therefor).
    Your brief indicates a concern that even if the commis-
    sioners court may have trees and shrubs in the right-of-way
    removed, there would remain a legal question, for purposes
    of the disposal, by sale or otherwise, of those materials,
    as to where title in them lay -- h,    whether the county's
    disposal of the materials might constitute a conversion, and
    thus a taking, of private property for public purposes
    without compensation in violation of article I, section 17,
    of the Texas Constitution.
    801 -h           specifically held that the destruction
    of treesCand' E6      in the right-of-way there involved no
    unl.awful taking under the constitution. &    at 430. If the
    public easement holder may, without compensating the fee
    owner, &&IQY     trees and shrubs in the right-of-way for
    right-of-way purposes, we see no reason why it may not
    otherwise dispose of trees and shrubs that are removed
    because they interfere with use of the right-of-way, even by
    sale, without compensation. Though the fee owner may "own"
    the trees and shrubs in the right-of-way, and presumably
    himself have the right to transplant or cut them, if not in
    2. The point at which changing public' utilization of
    the right-of-way imposes burdens on the servient fee estate
    in excess of the easement rights, thus entitling the fee
    owner to additional compensation, would depend on the terms
    of the particular easement, the nature of the change in use,
    and local conditions. See. e.cic,31 Tex. Jur. 3d Easements
    and                           5 43, *sea.:   see also Tsas
    P er h Liaht Co. v. Casey 
    138 S.W.2d 594
    (Tex. Civ. App. -
    F::   Worth 1940    writ Aism'd judgm't car.)      (easement
    holder's 1iabiliCy for negligent cutting of trees not
    necessary for easement purposes).
    p. 6604
    ,    ;
    Honorable Wike Driscoll - Page 6      (JIG1241)   r>;.
    violation of applicable ordinances or laws,3 his   ownership    .
    interest must give way when the trees or shrubs come to
    constitute an impairment of the public authority~s proper
    utilization of its right-of-way    easemsnt.   s.es ~sackman,
    6ypL;p*  He  plants  and  grows  trees  or shrubs in     the
    right-of-way with notics that the public easemsnt holder may
    remwe them when they come to constitute    an impairment of
    the easement.
    It appears that some other jurisdictions have followed
    a different rule.                               ,
    !ikWEEL 443 N.E.Zd %32"                      1981) (statute
    authorizing director of transportation to %2movem      trees
    within right-of-way did not authorize director to *take"
    such trees without compensation to fee owner).      Sa.ckman,
    w,     in section 5.45(3) notes that e[i]t is held in some
    jurisdictions that the public authorities may use the
    vegetable growth    for the    purpose of    repairing   the
    way . . . but when the vegetation is cut for any other
    purpose it belongs to the owner of the fee. If he fails to
    remove it within a reasonable time he may be held to have
    abandoned it.*
    We do find Texas cases which suggest #at      a public
    authority may use soil or gravel from a right-of-way ease-
    ment only for improving that or other roadways.   See. e.c%,
    G.&v of La Gram= v. kmaa      
    161 S.W. 8
     (Tex. Civ. App. -
    Austin 1913, writ ref'd) (city may use soil excavated from a
    street easement for improvement of other roads). In !2.isb,
    3. We note that section 2.006 of article 6702-l
    authorizes the commissioners court to lay out "neighborhood
    roads* and provides for the payment of damages to the fee
    owners for the takings. The section further authorizes the
    commissioners court 'to direct that the'fee owners clear
    obstructions from the right-of-way "for a space of not less
    than 15 feet or more than 30 feet on each side of a
    designated line" except that "the.marked trees and other
    objects  used to designate the line.shall not be removed or
    defaced." We think this provision reflects the commis-
    sioners cou*'s    control over trees in the right-of-way
    (though we do not take the provision to indicate that if the
    commissioners court fails to order the clearance and later
    itself has it done, or later has a greater portion of the
    right-of-way cleared, the fee owner is entitled to any
    further compensation).
    p. 6605
    Honorable Uike Driscoll - Page 7   (JW-1241)
    the court in atv    of Sa~-&$~pAntonio
    v. m,        
    33 S.W. 256
    (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1895, no writ) noted that "if
    the city does not remcve the soil for the purpose of filling
    in other streets, a     the adiow      om   does not remo e
    a, the city may sell and dispose of it in any way it zy
    deem proper."   (Emphasis added.)
    We think the later Gilliland and &&&         decisions,
    however, indicate that a public authority may, in exercising
    a right-of-way easement, remove trees and shrubs for road
    purposes and dispose of them without compensation to the fee
    owner. The supreme court expressly approved m,           and
    refused writ of error in &&GA&.     We find no Texas cases
    subsequent to the now almost 50-year-old m               and
    Wolcon& cases which follow a different rule with regard to
    compensation for removal of trees and shrubs from a public
    right-of-way.
    Your second guestion'is:
    If the county can sell trees from the
    right-of-way, what procedure must be followed
    in doing so?
    Your brief indicates that your second question reflects
    a concern as to whether the county's sale of trees would be
    governed by subchapter A of chapter 263 of the Local Govern-
    ment Code, providing for the county's sale or lease of real
    property, or rather by subchapter D providing for'the dis-
    position of personal property falling within the definitions
    of "salvage" or nsurplusa property in section 263.151.
    Though trees, while growing and unsevered are generally
    considered "part of the land" -- gee. e.a,, Jbuers v. Fort
    )fOrth PoultN h Ecc Co, 
    185 S.W.2d 165
         (Tax. Civ. App. -
    Fort Worth 1944, no writ; -- cut trees, or trees   "COnStNC-
    tively severed" by selling them in the contemplation that
    they will be cut and removed, are considered personal
    property. &S pavis v. CD      
    161 S.W. 39
    (Tex. Civ. App. -
    Texarkana 1913, writ dism#d)i mv     v. Dowu,   
    207 S.W. 585
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1918, writ dism'd).
    Section 263.151 of subchapter D of chapter 263, Local
    Government Code, providing for the county's sale of wsal-
    vage" or "surplus" property, defines such property as
    follows:
    (1) 'Salvage property' means      personal
    property, other than items routinely discard-
    ed as waste, that because of      use, time,
    P- 6606
    Honorable Niks Driscoll - Pags 8       (JM-124~)     - r+     .:--
    accident, or any other cause- is so worn,
    damaged, or obsolete that it has no value for
    Eb,ru~se      for  which it was originally
    .
    (2)  surplus       property'   meatis   personal
    property that:
    (A)  is not salvage property           or
    items routinely discarded as waste:
    (B)   is not currently needed by   its
    owner ;
    (C) is not reguired for the owner's
    foreseeable needs: and
    (D) possesses some usefulness for
    the purpose for which it was intended.
    We think that in the usual case, where trees or shrubs
    originally intended for    beautification, shade, or soil
    conservation purposes are remwed, or are to be remwed,    by
    the county for  right-of-way purposes, the trees or shrubs
    would fall within the definitions of esalvagew or "surplus"
    property in section 263.151, and the county*s disposition of
    them by sale would be governed by subchapter D.
    Your third question is:
    Can the County refuse to approve subdivision
    plats that have existing ~shrubs and trees in
    the right of way, and/or plans to landscape
    rights-of-way by planting shrubs and trees or
    where an attempt has been made to reserve
    rights to maintain such trees and shrubs in
    the right-of-way?
    You argue that certain provisions of the Harris County Road
    Law, sunrg, would in effect permit the Harris County Commis-
    sioners Court to refuse to approve a subdivision plat
    purporting to reserve rights to maintain trees or shrubs in
    a right-of-way dedicated therein.   We agree. Section 1 of
    the Harris County Road Law provides:
    Section 31-C. u accu-riahts-of    -wa
    roads in Harris County. the Commissionen
    -shall
    C                      the width of’ the
    richt-of-way recuired. and establish  thg
    P- 6607
    Honorable Mike Drisccll - Rags 9   (JM-1241)
    of u          All of the
    field notes of roads so esiablished and
    determined shall be filed with the Commis-
    sioners Court and be recorded on the Road Log
    of Harris County, and no expenditures shall
    be made by the Commissioners Court upon any
    road not carried on the Road Log.         The
    Commissioners Court may adopt a system for
    carrying roads on the Road Log with the
    required width of the right-of-way to be
    established by the Court. fiwided. however,
    ned bv the county on a -t-of-way
    less than twentv (20) feet nor more than 604
    s the richt-of-wav wu
    out or established on or after Jm
    1. 1963. No subdivision or nlat of mds    ID
    be filed for rw     bv the Counfv Clerk
    Qf Harris COUntV. Texas. until such Dlat ox
    subdivision bears the sianature of the County
    Enaineer to the effect that the roads. as
    catsd on the nlat. have met the recuire-
    mts   of the svstem adODted bv the Commis  * -
    sioners Court ~-1s             Section as tQ
    fhe width of'the riaht-of-way and have a base
    surface of at least twenty 120) feet is
    y&&h with the base andlsurface meeting the
    minimum requirements    prescribed   by   the
    Commissioners Court by order duly entered in
    the minutes of said court, and that all
    requirements of Harris County and the Harris
    County Flood Control District as to drainage
    have been complied with. (Emphasis added.)
    Special Law, Acts 1913, 33d Leg., ~ch. 17, md      by Acts
    1963, 58th beg., ch. 369, m          Acts 1973, 63rd Leg.,
    ch. 614.
    We find no provision of Texas law specifically author-
    izing the Harris County Commissioners Court to require that
    rights-of-way be dedicated without reservation as to trees
    and shrubs in the right-of-way. However, could it not
    require that dedicated rights-of-way be unencumbered by
    reservations with respect to trees and shrubs       or other
    ObstNCtiOns,   the county's authority under the Harris County
    Road Law to require that dedicated rights-of-way be of a
    certain width would be rendered nugatory -- particularly as
    the county's authority to refuse to approve subdivision
    p. 6608
    .   I
    Honorable Wike Driscoil - Rage 10 (JR-1241,) "
    plats is otherwise quits limited. We find no provisions
    other than' the width requirement provisions which would
    appear to authorize the commissioners court to require that
    dedicated rights-of-way be free of reservations whiihtii$tt;
    impair the use of the        full width of   the
    right-of-way for right-of-way purposes.    m     Local Gw't
    Code 53 232.002 (%ommissioners court . . . must approve
    plat' meeting requirements prescribed under chapter 232),
    232.003, 232.006 (providing respectively that commissioners
    courts generally, and in counties of over 2.2 million
    population, may require that rights-of-way be of stated
    widths, but making no provision with respect'to trees and
    shrubs or other potential obstructions in the rights-of-way
    or purported reservations with respect thereto): s e also
    Attorney General Opinion JW-789 (1987) (limitations on
    commissioners court's authority to refuse to approve subdi-
    vision plats).
    We think that section 31-C of the Harris County Road
    Law not only specifically authorizes the commissioners court
    to require that a dedicated right-of-way.. be of a certain
    width, but also implicitly authorizes the,court to require
    that the right-of-way.dedicated be unencumbered by reserva-
    tions of the right to maintain trees or shrubs in the
    right-of-way which might impair its full utilization. As we
    have determined that the FlarrisCounty Commissioners Court
    possesses such authority under section 31-C of the Harris
    County Road Law, we do not think it necessary to determine
    here whether the above-cited provisions of 'chapter 232,
    Local Government Code, would also confer such authority.
    Subject to the terms of ~the conveyance,
    dedication, condemnation judgment, etc. under
    which .$he right-of-way was acquired, the
    .Harris County Commissioners Court generally
    has authority. for right-of-way purposes, to
    remove and dispose. of trees or shrubs from
    the public right-of-way easement of a county
    road or prevent     their planting    without
    compensation to the fee owner.
    Cut trees,    or   trees   *constructively
    severed" by having been sold in the anticipa-
    tion that they will be cut and removed from
    the land where they were growing, are person-
    al rather than real property.
    p. 6609
    ,.   “.
    ,,   :.                  /
    Honorable Wike Driscoll - Page 11 (JR-1241)
    The Harris County Commissioners Court may,
    under the Harris County Road Law, require
    that rights-of-way dedicated in subdivision
    plats be of certain widths, and unencumbered
    by reservations of the right to maintain
    trees or shrubs within the right-of-way area.
    JIW     MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    MARY KELLER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    IOU MCCREARY
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STEARLEY
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    REUEA HICKS
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by William Walker
    Assistant Attorney General
    P- 6610