Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1989 )


Menu:
  • JIM MA.rroX                     November 13, 1989
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann      Opinion   No. JM-1115
    Palo Pinto County Attorney
    Courthouse                    Re: Whether the Water Commis-
    Palo Pinto, Texas 76072       sion has the authority to
    create a district whose boun-
    daries    exclude     mineral
    estates located more than 300
    feet below the surface of the
    land and whether such mineral
    estates must be taxed
    (RQ-1457)
    Dear Mr. Mann:
    .. inform us that _in 1980 the Texas Water Commission
    You
    by written order granreo a petition authorizing the creation
    of a municipal utility district within Palo Pinto County
    designated %portsman‘s World Municipal Utility District.”
    The petition approved by the commission set forth the
    boundaries of the district, specifically excluding from the
    boundary description the mineral estates located below a
    depth of 300 feet under the surface area of the land
    comprising the district.     Consequently, as a practical
    matter, all mineral interests within the surface boundaries
    of the district below a depth of 300 feet from the surface
    have been exempted from ad valorem taxation imposed by the
    district since the district's creation.
    Because of the requirement of article VIII of the Texas
    Constitution that all property, except that specifically
    exempted by the constitution, be taxed in any equal and
    uniform manner, you ask the following question:
    [A]re the mineral interests located under the
    boundaries of the Sportsman's World Municipal
    Utility District taxable for ad valorem taxa-
    tion purposes by the Sportsman's World Munic-
    ipal Utility District?
    YOU also ask:
    P. 5847
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 2   (JM-1115)
    Does the Water Commission have the authority
    to create a district whose boundaries exclude
    a category of taxable property?
    We will address initially your second question.     We
    answer it in the negative: the Texas Water Commission is
    without authority to approve a petition authorizing the
    creation of a municipal utility district that excludes from
    its boundaries a particular class of taxable property,
    specifically the mineral estates located below a depth of
    300 feet from the surface area of the land comprising the
    district.
    There can be no question that, absent the Water
    Commission order purporting to exclude from the boundaries
    of the district the mineral estates below a depth of 300
    feet under the surface of the land comprising the district,
    such mineral estates would be taxable by the district. See.
    u,    Note, Ad Valom     Tax&ion   of Mineral Prooerty   21
    Baylor L. Rev. 46 (1969). The issue then is whether' the
    Water Commission has the authority to approve the creation
    of a district that excludes such a category of taxable
    property from the boundaries of the district.
    The Sportsman's World Municipal Utility District was
    created pursuant to section 59 of article XVI of the Texas
    Constitution and chapter 54 of the Water Code.      Section
    54.013 of the code governs the composition of the district
    and provides:
    (a) A district may include the m        in
    all or part of any county or         counties
    including all or part of any cities and other
    public agencies.
    (b) The m      composing a district need
    not be in one body, but may consist of
    senarate bodie   of land separated by land
    which is not' included in the      district.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Section 54.014 of the code provides that, in order to
    create a chapter 54 municipal utility district, a petition
    requesting creation must be filed with the Texas Water
    Commission [hereinafter the commission]. Section 54.015 of
    the code sets forth the contents of the petition and
    provides in pertinent part:
    The petition shall:
    p. 5848
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 3   (JM-1115)
    (1) describe the              of the pro-
    posed district bv metes and bounQs or bv lot
    if there is a recorded map
    itiyefFt       survey of the     area . . . .
    (Emphasis added.)
    Section 54.020 of the code requires that, after proper
    notice, the commission shall hold a hearing and Qhall
    examine the    petition to    ascertain its    sufficiency.18
    Subsection (b) of section 54.020 provides that "[t]he com-
    mission shall have jurisdiction to determine all issues on
    the sufficiency of the petition and creation of          the
    district."
    Section 54.021 of the code governs the granting      or
    denial of the petition and provides in relevant part:
    (a) After the hearing of the petition if
    it is found that the petition conforms to the
    requirements of Section 54.015 of this code
    and that     the project    is feasible    and
    practicable and is necessary and would be a
    benefit to the m       to be included in the
    district,  the commission shall so find by its
    order and grant the petition.
    (b) In determining if the project is
    feasible and practicable     and if it    *
    necessary and would be a benefit to the G
    included in the district, the commission
    shall consider:
    . . . .
    (3) whether or not the district and
    its system and subsequent      development
    within   the   district   will   have   an
    unreasonable effect on the following:
    (A) land elevation:
    (W   subsidence;
    (C) groundwater    level   within
    the region:
    (D) recharge capability     of   a
    groundwater source:
    P. 5849
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 4   (JM-1115)
    (El  natural run-off   rates   and
    drainage;
    (P) water quality: and
    ((3 total tax assessments on
    all land located within the district.
    (c) If the commission finds that not all
    of the u      proposed to be included in the
    district will be benefited by the creation of
    the district, the commission shall so find
    and exclude all m      which is not benefited
    from the proposed district and
    She Drooosed district s bodies        accord-
    -.       (Emphasis adde:.)
    Neither section 54.013 nor any other section of the
    code expressly authorizes the commission to approve a
    petition authorizing the creation of a district        that
    excludes from its boundaries the mineral estate located
    below the surface of the land comprising the district.
    However, a brief submitted to us in connection with this
    request concludes that the code impliedly authorizes the
    creation of such a district.  We summarize the argument as
    follows:
    Minerals in place are realty and, as such,
    are subject to ownership, severance, and
    ;;d;; maer   v. Stakeg, 
    294 S.W. 835
    (Tex.
    Dx s Co. v. Daua&&y      
    176 S.W. 717
           (Tex.' 191:).   A grant   or  keservation  of
    mineral interests by the fee owner effects a
    horizontal severance and creation of two
    separate and distinct estates: an estate in
    surface and an estate in mineral.
    m,     464 S.W.Zd 348 (Tex. 1971);
    Ref. Co. v. Noa, 
    443 S.W.2d 35
    (Tex. 1968).
    Real estate ordinarily is taxed as a unit;
    yet, where there has been a severance by
    conveyance, exception, or reservation, so
    that one portion of the realty belongs to one
    person and other portions to others, each
    owner should pay taxes under proper assess-
    ment against him of the portion owned by him.
    The fact that a portion may consist of
    minerals or of a fractional interest therein
    makes no difference. -v.               NJxa:
    State v. Downmgn, 
    134 S.W. 707
    (Tex. Civ.
    p. 5850
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 5 (JM-1115)
    APP. 191>1), u,       
    231 U.S. 353
    (19i3).
    Because a grant or reservation of mineral
    estates effects a horizontal severance and
    creation of two separate estates, each of
    which is taxable separately, the petition
    seeking the    creation of    a chapter  54
    municipal utility district may be drawn in
    such a way as to exclude the mineral estate
    and reflect that horizontal severance.
    We disagree with this construction of the Water Code for two
    reasons.
    First, the severance of mineral interests by the 'fee
    owner creates two separate mtateg     in land.    When     the
    severance is accomplished, each gstatg, that in the minerals
    in place,  and that in the remainder of the land, may be a
    freehold, or an estate in fee simp1e.w aevs      -Mexia
    *     co.
    v. Gammon, 
    254 S.W. 296
    , 299 (Tex. 1923) (emphasis added).
    The estate   of a person is not the land itself, but the
    status or relation that the law permits that person to bear
    toward the land.     &&&&   v. Milti,    
    28 S.W. 940
    (Tex.
    1894). The term "estate" in law means the degree, quantity,
    nature, and extent of one88 interest or ownership in land or
    other tenements.
    S.W.Zd 506 (Tex. 1962):
    E                                  ' (T:::
    Comm'n App. 1931, judgm*t adopted). It may designate the
    quantum, extent, or duration of one's ownership of a
    particular item of property.      Gibbs,              i%zwr.a.
    Different persons may, at the same time, bear different
    relations, each constituting an estate in the land. Bouldin
    Y. Mi.ue?cI-.
    Sections 54.013 and 54.015 of the Water Code do not
    provide that a municipal utility district comprise westates"
    in land: rather they provide that a district comprise "area"
    or "land" whose nboundariesVO are described by "metes and
    bounds or by lot and block number."        The word "land"
    ordinarily includes a mineral estate, even when the minerals
    are severed constructively from the surface.      no110 v
    own Heirs v. What&y       131 S.W.Zd 89 (Tex. 1::9;7
    Tennantv.           110 S.W.Zd 53 (Tex. 1937);
    eld v. Hoaq, 77 S.W.Zd 1021 (Tex. 1934).
    Second, the petition to establish a district must
    describe the wboundariesw by "metes and bounds or by lot and
    block number." Water Code f 54.015.     Boundaries mark out
    the limits of the territory over which the district has
    jurisdiction. m     2E.   McQuillan, The Law of Municipal
    p. 5851
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 6 (JM-1115)
    Corporations f 7.02, at 359 (3d ad. rev. 1988).   Boundaries
    ordinarily are limits established laterally on the surface
    of the land, and do not extend vertically to mark a
    district's limits underground or in the airspace. $@= Doria
    y. Suchowolsu, 531 S.W.Zd 360 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio
    1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("boundary by aquiescence"       is
    generally a line    established by a fence): 11       C.J.S.
    Boundariee 9 1, at 538:   &   &I.G. Invesats     v. E.P A,
    ;;:,",,f:."d1 (Ill. 1988) (boundaries generally involv;
    not vertical measurement, but exception is made for
    solid haste fill, which      has boundaries expressed     in
    altitude).
    %etes and bounds" refers to a method of measurement by
    distances and angles from designated landmarks in relation
    to adjoining properties.    B. Garner, Dictionary of Modern
    Legal Usage 359 (1987); set 11 C.J.S. Boundaries 5 4, at 542
    (*metes" includes the exact quantity of land in square feet,
    rods,  or acres). Metes and bounds provide a two dimensional
    measurement of land.    A description of land by metes    and
    bounds indicates that its boundaries are on the surface, and
    that the land is not limited by boundaries at a certain
    subsurface depth or distance above the ground.
    Thus, any district whose creation is approved by the
    Water Commission consists of land marked out by boundaries
    on the surface of the earth.        The commission is not
    authorized by the code to approve boundaries that limit the
    district's jurisdiction vertically. Accordingly, we answer
    your second question in the negative: The Water   Commission
    may not grant a petition seeking the creation of a chapter
    54 municipal utility district whoae boundaries exclude the
    mineral estate or a portion thereof below the surface of the
    land comprising the district.
    We note, however, that after the commission approves
    the petition seeking creation of the district, but before
    the district's governing board issues the district's first
    series of bonds, the code requires the governing body of the
    district to exclude "land     or other property" from the
    boundaries of the district under certain circumstances.
    Section 54.701 provides in pertinent part:
    (a) Before the board issues the first
    series of district bonds payable in whole or
    in part from taxes, the board may on its own
    motion call a hearing on the question of the
    exclusion of J&3.@from the district under the
    provisions of Sections 54.702-54.707 of this
    p. 5852
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 7 (JM-1115)
    code,  if the exclusions are    practicable,
    just, or desirable.
    (b) The board must call a hearing on   the
    exclusion of w   or otue*v         from   thg
    er in the district
    filed with the secretary of the board before
    the district issues its first series of bonds
    payable in whole or in part from taxes.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Section 54.704 of the code governs the petition      for
    exclusion from the district of "land or other property"   and
    provides in relevant part:
    (a) A petition for exclusion of land must
    accurately describe by metes and bounds or
    lot and block number the land to be excluded.
    A petition for exclusion of other property
    must describe the property to be excluded.
    Thus, it appears that the class of property that may be
    excluded from the boundaries of the       district  by   its
    governing body m      the initial petition to create the
    district has been approved by the Water Commission is
    greater than that which the commission may consider when
    deciding whether to approve the initial petition. No case
    decided under chapter 54 of the Water Code, which governs
    municipal utility districts, has construed the phrase "land
    or other propertyH that is set forth in section 54.701.
    However, a case decided under chapter 51 of the code, which
    governs water control and improvement districts and contains
    a section virtually identical to section 54.701, has done
    so.1
    1. The 1925 codification of what later would become
    chapter 51 of the Water Code provided that the district
    comprise "land' and provided that "land" may be excluded
    from the boundaries after its creation under        certain
    circumstances. No mention was made of "other property" or
    "interests in land." Acts 1925, 39th Leg., ch. 25, 5 76, at
    106. Two years later, section 76 of chapter 25 was amended
    to provide that notice for exclusion of "land" from the
    district must be afforded "to the owner or owners of the
    (Footnote Continued)
    p. 5853
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page B (JM-1115)
    W-s     Countv Water Control   6 UggrovemeUst.    No
    , 304 S.W.Zd 281 (Tex. Civ. App - El Paso    1957,'
    writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court of appeals upheld a       trial
    (Footnote Continued)
    land and all others in anywise interested." Acts 1927, 40th
    Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 107, 5 9, at 501.        The "or other
    property" language was included for the first time in a 1929
    amendment to section 76:
    After a district has been       organized,
    preliminary surveys have been completed, the
    district   does   adopt    plans   for    the
    construction of a plant and improvements, and
    before the district calls an election for the
    authorization of construction bonds, there
    rt   be
    anyexc::e-  ::c"""""t"""""i
    are
    practicable, just or desirable, from the
    district by means and upon conditions as
    follows . . . .
    Acts 1929, 41st Leg., ch. 280, 8 8, at 585. Such language
    was retained in the 1957 amendment to then article 7680-76,
    V.T.C.S. Acts 1957, 55th Leg., ch. 324, g 1, at 787.     No
    legislative history exists indicating what the legislature
    meant by the phrase.
    The Water Code was enacted in 1971, codifying the
    general and permanent statutes relating   to water rights,
    water development, water quality control, river    compacts,
    and general law districts. Acts 1971, 62d Leg., ch. 58, at
    110.   The code was extensively amended by other 1971
    amendments, including the addition of chapter 54, which
    authorizes the creation of municipal utility districts. 
    Id. ch. 84,
    at 774. Title 4 of the code sets forth those code
    provisions governing the creation and operation of 14
    general law districts.   Chapters 50 (containing provisions
    generally applicable    to   general law    districts),   .52
    (governing underground water conservation districts), 58
    (governing irrigation districts), and 65 (governing special
    utility districts), in addition to chapters 51 and 54, each
    contain sections regarding the exclusion of "land or other
    property" from the boundaries of the districts after the
    petition seeking the creation of the district has been
    granted. No case has construed the phrase under any of
    (Footnote Continued)
    p. 5854
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 9 (JM-1115)
    court judgment excluding certain lands owned by one party
    (who presumably owned both the surface and the subsurface
    estates) and certain oil and gas leases owned by oil and gas
    companies from the boundaries of a water control and
    improvement district.   The district comprised 140 square
    miles of territory, SO percent of which was submerged by the
    waters of two bays.   The land that one party sought to be
    excluded comprised 8,400 acres of Uustang Island. The oil
    leases of the oil and gas companies were located under lands
    that were submerged by the bays. The plans of the proposed
    district did not call for, nor was any expenditure of
    district funds shown for, providing service to any other
    area other than the town of Port Aransas and the area
    immediately adjacent thereto.   Specifically, the plans did
    not contain any provision for service either to the lands
    sought to be excluded or to the submerged oil and gas
    leases.
    In affirming the trial court judgment excluding both
    the land and the oil and gas leases, the court of appeals
    stated:
    The only two issues submitted to the jury
    by the court were whether. the lands of
    appellee Sam    E. Wilson,    Jr. would    be
    benefited by .the proposed improvements, and
    as to whether the oil and gas leases of the
    appellee oil companies would be benefited by
    the proposed improvements. The jury answered
    both questions in the negative.     Appellant
    objected to said issues because they were
    immaterial, and    because   there   was
    evidence, and    insufficient evidence,    ::
    support the jury's findings to said issues.
    We overrule these points. There was ample
    evidence to support the findings of the jury.
    The question of benefit to the lands involved
    is material,  as is provided in the above
    quoted statute.
    (Footnote Continued)
    these chapters, except for   pueces County Water Control &
    ist. No. 4 v. Wilsqn, 304 S.W.Zd 281 (Tex. Civ.
    APP. - El Paso 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
    p. 5855
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 10   (JM-1115)
    Ig, at 287: ~98 Attorney General Opinion H-881 (1976) (sets
    forth background of law enacted by legislature granting
    Corpus Christi certain submerged lands in Corpus Christi Bay
    to use as public beach).
    Thus, under chapter 51 of the Water Code, mineral
    estates apparently can be excluded under subchapter 0 of
    chapter 51 of the code. There is no authority, however, for
    excluding such estates from the boundaries set forth in the
    initial petition seeking the creation of the district   that
    must be passed on by the Water Commission. Analogously, we
    assume that a court, if presented with a question of
    exclusion of mineral estates under chapter 54 of the code,
    would conclude that section 54.701 likewise authorized such
    an exclusion under the phrase "land or other property."
    See. e.a,, 59 Tex. Jur. 3d m        SS l-4 (V1prope*yt'is a
    broad term, referring not to a particular material object
    but to the right and interest or domination rightfully.
    obtained over such object, with the unrestricted right to
    its use, enjoyment, and disposition, and includes not only
    that which is perceptible to the senses but also that which
    is intangible). We turn now to your first question.
    You ask:
    Are the mineral estates located under the
    boundaries of the Sportsman's World Municipal
    Utility District taxable for ad valorem tax
    purposes by the Sportsman's World Municipal
    Utility District?
    Section 21.01 of the Tax Code provides that "[r]eal
    property is taxable by a taxing unit u located in the unit
    wJanuarv       (emphasis added).2 Thus real property that is
    not located within a taxing unit is not taxable by that
    taxing unit. Mineral interests are interests in land and
    2. Section    11,   article   VIII,   of   the   Texas
    Constitution sets forth the general rule governing situs of
    property for purposes of taxation and provides in relevant
    pa*:
    All property, whether owned by persons or
    corporations shall be assessed for taxation,
    and the taxes paid in the county where
    situated . . . .
    p. 5856
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 11 (JM-1115)
    are taxable in the   taxing unit where   the land islocated.
    , 165
    S.W.Zd 645 (Tex. 1943); m        Countv v. Mid-w      Oil &
    Gas Co<, 
    254 S.W. 290
    (Tex. 1923).    Real property that is
    omitted from the appraisal roll of a district is required to
    be added to the roll and back appraised pursuant to section
    25.21 of the Tax Code. In this instance, however, we are
    unable to answer whether such excluded mineral interests
    should be back appraised.
    We do not have sufficient facts before us to determine
    whether the initial petition proposing the creation of the
    district is fatally flawed because of the failure to include
    owners of the mineral estates. Section 54.014 of the Water
    Code sets forth the requirements for the petition and
    provides:
    When it is proposed to create a district,
    a petition requesting creation shall be filed
    with the commission.   The petition shall be
    signed by a majority in value of the holders
    of title of the land within the proposed
    district, as indicated by the county tax
    rolls. If there are more than 50 persons
    holding title to the land in the proposed
    district, as indicated by the county tax
    rolls, the petition is sufficient if it is
    signed by 50 holders of title to the land.
    We do not have sufficient facts before us to determine
    either whether the petition was signed by a majority in
    value of the holders of title to the land when the value of
    the mineral estates is added to the value of the surface
    estates or whether there are more than 50 persons holding
    title to the land in the district when the owners of mineral
    estates are added.    Nor are we empowered to make such
    findings of fact.
    In the matter of the creation and organization of
    public and    quasi-public corporations,    there must    be
    substantial compliance    with the    conditions   precedent
    required by statut;;xa~l;;gCrutc~,           578 S.W.Zd 438
    I writ ref‘d n.r.e.); State
    eside vim       329
    S.W.Zd 245 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1959, writ r;fld).
    An irregularity, if harmless, in the creation of a municipal
    corporation will not work an ouster under quo warranto.
    We-s Countv ater Control & Imvrovement Dist. No. 4
    270 S.W.Zd 672 (Tex. Civ. App. - Sk
    p. 5857
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 12 (JM-1115)
    Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State ex rel. Miller vr
    Troell, 
    207 S.W. 610
    (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1918,
    writ ref'd). In an instance in which the irregularity is
    deemed sufficiently serious, a proposed district has been
    declared to be without legal existence. fitv of Cornu
    288 S.W.Zd 836 (Tex. Civ. App. - Sa:
    writ ref'd)    (court invalidated proposed
    district when' relevant statute required petition to be
    signed by "majority in number of the holders of title to t&
    J&p& [within the proposed district] and the owners of a
    majority in value of the lands ther& II and the owners of
    the mineral estates were not considered in determining the
    sufficiency of the petition: under the facts presented,
    court found that less than a majority of landowners signed
    No. 3 v. State, 73 S.W.Zd 1101 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana
    1934, writ dism'd) (irregularities in creation of levee
    district would make district bonds voidable, not void).
    Moreover, subsection (b) of section 54.701 of the   code
    provides:
    The [governing] board [of the district]
    must call a hearing on the exclusion of land
    or other property from the district on the
    wrA::enirtition of any landowner or property
    the district    filed with    the
    secretary of the board before the time the
    first election on     the question of     the
    issuance of bonds payable in whole or in part
    from taxes is called.
    The failure to provide for such a hearing amounts to a
    denial of due process.
    (Tex. 1927); State ex rel. Ma        v. BaU
    (Tex. 1927). We do not have sufficient facis before us to
    determine, nor are we empowered to so determine, whether
    such notice was, in fact, afforded.
    We cannot answer your first question or other questions
    about the possible consequences of our answer to your second
    question. The ultimate resolution of such questions would
    require us to make findings of fact, which we are not
    empowered to make, and to evaluate the interests of various
    parties who have relied on the boundaries of the district
    established by the commission. &= Wallin-
    Texas                  , 348 S.W.Zd 532 (Tex. 1961); b Sal18
    p.   5858
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 13 (JM-1115)
    OVement Dist. NO. 1 v. Gw     40 s.w.zd 892
    (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1931, writ ref8& (when it is
    claimed that a statute was not followed in establishing the
    territorial limits      of  a special    district   as   then
    constituted, matter can be raised only by the state in a guo
    warrant0 proceeding).
    SUMMARX
    Chapter 54 of the Water Code does not
    authorize the Texas Water Commission       to
    permit the creation of a municipal utility
    district that exc,ludesfrom its boundaries
    the mineral estates located below a depth of
    300 feet under the surface of the land
    comprising the district.     The code    does
    authorize the board of the district        to
    exclude such    property after    the   Water
    Commission has approved the petition seeking
    the creation of the district. We are unable
    to answer whether such mineral interests,
    which were heretofore improperly excluded
    from the district, should be added to the
    district*s appraisal roll and back appraised
    pursuant to section 35.21 of the Tax Code,
    because we are given insufficient facts to
    determine the validity of the creation of the
    district, and we     are not empowered     to
    determine such facts.     The filing of an
    information in the nature of guo warrant0 is
    the proper method for resolving such        a
    matter, rather than the opinion process.
    JIM     MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    WARYKELLER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    LOUMCCREARY
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    JUDGE ZOLLIE STBARIBY
    Special Assistant Attorney General
    p.   5859
    Honorable Bobby Joe Mann - Page 14 (JM-1115)
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Jim Moellinger
    Assistant Attorney General
    P. 5860