Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1978 )


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    The Attorney              General              of Texas
    August        22,   1978
    JOHN L. HILL
    Attorney General
    Honorable Sam Kelley                              Opinion No. H-1231
    Consumer Credit Commissioner
    Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner            Re: Whether banks which take
    P. 0. Box 2107                                    physical possession of tangible
    Austin, Texas 78768                               personal property    as collateral
    for loans are required to comply
    with the provisions of the Texas
    Pawnshop Act.
    Dear Mr. Kelley:
    You have requested our opinion as to whether the Texas Pawnshop Act,
    artic?e 5069-51.01, e; seq.,, V.T.C.S., is applicable to state banks which take
    physlcal possesslon o tangible personal property as collateral for loans.
    The Pawnshop Act prohibits any person from ” engag[ingl in business as
    a pawnbroker without first obtaining a license from the [Consumer Credit1
    Commissioner.”     V.T.C.S. art. 5069-51.03. “Pawnbroker” is defined as “any
    person engaged in the business of lending money on the security of pledged
    goods,” and “person” includes every “corporation . . . or any other legal entity
    however organized.”    V.T.C.S. art. 5069-51.02. We have been advised that a
    borrower occasionally secures a large loan from a bank by pledging valuable
    jewelry or a rare coin collection.    As a rule, such collateral  is held in the
    physical possession of the bank and in those instances, you ask whether the
    bank must qualify as a “pawnbroker.”
    Under the Banking Code, a state bank is empowered to ‘lend money
    with or without security at interest.”        V.T.C.S. art. 342-301(a).     In its
    statement of purpose, the Banking Code provides:          “This code provides a
    complete system of laws governing the organization, operation, supervision
    and liquidation of state banks. . . .” V.T.C.S. art. 342-101 (emphasis added). In
    Robertson v. State, 
    406 S.W.2d 90
    (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1966, writ
    ref’d n.r.e.1, the court held that, by virtue of this statement     of purpose, a
    provision of the Texas Business Corporation Act regarding cumulative voting
    is not applicable to the election of directors of a state bank:
    Surely the Legislature has in plain words with clear
    meaning spelled out its intent that the operation of
    p.    4918
    Honorable Sam Kelley     -   Page 2    (R-1231)
    state banks shall be controlled by the ‘complete’ provisions
    of the Texas Banking Code, subject to such future legislation
    as may be enacted by it for the ‘regulation of such banking
    
    institutions.’ 406 S.W.2d at 94
    .
    Although we need not determine the outer boundaries of the Robertson
    doctrine, we believe the court’s language in Robertson requires the conclusion that
    the Pawnshop Act is not applicable to state banks. A number of restrictions which
    the statute places on pawnshops are not present in the Banking Code, and are
    contrary to banking practice. A pawn loan, for example, may not exceed the sum
    of $2,500, whereas no limitation is placed on the amount of a secured loan made by
    a state bank. V.T.C.S. art. 5069-51.12. See Attorney General Opinion H-49 (1973).
    The pledgor in a pawn loan has no personal obligation to repay the amount
    borrowed, while one who borrows from a bank assumes personal liability for
    repayment.      V.T.C.S. art. 5669-51.U. Finally, the default of a pawn loan transfers
    title to the pledgee, regardless of the amount of money originally paid to the
    pledgor, whereas a bank, following default, must account to the debtor for any
    amount which exceeds the amount of the loan, plus an additional amount for
    interest, costs, and attorneys fees.    It is our opinion, therefore, that the Texas
    Pawnshop Act is not applicable to state banks which under normal banking
    practices take physical possession of tangible personal property as collateral for
    loans.
    You also ask whether lenders regulated by chapter 3 of article 5069, other
    than state banks, must comply with the provisions of the Pawnshop Act if they take
    physical possession of tangible personal property as collateral for loans. Unlike the
    Banking Code, chapter 3 of article 5069 does not purport to furnish a “complete
    system of laws” governing the transactions       described therein.    Thus, it would
    appear, absent some other statute, that any lender which is regulated under chapter
    3 of article 5069, must also comply with the provisions of the Pawnshop Act if it is
    “engaged in the business of lending money on the security of pledged goods.”
    SUMMARY
    The Texas Pawnshop Act, article           5069-51.01, et seq.,
    V.T.C.S., is not applicable to state banks which under normal
    banking practices      take physical possession of tangible
    personal property as collateral for loans, but it is applicable
    to other lenders regulated by chapter 3 of article 5069,
    absent some other statute.
    P.   4919
    Honorable Sam Kelley   -       Page 3   (K-1231)
    Attorney   General of Texas
    APPROVED:
    C. ROBERT HEATH, Chairrian
    Opinion Committee
    ,
    p.   4920
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-1231

Judges: John Hill

Filed Date: 7/2/1978

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017