Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1986 )


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  •                             Oc,:ober29, 1986
    Honorable Curtis R. Wilkin3on         Opinion No. JM-572
    Lamb County Attorney
    County Courthouse, Room 103           Re:   Whether a lake in a munici-
    Littlefield, Texas 79339              pal park is public water under the
    jurisdiction of the Texas Depart-
    ment of Parks and Wildlife for
    purposes of the Water Safety Act
    Dear Mr. Wilkinson:
    You inquire whether a Blake in a certain municipal park is public
    'water within the meaning of the Water Safety Act and subject to the
    jurisdiction of the Texm     Department of Parks and Wildlife for
    purposes of the Water Safety Act.
    A home rule city has leased for recreational puxposes a reservoir
    and adjacent shoreline on private ranch land outside the limits of the
    city. We are advised that the reservoir is approximately 1200 surface
    acres and is fed by.underground springs and rainfall and that citizens
    of the area have used the lake extensively for swimming, skiing,
    fishing, and camping for many years. By ordinance, the city has
    declared the reservoir ani.adjacent shoreline a municipal park for as
    long as the ordinance and long term lease remain in effect. The city
    also adopted the provisions of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code as an
    ordinance to govern the behavior in and use of the municipal park.
    Statutory and case law determine whether specific bodies of water
    are the property of the slate. Statutory law now codified as section
    11.021(a) of the Water Code provides that
    -
    [t]he water of t!leordinary flow, underflow, and
    tides of every :il.owingriver, natural stream, and
    lake, and of evsery bay or arm of the Gulf of
    Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rain-
    water of every river, natural stream, canyon,
    ravine, depressi.on,and watershed in the state is
    the property of the state.
    The statute has been interpreted by the courts in light of the
    constitution and the law under which lands were granted. Water from
    springs and surface water Erom rainfall covering private land is not
    P
    p. 2549
    Honorable Curtis R. Wilkinson - Page 2 (m-572)
    always state water within the meaning of section 11.021(a). See
    Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 
    96 S.W.2d 221
    , 228 (Tex. 1936) (rainwater
    on private land);                  
    527 S.W.2d 754
    , 759 (Tex. Civ. App.
    - San Antonio 1974,                n.r.e.) (ownership of water from
    springs). See also Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 
    86 S.W.2d 441
    , 446
    (Tex. 1935) (water diverte(Tfrom navigable stream); Reed v. State, 
    175 S.W.2d 473
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1943, no writ) (surface water in
    non-navigable lake); Taylor ,Fishing Club v. Hasauett, 88 S.W.2d, 127,
    130 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1935, writ dism'd) (water from springs,
    rainfall, and floodwaters in non-navigable inland lake); Attorney
    General Opinions H-805 (1976); H-68 (1973); M-1210 (1972); O-6579
    (1945).
    The question of whether specific water is state water under
    section 11.021(a) of the Rater Code usually involves facts that this
    office cannot determine in the opinion process, such as the source and
    location of the water. However, the real issue before us is whether
    the reservoir is public water for purposes of the Water Safety Act and
    not whether it is the property of the state. In our opinion, the lake
    -on private land that is lt!asedto the city for recreational purposes
    and used as a public munic:.palpark is public water within the meaning
    of the Water Safety Act, and the Parks and Wildlife Department may
    enforce the act.
    The provisions of the Water Safety Act "apply to all public water
    in this state and to all watercraft navigated or moving on the public
    water." Privately owned water is not subject to the provisions of the
    Water Safety Act. Parks 6 Wild. Code §31.004. Section 31.003 of the
    Parks and Wildlife Code provides that
    [l]n this Chapter [the Water Safety Act]:
    .   .   .   I
    (5) 'Water oj! this state' means any public
    water within the territorial limits of this state.
    The Water Safety Act does not define "any public water" within the
    territorial limits of this state. The legislature, however, did state
    the policy of the act. Se:tion 31.002 provides:
    It is the duty of this state to promote
    recreational water safety for persons and property
    in and connected with the use of all recreational
    water facilities in the state, to promote safety
    in the operatior-and equipment of facilities, and
    to promote uniformity of laws relating to waZZ
    safety. (Emphases added).
    p. 2550
    Honorable Curtis R. Wilkinmn   - Page 3   (JM-572)
    .
    P
    We do not construe the charter powers of the city but assume,
    without deciding, that the city is authorized by its charter to
    acquire property for use as a city park. A city is authorized by
    state statute to acquire and operate property for recreational
    purposes, including land outside the city limits. See V.T.C.S. art.
    6081e (cities may acquire lyr gift, devise, purchasezr    condemnation
    land for oublic uarks wit:l:Lnor without limits of the citv): art.
    6081f (cities may acquire land for park purposes and ope&;e and
    maintain parks). See also V.T.C.S. arts. 1015c-1; 1176; City of
    College Station v. Turtle R%k Corp., 
    680 S.W.2d 802
    , 807 (Tex. 1984);
    Attorney General Opinions Tt-889, M-804 (1971). A city's power to
    acquire property for municip.alpurposes implies the power to lease it.
    See Attorney General Opinion Nos. MW-535
    -                                        (1982); O-6911 (1945).
    A lease of real property is a sale of the right to use and occupy
    the property for a certain period of time and is a transfer of a right
    of ownership and an interest in the property. See State National Bank
    of El Paso v. United States, 509 F.2d y32.835         (5th Cir. 1975);
    Citizens Bank and Trust CoTv. Wy-Tex Livestock Co., 
    611 S.W.2d 168
    ,
    ‘171 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amariilo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); L. A. Durrett
    h Company v. Iley, 434 S.W.Zd 367, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1968,
    writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Evans v. Ropte, 
    96 S.W.2d 973
    (T&x. 1936). the
    court, quoting from a dis&sion      by Emory Washburn in his book on
    Servitudes and Easements, points out that a right to take,water from a
    spring or well is a grant of own.srshipand constitutes an interest in
    real estate.
    The Texas Supreme Court has stated that a municipal park is a
    place where the public gene.rally.maygo for various kinds of recrea-
    iion and amusement. --
    L&S    v. City if-Fort Worth, 
    89 S.W.2d 975
    , 978
    (Tex. 1936). See also ICi!y;v. Sheppard, 
    157 S.W.2d 682
    , 685 (Tex.
    Cl". ADO. - Austin 1941. writ ref'd w.o.m.) (oublic oark is ulace
    which public at large may-resort to for recreation). Land acquired by
    a city for use as a public park is acquired for a public use.
    It is our opinion tha,t the fact that the city owns a leasehold
    interest in the lake which is used as a public municipal park ana'"a
    recreational water facility in the state" makes the lake public water
    for purposes of the Water Safety Act. We conclude ,that, during the
    duration of the lease to ~1e city and the city's use of the lake as a
    municipal park, the lake is not privately owned water within the
    meaning of the Water Safety Act. Hence, it is not excluded from the
    provisions of the act.
    SUMMARY
    A lake on private land that is leased to a city
    for recreational purposes and used as a public
    municipal park illpublic water within the meaning
    p. 2551
    Honorable Curtis R. Wilkinson - Page 4     (JM-572)
    of the Water Safety Act, and the Parks             and
    Wildlife Department may enforce the act.
    J-b
    Very truly yours,
    .
    JIM     MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    JACK HIGHTOWER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Executive Assistant Attorney General
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, Opinion Committee        ,
    'Prepared by Nancy Sutton
    Assistant Attorney General
    p. 2552